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Preface
The 13th installment of the annual meeting of the Gesellschaft fu¨r Semantik, Sinn und
Bedeutung 13, took place September 30—October 2, 2008 at the University of Stuttgart.
Our invited speakers were Gerhard Ja¨ger, Lauri Karttunen, Alex Lascarides, and Claudia
Maienborn. In addition, 42 submitted abstracts were selected for presentation. We are
deligthed to be able to include 38 of these in the proceedings.
On behalf of the organizers – Ljudmila Geist, Klaus von Heusinger, Hans Kamp, Udo
Klein, Fabienne Martin, Edgar Onea, Arndt Riester, and Torgrim Solstad – we would like
to thank the speakers, reviewers and student helpers for making SuB13 such an inspiring
and enjoyable event. We are also much obliged to Nina Seemann for assisting us with
the typesetting of this document.
The financial support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Collaborative
Research Center 732 Incremental Specification in Context is gratefully acknowledged.
Stuttgart, May 20, 2009
Arndt Riester
Torgrim Solstad
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Pragmatic Rationalizability
Gerhard Jäger Christian Ebert
Dept. of Linguistics and Literature
University of Bielefeld
{gerhard.jaeger,christian.ebert}@uni-bielefeld.de
Abstract
We present a formal game-theoretic model towards the explanation of implicatures
based on the computation of iterated best responses: literal meaning of signals
constitutes their default interpretation, and rational communicators decide about
their communicative strategies by iteratively calculating the best response to this
default strategy. We demonstrate by means of several examples how the resulting
pragmatically rationalizable strategies account for different types of implicatures.
1 Signaling Games
In order to introduce the basic concepts of the underlying game-theoretic model (see
e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, for an introductory textbook on game theory), let us
look at a simple scenario where communication makes a decisive difference. Suppose
Robin invited Sally for dinner where he wants to serve some thai curry. While slicing the
chili he realizes that he is unsure about whether Sally likes her curry hot or not. Robin
obviously wants to offer his guest the curry in her preferred way. In other words, they
both prefer the outcome where Sally receives her favorite type of curry over the other
outcome, where she finds it inedible because of the lack or the abundance of chili.
Wemay formalize this scenario as follows. There are two possible worlds, w1 and
w2. In w1 Sally prefers mild curry; in w2 she likes it hot. Robin has a choice between two
actions: preparing a mild curry would be action amild, and preparing a hot curry action
ahot. Sally knows how she likes her curry, i.e. she knows which world they are in, but
poor Robin does not. But although he does not know for sure, he may have some a priori
belief about Sally’s liking, i.e. about the probabilities of each world. Maybe Robin has
seen her eat jalapeño spiced taco burgers on another occasion such that he assumes w2 to
be more likely than w1. In our concrete example, let us assume that he is totally clueless
– he assigns both worlds an a priori probability of 50%.
This scenario can be represented formally as follows. In game theory, the pref-
erences are usually encoded by assigning numerical values, called utilities or payoffs, to
each outcome for each player. For instance, as Robin prefers the outcome of performing
action amild in world w1 over the outcome of performing the same action in w2, we may
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assign 1 to the first and 0 to the second outcome and use the≥-order on natural numbers
to reflect the preference order. Continuing like that we arrive at the following utility ma-
trix. Rows represent possible worlds and columns represent Robin’s actions. The first
number in each cell gives Sally’s payoff for this configuration, and the second number
Robin’s payoff.
amild ahot
w1 1,1 0,0
w2 0,0 1,1
(1)
Without any further coordination between the players, Robin will remain clueless and
he will have to prepare one type of curry hoping to guess the right one. His expected
utility/payoff for performing action a is as follows (given his prior belief p∗, the set of
possible worldsW and his utilities uR(w,a) for the outcome (w,a)):
EU(a) = ∑
w∈W
p∗(w) ·uR(w,a) (2)
In the case at hand he receives an expected payoff of 0.5 for either action, and (because
of their identical preferences/utilities) Sally will also receive an expected payoff of 0.5.
They can do better though if they communicate. Sally might simply tell Robin her
favourite type of curry. Suppose Robin expects that Sally says “mild” in w1 and “hot” in
w2. Then the rational course of action for Robin is to perform amild if he hears “mild”,
and to perform ahot upon hearing “hot”. In other words, Robin learns the actual world
from Sally’s utterance, i.e. revises his belief, and acts accordingly. On the other hand, if
Sally beliefs that Robin will react to these signals in this way, it is rational for her to say
“mild” in w1 and “hot” in w2. If they follow this rational course of behaviour they both
will obtain an overall payoff of 1.
So adding the option for communication may improve the payoff of both players.
Technically, the original scenario (which is not really a game but a decision problem
because Sally has no choice between actions) is transformed into a signaling game.
Here the sender (Sally in the example) can send signals, and she can make her choice
of signal dependent on the actual world. Formally, the sender’s behaviour is given by a
sender strategy, which is a function from possible worlds to signals. The receiver (Robin
in the example) can condition his action on the signal received. So a receiver strategy
is a function from signals to actions. We will represent strategies graphically as tables
indicating the corresponding functions:
Sally’s strategy s : Robin’s strategy r :[
w1 → “mild”
w2 → “hot”
] [
“mild” → amild
“hot” → ahot
] (3)
The above example suggests that rational players will benefit from the option of commu-
nication. Things are not that simple though. Consider the following pair of strategies:
Sally’s strategy s′ : Robin’s strategy r′ :[
w1 → “hot”
w2 → “mild”
] [
“hot” → amild
“mild” → ahot
] (4)
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If Sally and Robin play these strategies they will also end up with the maximal payoff of
1. Pure reason does not provide a clue to decide between these two ways to coordinate.
It is thus consistent with rationality that Sally assumes Robin to use r′ and thus to signal
according to s′, while Robin assumes Sally to use s, and thus will interpret her signals
according to r. In this situation, Robin will perform ahot in w1 and amild in w2. Both
players would receive the worst possible expected payoff of 0 here.
These considerations ignore the fact that the two signals have a conventional
meaning which is known to both players. In our example, we would say that the conven-
tional meaning of “mild” is the proposition JmildK= {w1}whereas the meaning of “hot”
is JhotK = {w2}. Then (s,r) is a priori more plausible than (s′,r′) because in (s,r) Sally
always says the truth and Robin always believes the literal meaning of Sally’s message.
However, rational players cannot always rely on the honesty/credulity of the other
player. Consider the following scenario. Rasmus also invites Sally for dinner but he
cannot stand her. He wants to annoy her by preparing the curry the way she does not
like. So while Sally will still prefer to receive her favoured type of curry, Rasmus will
be happy only if he manages to prepare her disfavoured type.
amild ahot
w1 1,−1 −1,1
w2 −1,1 1,−1
(5)
Here the interests of Sally and Rasmus are strictly opposed; everybody can only win as
much as the other one looses. Again we assume that Sally can send two signals “mild”
and “hot” with the conventional meaning as above. If Rasmus is credulous, he will react
to “mild” with ahot and to “hot” with amild. But if Sally believes this and is rational,
she will be dishonest and send “hot” in w1 (where she actually likes mild curries) and
“mild” in w2 (where she actually likes hot curries). But Rasmus might anticipate this. If
he is not quite so credulous, he may switch his strategy accordingly, and react to “mild”
with amild etc. This again might be anticipated by Sally and she might revert to the lying
strategy, which again might be anticipated by Rasmus, etc. In fact, it turns out that any
strategy is rationalizable in this game.1 In other words, no real communication ensues.
The lesson here is that communication might help in situations where the interests of the
players are aligned, but it does not make a difference if these interests are completely
opposed.
Gricean Reasoning
The kind of reasoning that was informally employed in the last section is reminiscent
to pragmatic reasoning in the tradition of Grice (1975). For instance, information can
only be exchanged between rational agents if it is in the good interest of both agents that
this information transfer takes place. This intuition is captured by Grice’s Cooperative
Principle. Furthermore, we mentioned the default assumption that messages are used
1A strategy s is rationalizable if there is a consistent set of beliefs such that s maximizes the expected
payoff of the player, given these beliefs and the assumption that rationality of all players is common
knowledge.
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according to their conventional meaning, unless overarching rationality considerations
dictate otherwise. This corresponds to Grice’s Maxim of Quality.
To illustrate how game theoretic reasoning can account for pragmatic reasoning
let us consider the prime example of a scalar implicature, namely the strengthening of
the conventional meaning of “some” to “some but not all”. You can imagine that Robin
wants to know who was at the party last night, and Sally knows the answer. In w∀ all
girls were at the party and in w∃¬∀ some but not all girls were there. Again, Robin is
completely unsure, i.e. he considers each world to be equally likely. Considering Robin’s
actions let us assume that there are three of them: two actions a∀ and a∃¬∀ that are
appropriate in and only in worlds w∀ and w∃¬∀, respectively, and a kind of default action
a?. For each world, both Sally and Robin prefer Robin to perform the appropriate action
to Robin performing the default action, which they in turn prefer to Robin performing
the inappropriate action. The following payoff structure reflects this preference order.
a∀ a∃¬∀ a?
w∀ 10,10 0,0 9,9
w∃¬∀ 0,0 10,10 9,9
(6)
Furthermore we have three different messages with their corresponding conventional
meaning.
f∀ = “All girls were at the party.” J f∀K = {w∀}
f∃¬∀ = “Some but not all girls were at the party.” J f∃¬∀K = {w∃¬∀}
f∃ = “Some girls were at the party.” J f∃K = {w∀,w∃¬∀}
Obviously f∃¬∀ is more complex than the other two messages, which are approximately
equally complex. This is covered by the assignment of costs to signals which the sender
has to pay. Formally this is implemented by a cost function c that assigns some numerical
value to every signal. Let us say that in this example we have c( f∀) = c( f∃) = 0 and
c( f∃¬∀) = 2. So the sender’s utility is now a three-place function uS that depends on
the actual world, the message sent, and the action that the receiver takes. If vS(w,a) is
the distribution of sender payoffs that is given in the payoff table (6) above, the sender’s
overall utility is now
uS(w, f ,a) = vS(w,a)− c( f ) (7)
According to Gricean pragmatics, Sally would reason about her strategy roughly as fol-
lows:
If I am in w∀ I want Robin to perform a∀ because this gives me a utility of 10.
a∀ is what he would do if he believed that he is in w∀. I can try to convince him of this
fact by saying f∀. It is not advisable to say f∃¬∀, because if Robin believed it, he would
perform a∃¬∀, which gives me a utility of a mere −2. Also saying f∃ is not optimal. If
Robin believes it, this will not settle the issue which world we are in for him and thus he
will perform a?, because his expected utility in this case is 9 while his expected utility
for the other two actions is only 5. This would give me also a utility of 9. So it seems
reasonable to send f∀ in w∀.
If I am in w∃¬∀, it might seem reasonable to say f∃¬∀ because if Robin believes
it, he will perform a∃¬∀, which is my favorite outcome. However, I will have to pay the
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costs of 2, so my net utility is only 8. If I say f∃ and Robin believes it, he will perform
a?. Since f∃ is costless for me, my net utility is 9 in this case, which is better than 8.
So in w∃¬∀ I will send f∃. After this reasoning, Sally will hence settle on the following
strategy: [
w∀ → f∀ (“All girls were at the party.”)
w∃¬∀ → f∃ (“Some girls were at the party.”)
]
(8)
Robin in turn will anticipate that Sally will reason this way: If I am confronted with the
message f∀, I know that the world is w∀, hence I will perform a∀. If I hear f∃, I know
that the world is w∃¬∀, hence I will perform a∃¬∀ after all. Therefore his strategy will
look as follows: [
f∀ (“All girls were at the party.”) → a∀
f∃ (“Some girls were at the party.”) → a∃¬∀
]
(9)
Sally, being aware of this fact, will reason: Taking into consideration Robin’s reasoning
and his eventual strategy, it is even more beneficial for me to send f∃ if I am in w∃
because this will give me the maximal payoff of 10. So I have no reason to change the
plan of sending f∀ in w∀ and f∃ in w∃¬∀.
Hence she will stick to her strategy in (8). In a further round of deliberation
Robin will realize this and thus also stick to his strategy (9). Any further deliberation of
Sally and Robin will not change anything.
This iterated reasoning procedure explains the emergence of the scalar implica-
ture. It leads to a sender strategy where f∃ is sent if and only if {w∃¬∀} is true. In other
words, the literal meaning of f∃, which is {w∀,w∃¬∀}, has been pragmatically strength-
ened to a proper subset {w∃¬∀}. The information that w∀ is not the case is a scalar
implicature — “some” is pragmatically interpreted as “some but not all”.
As in the examples discussed in the previous section, the inferences that are used
here start with a default assumption that messages are used according to their literal
interpretation, but this is only a provisional assumption that is adopted if this is not in
contradiction with rationality.
2 Iterated Best Response
The reasoning pattern that is used here makes implicit use of the notion of the best
response of a player to a certain probabilistic belief. A best response (that need not be
unique) to such a belief is a strategy that maximizes the expected payoff of the player as
compared to all other strategies at his disposal, given this belief state. For a player to be
rational means then to always play some best response, given his belief.
Let us now assume the position of an external observer who wants to formally
model the notion of a best response, say Sally’s best response to her belief about Robin’s
strategies. If we denote the set of strategies available to Robin at some point with R, we
know that 1. Sally believes that Robin will play some strategy from R, 2. Sally holds all
strategies in R possible, i.e. she cannot exclude any strategy for sure. Despite that we do
not have any further information about Sally’s belief – maybe she holds all strategies in
R equally possible, or maybe she considers some strategies more likely than others. The
best we can do as external observer is to take all possible beliefs for Sally into account.
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Formally we can do this by modeling a belief of Sally as a probability distribution
over the set of strategies R such that it does not assign zero probability to any element of
R (i.e. Sally cannot exclude any strategy for sure). Let us therefore define the following
sets of probability distributions over X for a non-empty and finite set X :
∆(X) .=
{
p ∈ X → [0,1]
∣∣∣ ∑x∈X p(x) = 1 } (10)
∆+(X) .=
{
p ∈ X → (0,1]
∣∣∣ ∑x∈X p(x) = 1 } (11)
The difference is subtle but important. Both ∆(·) and ∆+(·) can be used to model prob-
abilistic beliefs. If we say that a player holds a belief from ∆(X), say, this means that
he may exclude some elements from X with absolute certainty. On the other hand, if
he holds a belief from ∆+(X), then he may have certain guesses, but he is not able to
exclude any element from X with certainty. In the case discussed above, Sally’s believe
about Robin’s strategies R is modeled some ρ ∈ ∆+(R). Hence any best response of
Sally’s to any such belief is a potential best response for Sally against R. All that we as
an external observer can predict with certainty if we assume Sally to be rational, is that
she will play some potential best response against R.
The iterative inference process that was used in the computation of the implica-
ture above can be informally described as follows. At start, Sally provisionally assumes
that Robin is entirely credulous, and that he conditions his actions only on the literal
interpretation of the message received. Let us call the set2 of credulous strategies R0.
Sally’s turn. Sally might ponder any strategy that is a potential best response against
R0. Let us call this set of strategies S0.
Robin’s turn. Robin might ponder all strategies that are potential best responses against
S0. The set of these strategies is R1.
Sally’s turn. Sally might ponder any strategy that is a potential best response against
R1. Let us call this set of strategies S1.
Robin’s turn . . .
In general, Sn and Rn+1 are the set of strategies that are potential best responses against
Rn and Sn, respectively. If a certain strategy cannot be excluded by this kind of reasoning,
i.e. if there are infinitely many indices i such that it occurs in Si or Ri, then we call it a
pragmatically rationalizable strategy.
Contexts
In the scalar implicature example, the described reasoning of Sally and Robin went in
circles at some point. Therefore, all strategies they considered possible at this point were
pragmatically rationalizable. These were exactly the strategies in (8) and (9), which
described the scalar implicature.
2There might be more than one credulous strategy because several actions may yield the same maximal
payoff for Robin in certain situations.
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Taking another close look at the payoff structure in (6), we see that the scalar im-
plicature arises because the difference between vS(w∃¬∀,a∃¬∀) and
vS(w∃¬∀,a?) is smaller than the costs of sending f∃¬∀. Suppose the utilities would be
as in (12), rather than as in (6). Then the pragmatically rationalizable outcome would be
that Sally uses f∃¬∀ in w∃¬∀, while f∃ would never be used.
a∀ a∃¬∀ a?
w∀ 10,10 0,0 6,6
w∃¬∀ 0,0 10,10 6,6
(12)
At this point, we introduce another level of uncertainty concerning the payoff structure
(in addition to the uncertainty of the player about the actual strategy of the other player).
Robin might actually not know for sure what Sally’s precise preferences are. If we call
the utility matrix (6) context c1, and the utilities in (12) context c2, Robin might hold
some probabilistic belief about whether Sally is in c1 or in c2. Likewise, Sally need not
know for sure which context Robin is in. Now in each round of the iterative reasoning
process, the players will ponder each strategy that is a potential best response not only
to any probability distribution over strategies of the previous round as before, but also
to any probability distribution over contexts. Sally will compute her first set of best
responses S0 by assuming a credulous Robin as follows: In w∀ I will definitely send f∀,
no matter which context is the actual one. Now for w∃¬∀: If the actual context is c1 it is
better to send f∃ because the costs of sending the more explicit message f∃¬∀ exceed the
potential benefits. But if it is c2 and it is advisable to use f∃¬∀ nevertheless.
Robin, in turn, will reason as follows to compute his best responses R1: If I hear
f∀, we are definitely in w∀, and the best thing I can do is to perform a∀, no matter which
context we are in. If I hear f∃¬∀ we are in c2/w∃¬∀ and I will perform a∃¬∀. If I hear f∃
we are in c1/w∃¬∀ and I will also play a∃¬∀.
So in S1 Sally will infer: f∀ will induce a∀, and both f∃¬∀ and f∃ will induce
a∃¬∀, no matter which context Robin is in. Since f∃ is less costly than f∃¬∀, I will hence
always use f∀ in w∀ and f∃ in w∃¬∀, regardless of the context I am in.
Robin, in R1, will thus conclude that his best response to f∀ is always a∀, and his
best response to f∃ is a∃¬∀. Nothing will change in later iterations. So here, the scalar
implicature from “some” to “some but not all” will arise in all contexts, even though
context c2 by itself would not license it.
The Formal Model
In this section we will present a formal model that captures the intuitive reasoning from
the last section. A semantic game is a game between two players, the sender and the
receiver. It is characterized by a finite set of contextsC, a finite set of worldsW , a finite
set of signals (or forms) F , a finite set of actions A,
• a probability distribution p∗ ∈∆+(W ) specifying the receiver’s a priori probability
for each world,
• an interpretation function J·K : F → Pow(W ),
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• and utility functions
uS : C×W ×F×A→ R for the sender and
uR : C×W ×A→ R for the receiver.
As in (7), we will give the sender’s utility function by separating the context/outcome
utilities vS from the signalling costs c : F → R in the following. The structure of the
game is common knowledge between the players.
Definition 1. The space of pure sender strategies S =C×W →F is the set of functions
from context/world pairs to signals. The space of pure receiver strategies R =C×F →
A is the set of functions from context/signals pairs to actions. A sender belief is a
pair of probability distributions (ρ, p) ∈ ∆(R )×∆(C) and a receiver belief is a pair of
probability distributions (σ, p) ∈ ∆(S)×∆(C).
The central step in the iterative process described above is the computation of the set
of strategies that maximize the expected payoff of a player against his belief about the
strategies of the other player and the context. The notion of a best response captures this.
Definition 2. Let (σ, p) be a receiver belief and (ρ, p) a sender belief. The set BRR(σ, p)
of best responses of the recevier to (σ, p) and the set BRS(ρ, p) of best responses of the
sender to (ρ, p) are defined as follows:
BRR(σ, p)
.=
{
r ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ ∀c ∈C :
r ∈ argmax
r∈R
∑
s∈S
σ(s) ∑
c′∈C
p(c′) ∑
w∈W
p∗(w)uR(c,w,r(c,s(c′,w)))
}
BRS(ρ, p)
.=
{
s ∈ S
∣∣∣∣ ∀c ∈C ∀w ∈W :
s ∈ argmax
s∈S
∑
r∈R
ρ(r) ∑
c′∈C
p(c′)uS(c,w,s(c,w),r(c′,s(c,w)))
}
Based on this definition of best responses to a certain belief we may define the set of
potential best responses against some set P of strategies of the opposing player as the set
of strategies that are best responses to some belief state that assigns positive probability
exactly to the elements of P.
Definition 3. Let S ⊆ S and R ⊆ R be a set of sender and receiver strategies, respec-
tively. The set PBR(S) of potential best responses of the receiver to S and the set PBR(R)
of potential best responses (of the sender) to R are defined as follows:
PBR(S) .= { r ∈ BRR(σ, p) | (σ, p) a receiver belief with σ ∈ ∆+(S) }
PBR(R) .= { s ∈ BRS(ρ, p) | (ρ, p) a sender belief with ρ ∈ ∆+(R) }
Suppose we know that Sally, being the sender, knows which context and world she is in,
she believes for sure that Robin will play a strategy from R, and there is no more specific
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information that she believes to know for sure. We do not know which strategy from R
Sally expects Robin to play with which likelihood, and which context Sally believes to
be in. Under these conditions, all we can predict for sure is that Sally will play some
strategy from PBR(R) if she is rational.
The same seems to hold if we only know that Robin, the receiver, expects Sally to
play some strategy from S. Then we can infer that Robin, if he is rational, will certainly
play a strategy from PBR(S). However, we may restrict his space of reasonable strategies
even further. Suppose none of the strategies in S ever make use of the signal f (formally
put, f ∈ F −Ss∈S range(s)). We call such a signal unexpected. Then it does not make
a difference how Robin would react to f , but he has to decide about how to react to
f nevertheless because receiver strategies are total functions from context/form pairs to
actions. It seems reasonable to demand (and it leads to reasonable predictions, as we will
see below) that Robin should, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, still assume that
f is true. For instance, if Sally speaks English to Robin, and she suddenly throws in a
sentence in Latin that Robin happens to understand, Robin will probably assume that the
Latin sentence is true, even if he did not expect her to use Latin.
If Robin encounters such an unexpected signal, he will have to revise his beliefs.
Robin will have to figure out an explanation why Sally used f despite his expectations
to the contrary, and this explanation can bias his prior beliefs in any conceivable way.
We have to assume though that the result of this believe revision is a consistent belief
state, and that Robin will act rationally according to his new beliefs. Formally speaking,
he should only consider strategies that react to an unexpected signal f in a way that
maximizes his expected utility, given that f is interpreted literally for some belief about
W .
We can now proceed to define the iterative reasoning procedure that was infor-
mally described in the previous section, taking into account the treatment of unexpected
signals detailed above (recall that p∗ is the receiver’s a priori probability distribution).
Definition 4.
R0
.=
{
r ∈ R
∣∣∣∣ ∀c ∈C∀ f ∈ F : r(c, f ) ∈ argmax
a∈A
∑
w∈J f K p
∗(w)uR(c,w,a)
}
Sn
.= PBR(Rn)
Rn+1
.=
{
r ∈ PBR(Sn)
∣∣∣∣ ∀ f ∈ F− [
s∈Sn
range(s)∀c ∈C
∃p ∈ ∆+(W ) : r(c, f ) ∈ argmax
a∈A
∑
w∈J f K p(w)uR(c,w,a)
}
R0 is the set of credulous strategies of the receiver. It consists of those strategies r that
yield, in each context c and for each signal f , some action a ∈ A that is optimal for the
receiver (i.e. that maximize his expected utility, cf. (2)), given that his a priori belief
p∗ is updated with the information that f is used literally. Sn is the set of potential best
responses of the sender against Rn. Likewise, Rn+1 is the set of potential best responses
of the receiver if he assumes that the sender plays a strategy from Sn in which he always
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tries to make sense of unexpected messages under the assumption that they are literally
true.
The sets of pragmatically rationalizable strategies are the set of sender strategies
and receiver strategies that cannot be excluded for sure by the iterative reasoning process,
no matter how deeply the reasoning goes.
Definition 5. (S,R)∈Pow(S)×Pow(R ), the sets of pragmatically rationalizable strate-
gies, are defined as follows:
S .= {s ∈ S | ∀n ∈ N∃m> n : s ∈ Sm}
R .= {r ∈ R | ∀n ∈ N∃m> n : s ∈ Rm}
Note that there are only finitely many strategies in S and R (because we are only con-
sidering pure strategies over finite sets). Therefore there are only finitely many subsets
thereof. The step from (Sn,Rn) to (Sn+1,Rn+1) is always deterministic. It follows that
the iterative procedure will enter a cycle at some point. This ensures that (S,R) is always
defined.
3 Applying the IBR Model
In light of this formal definition, let us consider some of the previous examples again.
For the ease of exposition we will specify signals as fx1...xn with the convention thatJ fx1...xnK = {wx1, . . . ,wxn}. Furthermore, if the utilities of the players are identical for
each outcome, we will show only one number in the utility matrix. If the a priori prob-
ability p∗ is not explicitly stated, we assume that it is the uniform distribution onW that
assigns all worlds equal probability.
Completely aligned interests. We assume that all signals f are costless, i.e. c( f ) = 0.
There is only one context and vS and uR are given in table (1). Here is the sequence of
iterated computation of potential best responses, starting with the set R0 of credulous
strategies.
R= R0 =

 f1 → amildf2 → ahot
f12 → amild
 ,
 f1 → amildf2 → ahot
f12 → ahot

S= S0 =
{[
w1 → f1
w2 → f2
]}
In the following we will abbreviate the specifications of the strategy sets by dropping the
set brackets and by conflating the strategies to one representation. The original set can
be recovered by combination of all possible argument/value pairs.
Completely Opposing Interests. Again all messages are costless and there is only one
context. The utilities are as in (5). Here the iterative procedure enters a never-ending
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cycle:
R0 =
 f1 → ahotf2 → amild
f12 → amild/ahot
 S0 = [ w1 → f2w2 → f1
]
R1 =
 f1 → amildf2 → ahot
f12 → amild/ahot
 S1 = [ w1 → f1w2 → f2
]
R2 = R0 S2 = S0
R =
[
f1/ f2/ f12 → amild/ahot
]
S =
[
w1/w2 → f1/ f2/ f12
]
So if the interests of the players are completely opposed, any strategy is pragmatically
rationalizable and no communication will ensue.
Scalar Implicatures and the Q-Heuristics. Next we will reconsider the example of
the scalar implicature discussed above. There are two contexts c1 and c2 with utilities
as in (6) and (12), respectively. The signals and their costs are also as above: c( f∀) =
c( f∃) = 0 and c( f∃¬∀) = 2.
R0 =
 (c1, f∀)/(c2, f∀) → a∀(c1, f∃¬∀)/(c2, f∃¬∀) → a∃¬∀
(c1, f∃)/(c2, f∃) → a?
 S0 =
 (c1,w∀)/(c2,w∀) → f∀(c1,w∃¬∀) → f∃¬∀
(c2,w∃¬∀) → f∃

R= R1 =
[
(c1, f∀)/(c2, f∀) → a∀
(c1, f∃¬∀)/(c2, f∃¬∀)/(c1, f∃)/(c2, f∃) → a∃¬∀
]
S= S1 =
[
(c1,w∀)/(c2,w∀) → f∀
(c1,w∃¬∀)/(c2,w∃¬∀) → f∃
]
The previous example illustrated how pragmatic rationalizability formalizes the
intuition behind Levinson’s (2000) Q-heuristics “What isn’t said, isn’t.” This heuristics
accounts, inter alia for scalar and clausal implicatures like the following:
(1) a. Some boys came in.  Not all boys came in.
b. Three boys came in.  Exactly three boys came in.
(2) a. If John comes, I will leave.  It is open whether John comes.
b. John tried to reach the summit.  John did not reach the summit.
The essential pattern here is as in the example above: There are two expressions
A and B of comparable complexity such that the literal meaning of A entails the literal
meaning of B. There is no simple expression for the concept “B but not A”. In this
scenario, a usage of “B” will implicate that A is false.
12 Gerhard Jäger and Christian Ebert
The I-Heuristics. Levinson assumes two further pragmatic principles that, together
with the Q-heuristics, are supposed to replace Grice’s maxims in the derivation of gen-
eralized conversational implicatures. The second heuristics, called I-heuristics, says:
“What is simply described is stereotypically exemplified.” It accounts for phenomena of
pragmatic strengthening, as illustrated in the following examples:
(3) a. John’s book is good.  The book that John is reading or that he has written
is good.
b. a secretary a female secretary
c. road hard-surfaced road
The notion of “stereotypically exemplification” is somewhat vague and difficult
to translate into the language of game theory. We will assume that stereotypical propo-
sitions are those with a high prior probability and that simplicity of descriptions can be
translated into low signaling costs. So the principle amounts to “Likely propositions are
expressed by cheap forms”.
Let us construct a schematic example of such a scenario. Suppose there are two
possible worlds (which may also stand for objects, like a hard surfaced vs. soft-surfaced
road) w1 and w2, such that w1 is a priori much more likely than w2, say p∗(w1) = 3/4
and p∗(w2) = 1/4. There are three possible actions for Robin: he may choose a1 if he
expects w1 to be correct, a2 if he expects w2, and a3 if he finds it too risky to choose.
There are again three signals, f1, f2 and f12. This time the more general ex-
pression f12 (corresponding for instance to “road”) is cheap, while the two specific ex-
pressions f1 (“hard-surfaced road”) and f2 (“soft-surfaced road”) are more expensive:
c( f1) = c( f2) = 5, and c( f12) = 0.
The interests of Sally and Robin are completely aligned, except for the signaling
costs which only matter for Sally. There are three contexts (13). In c1 and c2, it is safest
for Robin to choose a3 if he decides on the basis of the prior probability. In c3 it makes
sense to choose a1 if he only knows the prior probabilities because the payoff of a3 is
rather low (but still higher than making the wrong choice between a1 and a2). In c1, but
not in c2 it would be rational for Sally to use a costly message if this is the only way to
make Robin perform a1 rather than a3.
c1 :
a1 a2 a3
w1 28 0 22
w2 0 28 22
c2 :
a1 a2 a3
w1 28 0 25
w2 0 28 25
c3 :
a1 a2 a3
w1 28 0 10
w2 0 28 10
(13)
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R0 =
 (c1, f1)/(c2, f1)/(c3, f1)/(c3, f12) → a1(c1, f2)/(c2, f2)/(c3, f2) → a2
(c1, f12)/(c2, f12) → a3

S= S0 =

(c1,w1)/(c3,w1) → f1/ f12
(c1,w2)/(c3,w2) → f2
(c2,w1) → f12
(c2,w2) → f2/ f12

R= R1 =
 (c1, f1)/(c2, f1)/(c3, f1)/(c3, f12) → a1(c1, f2)/(c2, f2)/(c3, f2) → a2
(c1, f12)/(c2, f12) → a1/a3

Here both f1 and f2 retain their literal meaning under pragmatic rationalizability.
The unspecific f12 also retains its literal meaning in c2. In c1 and c3, though, its meaning
is pragmatically strengthened to {w1}. Another way of putting is to say that f12 is
pragmatically ambiguous here. Even though it has an unambiguous semantic meaning,
its pragmatic interpretation varies between contexts. It is noteworthy here that f12 can
never be strengthened to mean {w2}. Applying it to the example, this means that a
simple non-specific expression like “road” can either retain its unspecific meaning, or it
can be pragmatically strengthened to its stereotypical instantiation (like “hard-surfaced
road” here). It can never be strengthened to a non-stereotypical meaning though.
M-Heuristics. Levinson’s third heuristics is the M-heuristics: “What is said in an ab-
normal way isn’t normal.” It is also known, after Horn (1984), as division of pragmatic
labor. A typical example is the following:
(4) a. John stopped the car.
b. John made the car stop.
The two sentences are arguably semantically synonymous. Nevertheless they carry dif-
ferent pragmatic meanings if uttered in a neutral context. (4a) is preferably interpreted
as John stopped the car in a regular way, like using the foot brake. This would be another
example for the I-heuristics. (4b), however, is also pragmatically strengthened. It means
something like John stopped the car in an abnormal way, like driving it against a wall,
making a sharp u-turn, driving up a steep road, etc.
This can be modeled quite straightforwardly. Suppose there are again two worlds,
w1 and w2, such that w1 is likely and w2 is unlikely (like using the foot brake versus
driving against a wall). Let us say that p∗(w1) = 3/4 and p∗(w2) = 1/4 again. There
are two actions, a1 and a2, which are best responses in w1 and w2 respectively. There is
only one context. The utilities are given as follows:
a1 a2
w1 5 0
w2 0 5
(14)
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Unlike in the previous example, we assume that there are only two expressions, f and
f ′, which are both unspecific: J f K= J f ′K= {w1,w2}. f ′ is slightly more expensive than
f , say c( f ) = 0 and c( f ′) = 1.
R0 =
[
f/ f ′ → a1
]
S0 =
[
w1/w2 → f
]
R1 =
[
f → a1
f ′ → a1/a2
]
S1 =
[
w1 → f
w2 → f/ f ′
]
R = R2 =
[
f → a1
f ′ → a2
]
S = S2 =
[
w1 → f
w2 → f ′
] (15)
The crucial point here is that in S0, the signal f ′ remains unused. Therefore any ra-
tionalizable interpretation of f ′ which is compatible with its literal meaning is licit in
R1, including the one where f ′ is associated with w2 (which triggers the reaction a2).
Robin’s reasoning at this stage can be paraphrased as: If Sally uses f , this could mean
either w1 or w2. Since w1 is a priori more likely, I will choose a1. There is apparently
no good reason for Sally to use f ′. If she uses it nevertheless, she must have something
in mind which I hadn’t thought of. Perhaps she wants to convey that she is actually in
w2.
Sally in turn reasons: If I say f , Robin will take action a1. If I use f ′, he may
take either action. In w1 I will thus use f . In w2 I can play it safe and use f , but I can
also take my chances and try f ′.
Robin in turn will calculate in R2: If I hear f , we are in w1 with a confidence
between 75% and 100%. In any event, I should use a1. The only world where Sally
would even consider using f ′ is w2. So if I hear f ′ we are surely in w2 and I can safely
choose a2. If Robin reasons this way, it is absolutely safe for Sally to use f ′ in w2.
4 Conclusion
We proposed a game theoretic formalization of Gricean reasoning that both captures the
intuitive reasoning patterns that are traditionally assumed in the computation of impli-
catures. The essential intuition behind the proposal is that the literal meaning of signals
constitutes their default interpretation, and that rational communicators decide about
their communicative strategies by iteratively calculating the best response to this default
strategy.
Concerning related work, Franke (2008) proposes to calculate the pragmatically
licit communication strategies by starting with a strategy based on the literal interpreta-
tion of signals and iteratively computing the best response strategy until a fixed point is
reached. So this approach is very similar in spirit to the present one. The main differ-
ences are that Franke uses a particular honest sender strategy — rather than the set of
all credulous receiver strategies — as the starting point of the iteration process, and that
he uses deterministic best response calculation, rather than potential best responses, as
update rule.
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Abstract
We propose a dynamic semantics of questions in dialogue that tracks the public
commitments of each dialogue agent, including commitments to issues raised by
questions.
1 Introduction
A semantic framework for interpreting dialogue should provide an account of the content
that is mutually accepted by its participants. The acceptance by one agent of another’s
contribution crucially involves the theory of what that contribution means; A’s accep-
tance of B’s contribution means that the content of B’s contribution must be integrated
into A’s extant commitments.1 For assertions, traditionally assumed to express a propo-
sition formalised as a set of possible worlds, it was clear how the integration should go:
acceptance meant intersecting the newly accepted proposition with the set of worlds rep-
resenting the content of the agent’s prior commitments. Dynamic semantics (e.g., Asher
(1989)) refined this picture by replacing intersection with the operation of dynamic up-
date. The way to treat the negative counterpart of acceptance—namely, rejection—is
also clear in principle: A′s rejection of B’s assertion means that the negation of the con-
tent of B’s contribution should be integrated with the content of A’s prior commitments.
However, acceptance and rejection don’t just happen with assertions. These
speech acts can happen with questions as well. That is, an agent can choose to ad-
dress the issues raised by the questioner; he can also choose to reject them. The explicit
acceptance of a question can be conveyed by providing a direct answer or by an ex-
plicit admittance that one doesn’t know an answer; explicit rejection by uttering I won’t
answer.
Agents can also signal acceptance or rejection of questions via implicature, just
as they can indicate acceptance or rejection of assertions by implicature, as Lascarides
1Lascarides and Asher (2009), following (Hamblin, 1987, p.240), argue that public commitment is the
appropriate mental attitude of a speaker towards his own dialogue moves and the moves that he accepts.
We adopt this standpoint here as well.
Arndt Riester & Torgrim Solstad (eds.)
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and Asher (2009) show. For instance, compare (1) (from dialogue r053c in the Verbmobil
corpus (Wahlster, 2000)) with the excerpt (2) of a press conference given by Mr. Shee-
han, the aide to Senator Coleman (see www.youtube.com/watch?v=VySnpLoaUrI).2
(1) a. A: Can you meet in the morning?
b. B: How about eight thirty to ten?
(2) a. REPORTER: On a different subject is there a reason that the Senator won’t
say whether or not someone else bought some suits for him?
b. SHEEHAN: Rachel, the Senator has reported every gift he has ever re-
ceived.
c. REPORTER: That wasn’t my question, Cullen.
d. SHEEHAN: The Senator has reported every gift he has ever received. We
are not going to respond to unnamed sources on a blog.
e. REPORTER: So Senator Coleman’s friend has not bought these suits for
him? Is that correct? [The dialogue continues with Sheehan repeating (2)b
to every request for information from the reporters]
In (1), B responds to A’s question with a question; but B’s question, given its content,
also implicates that he accepts the issues raised by A’s question (i.e., he is indicating his
willingness to help answer (1)a). In (2), Sheehan’s assertion (2)b is clearly not an answer
to the question (2)a, and in (2)c the reporter (correctly) takes it as a refusal to answer.
This refusal is not explicit—like uttering I won’t answer would be—but implicit.
In this paper we propose an account of acceptance and rejection of questions.
Standard theories of the semantics of questions (Kartunnen (1977), Groenendijk and
Stokhof (1982) or Ginzburg (1995)) are difficult to integrate with an intuitive theory of
acceptance and rejection. All of these theories take the content of a question to be its
set of answers (they differ on what counts as an answer in context and on whether the
set denoted by the question includes only true or both true and false answers). But how
can we use such a set of answers to update the commitments of an agent who accepts or
refuses a question?
Some theories model acceptance in terms of an agent’s commitments to a set of
propositions, but it is clear from the way these sets are conceived that the elements in
the set are understood intersectively; i.e., the set representation is just another way of
formulating the traditional approach to acceptance. This will not work with the seman-
tics of questions in general, and it’s easy to see why: the set of answers to a question
are often inconsistent with each other. For instance, the semantics of a yes/no question
like Did you take the garbage out? is given in terms of two propositions: You took the
garbage out, and you did not take the garbage out. Taking the intersection of these two
propositions yields an empty set. Conceivably, if a question denotes only answers that
are true at the world of evaluation, one might avoid this absurd result. But it has equally
bad consequences for acceptance: it would imply that agents who accept questions are
always committed to its true answers; and thus one can’t truthfully respond to a yes/no
question with I don’t know but your question is an interesting one, since the responding
agent is already committed to the true answer (be it positive, or negative). Thus, tradi-
2Thanks to Chris Potts for bringing this example to our attention.
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tional semantic analyses of questions appear to be incompatible with intuitive accounts
of acceptance and rejection.
If the formal semantics of questions is to be made relevant to accounting for the
basic phenomena of acceptance and rejection in dialogue, it has to change. That is what
we propose to do in this paper. There is additional pressure on the traditional semantics
of questions from data on embedded speech acts: Asher (2007) argues that it cannot
adequately handle questions embedded within other operators like conditionals—as in
If I buy into this plan, what can I expect my returns to be? Asher (2007) provides
a dynamic, first order adaptation of Groenendijk’s (2003) semantics for questions to
recursively compute appropriate values for embedded speech acts; the general idea is to
use a question’s direct, exhaustive answers to form a partition over the input information
state and then to lift the dynamic semantics of other operators and quantifiers so as to
define them as transitions from an input partition to an output partition. In this paper, we
demonstrate that this semantics is also the basis for a uniform account of the acceptance
(and rejection) of questions and assertions in dialogue. It achieves this by making the
input and output contexts for interpreting propositions and questions of the same type,
and so an agent can be simultaneously committed to questions and propositions and also
share those commitments with other agents.
We motivate and describe our model in Section 2, and in Section 3 we define the
dynamic semantics for questions and show how it makes intuitively compelling predic-
tions about acceptance and rejection.
2 Background
To our knowledge, there is currently no formally precise, adequate account of accep-
tance (and rejection) of both propositions and questions in dialogue. The Grounding
Acts Model (GAM, Traum (1994), Poesio and Traum (1998)) addresses the effects of
both questions and assertions on an information state. In Poesio and Traum’s (1998)
formalisation of GAM, agreement occurs when one agent accepts a prior assertion that’s
made by another agent. Questions, on the other hand, create an obligation on the inter-
locutor to respond, but GAM as it stands does not address the issue of predicting when
the response conveys, indirectly, that the speaker is prepared to answer the question (as
in (1)). So GAM needs to be supplemented to account for this data.
Asher and Lascarides’ (2003) SDRT also addresses updates with questions and
assertions. But its traditional semantics for questions makes it fall prey to the problem
about acceptance that we described in Section 1. While Ginzburg (1995) provides very
detailed predictions for when a question is resolved, his theory does not predict when an
agent rejects the question; indeed he observes in Ginzburg (2009) that being a question
under discussion is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for both acceptance and
rejection of the issues raised by the question.
Lascarides and Asher (2009) argue that Poesio and Traum’s (1998) rules for
identifying speech acts undergenerate acceptance in many cases and that SDRT from
Asher and Lascarides (2003) errs in the opposite direction to GAM by overgenerating
acceptance. To correct these problems, Lascarides and Asher (2009) propose a logical
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Turn A’s SDRS B’s SDRS
1 pi1.1 : Kpi1.1 /0
2 pi1.1 : Kpi1.1 pi2B : Correction(pi1.1,pi2.1)
3 pi3A : Correction(pi1.1,pi3.1)∧ pi2B : Correction(pi1.1,pi2.1)
Acceptance(pi2.1,pi3.1)
Table 1: The logical form of dialogue (3).
form for dialogue that tracks each agent’s public commitments. They argue that these
include commitments to rhetorical connections (e.g., Narration) among utterances in
the dialogue, on the grounds that recognising implicit acceptance and identifying the
rhetorical connection that links an agent’s utterance to the dialogue context are logically
co-dependent. So they propose that each agent’s commitments at any given stage in the
dialogue be represented as a Segmented Discourse Representation Structure (SDRS): this
is a set of labels that each represent a unit of discourse, and a function that associates
each label with a formula representing the unit’s interpretation. These formulae include
rhetorical relations among labels.
To see how this framework handles both acceptance and rejection, consider (3),
an example where A accepts a denial of his prior assertion:
(3) pi1.1. A: It’s raining.
pi2.1. B: No it’s not.
pi3.1. A: Oh, you’re right (uttered after looking out the window).
The logical form of a dialogue turn (where a turn boundary occurs whenever the speaker
changes) is a tuple of SDRSs: one for each agent, representing his public commitments.
The logical form of dialogue—known as a Dialogue SDRS or DSDRS—is the logical
form of each of its turns, yielding Table 1 as the logical form for dialogue (3). For
reasons of space, the logical forms of the clauses are omitted from Table 1. We will
often gloss the content of a label pi as Kpi, and use pind to label the dialogue segment
of turn n with (unique) speaker d, and pin.i to label the ith elementary discourse unit
that is part of the turn pind . The glue-logic inference that Correction(pi1.1,pi3.1) is a
part of A’s commitments in turn 3 arises from the fact that pi3.1 is an Acceptance of the
corrective move pi2.1 (see Lascarides and Asher (2009)). The SDRSs in a DSDRS share
labels because a speaker can perform a relational speech act whose first argument is part
of a prior turn (e.g., pi1.1 and pi2.1 are literals in A’s SDRS for turn 3 in Table 1). As a
special case, it captures the fact that an agent can reveal his commitments (or lack of
them) to content that another agent conveyed, even if this is linguistically implicit.
To see how DSDRSs capture facts about acceptance and rejection, let’s review
how they’re are interpreted. Asher and Lascarides (2003) define precisely the context
change potential (CCP) of an individual SDRS. Since the logical form of a dialogue turn
is now a tuple of SDRSs, its CCP is the product of the CCPs of the individual SDRSs.
In other words, the context of evaluation Cd for interpreting a dialogue turn is a set of
dynamic contexts for interpreting SDRSs—one for each agent a ∈ D, where D is the set
of dialogue agents. Thus, where Cia and C
o
a are respectively an input and output context
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Turn A’s SDRS B’s SDRS
1 pi1A : Kpi1.1 /0
2 pi1A : Kpi1.1 pi2B : Q-Elab(pi1.1,pi2.1)
Table 2: The logical form of (1).
for evaluating an SDRS:
Cd = {〈Cia,Coa〉 : a ∈ D}
The semantics of a dialogue turn T = {Sa : a ∈ D} is the product of the CCPs its SDRSs,
as shown in (4) (m in [.]m stands for monologue and d in [.]d for dialogue):
(4) Cd[T ]dC′d iffC
′
d = {〈Cia,Coa〉 ◦ [Sa]m : 〈Cia,Coa〉 ∈Cd,a ∈ D}
And given that a turn represents all of each agent’s current commitments, the CCP of
a DSDRS is that of its last turn. Dialogue entailment is then defined in terms of the
entailment relation |=m afforded by [.]m of SDRSs:
(5) T |=d φ iff ∀a ∈ D,Sa |=m φ
Thus |=d defines shared public commitments, and we assume that φ is mutually accepted
in turn T amongD iff T |=d φ. Similar definitions hold for acceptance among a subgroup
D′ ⊂ D: i.e., for all a ∈ D′, Sa |=m φ.
Equation (6) defines the dynamic interpretation of veridical relations (e.g. Nar-
ration, Explanation, Acceptance), ensuring that a discourse unit consisting of veridi-
cal relations entails its smaller discourse units plus the relations’ illocutionary effects
ϕR(α,β):
(6) Ci[R(α,β)]mCo iffCi[Kα∧Kβ∧ϕR(α,β)]mCo
(7) Ci[Correction(α,β)]mCo iffCi[(¬Kα)∧Kβ∧ϕCorr(α,β)]mCo
Meaning postulates then constrain the content ϕR(α,β): e.g., ϕExplanation(α,β) entails Kβ is
an answer to Why Kα? Equation (7) is the interpretation of Correction and it entails the
negation of the denied segment.
These definitions capture intuitions about acceptance and rejection for dialogue
(3), given its logical form in Table 1. Assuming that Kpi1.1 to Kpi2.1 are expressed appro-
priately, turn 2 in Table 1 entails that A is committed in Kpi1.1 while B rejects it (for his
commitments entail ¬Kpi1.1), a rejection that A then accepts in turn 3. The CCP of Ta-
ble 1 thus reflects intuitions about changing commitments and agreement. At the end of
turn 3 both agents agree that it’s not raining, and A has dropped an earlier commitment
in favour of an incompatible commitment. The DSDRS is consistent even though A’s
SDRS for turn 2 is inconsistent with his SDRS for turn 3, and the SDRSs for turn 2 are
inconsistent with each other.
This formalism provides logical forms for dialogues involving questions as well,
as shown in Tables 2 and 3, the proposed logical forms for dialogues (1) and (2) respec-
tively. Consider Table 2 first. The relation Q-Elab(pi1.1,pi2.1)—which means that pi2.1
is a question all of whose possible answers elaborate a plan to achieve the goal of pi1.1,
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Turn R’s SDRS S’s SDRS
1 pi1.1 :?Kpi1.1 /0
2 pi1.1 :?Kpi1.1 pi2.1 : Kpi2.1
3 pi3A : Commentary∗(pi2.1,pi1.1) pi2.1 : Kpi2.1
4 pi3A : Commentary∗(pi2.1,pi1.1) pi4B : Explanation∗(pi4.1,pi4.2)
5 pi5A : Result∗(pi4B,pi5.1)∧ pi4B : Explanation∗(pi4.1,pi4.2)
Elaboration(pi5.1,pi5.2)
Table 3: The logical form of dialogue (2)
which here is for A to know its answer—intuitively implicates a commitment by B to
the question pi1.1 posed by A (we’ll see later why this doesn’t quite work in Asher and
Lascarides’ (2003) model theory though).
The DSDRS for (2) in Table 3 (R is the reporter and S is Sheehan) contains lots
of implicit rejections. Again, we have omitted the logical forms of clauses because of
space. The lack of a relation between S’s utterance pi2.1 and R’s question pi1.1 impli-
cates a rejection by S of the question (although, as we’ve mentioned, to ensure that this
intended interpretation is reflected in the model theory, we must revise the semantics
of questions).3 R’s commitments in turn 3 are to Commentary∗(pi2.1,pi3.1)—that is, his
utterance is a commentary on the fact that S said pi2.1 (rather than a commentary on its
content Kpi2.1). Thus the semantics of this relation does not entail Kpi2.1 , indicating R’s
lack of commitment to it. Result∗(pi4B,pi5.1) in S’s SDRS for turn 5 likewise entails that a
particular assertion pi4B was made but not that assertion’s content (in contrast to Result):
it entails that S making the assertions he did leads to the question pi5.1 (which is in effect
the earlier question that R asked). So R does not accept the content of S’s assertions, just
as S doesn’t accept the issues raised by the question.
Note that acceptance and rejection in dialogue (2) are implicated but not part of
semantic content. This is because anaphoric tests suggest that these acts, while impli-
cated, are not a part of what the agents said: the reporter cannot coherently respond
to (2)b with Why? (meaning “why are you refusing to answer the question?”). SDRT
distinguishes what was said from its cognitive effects partly so as to account for these
anaphoric effects: antecedents to surface anaphors must be chosen from SDRSs, while
cognitive effects are validated within a separate cognitive logic not discussed here (but
see Asher and Lascarides (2008)).
However, as we mentioned before, the dynamic interpretation Lascarides and
Asher (2009) provide for DSDRSs has a serious defect in its semantics for questions,
which undermines the generality of its model of acceptance. We will now remedy this
defect.
3Readers familiar with SDRT may wonder why S’s SDRS is not pi2S : Plan-Elab(pi1.1,pi2.1)—this would
implicate that S accepts R’s question, because it entails that pi2.1 elaborates a plan to achieve the intention
that prompted it; namely, for R to know an answer. While Kpi2.1 is compatible with the semantics of
Plan-Elab(pi1.1,pi2.1), an inference to this relation is blocked by knowledge of S’s mental state: namely, R
and S mutually know that S, being an aide to the senator, knows the answer. By S not providing an answer
when he knows it, R can infer that S does not adopt R’s intention for R to know an answer, and thus an
inference to the speech act Plan-Elab is not validated.
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2.1 Questions
The semantics of SDRSs in Asher and Lascarides (2003), on which the model of dialogue
in Lascarides and Asher (2009) is based, incorporates a traditional semantics of ques-
tions, according to which the meaning of a question is given by its set of (true) answers
(in this it follows Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982) but agrees with Ginzburg (1995) that
those answers need not be exhaustive). More formally, the context of evaluation in SDRT
is a pair of elements (w, f ), where w is a possible world and f is a partial variable as-
signment function. But the CCP of a question transforms an input state (w, f ) into an
output state of a different type: a set of dynamic propositions, each proposition being
a true answer. In other words, the output state of a question is a set of pairs of world
assignment pairs.
While this semantics of questions has a certain appeal when considered in iso-
lation, it is problematic when questions are part of the content of an extended dialogue.
This is because the output context of a question cannot be the input context for interpret-
ing a subsequent discourse unit. Therefore, questions cannot be arguments to veridical
rhetorical relations, given their CCP in (6). And yet intuitively, the second question in
(2)e should be construed as elaborating the first question in (2)e (as we’ve shown in
Table 3), since all true answers to one entail a true answer to the other. Asher and Las-
carides (2003) provide many more examples where questions can enter into relations
that are normally associated with assertions, like Explanation and Narration.
SDRT as described in Asher and Lascarides (2003) bypasses this problem by
introducing a distinct relation Elaborationqq for connecting an ‘elaborating’ question to
the question it elaborates. Semantically, the CCP of Elaborationqq(pi1.1,pi2.1) makes it
a test on the input context: in words, the input context (w, f ) must be such that Kpi1.1
and Kpi1.2 are questions, and any true answer to Kpi2.1 in (w, f ) entails a true answer to
Kpi1.2 in (w, f ). Similar additional relations are introduced for other veridical rhetorical
relations—e.g., Explanationqq and Narrationpq.
But the problems go much deeper than this. The proliferation of non-veridical
relations for handling questions is not just an inconvenience; it is a fatal flaw in our pro-
posed model of acceptance. If R’s commitments in turn 5 are represented in terms of
Elaborationqq, then R is not committed even to his own questions, contrary to intuitions.
Rather, he is simply committed to the two questions being in a certain semantic relation-
ship. Similarly, consider the relation Q-Elab(pi1.1,pi2.1), which forms part of B’s SDRS
for turn 2 of (1). As we said, this expresses the information that Kpi2.1 is a question and
any of its possible answers elaborate a plan to achieve the communicative goal behind
Kpi1.1 (that A know an answer to the question Kpi1.1). But out of technical necessity the
CCP of Q-Elab from Asher and Lascarides (2003) is a test on the input context, and so
B’s SDRS does not commit him to Kpi2.1 or Kpi1.1 . This undergenerates what’s accepted
for (1): it makes B committed to the answers of pi2.1 bearing a certain semantic relation-
ship with those of pi1.1, but it fails to commit B to A’s question, and therefore also fails
to predict that R’s responses to S’s question in (2) are different in this respect from B’s
responses to A’s in (1).
Ideally, we want a semantics for questions that is compatible with an agent be-
ing committed to it. This requires the input and output contexts for questions and for
24 Alex Lascarides and Nicholas Asher
propositions to be of uniform type, allowing both of them to be arguments to veridical
rhetorical relations. This would not only solve the problem with acceptance that we
have just described, but it would also simplify the inventory of rhetorical relations: a
question could be an argument to Elaboration, obviating the need for the distinct rela-
tion Elaborationqq that comes with similar implicatures to Elaboration; similarly for all
other veridical relations. Groenendijk’s (2003) semantics of questions assumes uniform
input and output contexts for both propositions and questions. Asher (2007) generalises
this semantics to provide a dynamic treatment of variables and quantifiers so as to pre-
serve SDRT’s predictions about anaphora (Groenendijk treats quantifiers statically). This
is the semantics that we will adopt here. While the semantic type of the contexts Cia and
Coa for SDRSs will change, the definitions (4) and (5) for interpreting DSDRSs will be
unchanged.
3 Formal Syntax and Semantics
Before we refine the formal semantics of questions, we must define the language’s syn-
tax. We start with the syntax of so-called SDRS-formulae from which DSDRSs are built
(Definition 1 is from Asher and Lascarides (2003)).
Definition 1 The Syntax of SDRS-Formulae
SDRS-formulae are constructed from the following vocabulary:
vocab-1. A classical first order vocabulary, augmented with the modal operator
δ that turns formulae into action terms (δφ is the action of bringing it
about that φ and this is used to represent imperatives); and the operator
‘?’ and λ-terms for representing questions as ?λx1 . . .λxnφ, each xi
corresponding to a wh-element.
vocab-2. labels: pi,pi1,pi2, etc.
vocab-3. a set of symbols for rhetorical relations: R,R1,R2, etc.
The set L of well-formed SDRS-formulae is defined as follows:
1. Let Lbasic be the set of well-formed formulae that are derived from
vocab-1 using the usual syntax rules for first order languages with ac-
tion terms and questions. Then Lbasic ⊆ L .
2. If R is an n-ary discourse relation symbol and pi1, . . . ,pin are labels, then
R(pi1, · · · ,pin) ∈ L .
3. For φ,φ′ ∈ L ,(φ∧φ′),¬φ ∈ L .
Definition 2 reflects the logical forms proposed in Lascarides and Asher (2009)
and illustrated in Tables 1 to 3. It maps each dialogue turn and agent into an SDRS: that
is, a rooted and well-founded partial order of labels, each one standing for a discourse
unit and associated with a representation of its content. For simplicity, we have ignored
Asher and Lascarides’ (2003) notion of a last label in these definitions, since we won’t
be focussing on anaphora in this paper.
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Definition 2 DSDRSs
Let D be a set of dialogue participants. Then a Dialogue SDRS (or DSDRS)
is a tuple 〈n,T,Π,F 〉, where:
• n ∈ N is a natural number (intuitively, j ≤ n is the jth turn in the
dialogue);
• Π is a set of labels;
• F is a function from Π to the SDRS-formulae L ;
• T is a mapping from [1,n] to a function from D to SDRSs drawn from
Π and F . That is, if T ( j)(a) = 〈Πaj ,F aj 〉 where j ∈ [1,n] and a ∈ D,
then Πaj ⊆ Π and F aj =def F  Πaj (that is, F aj is F restricted to Πaj).
Furthermore, let piaj pi′ iff pi′ is a literal in F aj (pi) or a literal in Faj (pi′′)
where piaj pi′′. Then aj is a well-founded partial order with a unique
root.
There are many notational variants for DSDRSs—Table 1 is a notational variant
of the DSDRS (8) for example:
(8) 〈2,T,{pi2B,pi3A,pi1.1,pi1.2,pi2.1,pi3.1},F〉, where:
•F(pi1.1) = Kpi1.1 , F(pi2.1) = Kpi2.1 , F(pi3.1) = Kpi3.1
F(pi2B) = Correction(pi1.1,pi2.1)
F(pi2K) = Correction(pi1.1,pi3.1)∧Acceptance(pi2.1,pi3.1)
•T (1) = {(A,〈{pi1.1},F1〉),(B, /0)}, where F1 = F  {pi1.1}
•T (2) = {(A,〈{pi1.1},F1〉),(B,〈{pi2B,pi1.1,pi2.1},F2〉)}
where F2 = F  {pi2B,pi1.1,pi2.1}
•T (3) = {(A,〈{pi3A,pi1.1,pi2.1,pi3.1},F3〉),(B,〈{pi2B,pi1.1,pi2.1},F2〉)}
where F3 = F  {pi3A,pi1.1,pi2.1,pi3.1}
Definition 2 allows label sharing across speakers and turns but the content assigned to
a label is unique: ∀pi ∈ Πa1j ∩Πa2k , j,k ∈ [1,n], a1,a2 ∈ D, F a1j (pi) = F a2k (pi). A situa-
tion where a1 and a2 interpret pi differently won’t correspond to a situation where pi is
assigned distinct contents in distinct SDRSs within the same DSDRS. Rather, it corre-
sponds to a situation where a1 and a2 each build different DSDRSs (although we won’t
explore misunderstandings further here).
With the syntax of the formal language in place, let’s define its semantics. As
we explained in Section 2.1, the semantics [.]d of DSDRSs requires the input and output
contexts for propositions, questions and requests to be the same. We now adapt the
semantics from Asher and Lascarides (2003) to meet this criterion. We start with a few
illustrative clauses of the distributive, non-eliminative CCP for Lbasic from Asher and
Lascarides (2003), which we refer to here as [.]δ. Our new semantics [.]m of SDRSs
will be defined in terms of [.]δ. Both [.]δ and [.]m are defined with respect to a model
M = 〈∆,W, I〉, where ∆ is a set of individuals,W is a set of possible worlds and I is an
interpretation function that maps n-place predicates into sets of n-tuples from ∆.
26 Alex Lascarides and Nicholas Asher
The CCP [.]δ from Asher and Lascarides (2003) treats all formulae save ∃x,
conjunctions, imperatives and questions as tests on the input context. For instance:
(w, f )[P(x)]δ(w
′,g) iff (w, f )= (w′,g) and f (x)∈ I(P); and (w, f )[¬φ]δ(w′,g) iff (w, f )=
(w′,g) and there is no (w′′,k) such that (w, f )[φ]δ(w′′,k). Conjunction is interpreted
as dynamic succession: (w, f )[φ∧ψ]δ(w′,g) iff (w, f )[φ]δ ◦ [ψ]δ(w′,g). Questions,
as we have already stated, transform an input context (w, f ) into a set of propositions
that are its true (non-exhaustive) answers (see Asher and Lascarides (2003) for de-
tails). The formula ∃x updates the input variable assignment function: (w, f )[∃x]δ(w′,g)
iff dom(g) = dom( f ) ∪ {x} and f ⊆ g (i.e., ∀y ∈ dom( f ), f (y) = g(y)). Note that
∃xφ is syntactic sugar for ∃x∧ φ. Action terms, on the other hand, update the world:
(w, f )[δφ]δ(w′,g) iff (w′, f )[φ]δ(w′,g).
Following Asher (2007), we will ‘lift’ the distributive semantics [.]δ to a col-
lective semantics [.]m so that it can incorporate the collective semantics to questions
proposed in Groenendijk (2003). This strategy results in a uniform type of input and
output context for all formulae. Asher demonstrates that this allows questions to be em-
bedded in conditionals (e.g., If you’re serious, what’s his name?). Here, we demonstrate
that it also properly accounts for their rhetorical role in dialogue, including their role in
acceptance.
For Groenendijk, a question partitions the input information state, which in turn
consists of all the world assignment pairs that have not been ruled out by prior assertions.
Each equivalence class in the output partition represents a different possible answer to
the question. Thus the input and output contexts Cm are always a subset of (W ×F)2,
whereW is the set of possible worlds and F is the set of partial variable assignment func-
tions, and 〈(w, f ),(w′,g)〉 ∈Cm means that (w, f ) and (w′,g) are in the same equivalence
class. One can intuitively interpret the equivalence class in terms of the agent’s attitudes:
if 〈(w, f ),(w′,g)〉 ∈Cm, then the agent ‘doesn’t care’ about the different interpretations
to formulae that these world-assignment pairs define. If, on the other hand, (w, f ) and
(w′,g) are in different classes ofCm then the agent does care—he is committed to a ques-
tion whose true answers are different in (w, f ) vs. (w′,g). Assertions that are subsequent
to a question may then remove all but one equivalence class from the partition that’s
created by the question; if so, the question is answered.
Informally, then, our new dynamic semantics [.]m for SDRS-formulae is as fol-
lows. For those formulae φ where [.]δ imposes a test on the input context—so φ is not of
the form ∃x, ψ∧χ, δψ or ?ψ—[φ]m has an entirely eliminative and distributive seman-
tics. In other words, any element 〈(w, f ),(w′,g)〉 from the input context C will survive
as an element of the output context C′ iff (w, f )[φ]δ(w, f ) and (w′,g)[φ]δ(w′,g). ∃x,
on the other hand, changes the input assignment functions f and g, by extending them
to be defined for x. δφ changes the input worlds. Conjunction is dynamic succession,
as before. And following Groenendijk (2003), questions will refine the input partition
by eliminating pairs 〈(w, f ),(w′,g)〉 ∈C, according to whether (w, f ) and (w′,g) define
different possible answers. Whether they do this or not is determined by whether the
[.]δ-semantics of the question transforms (w, f ) and (w,g) into the same set of true an-
swers, or not. These principles for defining [.]m lead to Definition 3—we will see shortly
how this semantics is extended to SDRS-formulae that feature rhetorical relations.
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Definition 3 The Semantics [.]m of Lbasic
Let M = 〈D,W, , I〉 be a model, and letC,C′ ⊆ (W ×F)2. Then:
(i) C[P(x1, . . . ,xn)]
M
mC
′ iff
C′ = {〈(w, f ),(w′,g)〉 ∈C : (w, f )[P(x1, . . .xn)]Mδ (w, f ) and
(w′,g)[P(x1, . . . ,xn)]Mδ (w′,g)}
(ii) C[∃x]MmC′ iff C′ = {〈(w, f ′),(w′,g′)〉 : 〈(w, f ),(w′,g)〉 ∈C,
(w, f )[∃x]Mδ (w, f ′) and
(w′,g)[∃x]Mδ (w′,g′)}
(iii) C[φ∧ψ]MmC′ iffC[φ]Mm ◦ [ψ]MmC′.
(iv) C[¬φ]MmC′ iff C′ = {〈(w, f ),(w′,g)〉 ∈C : (w, f )[¬φ]Mδ (w, f ) and
(w′,g)[¬φ]Mδ (w′,g)}
(v) C[δφ]MmC′ iff C′ = {〈(wo, f ′),(w′o,g′)〉 : 〈(w, f ),(w′,g)〉 ∈C and
(w, f )[δφ]Mδ (wo, f ′) and
(w′,g)[δφ]Mδ (w′o,g′)}
(vi) C[?λx1 . . .xnφ]MmC′ iff
C′ = {〈(w, f ),(w′,g)〉 ∈C :
∀ f ′ st dom( f ′) = dom( f )∪{x1, . . . ,xn} and f ⊆ f ′,
∃g′ st dom(g′) = dom(g)∪{x1, . . .xn} and g⊆ g′, and
f ′(xi) = g′(xi),1≤ i≤ n and
∃(w′′,k),(w′′′, l) st
(w, f ′)[φ]Mδ (w
′′,k)↔ (w′,g′)[φ]Mδ (w′′′, l)
and conversely:
∀g′ st dom(g′) = dom(g)∪{x1, . . .xn} and g⊆ g′,
∃ f ′ st dom( f ′) = dom( f )∪{x1, . . . ,xn} and f ⊆ f ′, and
f ′(xi) = g′(xi),1≤ i≤ n and
∃(w′′,k),(w′′′, l) st
(w, f ′)[φ]Mδ (w
′′,k)↔ (w′,g′)[φ]Mδ (w′′′, l)}
The CCPs (6) and (7) of rhetorical relations lift immediately to these new contexts
of evaluation; soCi,Co ⊆ (W ×F)2 in these definitions. But we can now take advantage
of the uniform contexts of evaluation for propositions and questions. As promised in
Section 2.1, rhetorical connections among questions can be simplified. Unlike the [.]δ-
semantics from Asher and Lascarides (2003), questions in the [.]m-semantics can be
arguments to veridical relations such as Elaboration. So the SDRS representing the turn
(2)e, as shown in Table 3, invokes an Elaboration on labels for questions. Thus the
reporter is committed to the issues raised by both questions, and the second question can
be paraphrased in this context as So is it correct that Senator Coleman’s friend has not
bought these suits for him?
Further examples of rhetorical relations involving questions from Asher and Las-
carides (2003) are QAP (Question Answer Pair) and Q-Elab mentioned earlier. We start
with the semantics of QAP. The semantics of questions in Definition 3, following Groe-
nendijk’s (2003), assumes that a direct answer to a question is an exhaustive answer. But
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in reality, the demands on answerhood are not so stringent during dialogue interpretation
(Ginzburg, 1995): a question can be resolved to the questioner’s satisfaction without the
answer being exhaustive. We reflect this in our semantics of QAP—we make it match
the constraints on specificity for answerhood that we assumed for this relation in our
earlier work.
Technically, we achieve this by introducing a predicate symbol Answer between
a question and a proposition. Answer(q, p) is a test on the input context, but the test
may be passed even if p is not an exhaustive answer (and so fails to exclude all but one
class from the partition created by q). In essence, as in Asher and Lascarides (2003),
p must identify de re values for q’s wh-elements, or entail that no such elements exist.
So it is a stronger constraint on answerhood than partial answerhood but not as strong
a constraint as exhaustive answerhood. For instance, Answer(q, p) will be true when q
is Who talked? and p is Mary talked: this is not an exhaustive answer (people other
than Mary may have talked) and accordingly fails to eliminate all but one class from the
partition created by q. The formal definition of the predicate Answer is as follows:
• C[Answer(?λx1, . . . ,xnφ, p)]mC′ iff
1 C =C′; and
2 ∀C′′ such that C[?λx1, . . . ,xnφ]mC′′, there is a C′′′ such that C′′[ p]mC′′′ and
either
– ∃a1, . . .an ∈ ∆ such that for all (w, f ) ∈SSC′′′,
∃(w′,g) st (w, f a1x1 . . .
an
xn
)[φ]δ(w′,g) or
– ∀a1, . . .an ∈ ∆ and for all (w, f ) ∈SSC′′′,
¬∃(w′,g) st (w, f a1x1 . . .
an
xn
)[φ]δ(w′,g)
The semantics of QAP is then defined in terms of Answer, to reflect the intuition
that non-exhaustive answers can play a rhetorical role in a dialogue of being a sufficiently
specific answer:
C[QAP(α,β)]mC
′ iffC[Kα∧Answer(Kα,Kβ)∧Kβ]mC′
In words, QAP(α,β) partitions its input state C into one that distinguishes among the
possible exhaustive answers to the question Kα, the resulting partition satisfies the test
imposed by Answer(Kα,Kβ)—in other words, updatingC with Kβ would yield an output
state that identifies de re values to Kα’s wh-elements, or it identifies that there no such
values exist—and finally the context is updated by Kβ, and hence the output context C′
has resolved (in the rhetorical sense, if not in the literal sense) the question Kα. The
original definition of QAP(α,β) from Asher and Lascarides (2003) was not veridical on
α; now it is, reflecting the fact that answering a question entails acceptance of the issues
raised by the question. Similarly, whereas the original definition of Q-Elab from Asher
and Lascarides (2003) was non-veridical our revised definition makes it veridical. In
other words, its CCP is defined by (6), with meaning postulates on ϕQ-Elab(α,β) constrain-
ing Kβ so that it helps achieve the intentions behind α (formal details are omitted here,
but see Asher and Lascarides (2003)). We can similarly define a univocal semantics
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for Result, Result∗, Elaboration, Commentary and Commentary∗, regardless of whether
their terms are questions or assertions.
We have now defined the [.]m-semantics for all SDRS-formulae. The semantics
of an SDRS is the semantics of the content of its unique root label. In other words, for
an SDRS S with root label pi0, C[S]mC′ iff C[Kpi0]mC
′. The semantics [.]d of a DSDRS
is then defined in terms of [.]m as described in Section 2: the CCP of a dialogue turn is
given in (4); the entailment relation it engenders in (5); and the CCP of an entire DSDRS
is that of its last turn.
The illocutionary contributions of speech acts are encoded in the semantics of
DSDRSs, as a part of the agents’ commitments. And thus our definition of acceptance
as joint entailment on those commitments enables implicit acceptance. With our new
semantics of SDRSs, we can now make the right predictions about acceptance and re-
jection of questions, as well as acceptance and rejection of assertions. For instance,
with the logical form in Table 2 for dialogue (1), our revised semantics of Q-Elab as a
veridical relation ensures that B accepts A’s question (1)a. In contrast, S does not accept
R’s questions in dialogue (2), given its logical form in Table 3; nor does R accept S’s
assertions.
4 Conclusion
This paper presents a dynamic model theory for questions that fully supports a theory of
acceptance and rejection for questions and assertions. Following GAM (Traum, 1994),
it models acceptance as shared public commitment. However, unlike any prior formally
precise theory of dialogue of which we are aware, it is able to represent implicit accep-
tance, and it also analyses commitments to questions and mutual acceptance of the issues
raised by questions.
A crucial ingredient in our account was the use of relational speech acts, and
the logical relationships among their semantics. By ‘lifting’ the distributive dynamic
semantics from Asher and Lascarides (2003) to a collective semantics in the style of
Groenendijk (2003), we were able to maintain a uniform model of acceptance regardless
of whether the speakers utter indicatives or interrogatives.
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Abstract 
The paper develops a new perspective on the semantics and pragmatics of 
adjectival passives that focuses on their characteristic context dependency. 
Adjectival passives are analyzed as a flexible grammatical means of creating a 
potentially new ad hoc property based on the verbal event by which the subject 
referent is categorized according to contextually salient goals. The post state vs. 
target state ambiguity of adjectival passives is accounted for by deriving the two 
readings from a semantically underspecified representation that requires the 
pragmatic machinery to infer a suitable contextual instantiation. 
 
1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to develop a new perspective on the semantics and pragmatics 
of adjectival passives that accounts properly for the impact the context has on their 
formation and interpretation. There are two ways in which the context comes into play 
when dealing with adjectival passives. First, context appears to greatly influence which 
verbs get to build adjectival passives. Typical cases of adjectival passives discussed in 
the literature are based on transitive resultative verbs like to close or to submit, i.e. 
verbs with a lexically specified result state; see e.g. the German sentences in (1).
1
 
 
(1)  a. Die Schublade war geschlossen. 
  The drawer was closed. 
 
(1)  b. Das Manuskript ist eingereicht. 
  The manuscript is submitted. 
 
                                                 
1
 Note that (1) only has an adjectival passive reading; the verbal passive is built with the auxiliary 
werden in German; see below. 
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Kratzer (2000) briefly mentions the case of activity verbs like streicheln „to pet‟. These 
verbs do not have a designated result state and they seem to resist adjectival passive 
formation. A sentence like (2) sounds odd out of the blue.  
 
(2)  ? Die Katze ist gestreichelt. 
  The cat is petted. 
 
Yet under certain contextual conditions adjectival passives may also be built with 
activity verbs. In particular, sentences like (2) are fine if the context supports what 
Kratzer (2000: 4) calls a “job is done” interpretation; see also Rapp (1998: 243f), 
Maienborn (2007a). A natural setting for such a “job is done” interpretation for (2) is 
given in (2‟). 
 
(2‟) Anna hat ihre Nachbarspflichten erfüllt: Der Briefkasten ist geleert, 
  Anna has her neighbor-duties fulfilled: The mail-box is emptied  
 
   die Blumen sind gegossen und die Katze ist gestreichelt. 
   the flowers are watered, and the cat is petted. 
  „Anna has done her neighborly duties: the mailbox is emptied, the flowers are 
watered and the cat is petted.‟ 
 
Judgments are also improved if the subject triggers a figurative use of the participle as 
in (2”); cf. Gese et al. (2009). 
 
(2”) Meine Seele ist gestreichelt. 
  My soul is petted. 
  „My soul is caressed.‟ 
 
Thus, in light of perfectly natural variants like (2‟) and (2”), the adjectival passive 
formation of activity verbs such as streicheln „to pet‟ should not be ruled out as 
ungrammatical. The same holds true for other seemingly ill-formed cases, such as 
stative verbs. According to Kratzer (2000: 5) stative verbs like wissen „to know‟ are 
categorically excluded from the adjectival passive formation; sentence (3) is judged 
ungrammatical by Kratzer. Yet in a contrastive setting like the one in (4), where it is at 
issue whether an answer has been given on the basis of firm knowledge or by guessing, 
sentence (3) is perfectly fine and by no means deviant. 
 
(3) Die Antwort ist gewusst. 
 The answer is known. 
 
(4) Ist die Antwort gewusst oder geraten? 
 Is the answer known or guessed? 
 
Thus the context plays an important role in the formation and admissibility of 
adjectival passives. Moreover – and this is the second way how context comes into 
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play – adjectival passives have two readings, depending on their contextual environ-
ment: a “post state reading” as indicated by the continuation in (5a) and a “target state 
reading” illustrated in (5b). 
 
(5)   Das Manuskript ist eingereicht … 
  The manuscript is submitted … 
 
 a. … jetzt können wir uns an den Projektantrag machen post state reading 
  … let‟s turn to the project proposal now  
 
b. … aber nicht angenommen / veröffentlicht / … target state reading 
  … but not accepted / published / …  
 
Roughly speaking, the post state reading of sentence (5) means that the manuscript is 
classified as being in the post state of a submitting event, while the target state reading 
of (5) expresses that the manuscript belongs to the class of submitted papers, rather 
than being, e.g.,  accepted or published or rejected. A first indication for the existence 
of these two readings can be found in Brandt (1982: 31) and has been independently 
observed and elaborated by Kratzer (2000).
2
 Kratzer‟s account will be presented in 
more detail below. 
 This provides a first overview of the kind of data that will be discussed in the 
present paper. In the following I will argue that adjectival passives are subject to a 
particular kind of contextual variance resulting from the interplay between grammar 
and pragmatics. More specifically, adjectival passives will be analyzed as a flexible 
grammatical means of creating a potentially new ad hoc property based on the verbal 
event by which the subject referent is categorized according to contextually salient 
goals. Under this view post state and target state readings of adjectival passives will 
turn out to be contextual specifications of a common, more abstract semantic 
representation. 
 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the relevant facts and 
assumptions concerning adjectival passives that constitute the background for the 
present analysis. Section 3 develops the idea of event-based ad hoc properties as the 
core notion behind adjectival passives. This leads to the formulation of an 
underspecified semantics for adjectival passives in section 4, which in turn provides 
the starting point for deriving post state and target state readings of adjectival passives 
by means of contextual enrichment in the final section 5.  
 
2 Background 
Let‟s start with some introductory remarks on adjectival passives. In the literature on 
passives it has widely been observed that many languages display two kinds of 
                                                 
2
 Kratzer (2000) uses the term “resultant state reading” instead of the term “post state reading”, which I 
will use here. She also has a somewhat narrower understanding of the target state reading in mind, 
restricting it to only those target states that are reversible (as indicated by the admissibility of the 
modifier immer noch „still‟).  
34 Claudia Maienborn 
 
passives: an eventive, or verbal, passive and a so-called “stative”, or “adjectival”, 
passive; see the overview in Emonds (2006). English does not mark this difference 
overtly – both verbal and adjectival passives are expressed by an -en/-ed participle in 
combination with a form of to be. Thus, a sentence like (6) is ambiguous between an 
eventive and a stative reading and can only be disambiguated by the linguistic or 
extralinguistic context; see (6a) vs. (6b). The manner adverbial quietly and the agent 
phrase by the thief in (6a) highlight the verbal passive‟s eventive reading whereas the 
durative adverbial for years in (6b) selects for the adjectival passive‟s stative reading. 
 
(6)  The drawer was closed. adjectival or verbal passive 
 
a. The drawer was quietly closed by the thief. verbal passive 
 
b. The drawer was closed for years. adjectival passive 
 
That is, the same form to be is used both in the verbal and in the adjectival passive. 
This makes it difficult to tease apart verbal and adjectival passives in English. In a 
language like German the situation is more transparent, because verbal and adjectival 
passives are expressed by different means. The verbal passive is built by combining an 
-en/-t participle with the passive auxiliary werden („become‟); cf. (7).3 The adjectival 
passive is formed by using sein („be‟) instead; cf. (8).  
 
(7) a. Die Schublade wurde geschlossen. verbal passive 
  The drawer became closed  
  „The drawer was closed.‟ 
 
(7)  a. Die Schublade wurde leise von dem Dieb geschlossen. 
  The drawer became quietly by the thief closed 
  „The drawer was quietly closed by the thief.‟ 
 
(7)  b. *Die Schublade wurde jahrelang geschlossen. 
  *The drawer became for years closed 
 
(8) a. Die Schublade war geschlossen. adjectival passive 
  The drawer was closed  
  „The drawer was closed.‟ 
 
(7)  a. *Die Schublade war leise von dem Dieb geschlossen. 
  *The drawer was quietly by the thief closed 
 
(7)  b. Die Schublade war jahrelang geschlossen. 
  The drawer was for years closed 
  „The drawer was closed for years.‟ 
 
 
                                                 
3
 The ungrammatical sentence (7b) could only be rescued by an iterative reinterpretation of the verbal 
expression. 
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Thus, a sentence like (8) can only receive an adjectival passive analysis. Due to their 
formal difference there is no danger of mixing up adjectival and verbal passives in 
German. This makes German particularly suitable for studying adjectival passives.  
 It should be stressed that the adjectival passive formation is a very productive 
process, at least in German. Adjectival passives coexist with primary adjectives as in 
(9); forms such as geleert sein („to be emptied‟), geöffnet sein („to be opened‟) are not 
blocked by the respective primary adjective but are completely regular. 
 
(9)  a. Die Schublade ist geöffnet / offen 
  The drawer is opened / open 
 
(7)  b. Die Schublade ist geleert / leer 
  The drawer is emptied / empty 
 
Further illustration of the productivity of the adjectival passive formation in German is 
given in (10). A manuscript may be submitted, accepted, cited, reviewed, rejected etc. 
as in (10a). One may also use a sentence like (10b) to express that a certain crisis is an 
artefact that was brought about by the actions of some protagonists (rather than being 
the result of a natural development). 
 
 (10) a. Das Manuskript ist eingereicht / akzeptiert / zitiert / begutachtet ... 
  The manuscript is submitted / accepted / cited / reviewed …  
 
(10)  b. Die Krise ist gemacht. 
  The crisis is made 
 
That is, with the exception of a very small set of verbs for which the adjectival passive 
formation is categorically ruled out (e.g. weather verbs, true reflexives, certain statives 
like kosten („to cost‟)), almost any verb may form an adjectival passive in German; see 
Maienborn (2007a) for details and Gese et al. (2008) for a thorough discussion of the 
particularly interesting case of unaccusatives.  
 The last remark to be made here concerns the underlying structure of adjectival 
passives. Nowadays there is wide agreement among linguists that adjectival passives, 
are to be seen as combinations of the copula sein / to be with an adjectivized verbal 
participle (e.g., Kratzer 1994, 2000; Rapp 1997, 1998; von Stechow 1998; Maienborn 
2007a; Gese et al. 2008) rather than some analytic verb form. Following Lieber (1980) 
the adjectival participle is derived from its verbal counterpart via zero-affixation: 
 
(11) Die Schublade ist geschlossen adjectival analysis 
   COP [AP [A [VPART geschlossen] ø ]]  
 
(11) provides the structural basis for the following semantic analysis.
4
 
                                                 
4
 Stolterfoht et al. (2008) provide further psycholinguistic evidence for the structural analysis given in 
(11). In a self-paced reading study we found that participles in adjectival passives require more process-
ing effort than those in verbal passives. These results support the assumption that adjectival passives 
rely on an additional conversion process of the verbal participle. 
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3 Event-based ad hoc properties 
While the view that adjectival passives are in fact combinations of the copula sein / to 
be with an adjectivized participle has become widely accepted, the implications that 
such a view on the structure of adjectival passives has for their interpretation haven‟t 
been explored up to now. This is what I want to pursue here. If adjectival passives are 
to be seen as a special instance of the form „copula plus adjectival predicate‟, we 
expect their meaning to follow the general pattern of copula expressions.  
For our purposes it suffices to say that a copula sentence ascribes to the subject 
referent the property given by the predicate. For instance, sentence (12) expresses that 
the manuscript has the property of being new. That‟s fairly simple; see Maienborn 
(2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2007b) and the literature discussed therein for a more thorough 
consideration of the semantics of the copula. 
 
(12) The manuscript is new. 
 
So the question is whether we can view adjectival passives along these lines and 
analyze them as ascribing a certain property to their subject referent. What would be a 
plausible candidate for such a property? I propose that adjectival passives assign a 
pragmatically salient ad hoc property to the subject referent. This ad hoc property is 
conceived of as resulting from the event referred to by the verbal participle. That is, 
while a standard copula sentence with an adjectival base predicate assigns to the 
subject referent a lexically coded property, which has a fixed place in the subject 
referent‟s property space, adjectival passives are a grammatically supplied means of 
creating ad hoc potentially new, event-based properties, whose exact import, and 
therefore the place they occupy in the subject referent‟s property space, is more or less 
shaped by the context and by our contextually available world knowledge. 
 What do I mean by event-based ad hoc properties? Let‟s take (13) for an 
illustration.  
 
(13)   Das Manuskript ist eingereicht. 
  The manuscript is submitted  
 
Sentence (13) does not just express that the manuscript is in some result state of having 
been submitted; it tells us more. In fact, we may interpret (13) as a statement about the 
quality of the manuscript. Our background knowledge as (linguistic) scientific 
community provides us with rich information about possible stages and gradings for 
scientific papers. We know that – at least when it comes to some assessment – a 
manuscript that is submitted is better than a manuscript that isn‟t finished yet or a 
manuscript that is published in some less prestigious place. But of course it would be 
better if our manuscript were accepted or even published in a high impact journal. 
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Adding an event-related modifier as in (14) makes the differentiation of potential 
properties for the subject referent even finer.
5
 
 
(14)  a. Das Manuskript ist bei  Nature eingereicht. 
  The manuscript is to Nature submitted 
 
(14)  b. Das Manuskript ist von  Chomsky zitiert. 
  The manuscript is by Chomsky cited 
 
(14)  c. Das Manuskript ist in einer Nacht geschrieben. 
  The manuscript is in one night written 
 
The modifiers in (14) activate bits of background knowledge which then trigger certain 
inferences about the kind of manuscript we are dealing with. For instance, from (14a) 
we may infer, given the reputation of the Journal Nature, that the manuscript is of very 
high quality – at least that is what the author believes. To be cited by Chomsky, as 
expressed in (14b), is kind of an accolade in generative linguistics. And a manuscript 
that is written in one night (14c) could be either ingenious or awfully sloppy. 
 As these examples already show the inferences drawn in a given context may 
vary considerably and depend largely on our particular background knowledge and 
attitudes. Providing a full account of this kind of contextual variance is not our job as 
linguists. However, what is crucial is that the adjectival passive requires us to draw 
some such inference by which we derive a certain property that is ascribed to the 
subject referent in the given context. This requirement is part of the semantics of 
adjectival passives. 
 The ad hoc nature of the property expressed by adjectival passives becomes 
particularly evident in adjectival compounds such as (15). 
 
(15)  a. Das iPhone ist PIN-gesichert.  
  The iPhone is PIN-secured  
 
(14)  b. Alle Mitglieder des Berliner Senats sind stasi-überprüft. 
  All members of the Berlin senate are stasi-checked 
 
(14)  c. Die Realität ist heute weitgehend Diana-bereinigt. 
  The reality is today largely Diana-purged 
  (Spiegel-online 18.07.2007)
6
 
 
                                                 
5
 The ability of adjectival passives to combine with typical verbal modifiers like agent phrases, instru-
mentals and locatives plays a prominent role in the current discussion. Kratzer (1994, 2000) proposes to 
account for data such as (14) by assuming that the adjectival ø-affix may attach at the lexical level as 
well as at the phrasal level. In the latter case adjectivization applies to a whole VP including verbal 
modifiers. Kratzer‟s solution has been taken up and developed further by several authors; cf. e.g. (Rapp 
1997, 1998), von Stechow (1998), Anagnostopoulou (2003), Embick (2004), Alexiadou & Anagnosto-
poulou (2007). I don‟t have place to discuss this issue here, but see Maienborn (2007a) for arguments 
against using phrasal adjectivization to account for the combination of adjectival passives with verbal 
modifiers and an alternative solution that assumes only lexical adjectivization of the verbal participle. In 
short, I propose to analyze the modifiers in (14) as being integrated into the verbal complex (in the 
sense of Jacobs 1993, 1999), thus building a complex predicate.  
6
 From a report about the 10
th
 anniversary of Princess Di‟s death. 
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  d. Ich hatte Sorge wie der Japaner das Oktoberfest finden würde,  
aber es stellte sich heraus,  
(14)  d. dass er schwedentrainiert war.  (overheard on 11/2007) 
  that he Sweden-trained was   
  „I was worried about what the Japanese guy would think about the 
Oktoberfest, but it turned out that he was Sweden-trained.‟ 
 
Predicatively used compounds such as PIN-gesichert („PIN-secured‟) or stasi-über-
prüft („stasi-checked‟) are widespread. Besides more or less lexicalized forms such 
compounds are also readily built “online”; cf. the occasional compounds Diana-be-
reinigt (roughly: „Diana-purged‟) or schwedentrainiert („Sweden-trained‟) in (15c/d). 
E.g., the intended interpretation of schwedentrainiert in (15d) is that the Japanese 
referred to was “trained” in Sweden and thus got used to drinking (lots of) alcohol. 
 Both the modifier data in (14) and the compound data in (15) provide further 
support for the claim that adjectival passives are a means of creating more or less ad 
hoc a possibly complex adjectival predicate by which the subject referent is assigned a 
certain property that is shaped by contextually salient knowledge, attitudes and goals. 
 The view of adjectival passives as expressing ad hoc properties is inspired by 
Barsalou‟s (1983, 1991, 1992, 2005) notion of ad hoc categories such as „things to 
take on a camping trip‟. These are goal-derived categories that are created spontan-
eously for use in more or less specialized contexts. Under this perspective adjectival 
passives may be seen as a means to extend and contextualize a concept‟s property 
space with respect to contextually salient goals. 
 To sum up, there is more to the meaning of adjectival passives than some kind 
of aspectual shift between the verb‟s event referent and some result state. I propose 
that adjectival passives are, in fact, nothing but a special case of a copula sentence. By 
taking a (possibly complex) verbal predicate and converting it into an adjective which 
then is combined with the copula, the subject referent is assigned a certain property 
that is linked to the verb‟s event argument. The crucial point is that this link may be 
mediated more or less heavily by context and world knowledge. This accounts for the 
characteristic ad hoc nature of adjectival passives.  
 
 (16)  a. Das Manuskript ist von  Chomsky zitiert. 
  The manuscript is by Chomsky cited 
 
(16)  b. Das Manuskript ist von  Chomsky zitiert worden. 
  The manuscript has by Chomsky cited been 
 
With an adjectival passive such as (16a) we classify the manuscript and assign it a 
certain place within the concept‟s property space, e.g. as being recommended reading 
for the generative linguistics community. The perfect tense verbal passive counterpart 
in (16b) expresses that there is a post state of an event of citing the manuscript by 
Chomsky, and nothing more. We may go on and draw some inferences here too, but 
there is no need to do so. Adjectival passives, on the other hand, force us to derive a 
suitable ad hoc property. A semantics for adjectival passives should take account of 
this subtle difference. 
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4 An underspecified semantics for adjectival passives 
In the following I will sketch a proposal for a formal semantic account of adjectival 
passives that implements the analysis developed above. First I will briefly summarize 
the very influential proposal by Kratzer, which set the frame for a series of further 
developments and variants (e.g. von Stechow 1998, Anagnostopoulou 2003, Embick 
2004, Alexiadou & Anagnostopoulou 2007). 
 Kratzer (2000) proposes to assume two zero-affixes by which the verbal 
participle (whose semantics is identical to that of the verbal stem) is converted into an 
adjective. These so-called “stativizers” are intended to account for the two readings of 
adjectival passives. The semantics of the post (or resultant) state zero-affix is given in 
(17a), its target state variant is given in (17b). 
 
(17) a. Post state Ø-affix: λP λt e [P(e) & (e) < t] Kratzer (2000: 12) 
 b. Target state Ø-affix: λR λs e [R(s)(e)] Kratzer (2000: 8) 
 
The examples in (18) and (19) illustrate the result of applying these affixes to a verbal 
form.
7
 
 
 (18) Post state reading:  Kratzer (2000: 12) 
 a. Das Theorem ist bewiesen.   
  The theorem is proven  
 
(16)  b. beweis-: λx λe [prove (x)(e)] 
 
(16)  c. [IP das Theorem bewiesen sei]: λt e [prove (the theorem)(e) & (e) < t] 
 
(19) Target state reading:  Kratzer (2000: 8) 
 a. Der Reifen ist aufgepumpt.   
  The tire is pumped-up  
 
(16) b. aufpump-: λx λs λe [pump (e) & inflated (x)(s) & cause (s)(e)] 
 
(16) c. [IP der Reifen aufgepumpt sei]: λs e [pump (e) & inflated (the tire)(s)  & 
cause(s)(e)] 
 
Assuming the zero-affix in (17a) yields a semantic analysis of the post state reading 
according to which an adjectival passive expresses a resultant state (given over times t) 
that starts with the culmination of the verb‟s event and holds forever after; see Parsons 
(1990: 234) for this view on resultant states. Kratzer‟s target state affix in (17b) may 
only apply to a subgroup of resultative verbs, more specifically those verbs that specify 
a characteristic (and in principle reversible) target state that is compositionally 
accessible via the verb‟s argument structure; see e.g. the lexical entry for the verb 
                                                 
7
 For the time being I neglect further complications in connection with Kratzer‟s suggestion that these 
affixes may apply both at the lexical and the phrasal level (see footnote 5).  
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aufpumpen („to pump up‟) in (19b).8 According to this analysis the target state reading 
of an adjectival passive expresses a lexically specified target state that is caused by the 
verb‟s event.9 
 These are the aspects of Kratzer‟s proposal that are relevant for our present 
purposes in a nutshell. Under the perspective on adjectival passives developed above 
this analysis has three shortcomings. First, Kratzer analyzes the adjectival passive 
ambiguity as a case of lexical homonymy. Her post state stativizer in (17a) and the 
target state stativizer in (17b) have nothing in common (apart from the existential 
binding of the verb‟s event argument). This does not seem to me a particularly 
attractive feature of Kratzer‟s account given the apparent relatedness of the two 
readings. Second, the application of the stativizers is determined exclusively by the 
verb's argument structure. The target state reading is only available for the lexical 
subgroup of target state verbs. This is in conflict with the characteristic contextual 
flexibility of adjectival passives observed above. The previous discussion of the data 
has shown that the target state reading of adjectival passives is much more broadly 
available than Kratzer‟s lexical account predicts. In fact, with a little contextual help 
both readings are available for nearly any verb. And third, Kratzer‟s account reduces 
the semantic contribution of the adjectival zero-affixes to a merely aspectual shift from 
the verbal event to some subsequent state (either post or target state). This ignores the 
subtle but crucial difference between adjectival passives and perfect tense; see the 
discussion of (16). 
 In sum, all the ingredients of Kratzer‟s account of the meaning of adjectival 
passives are to be found either in the lexicon or in the grammar. There is no particular 
place for a systematic contextual import. This does not fit very well with the empirical 
evidence presented above. 
What would a more balanced division of labor between grammar and 
pragmatics look like? As for the grammar, I want to propose that the meaning of 
adjectival passives should be accounted for by assuming a unique adjectival zero-affix. 
This affix is semantically underspecified in two respects. First, it does not fully 
determine what kind of property is assigned to the subject referent. And, secondly, it is 
underspecified with respect to the post state / target state ambiguity of adjectival 
passives A respective semantic representation for a zero-affix that turns a verbal into 
an adjectival participle is given in (20). 
 
(20) Adjectival Ø-affix: λP λx λs e [s: Q(x) & result (e, s) & P(e)] 
 
According to (20) the adjectival affix introduces a free variable Q for the property that 
holds for the subject referent x in a state s. Q is further restricted as resulting from the 
verbal event e. The grammar does not suppy any more information than that about the 
actual kind of property. An illustration is given in (22). For comparison see the 
representation of a standard copula sentence with an adjectival base predicate in (21). 
                                                 
8
 Recall that Kratzer‟s conception of the target state reading is more narrow than the one I advocate here 
(see footnote 2) 
9
 Sentence (19a) may have an additional post state reading besides that. 
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(21) Das Manuskript ist neu.  
 The manuscript is new 
 s [s: new (the manuscript)] 
 
(22) Das Manuskript ist eingereicht.  
 The manuscript is submitted 
 s [s: Q (the manuscript) & result (e, s) & submit (e)] 
 
As for the semantics of the copula, I have argued in Maienborn (2005a, 2007b) that 
copula constructions and other stative verbs differ fundamentally from Davidsonian 
event and state expressions. In order to account for this difference I introduced a new 
ontological sort of so-called “Kimian states” (or K-states) that supplements the 
ontological sort of Davidsonian eventualities (which also include Davidsonian states). 
K-states are to be understood as reifications for the exemplification of a property Q at 
a holder x and a time t. From this it follows that K-states are ontologically poorer and 
more abstract than Davidsonian eventualities; see Maienborn (2005a, 2007b) for 
details. I‟ll come back to this issue below. 
Turning back to our adjectival passives, a comparison of the semantic struc-
tures given in (21) and (22) shows that the semantics of the adjectival zero-affix laid 
out in (20) leads to an analysis of adjectival passives that follows the pattern of regular 
copula sentences. Adjectival passives only differ from adjectival base predicates in that 
they express an internally more complex and semantically underspecified property. For 
the adjectival passive to be interpretable, the free variable Q must be given a suitable 
value by the context.  
 
5 Deriving post state and target state readings 
The semantic analysis advocated in the previous section takes adjectival passives to 
express a semantically underspecified, event-based ad hoc property. The task of 
pragmatics is to legitimate this ad hoc property in a given context. More specifically, 
pragmatics must provide a contextually suitable value for the free variable Q, and it 
must justify the choice of an ad hoc formation instead of a pre-established, lexically 
coded property. This will lead to the post state / target state differentiation.  
I will not present a formal account for the pragmatics in this paper but will only 
point towards the basic idea. In searching for a value for the free variable Q, the 
best/most economic instantiation for it is the one that gets by with the fewest 
contextually not licensed additional assumptions. If the conceptual knowledge 
associated with the verb‟s event referent happens to already specify a resulting 
property, this will of course be the best choice for Q. In this case, there is no need to 
draw further inferences and derive more remote ad hoc property candidates – unless 
the context explicitly forces us to.  
This explains why virtually no pragmatic effort is needed for interpreting 
adjectival passives in the case of resultative verbs. These verbs already specify a result 
state within their lexical entry. Thus Q may simply be identified with the property 
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introduced at the lexical level. Non-resultative verbs will need more contextual support 
to derive a suitable value for Q and to localize Q within the category‟s property space. 
That is, while the pragmatic effort needed to derive a contextually suitable value for Q 
may vary considerably, sometimes being completely predictable from the verb‟s 
lexical semantics and sometimes relying heavily on context and world knowledge, the 
basic mechanism is the same. 
A pragmatic justification for favoring an ad hoc formation over a lexically 
coded property follows from independent pragmatic economy principles (e.g. Blutner 
1998, 2000; Levinson 2000; see also Ackerman & Goldberg 1996). Using an ad hoc 
property will only be pragmatically licensed if the context supports a salient alter-
native. That is, for an adjectival passive to be interpretable, the context must provide a 
contrasting alternative K-state s‟.  
As I indicated above, K-states are ontologically sparse entities and therefore 
offer few possibilities for establishing suitable alternatives. There are basically two 
options. This gives us the two readings of adjectival passives. A contextually salient 
contrasting state s‟ may differ from s with respect to either the temporal or the 
qualitative dimension. In the first case the context provides a salient alternative state s‟ 
that preceeds s and in which x does not have the property Q. This corresponds to the 
adjectival passive‟s post state reading; see (23a). In the second case, s‟ exemplifies a 
contextually salient property Q‟  that is distinct from Q; see (23b). 
 
(23) Das Manuskript ist eingereicht.  
(18) s [s: Q (the manuscript) & result (e, s) & submit (e)]  
 
(23) a. Post state reading:  
  … & contrast (s, s‟) & s‟: ¬ Q(x) & s‟ < s   
(23) 
b. Target state reading: 
 
  … & contrast (s, s‟) & s‟: Q‟(x)   
 
Whether the contrasting state s‟ is construed along the temporal or the qualitative 
dimension affects the truth conditions of the adjectival passive. This is shown by the 
fact that we can simultaneously affirm and deny a particular state of affairs; see 
Zwicky & Sadock (1975), Kennedy (2009). In a context where an author finally 
succeeded in finishing a manuscript and submitted it to a journal but already received 
the sad note that the paper was rejected, he could answer (24) when asked about the 
manuscript. 
 
(24) Das Manuskript ist zwar eingereicht, aber es ist nicht eingereicht,  
 The manuscript is though submitted but it is not submitted 
 
(24) sondern abgelehnt. 
 but rejected 
 
The present proposal accounts for this post state / target state ambiguity by letting s be 
contextually determined relative to a salient contrasting alternative s‟.  
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Finally, Kratzer‟s “job is done” reading by which the adjectival passive of, e.g., 
an activity verb like streicheln („to pet‟) can be “rescued” (cf. (2‟) repeated in (25) 
below) turns out to be a specific instance of the post state reading.  
 
(25) Anna hat ihre Nachbarspflichten erfüllt: Der Briefkasten ist geleert, 
  Anna has her neighbor-duties fulfilled: The mail-box is emptied  
 
(25)  die Blumen sind gegossen und die Katze ist gestreichelt. 
   the flowers are watered, and the cat is petted. 
  „Anna has done her neighborly duties: the mailbox is emptied, the flowers are 
watered and the cat is petted.‟ 
 
The particular context given in (25) supports an ad hoc categorization of cats into two 
contrasting sets, cats that still need to be petted and cats that have already been petted. 
With the adjectival passive sentence The cat is petted the subject referent is assigned 
the property of belonging to the second class. 
The semantic and pragmatic analysis achieves the goals laid out in the 
beginning: First, it takes seriously the structural insights into the nature of adjectival 
passives and exploits them for their interpretation in taking adjectival passives to be a 
special instance of copula sentences. And, secondly, it accounts for the characteristic 
context dependency and ad hoc feel of adjectival passives by introducing a free 
variable at the semantic level that requires the pragmatic machinery to infer a suitable 
contextual instantiation. All in all this yields a more balanced division of labor 
between grammar and pragmatics in accordance with the empirical facts.  
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Abstract 
This paper argues that wh-islands are unacceptable because they cannot be given 
a complete (exhaustive) answer. In the case of degree questions, the complete 
answer expresses a contradiction given the assumption that degree questions 
range over intervals. In the case of manner questions the problem arose from the 
fact that a complete answer to these questions is equivalent to a sentence with an 
embedded declarative, which is either a violation of the principle of Maximize 
Presupposition!, as in the case of question embedding predicates such as know, or 
simply incompatible with the meaning of the question embedding predicate, 
which is argued to be the case with predicates such as wonder. 
 
1 Introduction 
An interrogative complement clause creates an environment of which wh-words 
ranging over individuals can move out
1
, but not wh-words ranging over degree or 
manners: 
 
(1)  a. ?Which problem do you wonder how to solve? 
*How do you know which problem to solve? 
*How high do you wonder who to lift? 
b. 
c. 
 
(2)  a. ?Which problem do you know whether to solve? 
*How do you wonder whether to solve the problem? 
*How tall do you know whether to be? 
b. 
c. 
 
                                                 
1
 There is significant crosslinguistic variation with respect to these facts: E.g. in English and Hungarian 
extraction of wh-words over individuals is indeed markedly better from their degree and manner 
counterparts, French e.g. however prohibits the extraction of wh-words ranging over individuals as well. 
I will not address this cross-linguistic difference.  
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The contrasts exemplified above represent some of the core cases of so called weak-
island violations and have been a major topic in the syntactic literature in the last 20 
years or so (cf. Rizzi 1990, Cinque 1990 and subsequent literature). Other examples of 
paradigmatic weak-island violations include negative islands, factive islands, islands 
created by certain quantifiers, to name but a few. Interestingly enough, the existing 
semantic accounts of weak islands, such as Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993, 1997), 
Honcoop (1996), Rullmann (1995), Fox and Hackl (2007) concentrate their attention 
on one or more of these latter types of islands, offering at best a promissory note about 
the cases of the type of island violations exemplified above. The exception is Cresti 
(1995), who offers a syntactico-semantic account for wh-islands that arise with degree 
extraction. This paper presents a new, purely semantic/pragmatic account to wh-
islands. 
Dayal (1996) has argued that a question presupposes that there is a single most 
informative true proposition in the Karttunen denotation of the question, i.e. a 
proposition that entails all the other true answers to the question. This principle has 
been shown to explain the unacceptability of negative degree islands in Fox and Hackl 
(2007) and Abrusán and Spector (2008), and also to explain a number of other types of 
weak islands in Abrusán (2007). In this paper I argue that in the case of  wh-islands 
that are formed by an extraction of a degree-wh phrase, Dayal‟s (1996) presupposition 
can also never be met. As a consequence, any complete answer to these questions will 
amount to the statement of a contradiction. The reason is that for any proposition p in 
the question domain, there will be at least two alternatives to p that cannot be denied at 
the same time. I argue that this maximization failure is predicted if we assume an 
interval-based semantics of degree constructions (cf. Schwarzschild and Wilkinson 
2002, Heim 2006). In the case of manner questions the situation will be slightly 
different: Although these do have a most informative true answer, however, this 
answer will always be contextually equivalent to its counterpart with an embedded 
declarative. Since the answer with the embedded interrogative comes with a vacuous 
presupposition, while the answer with the embedded declarative has a contentful 
presupposition, any answer to a question such as the b-examples above will be a 
violation of the principle of Maximize Presupposition (cf. Heim (1991), Sauerland 
(2003), Percus (2006), Schlenker (2008)). Thus according to this proposal the 
compositional semantics and pragmatics of questions supplies everything we need for 
the explanation of wh-islands in questions, without invoking any further special rules.  
A disclaimer is in order at this point: one aspect that I will not discuss in this 
paper is the role of tense, in other words why is it that the presence of overt tense 
marking turns these islands into strong islands in many languages
2
. I will assume that 
this is a consequence of an independent factor that creates strong-islands. Therefore 
the only thing that I will be concerned with here is the difference that I predict between 
questions about individuals on the one hand, and questions about manners and degrees 
on the other hand, independently of the contribution of tense.   
                                                 
2
 The data on tensed constituent wh-complements seems to show a lot of cross-linguistic and cross-
speaker variation. E.g. Szabolcsi (2006) reports sentences such as (i) below to be acceptable in 
Hungarian, but not in English or Dutch for most speakers.  
(i) ???Which men did John ask whether Bill invited? 
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2 Embedded Questions and Exhaustivity 
While Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982, 1984) have famously proposed that embedded 
questions in general should be understood as strongly exhaustive, Heim (1994) and 
following her Beck and Rullmann (1999), Guerzoni and Sharvit (2004) have argued 
for a theory that has more flexibility, namely allows for at least some embedded 
questions to be understood as weakly exhaustive. In this respect, a three-way 
classification is sometimes assumed (cf. e.g. Guerzoni and Sharvit 2004, Sharvit 1997) 
according to which predicates such as wonder are always strongly exhaustive
3
, 
predicates belonging to the know-class can be understood as both strongly and weakly 
exhaustive, while predicates such as be surprised or predict only allow weakly 
exhaustive readings. At the same time, the weakly exhaustive reading of the verbs 
belonging to the know-class is rather controversial (cf. Sharvit 1997 for an overview) 
and therefore in the following discussion I will only use their strongly exhaustive 
readings. 
       Which types of question embedding predicates create wh-islands? It seems that 
wh-islands arise with both the wonder- and the know-type of question embedding 
predicates.  
 
(3)  Wonder class predicates (e.g. Wonder, ask, want to know, inquire…) 
a. ?Who does Mary wonder whether to invite? 
b. *How is Mary wondering whether to behave? 
c. *How tall is the magician wondering whether to be? 
 
d. ?Which problem do you wonder how to solve? 
e. *How do you wonder which problem to solve? 
f. *How high do you wonder who to lift? 
 
(4)  Know-class predicates (Know, find out, remember, be certain…) 
a. ?Who does Mary know whether to invite?
4
 
b. *How does Mary know whether to behave? 
c. *How tall does Mary know whether to be? 
 
d. ?Which problem do you know how to solve? 
e. *How do you know which problem to solve? 
f. *How high do you know who to lift? 
 
How about predicates belonging to the surprise class, i.e. the class of weakly 
exhaustive predicates? Unfortunately, these examples do not offer a good testing 
ground for wh-islands, because the meaning of these seems to be incompatible with an 
                                                 
3
 But note that this claim is not uncontroversial, cf. discussion e.g. in Sharvit (1997). 
4
 The acceptability of this example shows speaker variation, and also variation across languages. Its 
French counterpart I am told seems to be consistently unacceptable, while its Hungarian counterpart is 
acceptable.  
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embedded infinitival clause. However, since tense in the embedded complement turns 
weak islands into strong islands, we cannot find weak-islands created by such weakly 
exhaustive predicates. Therefore, all the examples that we find with wh-islands are in 
fact cases where the question embedding verb requires a strongly exhaustive reading.  
 
3 Wh-Islands that Arise with Degree Questions  
This section looks at wh-islands that arise with degree questions. The first part is 
concerned with embedded whether questions, discussing examples with the question 
embedding predicates know and wonder. It is assumed that the explanation given for 
these two verbs will carry over to all the other question embedding predicates in their 
class. In the second half of the section I discuss the case of embedded constituent 
questions and show that the problem they pose can in fact be reduced to the same 
problem that made embedded whether questions unacceptable in the first place.  
 
3.1 Embedded Whether Questions 
Know-class predicates I follow Heim (1994) and Beck and Rullmann (1999) in 
assuming that the exhaustivity of embedded complements is encoded in the lexical 
meaning of the question embedding verb
5. Given this, let‟s represent the lexical 
semantics of the strongly exhaustive question embedding verb know as follows, using 
a Hintikka-style semantics for attitude verbs. (QH(w) stands for the Hamblin-
denotation of an interrogative). 
 
(5)  know (w) (x, QH(w))  is true iff  p QH(w) , x  knows whether p is true in w  
 where, „x knows whether p is true in w  ‘ is true in w iff for w‟  Doxx (w), 
 if p(w)=1,  p in w‟ and   if p(w)=0,  p in w‟ 
       ,where Doxx (w) ={w‟ W: x‟s beliefs in w are satisfied in w‟} 
 
Embedded whether questions with know-predicates about individuals     Let‟s look 
at an example of movement out of a whether-clause, and its Hamblin denotation: 
 
(6)  a. Who does Mary know whether she should invite?    
λq. x [person(x)∧  q=λw. knows (Mary, λp.[ p=λw‟. shem should 
           invite x  in w‟ ∨ p=λw‟. shem should not invite x in w‟]) in w 
b. 
 
Assuming that the domain of individuals in the discourse is {Bill, John, Fred}, the set 
of propositions that (6)b describes is {that Mary knows whether to invite Bill, that 
                                                 
5
 But note that this assumption is not in fact crucial for our analysis.  
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Mary knows whether to invite John,  that Mary  knows whether to invite Fred}
6
. More 
precisely we might represent this set of propositions as: 
 
(7)  { w‟  DoxM(w), (if invB in w,  invB in w’) ∧ ( if invB in w, invB in w’), 
  w‟  DoxM(w), (if invJ in w, invJ in w’)   ∧ ( if invJ in w, invJ in w‟), 
  w‟  DoxM(w), (if invF in w, invF in w’) ∧ (if invF in w, invF in w’)} 
     ,where invX in w  is a notational shorthand for Mary should invite X in w 
 
A complete answer to a question Q is the assertion of some proposition in Q together 
with the negation of all the remaining alternatives in Q. For (6), the meaning we would 
get if we negated one of the propositions in its denotation is shown below: 
 
(8)  Mary does not know whether to invite John 
[ w‟  DoxM(w), (if invJ in w, invJ in w’)  ∧ ( if invJ in w, invJ in w‟)] 
 =  w‟  DoxM(w), (invJ in w ∧  invJ in w’)  ∨  ( invJ in w ∧  invJ in w‟) 
 
Suppose that we assert Mary knows whether she should invite Bill as an answer to the 
question in (6). The statement that this answer is the complete answer means that we in 
fact assert that the rest of the alternative propositions in Q are false: i.e. we assert that 
Mary knows whether she should invite Bill and that she does not know whether she 
should invite John and that she does not know whether she should invite Fred: 
 
(9)  Mary knows whether she should invite Bill 
w‟  DoxM(w), if invB in w, invB in w’ ∧  if invB in w, invB in w’ 
and  w‟  DoxM(w), (invJ in w ∧  invJ in w’)  ∨  ( invJ in w ∧ invJ in w‟), 
and  w‟  DoxM(w),(invF in w ∧ invF in w’) ∨  ( invF in w ∧  invF in w’) 
 
In the case of questions about individuals thus no problem arises with complete 
answers: the meaning expressed above is coherent. This is because the alternatives in 
the question denotation are independent from each other: whether or not Bill is invited 
in the actual world is independent from whether or not Fred is invited etc.  
 
Embedded whether questions with know about degrees      Following the analyses 
of Schwarzschild and Wilkinson (2002), Heim (2006) and Abrusán and Spector 
(2008), I will assume that degree adjectives establish a relation between individuals 
and intervals:  
 
(10)  a.  tall=λI<d,t>. λxe. x‟s height I 
 b  John is I-tall=1 iff John‟s height I ;   where I is an interval: 
                                                 
6
 I restrict my attention to singular alternatives in the discussion. The reader can verify that adding plural 
alternatives would not change the facts. 
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 c. A set of degrees D is an interval iff 
For all d, d‟, d‟‟: if d D & d‟‟ D & d d‟ d‟‟, then d‟ D 
 
In the case of a positive degree question the alternative propositions in the question 
denotation range over different intervals that could be the argument of the adjective: 
 
(11)   How tall is John?w = λp. I [I DI ∧ p=λw‟. John‟s height I in w‟] 
„For what interval I, John‟s height is in that interval?‟ 
 
Given this, the Hamblin denotation of a question with movement of the degree 
expression out of the embedded question will be as shown below: 
 
(12)  a. *How tall does Mary know whether to be?  
λq. I [I DI ∧  q=λw. knows (Mary, λp.[p=λw‟. herm height   
          be in I in w‟ ∨ p=λw‟.  herm height be in I in w‟ ]) in w 
b. 
 
We might represent this set informally, as {that Mary knows whether her height be in 
I1, that Mary knows whether her height be in I2, that Mary knows whether her height 
be in I3 …etc, for all intervals in DI }, or  more precisely as follows: (Notice that if one 
knows that her height is not in an interval I equals knowing that her height is in the 
complement of interval I in a given domain of degrees, which I represent as I.) 
 
(13)  { w‟  Dox M(w), [if I1(w)=1, I1 (w‟)=1] ∧ [ if  I1(w)=1,  I1 (w‟)=1] 
  w‟  Dox M(w), [if I2(w)=1, I2 (w‟)=1] ∧ [ if  I2(w)=1,  I2 (w‟)=1]                  
  w‟  Dox M(w), [if I3(w)=1, I3 (w‟)=1] ∧ [ if  I3(w)=1,  I3 (w‟)=1] }        
  ,where In (w) is a notational shorthand for Mary’s height should be in In in w. 
 
Imagine now that we were to state Mary knows whether her height should be in I1 as a 
complete answer. A complete answer equals to the assertion of the most informative 
true answer together with the negation of all the alternatives that are not entailed by the 
most informative true answer. Now let‟s take 3 intervals: interval 1, interval 2 which is 
fully contained in 1 and interval 3 which is fully contained in the complement of 1:  
 
(14)  |__1_________________|_____ 1____________________| 
|_____2_____|__ 2________________________________| 
|______ 3_______________________|_____3__________| 
 
The propositions that Mary knows whether her height is in I1 and that Mary knows 
whether her height is in I2 and that Mary knows whether her height is in I3 do not entail 
each other. Thus, asserting that Mary knows whether her height be in I1 as a complete 
answer would amount to asserting the conjunction that she knows whether her height 
should be in I1 and that she does not know whether her height should be in I2 or I3: 
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(15)  w‟  Dox M(w),  [if I1(w)=1, I1 (w‟)=1] ∧ [ if  I1(w)=1,  I1 (w‟)=1] 
and    w‟  Dox M(w), (I2 (w)=1  ∧  I2  (w‟)=1) ∨  (  I2 (w)=1 ∧  I2  (w‟)=1) 
and    w‟  Dox M(w), (I3 (w)=1  ∧  I3  (w‟)=1) ∨  (  I3 (w)=1 ∧  I3  (w‟)=1) 
 
However, the problem is that the meaning expressed by this tentative complete answer 
above is not coherent. Suppose first that Mary‟s height is in I1. The complete answer 
states that Mary does not know that her height is in I3, i.e. in the complement of 
interval I3. From this it follows that for any interval contained in I3, Mary does not 
know that her height is in it. Interval I1 is contained in interval I3. But now we have 
derived that the complete answer states a contradiction: this is because it states that 
Mary knows that her height is in I1 and that she does not know that her height is in 
I3, which is a contradiction. We might illustrate the contradiction that arises with the 
following: 
 
(16)  #Mary knows whether her height is btw 0 and 5 or between 5 and 10 
but  She does not know whether her height is btw 0 and 3 or between 3 and 10 
and She does not know whether her height is btw 0 and 7 or between 7 and 10 
 
It is easy to see that if Mary‟s height had to be in the complement of interval I1 the 
same problem is recreated, but this time with interval I2. 
 
Embedded whether questions with wonder–type predicates about degrees       As a 
first pass, let‟s assume (cf. e.g. Lahiri (2002), Guerzoni and Sharvit (2004)), that the 
lexical semantics of wonder is the following: 
 
(17)  wonder (w) (x, QH(w)) is defined iff p QH(w) ,  x believe p  
if defined, wonder (w) (x, QH(w)) is true iff  
p QH(w) , x  wants-to-know whether p in w  
 
Let‟s spell out what it means if x wants to know whether p. Using a Hintikka-style 
semantics for attitude verbs such a meaning could be expressed as follows: 
 
(18)  „x wants-to-know whether p in w  ’  is true in w iff 
for w‟  Bulx (w),  if p(w)=1,  x knows p in w‟  
                          and if p(w)=0, x knows p in w‟ 
,where Bulx (w) ={w‟ W: x‟s desires in w are satisfied in w‟} 
„in every world in which x‟s desires are satisfied, if p, x knows that p  
and if not p, x knows that not p‟ 
 
Given this meaning, the meaning of question where a degree phrase moves out from 
the complement of wonder will be as follows:  
 
(19)  a. *How tall does Mary wonder whether to be? 
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b. λq. I [I DI ∧  q=λw. wonders (Mary, λp.[p=λw‟. herm height   
          be in I in w‟ ∨ p=λw‟.  herm height be in I in w‟ ]) in w 
 
Informally, we might represent the set described above as {that Mary wonders whether 
her height should be in I1, that Mary wonders whether her height should be in I2, that 
Mary wonders whether her height should be in I3, etc, for all intervals in DI}. 
Somewhat more precisely we might represent it as below: (Notice that if one wonders 
whether her height is not in an interval I equals her wondering about her height being 
in the complement of that interval in a given domain, which I represent as I.) 
 
(20)  { w‟  BulM(w), if I1w, M knows I1 in w’ ∧  if  I1w, M knows  I1  in w’, 
 w‟  BulM(w), if I2w, M knows I2 in w’ ∧  if  I2w, M knows  I2  in w’, 
 w‟  BulM(w), if I3w, M knows I3 in w’ ∧  if  I3w, M knows  I3  in w’, 
        etc. for all intervals in DI} 
  ,where Inw is a notational shorthand for Mary’s height should be in In in w. 
 
Imagine now that we were to state Mary wonders whether her height should be in I1 as 
a complete answer. Now let‟s again take 3 intervals as follows: interval 1, interval 2 
which is fully contained in 1 and interval 3 which is fully contained in the complement 
of interval 1:  
 
(21)  |__1_________________|_____ 1____________________| 
|_____2_____|__ 2________________________________| 
|______ 3_______________________|_____3__________| 
 
Asserting that Mary wonders whether her height should be in I1 as a complete answer 
would amount to asserting the conjunction that she wonders whether her height should 
be in I1 and that she does not wonder whether her height should be in I2 or I3: 
 
(22)  w‟  BulM(w), if I1w, M knows I1 in w’ ∧  if  I1w, M knows  I1  in w’, 
and w‟  BulM(w), (I2w ∧ M know I2 in w’) ∨  (  I2w ∧ M know  I2  in w’) 
and w‟  BulM(w), (I3w ∧ M know I3 in w’) ∨  (  I3w ∧ M know  I3  in w’) 
 
However, again the meaning expressed by the tentative complete answer above is not 
coherent.  Suppose first that Mary‟s height has to be in I1. Then the complete answer 
states that in her desire worlds, Mary does not know that her height is in I3, i.e. the 
complement of interval I3. From this it follows, that for any interval contained in I3, 
Mary does not know that her height is in it. Interval I1 is contained in interval I3. But 
now we have derived that the complete answer states a contradiction: this is because it 
states that in her desire worlds, Mary knows that her height is in I1 and that she does 
not know that her height is in I3, which is a contradiction. Finally, it is easy to see 
that if Mary‟s height had to be in the complement of interval I1, the same problem 
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would be recreated, but this time with interval I2. We might again illustrate the 
contradiction that arises with the following: 
 
(23)  #Mary wants to know whether her height is btw 0 and 5 or between 5 and 10   
but  She doesn‟t want to know whether her height is btw 0 and 3 or btw 3 and 10 
and She doesn‟t want to know whether her height is btw 0 and 7 or btw 7 and 10 
 
Interestingly, for both false alternatives, it would have been consistent with the 
meaning of p to exclude them, but trying to exclude them both at the same time leads 
to contradiction. Notice that this property connects in a straightforward way to the 
generalization made in Fox (2007) about non-exhaustifiable sets of alternatives.  
 
3.2 Embedded Constituent Questions 
Not only embedded whether-constituents, but also embedded constituent questions are 
wh-islands, as the examples below show: 
 
(24)  a. ?Which problem does Mary know how to solve? 
*How tall does Mary know who should be? b. 
 
The unacceptability of (24)b and similar questions can be reduced to the problem that 
lead to the unacceptability of embedded whether questions in the previous section. 
First, observe that the Hamblin-denotation of (24)b is as below: 
 
(25)  λq. I [I DI  ∧ q=λw. knows (Mary, λp. x [p=λw‟. x‟s height should be in 
I in w‟]) in w 
 
Informally, the meaning above might be schematized as below: 
 
(26)  {that Mary knows about Q1,  that Mary knows about Q2} 
 
Imagine that there are 3 individuals in the domain A, B and C, and 3 intervals: interval 
1, interval 2 which is fully contained in 1 and interval 3 which is fully contained in the 
complement of 1, exactly as was assumed in (21) above. Then the informal 
representation of the denotation of the question above could be as follows: 
 
(27)  {that Mary knows (for which x {A,B,C}, x‟s height is in I1) 
  that Mary knows (for which x {A,B,C}, x‟s height is in I2)  
  that Mary knows (for which x {A,B,C}, x‟s height is in I3) } 
 
Recall that the strongly exhaustive meaning for the question embedding predicate 
know places a constraint on the true as well as the false alternatives. Given this, our 
question denotation equals the following set of propositions: 
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(28)  {that M.knows{whetherA‟s height I1; 
                                                whether B‟s height I1;  
                                                                              whether C‟s height I1 }, 
that M.knows {whether A‟s height I2;  
                                                whether B‟s height I2;  
                                                                              whether C‟s height I2 }, 
that M.knows {whether A‟s height I3 ;  
                                                whether B‟s height I3 ; 
                                                                               whether C‟s height I3}} 
 
Before we proceed, let me insert here a note about negation: It has been already 
observed that the negation of a strongly exhaustive predicate is stronger than expected: 
e.g.  John does not know who came seems to suggest that for no individual does John 
know whether they came. This is surprising because by simple negation we would only 
expect a much weaker meaning, according to which John does not know for everyone 
whether they came. In other words, the question below in (29)a seems to have the 
stonger meaning shown in (29)b instead of the predicted weaker (29)c: 
 
(29)  a. John does not know who came 
 b. p QH(w) ,  John does not know whether p 
 c. p QH(w) ,  John knows whether p 
 
In the discussion that follows I will take this fact at face value, without providing an 
explanation. Given this, the complete answer conjoins the most informative true 
answer with the strengthened negation of the false alternatives. Now, a complete 
answer Mary knows who should be I1-tall will state: 
 
(30)  that M. knows whether A’s height I1  
                     & that M knows whether B‟s height I1  
& that M knows C’s height I1, 
&  that M. know whether A’s height I2  
                      &  that M  know whether B‟s height I2  
     &  that M  know whether C’s height I2 , 
& that M know  whether A’s height I3  
                      & that M know whether B‟s height I3  
      & that M  know whether C’s height I3  
 
Looking more closely at the set of propositions above, we can observe that exactly the 
same problem that arose with the embedded whether questions is recreated, but 
multiply! Observe that each boxed part below corresponds to an embedded 
contradictory whether question:  
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(31)  
 
  that M   knows if A’s height I1      &  that M knows if B‟s height I1       &   that M knows if C’s height I1 
 & that M know  if A’s height I2   &  that M know if  B‟s height I2    &   that M know if C’s height I2  
 & that M know  if A’s height I3    &  that M know if B‟s height I3    &   that M  know if C’s height I3  
 
 
Thus the problem of embedded constituent questions simply reduces to the problem of 
embedded whether questions, which have been argued to always lead to a 
contradiction in the previous section.   
 
4 Questions about Manners 
I will assume following Abrusán (2007) that the domain of manners contains 
contraries as described below:   
 
(32)  Manners denote functions from events to truth values. The set of manners 
(DM) in a context C is a subset of [{f | E{1,0}}= (E)] such that for 
each predicate of manners P DM, there is at least one contrary predicate 
of manners P‟ DM, such that P and P‟ do not overlap: P P‟ = .  
 
Second, although the context might implicitly restrict the domain of manners, just as 
the domain of individuals, but for any manner predicate P, its contrary predicates will 
be alternatives to it in any context, e.g. wisely, unwisely.  Finally, we might observe 
that the law of excluded middle does not hold for manners: for each pair (P, P‟), where 
P is a manner predicate and P‟is a contrary of P, and P DM and P‟ DM, there is a set 
of events  P
M 
DM, such that for every event e in P
M
 DM [e P DM  & e P‟ DM ]. 
Let‟s first observe that unfortunately the account proposed for degree questions 
above does not go through in a straightforward way for manner questions. In analogy 
with the intervals that we have used for degrees, we might think of contrary manner 
predicates as exclusive sets of events. Suppose now that the domain of manners 
contains three exclusive sets of events, i.e. three contrary predicates, e.g. the politely, 
impolitely, and neither politely and impolitely, which I represent as med-politely 
below. Now, the sets of events that are politely-events, the sets of events that are 
impolitely-events and the sets of events that are med-politely-events and the events that 
are in the complement set of these can be represented as follows: 
 
(33)  |  med.politely_____|___med.pol______|_ med.politely___ __| 
|     politely________ |_________________  politely_________| 
|   impolitely_______________________|_____impolitely____| 
 
Take now an example of a wh-island that arises if we attempt to move the manner-
expression out of the embedded interrogative: 
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(34)  a. *How does Mary know whether to behave? 
 b. λq. α [manner(α)∧  q=λw. knows (Mary, λp.[p=λw‟. shem       
      behave in α  in w‟ ∨ p=λw‟. shem not behave in  α  in w‟]) in w 
 
Assuming that our domain of manners is {politely, impolitely med-politely}, we might 
informally represent the Hamblin denotation of this question as {that Mary knows 
whether to behave politely, that Mary knows whether to behave impolitely, that Mary 
knows whether to behave med-politely , …}. A word of caution is in order. Notice that 
given this small domain, the set of alternatives is not the singular set {that Mary 
knows whether to (behave politely, behave impolitely, behave med-politely)}. This is 
because given the regular meaning of whether, this is simply not what we get 
compositionally. Given some proposition p, whether p, as defined in the previous 
section, gives us the set consisting of p and its complement proposition p: i.e. 
{p, p}. Whether p cannot denote the set of propositions that we would get by 
replacing a manner predicate m that p contains by all the contraries to m in the domain, 
which is what the second option would amount to in this case. Of course, the set we 
derive seems a little bit strange, but that is part of the point being made here. By the 
rules of semantic composition we only get this strange set.  
Suppose we tried to assert Mary knows whether to behave politely as a 
complete answer. If Mary has to behave politely, than her behavior will also be not 
impolite and not medium polite, therefore in her belief worlds if the event was a 
politely-event Mary will know that it was not an impolitely-event and not a med-
politely event, in other words it would be inconsistent for Mary to know that the event 
was polite, but not to know that it was also not-impolite and not-medium polite. As a 
consequence, it is not consistent with the complete answer that the event be polite. 
However, if the event in question is not a polite one, this is still consistent with it not 
being impolite (as it might be medium polite) and with it not being medium polite (as 
it might be impolite). Therefore, it will be coherent for Mary to know that the event 
was not polite, but not to know whether it was impolite or medium polite. Therefore, 
unlike what we have seen above in connection with manner questions, the complete 
answer above does not state a contradiction. However, we still might observe 
something unusual. While this complete answer is not contradictory, it is nevertheless 
contextually equivalent to its counterpart with an embedded declarative: 
 
(35)  Mary knows that she should not behave impolitely. 
 
This is because, as we have seen above, polite behavior would have resulted in an 
inconsistent state of beliefs, but impolite behavior would not have. It is easy to see, 
that given our earlier assumptions about the domain of contraries this observation 
generalizes to any complete answer to the question. However, now we might say that 
the problem with the question is that all of its complete answers are contextually 
equivalent to sentences which have a stronger presupposition, and therefore the 
question itself will be ruled out as violation of the principle of Maximize 
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Presupposition!
7
. Notice that a complete answer such as (36)a stands with a vacuous 
presupposition, but its counterpart with an embedded declarative in (36)b stands with a 
contentful presupposition: 
 
(36)  a.  Mary knows whether to behave  politely.      (vacuous presupp.: p ∨  p) 
 b. Mary knows that she should not behave politely    (presupposition:  p) 
 
Roughly speaking, the principle of Maximize Presupposition! requires that if we have 
two alternatives which are contextually equivalent, but one of them comes with a 
stronger presupposition, we are required to use the one with the stronger 
presupposition. (But cf. Heim (1991), Sauerland (2003), Percus (2006), Schlenker 
(2008) for a number of different ways of spelling out this principle in a more precise 
fashion.) Given this principle, any complete answer to our question will be ruled out in 
a systematic way as a violation of the principle of Maximize Presupposition. Finally, 
for any question, if we are in a position to know in advance that every complete 
answer to it will be ruled out then the question is infelicitous. 
 In the case of question embedding predicates such as wonder, the situation is 
again a bit different. This is because question embedding predicates such as wonder 
cannot in fact embed a declarative clause, as it is shown in the example below: 
 
(37)  *How do you wonder whether to solve the problem? 
a. I wonder whether you should solve this problem fast  
#I wonder that you should solve this problem fast  b. 
    
Therefore, although the meaning of the complete answer is still predicted to be 
contextually equivalent to a sentence with an embedded declarative, the embedded 
declarative is independently unacceptable and the explanation for the unacceptability 
of the question in (37) cannot rely on the principle of Maximize Presupposition. 
However, I would like to suggest that now the problem with the complete answer is in 
fact the same that makes it impossible for question-embedding predicates such as 
wonder to take declarative complements: Since it is the essential part of the lexical 
meaning of wonder-type verbs that they express a mental questioning act, a declarative 
complement (or a complement that is contextually equivalent to declarative one) is 
simply incompatible with the lexical meaning of wonder. It is for this reason then, that 
that both the embedded declarative, as well any complete answer to (37) above is 
unacceptable. 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that wh-islands are unacceptable because they cannot have 
a complete (exhaustive) answer. In the case of degree questions, the complete answer 
was shown to express a contradiction, given the assumption that degree questions 
                                                 
7
 I am indebted to E. Chemla (pc) for this suggestion. 
60    Márta Abrusán 
 
 
range over intervals. In the case of manner questions the problem arose from the fact 
that a complete answer to these questions was predicted to be equivalent to a sentence 
with an embedded declarative, which was either a violation of the principle of 
Maximize Presupposition!, as in the case of question embedding predicates such as 
know, or simply incompatible with the meaning of the question embedding predicate, 
which was argued to be the case with predicates such as wonder. 
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Abstract
This paper proposes an account of the interpretation of ‘only’ in the antecedents of
indicative conditionals. Our concern lies with the implication from a conditional
of the form if (only φ), ψ to its ‘only’ -less counterpart if φ, ψ: when and why it is
warranted. We argue that the pragmatic relationship of scalar upward monotonicity
determines its availability. Two factors serve as license. First, it may arise by virtue
of a language user’s pre-existing world knowledge. Second, it may manifest when
it constitutes the most informative reading of the conditional available. We discuss
one case in point; namely, its appearance when the consequent is desirable.
1 Introduction
Some, but not all conditionals with ‘only’ in the antecedent license the inference to their
‘only’ -less counterparts. Thus (1) implies that doing his homework will ensure that
Chris passes the class. By contrast, (2) does not convey that Chris’s doing his homework
will ensure that he fails the class.1
(1) a. If Chris only [does his homework]F , he will pass the class.
b. ; If Chris does his homework, he will pass the class.
(2) a. If Chris only [does his homework]F , he will fail the class.
b. 6; If Chris does his homework, he will fail the class.
The goal of this paper is to explain when and why the implication from ‘if only
φ, ψ’ to ‘if φ, ψ’ holds. Our analysis relies on three main ingredients. The first is the
scalarity of ‘only’ in cases in which the inference is licensed. Intuitively, both the avail-
ability of the inference in (1) and its absence in (2) rely on a construal of the situation
in which doing his homework and nothing else is at the “low end,” in terms of effort or
cost, of the list of things Chris might do to secure his success in the class. Formally, we
argue that the inference, where available, relies in part on an ordering relation between
the alternatives invoked by ‘only’ . The second ingredient is a relation between this order
1The bracketing indicates the location of focus; see Section 4 below for details.
Arndt Riester & Torgrim Solstad (eds.)
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on the one hand, and the truth of the consequent of the conditional, on the other. Simply
put, the question is whether, assuming that the alternative antecedents are ranked in terms
of effort, the consequent becomes more likely by moving up or down the scale. In the
above examples, it is reasonable to assume that expending more effort will make the con-
sequent more likely in (1) but not in (2).2 We refer to this relationship as scalar (upward
or downward) monotonicity. It is distinct from the familiar up/downward monotonicity
in terms of entailment: Although we assume that ‘Chris only does his homework’ en-
tails ‘Chris does his homework’ (see Section 4), we will whos in the next section that
the effects of scalar monotonicity are not limited to such cases.
It is evident from the above remarks that both of the first two ingredients – the
scalarity of ‘only’ and the scalar monotonicity between the alternative antecedents and
the consequent – crucially depend on the content of the conditional’s constituents. Thus
not surprisingly, background world knowledge plays an important role in explaining
when and why the inference goes through. The third ingredient of our account goes
beyond the immediate goal of explaining the inference in cases in which these relations
are common knowledge. Here we show that one can run the account “backwards,” so to
speak, and infer from the fact that the speaker chose to use the conditional with ‘only’ in
the antecedent, rather than its ‘only’ -less counterpart, that the requisite scalar relations
hold. This reasoning crucially relies on two elements: the assumption that the speaker is
being helpful, and common knowledge as to whether the consequent is desirable or not.
We discuss the data in some more detail in Section 2. Following that, we prepare
the ground for our account by laying out our assumption about the semantics of the main
ingredients: conditionals (Section 3) and ‘only’ (Section 4). We then spell out the main
ingredients, specifically scalar monotonicity, in Section 5. Section 6 is devoted to the
role of the desirability of the consequent. We conclude with Section 7.
2 Data
We first point out that the conditionals we are dealing with here are ones in which ‘only’
is embedded inside the antecedent. This is the case for (1) and (2) above, as well as for
the examples below. Our analysis does not apply to conditionals with ‘only’ in other
positions, such as (3).
(3) Only if Chris does his homework will he pass the class.
The analysis does apply to sentences like (4), however. We realize that an ut-
terance of (4), in addition to making an assertion about Chris’s situation, carries an
“evaluative” connotation on the part of the speaker to the effect that Chris’s success is
important to him or her. Our analysis does not explain this connotation, but we believe
that crucial parts of our analysis are prerequisites for an understanding of it.
(4) If only Chris does his homework, he will pass the class.
2In fact, is seems plausible that more effort makes the consequent less likely in (2).
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As we mentioned above, one main ingredient of our account is what we call
scalar monotonicity. We first take a look at its upward version – scalar upward mono-
tonicity, or ‘SUM’ – in more detail, previewing the main ideas of our analysis along
the way. We construe the SUM relationship as resting on two components: a scale con-
sisting of a set of alternative antecedents and an ordering on this set; and an upward
monotonic relationship between the values on the scale and the consequent. Given these
components, SUM holds if and only if: if the consequent is true for some element of the
scale, then it is also true for all higher-ranked elements. The case of scalar downward
monotonicity is similar.
‘Only’ facilitates the inference by making a scale salient, but is not itself essen-
tial. A scale may also arise implicitly from the context. Thus the inferences in (5) and (6)
go through despite the absence of ‘only’ .
(5) a. If Chris passes the final, he will pass the class.
b. ; If Chris gets a “B+” on the final, he will pass the class.
(6) a. If Chris gets a “B+” on the final, he will fail the class.
b. ; If Chris fails the final, he will fail the class.
On occasion, particular lexical items used in the conditionals in question draw
attention to a scale. Thus in (7) and (8), it is the cardinals and gradable adjectives,
respectively, that invoke the scale in virtue of their lexical semantics.
(7) a. If you have five dollars, you can buy a medium coffee.
b. ; If you have more than five dollars, you can buy a medium coffee.
(8) a. If you are a lazy student, you will pass the class.
b. ; If you are a hard-working student, you will pass the class.
That the availability of the inference indeed depends on the content of the condi-
tional rather than its logical form is indicated by the reversal of the pattern in (1-a) when
the antecedent belongs to a scale of activities which cumulatively lead to failing rather
than passing the class.
(9) a. If Chris only [skips the exam]F , he will pass the class.
b. 6; If Chris skips the exam, he will pass the class.
(10) a. If Chris only [skips the exam]F , he will fail the class.
b. ; If Chris skips the exam, he will fail the class.
As mentioned above, we identify two general reasons that scalar monotonicity
might manifest. One may know that the relationship holds by virtue of one’s pre-existing
knowledge of how the world works. Alternatively, an attempt to derive as informative
an interpretation of the conditional as possible may lead one to infer that it holds even
in the absence of any supporting world knowledge. The role of informativeness is made
plain by its interaction with the desirability consequent. It is possible to infer from the
mere fact that the speaker chose to assert ‘if (only φ), ψ’ that a SUM relationship holds,
hence ‘if φ, ψ’ can be inferred, without knowing so in advance. We observe this with
the following conditionals, which fail to provide, at first glance, either a notion of the
relevant alternatives to ‘florp’ , nor a dimension along which to rank those alternatives,
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nor a sense of how the resulting scale relates to the consequent. However, the reader
may verify for herself that the second-person subject greatly facilitates the availability
of these judgments.
(11) a. If you only [florp]F , you will win a hundred dollars.
b. ; If you florps, you will win a hundred dollars.
(12) a. If you only [florp]F , you will lose a hundred dollars.
b. 6; If you florp, you will lose a hundred dollars.
3 Conditionals and Modality
We follow Lewis (1975) and Kratzer (1981) in treating conditionals of the form if φ, ψ
as modal expressions. Our assumptions for this paper are very simple: Syntactically, a
conditional is composed of a matrix clause and an adverbial headed by ‘if’ . We refer
to the adverbial clause as the antecedent and to the matrix clause as the consequent.
Semantically, ‘if’ introduces a modal operator, restricted by the antecedent, that scopes
over the consequent.3
The semantic analysis of modal expressions that we adopt is that of Kratzer
(1981, 1991; see also Kaufmann, 2005b; Kaufmann et al, 2006; Portner, 2009). Modal
operators are interpreted relative to two parameters, amodal base and an ordering source.
Both are conversational backgrounds – formally, functions from possible worlds to sets
of propositions (i.e., sets of sets of possible worlds.) The modal base provides the domain
of modal quantification and determines the kind of modality (e.g., epistemic, doxastic,
deontic etc.), analogously to the accessibility relations familiar from modal logic. More
specifically, from the perspective of a world w of evaluation and a modal base f , the
worlds in the intersection
T
f (w) play the same role as those accessible from w via the
corresponding accessibility relation. However, within this set of accessible worlds, some
may be more salient, likely, or otherwise relevant to the truth of the conditional than oth-
ers. This is incorporated by ranking worlds according to their “goodness” with respect
to the propositions provided by the ordering source.
Definition 1 (Frame) A frame is a structure 〈W, f ,g〉 where W is a non-empty set of
worlds and f and g are conversational backgrounds, i.e., functions from worlds to sets
of propositions.
Definition 2 (Accessibility relation) Given a frame 〈W, f ,g〉, the accessibility relation
R f determined by f defined as follows: For all w,w′ ∈W , wR fw′ iff w′ ∈T f (w).
Definition 3 (Relative likelihood) Given a frame 〈W, f ,g〉, the relative likelihood order
determined by g is a three-place relation ≤ onW defined as follows: For all w,w′,w′′ ∈
W ,
w′ ≤g(w) w′′ iff {p|w′′ ∈ p∧ p ∈ g(w)} ⊆ {p|w′ ∈ p∧ p ∈ g(w)}
3This treatment is too simplistic to account for certain facts. For instance, there is good evidence
that the modal operator is not introduced by ‘if’ , but by tense. For this and related ideas, see Kaufmann
(2005a).
‘Only’ and Monotonicity in Conditionals 67
It is easy to show that ≤g(w) is transitive and reflexive.
For simplicity, we illustrate with a language LA , which for now is simply the
language of standard propositional logic built on a set A of propositional variables. We
extend it with a modal operator below.
Definition 4 (Model) A model for a language LA is a structure 〈W, f ,g,JK〉 such that
〈W, f ,g〉 is a frame and J·K : LA 7→ (W 7→ {0,1}) is a valuation function mapping propo-
sitional variables and their Boolean compounds to (characteristic functions of) subsets
ofW .
As mentioned above, we treat conditionals as modal expressions and assume,
following Kratzer, that their interpretation depends not only on the modal base, but also
on the ordering source. The main role of the ordering source here is to provide the formal
basis for a weaker notion of necessity (and a stronger notion of possibility) than that
afforded by standard necessity and possibility operators. Kratzer refers to these modal
forces as human necessity and human possibility, respectively. The idea is to make
certain worlds in the modal base irrelevant to the interpretation of modal expressions.
The worlds made irrelevant are those that are strictly “outranked” by others with respect
to some contexually salient criterion (plausibility, likelihood, normalcy). The relevant
ranking is given by the ordering source, formally represented as a world-dependent pre-
order on the set of possible worlds, defined in Definition 3 above. Human necessity is
defined with reference to this order as in Definition 5. Human possibility is its dual.
Definition 5 (Human necessity) The notion of human necessity is defined as follows:
For all w ∈ W and φ,ψ ∈ LA : J(φ)(ψ)KM,w = 1 iff for all w′ in T f (w) such thatJφKM,w′ = 1, there is some w′′ in T f (w) such that JφKM,w′′ = 1 and w′′ ≤g(w) w′ and for
all w′′′ in
T
f (w) such that JφKM,w′′′ = 1 and w′′′ ≤g(w) w′′), JψKM,w′′′ = 1.
Notice that the syntactic form employed in Definition 5 assumes that is a binary
operator. We follow a convention common in linguistics and refer to its two arguments
φ and ψ as its restrictor and its scope, respectively. Typically, for simple sentences
involving human necessity modals, the restrictor is semantically inert, and the relevant
set of worlds is simply
T
f (w). We may account for this by assuming that in the absence
of any overt information about the restrictor, the constant function λw.1 is inserted by
default.
In the case of conditionals, we follow Kratzer’s assumption that a covert human-
necessity modal is present by default (although that modal force can be overridden by
overt modal expressions). Here, the ‘if’ -clause does contribute explicit information
about the restrictor, while the consequent serves as the scope. The relevant domain
of modal quantification, then, consists of those worlds in the modal base where the an-
tecedent holds. Thus we interpret a conditional ‘if φ, ψ’ as (φ)(ψ).
(13) if′ = λφλψ (φ)(ψ)
The reason why we use human necessity in the semantics of ‘if’ rather than strict
necessity is that human necessity better captures our intuitions about the inferences avail-
able with conditionals. In particular, we avoid licensing strengthening of the antecedent.
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With strict necessity, we would incorrectly predict that if φ, ψ entails if (φ∧ γ), ψ, for
any γ. Human necessity avoids this problem because the ideal (φ∧γ)-worlds relevant for
the latter need not be a subset of the φ-worlds relevant for the former. Accordingly, the
latter may ψ-worlds while the former are not.
Most relevant for our purposes is that human necessity blocks the entailment
from if φ, ψ to if (only φ), ψ. The intuitive notion is that the “stereotypical” ways of
doing φmay make propositions true that are denied by only φ. For instance, an utterer of
(1-b) might take for granted that typically, students who complete their homework also
attend class. However, a speaker of (1-a) may have in mind that doing one’s homework is
sufficient for passing without any further effort. Clearly (1-b) does not entail (1-a) under
these conditions. Nevertheless, a classical account of indicative conditional meaning
would predict the entailment from if φ, ψ to if (only φ), ψ under the assumption (which
we make – see below) that (only φ) entails φ. Using human necessity as the modal
operator correctly allows the implication to fail.
4 Focus and ‘Only’
With a semantics for conditionals and modality in hand, we can now discuss ‘only’ . We
begin with a bare-bones and intuitive account of ‘only’ , and proceed to refine this by
appeal to notions of information structure and then finally scalarity.
‘Only’ is commonly analyzed as bearing two distinct semantic components, its
positive and its negative contribution. The prejacent of a sentence containing ‘only’ is
what remains after removing ‘only’ . Thus in (14), the prejacent is (14-a). The positive
contribution is the proposition denoted by the prejacent. The negative contribution is
the negation of a number of alternative propositions derived in a certain systematic way
which relies on a bipartition of the prejacent into two parts, typically referred to as focus
and background.
(14) Only Bill slept.
a. Bill slept.
b. {Mary slept, Sue slept, Bill and Mary slept, . . . }
Simply put, the alternatives are derived by substituting alternative values for the
focus (subject to pragmatic factors such as domain restriction) while holding the back-
ground constant. In (14), the focus is ‘Bill’ and the background is ‘slept’ . Thus the
alternatives are propositions which assert of various individual(s) that it/they slept. It is
usually assumed that the prejacent is itself one of the alternatives (Rooth, 1992). The
negative contribution is the denial of all alternatives other than the prejacent (Horn,
1996).
It is generally agreed that the negative contribution is an entailment, but there
is some debate over whether the positive contribution is implicated, presupposed, or
entailed. Without committing ourselves irrevocably to either of these positions, we see
good reasons for taking the latter route and assuming that the positive contribution, like
the negative one, is an entailment. If it were an implicature, then ‘only p’ would literally
mean that among the alternatives, at most p is true, but it would be consistent with the
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falsehood of p. This would result in the wrong predictions about the conditionals we are
concerned with: ‘Chris only does his homework’ would be equivalent to ‘Chris does at
most his homework’ , leading to truth conditions for (1-a) and (2-a) that are too strong.4
On the other hand, if the positive contribution were a presupposition, we would expect
it to project out of the antecedent, but we see no evidence for that. Thus we assume, at
least for the purposes of this paper, that both the positive and the negative contribution
are entailed.
We note in passing that while the focus is generally marked by accent placement,
the relationship between prosodic accent and semantic focus is not one-to-one and me-
diated in the standard theoretical approach by an abstract syntactic feature ‘F’. Thus for
instance, while the focus marking in (15) would be unambiguously expressed by placing
the nuclear pitch accent on ‘walked’ and ‘dog’ , respectively, an accent placement on
‘dog’ would be compatible with all three focus markings in (16).
(15) a. John only [walked]F his dog
b. John only walked [his]F dog
(16) a. John only [walked his dog]F
b. John only walked [his dog]F
c. John only walked his [dog]F
The relationship between accent placement and F-marking is the object of a long-
standing line of investigation and continues to be debated (Schwarzschild, 1999; Selkirk,
2001; German et al, 2006, among others). An exploration of this topic would lead us too
far afield. Instead, for the purposes of this paper, we simply assume that the F-marking
in the antecedents in question is given. F-marked constituents are treated as the focus,
while the remainder of the clause constitutes the background.
The interpretation of ‘only’ sketched above can be made precise within a Struc-
tured Meanings representation (Krifka, 1991, 1995). We assume that ‘only’ syntacti-
cally takes sentential scope and applies to an entire structured meaning. Formally, we
may represent it as in (17).5
(17) (Preliminary version)
only′ = λ〈F,B,A〉[B(F)∧∀X [(X ∈ A∧B(X))→ X = F ]]
To illustrate, the sentence in (18-a), with F-marking as indicated, is interpreted
as (18-b), which given the denotation in (17) simplifies to (18-c).
4One way to avoid this undesirable result while maintaining that the prejacent is an implicature would
be to claim that this implicature is compiled into the literal meaning as part of the interpretation of the
antecedent. Such a view would not be without precedent (Chierchia, 2004), but we will not explore it any
futher here.
5Notice that while we assume that ‘only’ composes with a structured meaning, the result is not a
structured meaning again. Thus the dentotation in (17) does not allow other focus-sensitive expressions
“higher up” to associate with a focus in the same clause. See Krifka (1991) for a solution to this problem,
which we sidestep here because it is orthogonal to our concerns.
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(18) a. John only [did his homework]F
b. only′
〈λx.do-hw(x),λP.P( j),

λx.attend(x),
λx.pass-final(x),
λx.do-hw(x), . . .

〉
c. do-hw( j)∧∀X

X ∈

λx.attend(x),
λx.pass-final(x),
λx.do-hw(x), . . .

∧X( j)
→ X = λx.do-hw(x)

The above denotation for ‘only’ denies that alternatives other than the focus
truthfully combine with the background. However, not all sentences with ‘only’ seem
to make so strong a claim. On occasion, the background may truthfully apply to other
alternatives. This happens when ‘only’ bears a scalar tinge: In this case, the alternatives
whose truth is not denied are “lesser” in some sense than the focus. For illustration,
imagine a selection of lunch choices ordered by size, as in (19-c). A truthful utterance
of (19-a) assuredly conveys that John did not eat a hamburger, but need not deny that he
had a handful of raisins. There are two distinct readings: on the first, John ate nothing
other than an apple; on the second, John ate nothing more than an apple. The data is
clearer if we imagine (19-a) as a response to either ‘Did John eat any items from the
refridgerator for lunch?’ or ‘Why does John look so famished?’ .
(19) a. John only ate [an apple]F for lunch
b. Focus alternatives to ‘apple’ : {apple, raisins, pear, cheeseburger}
c. 〈raisins  {pear, apple}  cheeseburger〉
Debate lingers over the nature of this scalar reading. One possible approach is to
explain it as a restriction on the set of alternatives, stipulating that raisins fails to count
as an alternative. However, this misses the fact that even among potential alternatives
that are excluded for pragmatic reasons, there is an asymmetry between higher-ranked
ones and lower-ranked ones: The former are still denied (counterfactually, as it were) in
a way the latter are not. For instance, one does not typically think of steak as a luncheon
choice, but (19-c) certainly seems to deny that John ate steak for lunch. Alternatively, the
optionality of the scalar reading might suggest that ‘only’ is ambiguous. This approach
gains traction from the presence of similar accounts for ‘even’ . However, although there
may be good reasons for taking this approach in the case of ‘even’ , parsimony demands
that we consider this a last resort. In the case of ‘only’ , several authors (e.g., Bonomi
and Casalegno, 1992; Beaver, 2004; van Rooij, 2002) have demonstrated that a uniform
scalar denotation for ‘only’ is sufficient. On such an implementation, ‘only’ conveys
that the combination of the background and higher-ranked alternatives is false, but cru-
cially makes no claims about the combination of the background with lower-ranked al-
ternatives. The appropriate scale is determined by a contextually given dimension for
ranking the alternatives. In the default case, the relevant scale is the semi-lattice of the
alternatives with conjunction, thus the relevant “scale” in that case is that of entailment.
Under this approach, we can always assume that a scale ranked by a pre-order 
is available. This allows for a unified account of ‘only’ along the lines of (20).
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(20) only′ = λ〈F,B,A〉[B(F)∧∀X [(X ∈ A∧B(X))→ B(X) B(F)]]
Notice that here we compare B(X) and B(F), rather than just X and F as in (17)
above. The reason for this is that we assume that the scale in question is uniformly one
of propositions. In (17), the difference did not matter since if X = F , then B(X) = B(F).
However, since Bmay itself contribute to the scalar ordering (e.g., the scale gets reversed
if B contains a negation), from X ≺ F it does not follow that B(X)≺ B(F), and it is the
latter that counts for the truth of the sentence.
4.1 ‘Only’ in conditional antecedents
The composition of ‘only’ within the antecedent of a conditional offers no surprises.
Intuitively, the result is an interpretation of ‘if only φ, ψ’ as ‘if φ and no more than φ,
ψ’ . Importantly, ψ is not ruled out if ‘more than φ’ is true. This means that, borrowing
from (1), Chris may do other things and still pass the class.
(21) if′(only 〈F,B,A〉)(ψ) =(only′〈F,B,A〉)(ψ)
=(B(F)∧∀X [(X ∈ A∧B(X))→ B(X) B(F)])(ψ)
5 Scalar Monotonicity and ‘Only’
The implication from if (only φ), ψ to if φ, ψ prompted our excursion into the interpre-
tation of ‘only’ conditional antecedents. The implication is present for some condition-
als, but absent for others. Our paper explores why the particular asymmetry exists and
what might explain it. The answer we arrive at is that the implication is governed by a
pragmatically-determined scalar relationship between the antecedent and the consequent
of a conditional. Before we go into nature of this relationship, we briefly mention why
we discard entailment and ambiguity in ‘only’ as possible explanations. Then, in the re-
mainder of the paper we discuss the role of scalar monotonicity. There are four parts to
our discussion. First, we offer a description of what it is to be SUM. Second, we discuss
how scalar monotoniciy accounts for the implication arising in (1). Third, we supply
an explanation of the conditions under which the SUM relationship arises. Lastly, we
discuss how the SUM reading may be informative.
5.1 Against ambiguity and entailment as explanations
Here we consider two possible alternative explanations before proferring our SUM ex-
planation. These are first that ‘only’ is ambiguous between a reading that permits the
implication and one that does not, and second that the relationship is adequately charac-
terized by entailment.
The most straightforward-seeming hypothesis regarding the asymmetry is that
it arises from an ambiguity in the meaning of ‘only’ itself. However, we can account
for our data with a single denotation for ‘only’ , as we argue below. Parsimony, then,
demands that we explain the asymmetry as arising from facts about conditionals rather
than an ambiguity with regard to ‘only’ itself.
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As for entailment, we find that it offers an inadequate description of the relation-
ship between the sentences in (1). Given that the implication in (1) is from a stronger
antecedent to one that it is weaker, it is an instance of an upward monotonic inference
that has never been claimed valid for conditionals.
5.2 Scalar monotonicity characterized
The above observations are made concrete in the examples below. If ‘if Chris only does
his homework, he will pass the class’ is true, then so is the conditional ‘if φ, Chris
will pass the class’ , for all alternatives φ that are higher than than ‘Chris only does his
homework’ on the scale, such as the antecedents in (22-b) and (22-c):
(22) a. If Chris only does his homework, he will pass the class.
b. ; If Chris does his homework, he will pass the class.
c. ; If Chris does his homework and attends class, he will pass the class.
d. 6; If Chris does his homework and gets caught cheating, he will pass the
class.
Working out a formal implementation of this idea is not trivial. Suppose the
scale in question is 〈Φ,〉, and the proposition is ψ. Intuitively, what one would want
is a condition on the distribution of ψ-worlds in the various propositions in Φ, stating
in effect that if ψ is a human necessity relative to some φ ∈ Φ, then it is also a human
necessity relative to all φ′ such that φ φ′.
To see why this is not trivial, notice first that in order for ψ to be a human neces-
sity relative to both φ and φ′, it is not required that ψ be true at all worlds in either φ or
φ′. For as we saw above, it is the very point of human necessity that some worlds in the
restrictor are made irrelevant to the truth of the modal expression. Without this ability,
we would predict that (22-b) entails (22-d) and (22-c), since both instantiate strength-
enings of the antecedent. We also saw that this ability is important for our purposes
because otherwise we could not account for the fact that even though ‘only p’ entails p,
the conditional ‘if p, q’ does not entail ‘if only p, q’ .
So we need a more restricted statement roughly to the effect that if we inevitably
and inescapably end up in ψ-territory by inspecting less and less far-fetched worlds in
φ, then the same is bound to happen when we inspect φ′-worlds in the same manner.
Somewhat more simplified, assuming that there is a set of “best” worlds (technically,
local minima) under ≤g(w) within each φ ∈Φ, if all the “best” worlds in φ are ψ-worlds,
then all the “best” worlds in φ′ are ψ-worlds, too. Stating it in this way is easy enough,
but we would like to go deeper than that by capturing the conditions under which this
outcome is guaranteed in terms of the worlds in φ, φ′, and ψ.
The intuition now is that even though the worlds in φ and φ′ may be distinct, there
is nevertheless a “correspondence” of sorts which determines, for a given world v in φ,
which worlds in φ′ are “at least as good” as v with respect to the ordering source. This
seems straightforward enough, but we cannot be sure that any two worlds in φ and φ′ are
even comparable under≤g(w). For instance, if g(w) contains φ and φ′, then no two worlds
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are comparable in terms of “goodness” across the two propositions.6 As an easy way to
avoid this problem, we simply stipulate that for all worlds w, g(w) consists entirely of
propositions that have non-empty intersections with all propositions in the alternative
set Φ.7 It is important to keep this in mind in reading the following definition:
Definition 6 (Scalar Upward Monotonicity) LetM = 〈W, f ,g〉 be a model and 〈Φ,〉
a scale of propositions such that for all w ∈W and φ ∈ Φ, all propositions in g(w) have
a non-empty intersection with φ. A proposition ψ is scalar upward monotone at a world
w ∈W relative to 〈Φ,〉 if and only if for all φ,φ′ ∈ Φ such that φ  φ′ and all worlds
v ∈ φ,v′ ∈ φ′ such that v′ ≤g(w) v, if z ∈ ψ for all z≤g(w) v, then z′ ∈ ψ for all z′ ≤g(w) v′.
6 Scalar monotonicity and desirability
One factor affecting the availability of the inference concerns the interplay between
scalar monotonicity and the interlocutors’ goals. The relevant examples are repeated
here. The failure of the inference from (2-a) to (2-b), as well as from (9-a) to (9-b) tends
to get strengthened to the conclusion that the (b)-conditional is false.
(1) a. If Chris only [does his homework]F , he will pass the class.
b. ; If Chris does his homework, he will pass the class.
(2) a. If Chris only [does his homework]F , he will fail the class.
b. 6; If Chris does his homework, he will fail the class.
(9) a. If Chris only [skips the exam]F , he will pass the class.
b. 6; If Chris skips the exam, he will pass the class.
(10) a. If Chris only [skips the exam]F , he will fail the class.
b. ; If Chris skips the exam, he will fail the class.
Assuming competence on the part of the speaker, this follows from two assump-
tions: First, it is common knowledge that listeners strive to make choices which lead to
desirable outcomes, and to avoid negative ones, both with minimal effort; and second,
speakers try to impart information that will help listeners in doing so.
For given a scale 〈Φ,≤〉 of alternative antecedents and a consequent q, let A =
{p ∈ Φ|If p, q is true}. Then cooperative speakers will choose ‘If min(A), q’ if q is
scalar increasing in A, as in (1-a) and (10-a), and ‘If max(A), q’ if q is scalar monotone
decreasing in A, as in (2-a) and (9-a) (choosing at random if min(A)/max(A) is not
unique).
Together with the fact that q is desirable in (1-a) and (9-a), the listener expects
the speaker to choose an antecedent that is minimal on its respective scale among those
alternatives for which the conditional is true – for knowing the least costly way to guar-
antee the truth of the consequent is useful both in securing and in preventing the latter.
6Problems arise under weaker conditions as well. For instance, if g(w) contains non-empty subsets of
φ and φ′, then there are two worlds v ∈ φ,v′ ∈ φ′ such that neither v ≤g(w) v′ nor v′ ≤g(w) v. We do not
attempt a complete characterization of the problematic cases in this paper.
7Ultimately the most elegant solution might be to manipulate g “online” in the course of the interpre-
tation, filtering our propositions from the ordering source that imposes a ranking among the alternatives.
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Antecedents higher on the scale than the minimal ensure the truth of the conditional, too.
Likewise, since q is undesirable in (2-a) and (10-a), the listener expects the speaker to
choose an antecedent that is maximal on its scale among those alternatives that ensure
the truth of the conditional – the listener’s interests are the same way as before, but since
the consequent is decreasing in A, knowing the most costly way to ensure its truth is
more useful to him. Antecedents higher than the maximal one do not ensure the truth of
the conditional. The preceding argument rests on the assumption that only is scalar, such
that for each of the two scales, only p ≤ p.
7 Conclusions and Future Directions
We investigated the implication from if (only φ), ψ to if φ, ψ, arguing that its presence
hinges on the availability of a scalar relationship between antecedent and consequent.
The pragmatic relationship of Scalar Upward Monotonicity that governs the implication
is characterized by three components. SUM first requires a set of alternatives; second, a
ranking of the alternatives; and third a relationship between the ranking and the conse-
quent. SUM holds if the consequent remains true when higher-valued propositions are
substitued into the antecedent.
Two factors appear to license SUM. First, language users may know of it simply
by virtue of their world knowledge. Second, pragmatic considerations may lead them to
conclude that it motivates the speaker’s choice of asserting ‘if only φ, ψ’ rather than just
‘if φ, ψ’ . Future work will explore this link between desirability and scalar monotonicity
in greater detail.
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Abstract 
How can identity sentences involving distinct names be informative? Any theory 
of names facing the problem of informativity will need to appeal to descriptions. 
The crucial question is: at which level do descriptions play a role? Kripke showed 
that descriptions neither constitute nor fix the semantic contents of names. At the 
same time, his Millian views imply the problematic existence of modal illusions: 
some necessary truths are knowable only aposteriori even though there is no 
possible world in which they don‟t hold. I sketch a new, metasemantic strategy 
that purports to avoid modal illusions within a referentialist framework: the 
relevant descriptions describe not extensions (descriptivism), not intensions (two-
dimensionalism), but names themselves (three-dimensionalism).  
 
1 Introduction 
The primary, Millian intuition about names is that they refer to their bearer directly, 
without the mediation of descriptive conditions. But, as Frege highlighted, if this 
intuition is taken seriously, it seems we cannot explain the potential informativity of 
identity sentences involving distinct names: how can a competent speaker fail to know 
the truth (or falsity) of a sentence like “Hesperus is Phosphorus”?  
Frege had initially proposed, in his Begriffschrift, that what such sentences 
convey is a piece of metalinguistic information about the names themselves. But later, 
in Sinn Und Bedeutung, he retracted from his early view, deeming that, after all, what 
people learnt when they discovered that Hesperus is Phosphorus was a substantive fact 
of astronomy, and not a metalinguistic fact about the arbitrary signs used to describe 
that substantive fact. And he introduced senses and descriptivism: 
 
Descriptivism: Descriptions (senses) constitute the semantic content of names.  
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Kripke, however, refuted descriptivism and rehabilitated referentialism, the view that a 
name contributes only an individual to truth-conditions. But his Millian views provide 
no solution to the problem of informativity. This problem, taken within a framework 
that combines referentialism with a possible worlds semantics, becomes the problem of 
modal illusions: some necessary truths are knowable only a posteriori even though 
there is no possible world in which they don't hold. So that the next challenge is this: 
offer a referentialist theory of names that avoids modal illusions. This is what 
advocates of two-dimensionalism (henceforth, 2-D) have been aiming to do:  
 
Two-dimensionalism: Descriptions fix the semantic content of names.  
 
However, as Byrne and Pryor (2006) emphasize, this strategy too is incompatible with 
Kripke‟s insights. Kripke showed not only descriptions do not constitute the contents 
of names, but also that they do not fix the contents of names. His central message is 
that no descriptive conditions, whatever their role, are linguistically associated with 
names. So that both descriptivist and two-dimensionalist approaches fail.  
I want to suggest a third route, one that grants Kripke‟s Millianism and puts the 
descriptions responsible for cognitive significance into the metasemantics and 
epistemology of language stories. Whereas both descriptivists and two-dimensionalists 
suppose that descriptions describe extralinguisic objects, I will argue that descriptions 
describe words:  
 
Three-dimensionalism: Descriptions fix public words (in individual minds). 
 
On this view, which I call three-dimensionalism (henceforth, 3-D), the (variable) 
function that explains informativity is a third function that comes over and above 
Kaplanian character (or any such reference-fixing function) and content: I call it 
metacharacter. Metacharacters are functions from possible worlds considered as 
actual into words. Unlike character and content, which both belong to the semantic 
story, metacharacter is meant to capture something highly metasemantic, internalistic 
and often private: the descriptive means through which individual speakers mentally 
individuate public words. I am aware that the claim that speakers describe public 
words in a mental language may appear highly controversial. But my hope is to show 
that this claim may well solve our problem. Some authors have already suggested that 
questions surrounding the individuation of words may provide the key to solving the 
problem of informativity. Among them, Kaplan, in Words:
1
  
 
“Could it be that the elusive cognitive difference between believing that Hesperus is 
Hesperus and believing that Hesperus is Phosphorus rests on nothing more than 
syntax? [...] My speculations led me to conclude that I had to go back to basics and 
rethink not just the semantics of names, but their very syntax, the metaphysics of 
words: How should words be individuated?” (Kaplan, 1990: 93-4) 
 
                                                 
1
  See also Kaplan (1989b: 598-599) for very similar suggestions.   
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3-D elaborates upon this suggestion, and the resulting view is close in spirit to Frege‟s 
in his Begriffschrift: the discovery that an identity sentence expresses a necessary truth 
is, for a crucial part, a metalinguistic discovery about words themselves. What Frege 
failed to appreciate, however, and what 3-D claims is the key to the problem of 
informativity, is that the epistemic individuation of names involves substantive 
knowledge of how the actual world is.  
 
2 Some background 
Before I present 3-D in more detail, I wish to state some assumptions that underlie it, 
and then highlight its continuity with the two-dimensionalist project.   
 
2.1 Six assumptions 
(a) Names are directly referential. 
Kripke showed that names are rigid designators de iure. This means that their semantic 
content is (linguistically meant to be) a constant function, yielding the same individual 
(or set of individuals or substance, in the case of natural kind terms) for all possible 
worlds of evaluation. Descriptivism, in contrast, is the view that the semantic content 
of a name is (usually) a variable function, whose value depends on which individual 
happens to satisfy the corresponding descriptive condition in some possible world of 
evaluation. So we have: 
 
Referentialism (direct reference, rigidity de iure): The intension of a name is constant. 
Descriptivism: The intension of a name is variable. 
 
I will grant referentialism, and this means that I accept Kripke‟s claim to the effect that 
some necessary truths can be discovered aposteriori. I also agree with him and with 
Kaplan that whereas necessity and contingency have to do with metaphysics, apriority 
and aposteriority have to do with epistemology. I think, however, that Kant and Frege 
were essentially right that anything which is necessary is ipso facto apriori. Also, I 
will, for that matter, line up with two-dimensionalists, who distinguish the bearers of 
necessity and contingency from those of apriority and aposteriority, although I will 
eventually disagree with them as to the nature and semantic role of the bearers of 
apriority and aposteriority. My major concern here is precisely to reconsider how 
necessity and apriority must be disentangled.   
 
(b) Names are context-insensitive. 
 
This is a thesis about the character of names. The rival views, here, are:  
 
Minimalism: The character of a name is constant. 
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Contextualism: The character of a name is variable. 
 
I will, following Kripke and Kaplan, grant minimalism. So I endorse the Millian view 
that linguistic conventions associate a name directly with its unique bearer; they do not 
specify descriptive conditions that would have to be satisfied by an individual in order 
to gain bearerhood. Linguistic conventions settle the bearer from the start. Names are 
absolute: their character is a constant function from contexts to contents. It follows 
that the cognitive value of names cannot be explained in terms of their character. Your 
ignorance of the fact that the sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus” expresses a truth has 
nothing to do with your ignorance of facts concerning the context in which the 
sentence was used. On this view, names are massively ambiguous, and the role of 
context is not semantic (it is not to determine the reference of a particular name), but 
merely presemantic (it is to disambiguate which name was used). The view that names 
are both rigid and absolute—that is, the view that neither the content nor the character 
of a name are descriptive—I call Millianism.  
 
(c) Semantics is not epistemology of language. 
 
I grant, following Wettstein (1986), that it is not the job of a semantic theory to 
account for all differences in cognitive value. This is primarily the job of epistemology 
of language. Strictly speaking, my semantics is not three-dimensional; my semantics is 
two-dimensional in the benign sense that linguistic rules associate expressions with 
characters, and characters are functions defined on particular contexts of use.   
 
(d) Some version of social externalism is true.  
 
I follow the main lines of Burge‟s (1979) social externalism: which name I use and 
which content that name has does not ultimately depend on my beliefs, but on social 
facts. Words are objects in the outer world, about which, importantly, speakers can 
have imprecise or false beliefs. 
 
(e) Names are individuated by their form and bearer. 
 
Pace Devitt (1981) or Evans (1982), I will assume that a name has its causal source 
essentially. Here I side with Justice (2001), who defends essentialism about names:  
 
“A name could have another referent only if it could have another bearer, but a name 
with any other bearer would be another name with its own origin in the naming of that 
other bearer. Having the bearer it has is an essential property of a name.” (Justice 
2001: 362) 
 
So, metaphysically speaking, the name „John‟ for John Lennon is individuated by its 
phonological form „John‟ and John Lennon himself; the name „John‟ for John Perry is 
another name, one which happens to share the phonological shape of the name „John‟ 
for John Lennon, but not its bearer. Differences in bearers are ipso facto differences in 
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names. This actually follows from Millianism: linguistic conventions link a name 
directly with its unique bearer. So, on this metaphysics of names, it is not an essential 
property of John Lennon‟s that he be called „John‟, but it is an essential property of 
that name „John‟ that it is a name for John Lennon only.2 
 
(f) There is only one modal space. 
 
This means that conceivability entails possibility: whatever I can conceive of is 
metaphysically possible, an assumption commonly found in the literature
3
, and that I 
will not discuss further here. Its relevance to the present discussion is that it implies 
that if something is conceivable then there must ipso facto be some metaphysically 
possible world in which it holds. We can conceive that the sentence “Hesperus is 
Phosphorus” is false, and the central aim of our enquiry is to locate and describe the 
sort of the falsifying possible world that our intuition detects (and which, of course, 
often explains the progresses of science). 
 
2.2 Two-dimensionalism 
3-D borrows some tools from two-dimensionalists. Inspired by Stalnaker‟s work on 
assertion and informativity (1978) and by Kaplan‟s (1989a) distinction between the 
character and the content of indexical expressions, two-dimensionalists have sought to 
extend the idea of a two-fold meaning to the semantics of names. In the case of 
indexicals, Kaplan‟s view seemed to allow that a competent hearer can grasp apriori, 
in virtue of her knowledge of character alone, something from my utterance of “I am 
hungry” even when she doesn‟t know precisely who uttered it and hence lacks full 
knowledge of the context: that the producer of this utterance, whoever she is, is 
hungry. Two-dimensionalists argue that things are similar with names. Despite 
Kripke‟s arguments to the contrary, they maintain that names are linguistically 
associated (perhaps implicitly) with reference-fixing descriptions. Also, they think, a 
hearer can understand something from an utterance of (1) 
 
(1) Hesperus appears in the evening sky. 
 
even when she doesn‟t know precisely which world is actual, and in particular doesn‟t 
know which star satisfies the reference-fixing condition being the evening star 
linguistically associated with the name „Hesperus‟: that the actual evening star, 
whatever it is, appears in the evening sky.  
The basic idea of 2-D is that there are two ways in which the semantic values 
of sentences depend on the facts. First, facts play an interpretation role when they 
determine what is said by a sentence on an occasion of use (this role is similar to that 
                                                 
2
  The claim here is that both the form and the bearer are essential to the individuation of a name; 
I do not mean that they are sufficient. In order to get sufficient identity conditions for names additional 
aspects of the causal chains relating the form of names with their bearers would have to be integrated. 
3
  But see Soames (2006) for a proposal based on the denial of that assumption.  
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of contexts in Kaplan‟s framework). Second, facts play an evaluation role when they 
determine whether what was said by that sentence is true or false (this role is similar to 
that of circumstances in Kaplan‟s framework). Two-dimensionalists argue that, 
corresponding to these two forms of dependency to facts, there are two sorts of 
propositions that are associated with a sentence, which, following Chalmers‟s (2006) 
terminology, may be called, respectively, its primary and its secondary intensions. 
Secondary intensions just correspond to the traditional functions from possible worlds 
of evaluation to extensions. For instance, when I utter sentence (1) in the actual world 
of interpretation i, what I say is true with respect to i taken as a world of evaluation, 
because in the actual world it is Venus that appears in the evening sky, but false with 
respect to a counterfactual world of evaluation j in which it would be Mars and not 
Venus that appears in the evening sky, as shown in matrix A:
4
   
 
  i   j 
i T F 
 
A 
 
Now, two-dimensionalists argue that each sentence is associated with a two-
dimensional matrix, one that captures, in addition to the dependency of truth-values on 
worlds taken in their evaluation role, the dependency of contents on worlds taken in 
their interpretation role. Which content a use of a sentence has depends on which 
world of interpretation turns out to be actual. Speakers have only imperfect knowledge 
of how the actual world is, so that a lot of possible worlds could, as far as they know, 
be the actual world. This imperfect knowledge, two-dimensionalists think, is relevant 
to semantics, for which world is considered to be the actual world of interpretation 
determines which secondary proposition gets actually expressed by a sentence. Had 
the actual world of interpretation been j and not i, then sentence (1) would have 
received a different content, one which is true in all worlds of evaluation in which it is 
Mars which is the star that appears in the evening sky, as shown in matrix B:
5
  
 
 i   j 
i T F 
j F T 
 
B 
 
Stalnaker calls a two-dimensional matrix like B a propositional concept: this is a 
function from possible worlds of interpretation into propositions. The worlds in the 
vertical rows are worlds taken in their interpretation role (contexts), and the worlds in 
the horizontal row are worlds taken in their evaluation role (circumstances). Each 
horizontal line thus represents a distinct proposition. Now, two-dimensionalists claim, 
                                                 
4
  From García-Carpintero and Macià (2006: 4). 
5
  Ibid. 
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there is another important proposition which can be recovered from B: this is the 
primary intension they are after. Stalnaker calls it the diagonal proposition, because it 
corresponds to “the function from possible worlds into truth-values whose values are 
read along the diagonal of the matrix from upper left to lower right” (1978: 81). This 
is the proposition which is true for any world of evaluation w when w is also taken to 
be the world of interpretation, or, equivalently, it is the set of worlds of interpretation 
(contexts, if you like) in which the sentence is true. Importantly, the primary intension 
is also the proposition that the competent speaker knows apriori to be true, regardless 
of how the actual world of interpretation happens to be.  
2-D comes in many versions; these differ in how they construe the worlds of 
interpretation and the primary intensions. As Chalmers (2006: 64) summarizes, the 
common denominator of all versions of 2-D is to relate the cognitive significance of a 
sentence with its primary intension:   
 
Core thesis of 2-D: A sentence S is metaphysically necessary iff its secondary 
intension is necessary; S is epistemically necessary (a priori) iff its primary intension 
is necessary. 
 
Correspondingly, a sentence S is necessary aposteriori iff its primary intension is 
contingent and its secondary intension is necessary; and S is contingent apriori iff its 
primary intension is necessary and its secondary intension is contingent. 
 
3 Three-dimensionalism 
My rejection of 2-D here simply follows from my assumption that Millianism is 
correct: both the character and the content of a name are constant functions. But then, 
given Millianism, the only way to solve the problem of informativity is to go 
metalinguistic. Indeed, it follows from Millianism that there is no possible world of 
evaluation in which Hesperus is not Phosphorus (names are rigid) and no possible 
world of interpretation in which the names „Hesperus‟ and „Phosphorus‟ have distinct 
contents (names are absolute). So if it is conceivable at all for a competent speaker that 
the sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus” express a falsehood, this must be because that 
speaker, although competent, lacks some piece of metalinguistic knowledge about the 
words themselves. Donnellan once remarked:  
 
“If we distinguish a sentence from the proposition it expresses, then the terms „truth‟ 
and „necessity‟ apply to the proposition expressed by a sentence, while the terms „a 
priori‟ and „a posteriori‟ are sentence relative. Given that it is true that Cicero is Tully 
[...], „Cicero is Cicero‟ and „Cicero is Tully‟ express the same proposition. And the 
proposition is necessarily true. But looking at the proposition through the lens of the 
sentence „Cicero is Cicero‟, the proposition can be seen a priori to be true, but through 
„Cicero is Tully‟ one may need an a posteriori investigation.” (Donnellan, 1983: 88) 
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In the same spirit, Tichy (1983: 231) draws a distinction between the proposition 
expressed by a sentence S in a language L (what S says in L) and the proposition 
associated with S (“the proposition to the effect that S is true in L”), and notes: 
 
“Kripke must think that the net result of the scientists‟ efforts was a semantic 
discovery. What they established is that the term „heat‟ names molecular motion and 
that accordingly sentence (2) [“Heat is molecular motion”] states the truism that 
molecular motion is self-identical. In other words, they discovered the truth of the 
proposition associated with (2); it is that proposition which is only knowable a 
posteriori, through hard experimental slog.” (Tichy, 1983: 234-5) 
 
Drawing on Donnellan‟s and Tichy‟s suggestions, Wong (1996; 2006) has recently 
argued that the bearers of apriority and aposteriority are not propositions simpliciter 
(that would be the absolute view of apriority) but propositions relative to sentences 
(the relative view). Here‟s the core thesis of the relative view of apriority:  
 
“A proposition p is a priori relative to a sentence S that expresses it if and only if S is a 
priori; p is a posteriori relative to a sentence S‟ that expresses it if and only if S‟ is a 
posteriori. [...] Some may want to replace „a sentence S‟ by something like „a way of 
taking p‟ or „a mode of access to p‟. Indeed, a major task in elaborating the relative 
view is to answer the question, „What is it that a proposition can be said to be a priori 
relative to?‟” (Wong, 1996: 67) 
 
3-D‟s answer is: relative to the epistemic individuation of words. The descriptions 
through which a speaker individuates the words „Hesperus‟ and „Phosphorus‟ are the 
lenses, mentioned by Donnellan, through which this speaker fails to see that the 
sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus” expresses a necessary truth. The problem is not 
semantic, but metasemantic: it has to do with how our speaker individuates the public 
names in her mind, and more specifically with what she wrongly believes or fails to 
know about these names.  
 
3.1 The meaning-constitution problem 
Before I go further, I wish to introduce a potential problem that threatens to undermine 
any metasemantic account like 3-D. García-Carpintero (2006) calls it the “meaning-
constitution problem.” Stalnaker (2006) contrasts between two interpretations, 
semantic and metasemantic, of the two-dimensionalist framework. On the semantic 
interpretation, primary intensions are semantic values that sentences have in virtue of 
linguistic conventions. Stalnaker claims that, granting Millianism, this interpretation 
gets automatically excluded: names are not linguistically associated with reference-
fixing descriptions. Stalnaker (2001: 150, 152; 2006: 301) therefore urges that only the 
metasemantic interpretation of the framework could make sense, and I agree with him 
on that point. But, Stalnaker (1999: Introduction; 2001; 2006) goes on to argue, the 
metasemantic construal has the consequence that the meanings of names can vary 
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freely across worlds of interpretations, hence it appears to imply that no diagonal 
proposition will ever be necessary, and therefore that the metasemantic interpretation 
makes any account of apriori knowledge impossible: 
 
“Since the metasemantic two-dimensional intension represents all the ways in which 
the reference or content of an expression depend on the facts, it will not provide any 
non-vacuous account of a priori truth. To say that a primary proposition associated 
with a sentence was necessary would be to say that the sentence would express a truth 
whatever it meant, and that notion, of course, will have no application.” (Stalnaker, 
2001: 155; my underlining)  
 
Thus, the reasoning underlying Stalnaker‟s skepticism is this: given Millianism, a 
metasemantic interpretation must assume that words that are carried across worlds of 
interpretation are individuated by their phonological form alone if their meaning is 
allowed to vary at all, so that words end up having any arbitrary meaning relative to 
all possible worlds considered as actual. In other words, the primary proposition 
would, on the metasemantic interpretation, reflect all the possible meanings that names 
could have in all possible languages. This, then, is the meaning-constitution problem.  
Interestingly, the worries expressed by Stalnaker resemble the reasons which 
led Frege to abandon the early metalinguistic view of his Begriffschrift. And here I 
disagree. I think that Stalnaker‟s point shows not that no Carnapian connection holds 
between apriori knowledge and linguistic conventions, but only that the relevant 
diagonal, the one that accounts for apriori knowledge, is of another sort, and must be 
construed differently. On my account, the key to overcome the meaning-constitution 
problem is to contrast between two types of metasemantic facts: metaphysical 
metasemantic facts (facts relevant to the metaphysical individuation of words) and 
epistemic metasemantic facts (facts relevant to the epistemic individuation of words). 
My view is then that something epistemic about the word can vary from world to 
world even though the metaphysical word itself remains, as Millianism requires, fixed.  
  
3.2 Metaphysical vs epistemic individuation of words 
I have assumed that, metaphysically speaking, its bearer is essential to a name. As a 
consequence, sentences (2) and (3) must express necessary truths about our language:  
 
(2) „Hesperus‟ designates Hesperus.  
(3) „Hesperus‟ designates Phosphorus.  
 
But then, how can a competent speaker discover that those metalinguistic truths only 
aposteriori? After all, if I am linguistically competent, then I should know that the 
propositions expressed by those sentences are true, since I do have a reliable grasp on 
what these names designate. The key is that, somehow, my epistemic situation is such 
that, for all I know, the actual language might be one in which these two names are not 
coreferential, even though, metaphysically speaking, there is no possibility that our 
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actual language be such that the two names would not corefer. Importantly, this can 
only be because my cognitive access to public words themselves is mediated by some 
inner description of words. Also, epistemically speaking, a name is individuated by its 
form and a description of its bearer. My descriptions of the words „Hesperus‟ and 
„Phosphorus‟—the lenses through which I see them—are somehow too vague and too 
general to exclude the possibility that they don‟t corefer. The epistemic individuation 
of a public name thus involves a description of its bearer, which is used within a 
(mental) reference-fixing description of the name itself.   
 
3.3 Linguistic competence 
One point of claiming that the informativity of the sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus” 
is a metasemantic matter is to maintain that even a linguistically competent speaker 
can fail to see that this sentence is true. Here is how I define linguistic competence: 
 
Linguistic competence: In order to be linguistically competent with respect to a 
name N, a speaker must have the capacity to reidentify the bearer of N as the 
bearer of N through a substantive description that uniquely picks out the 
individual which is the bearer of N in the actual world. 
 
So, for instance, in order to be competent with respect to the name „Aristotle‟, all you 
need to know is the form of the name and one description that uniquely picks out 
Aristotle in the actual world, like the tutor to Alexander the Great or any other 
description identifying only Aristotle in the actual world. With this knowledge at hand, 
you will be able to correctly identify, in the actual world, the name „Aristotle‟ itself: 
you will know of this name (i) that it has the phonological form „Aristotle‟, and (ii) 
that its bearer was the tutor of Alexander the Great. But on that definition of linguistic 
competence, and because that definition requires only to have a contingent description 
of the bearer (one satisfied by the bearer in the actual world), there are lots of things 
you can still discover about a name with respect to which you are, nonetheless, already 
perfectly competent. This definition of linguistic competence paves the way for a 
definition of metacharacters.  
 
3.4 Metacharacters 
Metacharacters can be defined in either of two equivalent ways. They can be seen 
either as functions from possible worlds considered as actual  to words, or as functions 
from possible languages considered as actual to words. Both understandings are fine 
here, because on my view possible languages cannot vary independently of possible 
worlds, and each possible language is determined by exactly one possible world. It 
must, however, be borne in mind that a central idea of 3-D is that what we discover 
when empirical investigation reveals a necessary truth is also something about the 
language. Consequently, what we want as a result of my discovery is that I exclude 
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some languages from the set of languages compatible with my metalinguistic beliefs, 
and not only that I exclude some worlds from the set of worlds compatible with my 
beliefs.  
Consider John, who is a linguistically competent speaker of English. He knows 
that the following sentences express truths about English:  
 
(4) „Hesperus‟ is a name for the actual evening star. 
(5) „Phosphorus‟ is a name for the actual morning star. 
 
John is linguistically competent, on the standards just defined, because both of those 
contingent substantive descriptions uniquely identify a certain star in the actual world, 
and because that star is indeed an essential ingredient of what metaphysically 
individuates both of the words „Hesperus‟ and „Phosphorus‟. (In order to count as 
linguistically competent with respect to the sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus”, the 
minimal information that John has to recover from it is the proposition that the actual 
evening star is the actual morning star. Although general, this proposition is rigid de 
facto—because of „the actual‟—so that its secondary intension is equivalent to the 
singular proposition semantically expressed, viz. that Venus is Venus. So the general 
proposition corresponding to linguistic competence and the singular proposition which 
is semantically expressed by the sentence share the same truth-value in all possible 
worlds of evaluation.) However, as far as John‟s metalinguistic knowledge is 
concerned, the actual public word „Hesperus‟ could still be a lot of words. This is 
because John doesn‟t know precisely which world, among, say, w1, w2, and w3, is the 
actual one, and especially he doesn‟t know exactly which entity, among Venus, Mars, 
and Uranus, is the actual evening star:  
 
w1 → Venus 
w2 → Mars 
w3 → Uranus 
 
It follows that his metalinguistic knowledge of the word „Hesperus‟ is imperfect 
because, as far as he knows, three words could still equally plausibly be the actual 
word „Hesperus‟, depending on which entity turns out to be the actual evening star:  
 
Venus-word: The word „Hesperus‟ picks out Venus in the actual public language, 
because the actual evening star is Venus;  
 
Mars-word: The word „Hesperus‟ picks out Mars in the actual public language, 
because the actual evening star is Mars;  
 
Uranus-word: The word „Hesperus‟ picks out Uranus in the actual public language, 
because the actual evening star is Uranus.  
 
As far as John is aware, the actual word „Hesperus‟ might be either of these three 
words, depending on which world (hence, language) turns out to be the actual one. 
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This dependency is precisely what the metacharacter function is meant to capture. 
John‟s linguistic competence is fine, but his metalinguistic competence is imperfect 
because his knowledge of the actual world (hence, of the actual language) is imperfect.  
 
2-D picture: „Hesperus‟ (The associated description describes an object.) 
  
 Venus-world Mars-world Uranus-world 
Venus-world Venus Venus Venus 
Mars-world Mars Mars Mars 
Uranus-world Uranus Uranus Uranus 
 
 
3-D picture: „Hesperus‟ (The associated description describes a word.) 
  
 Venus-world Mars-world Uranus-world 
Venus-world Venus-word Venus-word Venus-word 
Mars-world Mars-word Mars-word Mars-word 
Uranus-world Uranus-word Uranus-word Uranus-word 
 
The constancy in each horizontal row of both matrices reflects John‟s knowledge that, 
respectively, names in general are rigid because they have their bearer essentially. In 
the three-dimensional analysis, if the actual world is the Venus-world, then it will be 
an essential property of the name „Hesperus‟ that it picks out Venus as its referent, and 
if the actual world turns is Mars-world, then it will be an essential property of the 
name „Hesperus‟ that it picks out Mars as its referent, etc. The metacharacter that John 
associates with the word „Hesperus‟ is given by the diagonal of this matrix. This 
diagonal reflects John‟s knowledge that whichever world (language) turns out to be 
actual, the public word ‘Hesperus’ is such that it is a word essentially for whatever is 
the evening star in that world. That piece of knowledge is sufficient for linguistic 
competence, but it is not sufficient to grasp the metalinguistic proposition that 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ corefer, because it doesn‟t entail anything about 
whether or not the actual evening star is the actual morning star. The effect of an 
assertion of “Hesperus is Phosphorus” on John is double: (i) eliminate all the possible 
worlds in which the evening star is not the morning star from the set of worlds 
compatible with his knowledge of the actual world; (ii) eliminate all the possible 
languages in which the two names do not corefer from the set of languages compatible 
with his knowledge of the actual language, that is, modify his metalinguistic 
competence. (His linguistic competence remains unchanged.)  
 
3.5 The solution to the meaning-constitution problem 
We are now in a position to overcome the meaning-constitution problem and disavow 
Stalnaker‟s skepticism about a metasemantic account of apriori knowledge. It follows 
from my definition of linguistic competence with respect to a name that each 
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competent speaker must possess at least a substantive contingent description which is 
uniquely satisfied by the bearer in the actual world. That description stops the 
regression Stalnaker worries about, because it restricts the (infinite) set of arbitrary 
meanings that a phonological shape could have to the (finite) set of words that an 
actual word might be as far as a competent speaker's knowledge of the word is 
concerned. So it is the descriptions used to epistemically individuate the names that 
are kept constant across worlds (languages) considered as actual, and, importantly, 
these descriptions can, even for a linguistically competent speaker, still pick out 
different names at different worlds (languages). To say that John is linguistically 
competent with respect to the name „Hesperus‟ is to say that he knows enough of the 
actual world to know that not everything could plausibly be the actual evening star and 
hence that he knows enough of the actual world to know that not everything could 
plausibly be the word „Hesperus‟. Since he knows the truth of the metalinguistic 
sentence (6),  
 
(6) „Hesperus‟ is a word for the actual evening star. 
 
John knows apriori, in virtue of his metacharacter alone, that the object-language 
sentence (7) 
 
(7) Hesperus is the evening star. 
 
will express a truth in the actual world (language), whatever the actual world 
(language) turns out to be. And this is the result we were after. Only, metacharacters 
are often private, and apriori knowledge in general will need to be relativized to 
individual speakers (at particular times). But the account will hold regardless of the 
particular descriptions that individual speakers use to mentally individuate a public 
word, so long as these descriptions are substantive descriptions which are uniquely 
satisfied by the bearer in the actual world. This, then, is the sense in which linguistic 
conventions and apriori knowledge are connected. Carnap vindicated! 
  
4 Conclusion 
The sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus” can be informative even to a linguistically 
competent speaker because, although she must know at least a (rigidified) general 
proposition (hence, one cointensive with the singular proposition semantically 
expressed by the sentence), she is not required to know the metalinguistic proposition 
that the words ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ corefer. This metalinguistic proposition 
is necessary, because, metaphysically speaking, names have their bearers essentially. 
But our speaker, although competent, ignores it, because she epistemically 
individuates the names through descriptions that are only contingently true of the 
bearer in the actual world, and is not aware that the description she uses for the bearer 
of „Hesperus‟ and the description she uses for the bearer „Phosphorus‟ pick out the 
same individual in the actual world (language). Metacharacters capture the connection 
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between linguistic conventions and apriori knowledge, and do so by reflecting what a 
competent speaker must know of the names regardless of precisely which world and 
language happen to be actual.  
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Abstract
The paper starts out with the observation that modifiers to eventive ung-nominals
can both target at the denoted event as a whole and modify it from inside. The in-
ternal reading will be shown to challenge iconic mapping between surface-oriented
c-command and semantic scope. By using Egg (2006)’s flexible syntax-semantic
interface the given ambiguity is analyzed as landing site underspecification allow-
ing for a compositional make-up in both cases: based on a bipartite eventive struc-
ture for ung-nominals, the internal reading is argued to result from applying the
modifier to an event concept fed by the verbal lexical base whereas the external
reading emerges if the modifier targets at a concept-correlate introduced by the
nominal affix.
1 Introduction
In event semantics, ample evidence has been put forward in favor of correlating syntactic
position and interpretation of German adverbial modifiers, cf. e.g. Maienborn (2003),
Pittner (2004) and related work. (1) and (2) are indicative:1
(1) a. Paul
Paul
hat
has
die
the
Daten
data
schnell
fast
verarbeitet.
processed.
b. Paul
Paul
hat
has
schnell
fast
die
the
Daten
data
verarbeitet.
processed.
(2) a. Der
the
Koch
cook
hat
has
das
the
Huhn
chicken
in
in
einer
a
Pfeffersauce
pepper-sauce
zubereitet
prepared
b. Der
the
Koch
cook
hat
has
in
in
der
the
Ku¨che
kitchen
das
the
Huhn
chicken
zubereitet
prepared
1A close relation between syntax and semantics of adverbials is also suggested by Principle-C-effects,
quantifier scope, remnant topicalization, focus projection. I will not discuss these.
Arndt Riester & Torgrim Solstad (eds.)
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The adverbials are interpreted event-internally if projected in V-adjacent position as in
(1-a) and (2-a). The AP thus specifies the manner of the processing as fast, the PP
localizes an integral constituent of the cooking event, i.e. the chicken, in the pepper-
sauce.2 On the contrary, if adverbials are in a higher position next to the VP as in (1-b)
and (2-b), they are interpreted event-externally, i.e. they relate holistically to the event.
In this case, the AP specifies the time span of the whole processing event or the time span
between its initiation and some reference point as short. The PP situates the preparing
event in the kitchen.
These findings can straightforwardly be accounted for by mapping syntactic c-
command on semantic scope. The according intuition behind a compositional make-up
is that adverbials c-command the semantic entity they relate to. Haider (2002, 61) and
related work implement this idea by proposing the interface criterion and isomorphic
relation given in (3). (4) illustrates the point:
(3) a. Interface criterion: Syntactic c-command domains are mapped monotoni-
cally on incrementally structured semantic type-domains.
b. Isomorphic relation:
(i) semantics: Proposition ⊂ Event ⊂ Process/State
(ii) structure: [‘p-related’ [‘e-related’ [‘l-related’]]]3
(4) Paul
Paul
hat
has
[p−relatedvermutlich
p−relatedpresumably
[e−relatedam
e−relatedon
Montag
monday
[seine
his
Wohnung
appartement
[l−relatedsorgfa¨ltig
l−relatedcarefully
[aufgera¨umt]]]]]
cleaned
The sentence adverbial being bound to the proposition is projected higher than the tem-
poral one taking scope over the event; the manner specification being related to the
lexical verbal base is embedded most deeply.
The challenge to be addressed in the present paper is the following: event nom-
inals with the affix -ung that correspond to the examples in (1) and (2) do not show the
same structural effect thus casting doubt on a straightforward mapping between syntactic
surface and semantic scope. In case of a prenominal modifying adjective, both l-related
internal and e-related external reading are conveyed by the same surface structure, cf.
(5) and (6) with their respective readings:
(5) die
the
schnelle
fast
Verarbeitung
processing
der
the
Daten
dataGEN
durch
by
Paul
Paul
a. ‘the processing activity itself is fast’ (internal reading)
b. ‘the time span of the whole event or that between its initiation and some
reference point is short’ (external reading)
2Maienborn considers internal locatives semantically underspecified, cf. section 3 for details.
3Haider uses the term ‘l-related’ because he assumes that the verbal lexical base determines the deno-
tation as a process/state.
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(6) die
the
dumme
stupid
Anbiederung
fawning-on
a. ‘event of stupidly fawning on sb.’ (internal reading)
b. ‘event of fawning on sb. is evaluated as stupid’ (external reading)
The holistic external readings are expected by syntax in that the AP c-commands the
whole following nominal structure. In their internal reading, however, the modifiers re-
late to the verbal lexical base italized in the examples above, that is, they apply to just
one part of the expression modified syntactically. These thus challenge strict composi-
tionality in the nominal domain.
This mismatch is corroborated by postnominal modifying PP: in case of speci-
fying the l-related manner reading by a postnominal prepositional phrase, the structure
differs from the VP in ruling out head-adjacency of the modifier, cf. (7). The same holds
for locatives: even if interpreted internally, they do not surface in head-adjacent position
but in distance, cf. (8).
(7) a. die
the
Verarbeitung
processing
der
the
Daten
dataGEN
auf
in
schnelle
fast
Weise
manner
b. *die
the
Verarbeitung
processing
auf
in
schnelle
fast
Weise
manner
der
the
Daten
dataGEN
(8) a. die
the
Zubereitung
preparation
des
the
Huhns
chickenGEN
in
in
einer
a
Pfeffersauce
pepper-sauce
b. *die
the
Zubereitung
preparation
in
in
einer
a
Pfeffersauce
pepper-sauce
des
the
Huhns
chickenGEN
One might argue that the reason for this is syntactic: German adnominal genitive can
only be checked in N-adjacent position, cf. e.g. Sternefeld (2006, 587-589).4 Note
though that this explanation alone does not properly explain the availability of internal
postnominal PP-modifiers. First, if one proceeds from surface structure, the interaction
of syntactic constraint and mapping hypothesis should simply rule out any internal read-
ings in case of a theme projection in between. But this prediction is obviously wrong.
Second, one might weaken the claim of straightforward mapping between surface syn-
tax and semantics by allowing for movement and thus invisible syntactic structure, i.e.
the PP could be ascribed an N-adjacent base position. However, even then the PP still
4This is not quite the whole story. If the genitive is substituted by a PP with von (‘of’), the theme
argument cannot be projected in distance either, cf.:
(i) *?die
the
Zubereitung
preparation
in
in
einer
a
Pfeffersauce
pepper-sauce
von
of
Hu¨hnern
chickens
One could argue that in such cases von functions as a case-like feature since it substitutes for the bare
genitive which is ungrammatical here. Or one might account for the distribution by some hierarchy con-
straint. However, if one relies on a hierarchy, it seems even more urgent to explain why internal modifiers
cannot project before the theme’s projection as attested in the VP.
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c-commands the nominal, but not merely the verbal lexical base it in fact contributes to
in its internal reading.5
Finally, note that the locative in (8-a) could also be read externally if its pragmatic
nonsense is neglected; cf. (9) for a clearly conceivable example:
(9) die
the
Zubereitung
preparation
des
the
Hu¨hnchens
chickenGEN
in
in
der
the
Ku¨che
kitchen
To sum up: the data on modifiers to event nominals are at odds with compositional
semantics based on surface structure. In their internal reading, i.e. in their being related
to the lexical verbal base, adnominal modifiers apply to just one part of the expression
modified syntactically. The present paper aims at compositionally deriving external vs.
internal reading via a flexible syntax-semantic interface built upon underspecification.
I will first present Egg (2006)’s analysis of well-known bracketing paradoxes as good
dancer similarly involving internal modification not expected by simple c-command and
apply it to the adnominal AP modifiers from above (section 2). Second, I will extend
the proposal to PP modifiers by comprising Maienborn (2003)’s free variable approach
to internal locatives (section 3).
2 Scopally underspecified AP modifiers
2.1 Scope underspecification in Egg (2006)
Examples as good dancer are well-known for being ambiguous between reading (10-a)
und (10-b).6 A plausible structure is given in (11).
(10) a. λx.good′(x)∧GEN[e,y](y in e∧ y= x,dance′(y)(e))
b. λx.GEN[e,y](y in e∧ y= x,good′(e)∧dance′(y)(e))
(11) NP
N’
AP
A
good
N’
N
danc-er
In reading (10-a), the modifier has scope over the complex nominal. This is
expected by the c-command relations in surface structure (11). Reading (10-b) though is
in conflict with an iconic mapping between c-command and semantic scope because the
5Amovement analysis also has to capture the data on prenominal AP; I do not know how to reasonably
argue that they are base-generated in N-adjacent position. Such base position implies the bracketing [A+N]
and subsequent movement of this complex constituent.
6I took Egg (2006)’s representation. GEN codes habituality; see Egg (2006, 6) for details.
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modifier applies only to a part of the modifie, more specifically, it relates to the word-
internal lexical verbal base italized in structure (11). The information carried by the affix
thus has wide scope, what is unexpected.
Egg (2006) reconciles surface syntax and scope by using the following ingre-
dients of the underspecification formalism CLLS (= Constraint Language for Lambda
Structures) as developed in Egg et al. (1998) and Egg et al. (2001).7 First, it is assumed
that the semantics of constituents C contains a main and a secondary fragment. Second,
built upon surface structure, complex C are construed by syntax-semantic and morpho-
semantic interface rules (= SSI and MSI) which can address both fragments. Third, these
SSI- and MSI-rules result in dominance diamonds that possibly have different solutions.
These different solutions then correspond to the final readings available for the structure
computed.
Applying this procedure to good dancer leads to the following diamond, cf. Egg
(2006) for details:
(12)
The diamond consists of λ-terms representing the semantic fragments involved. ‘Holes’
(symbolized by2) indicate their unknown, hence underspecified parts. Dominance rela-
tions (symbolized by dotted lines) attach fragments and holes to each other and thereby
model scope. (12) can be read as follows: the final structure is not fixed; this moti-
vates the hole at the top. The left fragment represents the meaning contribution of the
affix -er, the fragment on the right side adds the meaning of the modifier good. While
their scope interaction is not determined (i.e. neither fragment dominates the other), the
lexical verbal base has necessarily narrow scope and is thus located at the bottom.
The possible solutions are calculated by monotonically identifying fragments and
holes. By first identifying the right-hand hole with the top, the modifier takes scope over
the full NP, cf. repeated from above (13-a). Starting from the left, i.e. identifying first
the hole in the left fragment with the topmost hole, derives the critical internal reading
with wide scope of the affix, cf. (13-b):
(13) a. λx.good′(x)∧GEN[e,y](y in e∧ y= x,dance′(y)(e))
b. λx.GEN[e,y](y in e∧ y= x,good′(e)∧dance′(y)(e))
The suggested formalism can hence systematically derive both readings on the basis
of a uniform surface-oriented syntax and common assumptions on the meaning of the
involved lexical items.8 In the next section, the given analysis will be transferred to the
modification of event nominals.
7Here, CLLS’s underspecified representations will be used in a simplified form.
8Taking advantage of a powerful semantic construction, Egg’s proposal can do without the assumption
of underlying syntactic structure different from surface. This constrasts with e.g. Larson (1998) who
ensures iconic mapping at the syntax-semantic interface by postulating an elaborate invisible syntax being
the input for semantics, cf. Egg (2006, 7-9) for some discussion.
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2.2 Underspecified AP modifiers to event nominals
Recall the task: how can one compositionally derive internal vs. external reading of
schnelle Verarbeitung der Daten (‘fast processing of the data’) on the basis of surface
structure (14) and standard semantics for the involved lexical units in (15):
(14) NP
N’
AP
A
schnelle
N’
N
Verarbeitung
DP
der Daten
(15) a. [[schnell]] = λx.fast′(x)
b. [[verarbeit]] = process′
c. [[Daten]] = λx.data′(x)
d. [[die]] = λQλP∃!x.[Q(x)]∧P(x)9
The anti-iconic effect in case of internal modification strikes as being very similar to
the paradox with agentive nouns discussed by Egg. In order to make his proposal work
here, the semantics of the eventive affix -ung has to be appropriately defined. Most
importantly, its semantics must assure two different landing sites the modifier can pertain
to. In case of -er, these landing sites, i.e. agent and event, were easy to detect due to
their obvious ontological difference. The situation with eventive affixes is more intricate
since -ung does not pick up a thematic argument but relates to the underlying verbal
event itself. What I propose is the following:
(16) a. main fragment: λPλe.e≈ λE.P(E)
b. secondary fragment: λPλxλe.theme′(e,x)∧P(e)
According to the given proposal, the semantic contribution of -ung is split into a main
and a secondary fragment. The main fragment entails a bipartite eventive structure.
Small e represents the nominal event argument which is associated with a big E variable
that stands for an event concept described by the verbal stem. This move presumes a
specific perspective on the relation between verbal predicates and their eventive nom-
inalizations. There are two conceivable positions: according to the first, nominalized
predicates contribute the identical predicate to logical form as the underlying verbal
predicate does, cf. e.g. Parsons (1990). Semantically, -ung would merely uncover the
silent verbal event argument. The second position instead assumes that nominalized
predicates contribute an individual term which is merely correlated with the underlying
9This abbreviates Montague’s denotation for the definite determiner λQλP[∃x[∀y[Q(y) ↔ y = x]∧
P(x)]]. Plural is ignored.
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verbal predicate, i.e. nominalizations contribute a concept-correlate in Fregean terms, cf.
e.g. Cocciarella (1996). The main fragment given above implements the second stance:
e symbolizes the nominal concept-correlate, the underlying verbal concept describes E
and ≈ stands for their link to each other.10 -ung thus introduces a new event argument
embedding the verbally given eventive concept. Crucially, such bipartite structure pro-
vides two possible targets for modifiers: if the modifier applies to the underlying concept
E, it is l-related and thus to be read internally. If it applies to the nominal e, it is e-related
and hence externally interpreted. The task will be to show how these landing sites can
be systematically predicted.
The secondary fragment of -ung takes care of the adequate integration of the
verbal base it takes. Importantly, I presuppose a Neo-Davidsonian approach (cf. Parsons
1990) in order to conceive of verbs as denoting properties of eventualities with thematic
roles being referred to by additional conjuncts. This spares taking along potential verbal
arguments throughout the whole computation; instead, it allows for making arguments
available by the characteristics of specific affixes. The proposal in (16-b) thus reads
as follows: First, -ung binds a property of eventualities P, regardless of the amount of
thematic arguments. Second, -ung influences the secondary fragment of the emerging
nominalization by introducing the theme argument potentially associated with the verbal
base, i.e. the verbal theme argument is made available for binding by a subsequent DP
argument.11
In order to derive the meaning of Verarbeitung (‘processing’) from the lexically
given verbal base and affix, a suitable rule for the interface between morphology and
semantics has to be specified, cf.(17):
(17)
ThisMSI-rule retains basic intuitions of theMSI-rule already given in Egg (2006):
specifically, affixes are assumed to be functions taking stems as arguments; furthermore,
by introducing a yet undetermined hole in the main fragment, the rule ensures the seman-
tic flexibility that is needed for computing the attested scopal interaction with modifiers.
Other than the MSI-rule in Egg (2006), (17) is a bit simpler in not explicitly λ-binding
thematic arguments of the base in the main fragment. The way thematic arguments are
integrated is thus left to the semantics of the affixes themselves.
The ingredients set forth so far yield the following representation for Verar-
beitung (‘processing’) via insertion and λ-conversion:
(18)
10It is not trivial to appropriately define the relation ≈. For the present purpose, I rely on a merely
intuitive grasp: e instantiates an E being characterized by the underlying verbal eventuality property P.
11I assume that -ung does not introduce the verbal agent; but nothing essential hinges on that.
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According to representation (18-b), Verarbeitung denotes a set of concept-correlates
which are characterized by a set of event concepts. These event concepts are determined
as processing events with an open position for a theme argument. The given constraint is
underspecified in that there is a dominance relation between the two fragments allowing
the integration of additional material in its solutions.
The next step comprises the integration of the DP argument der Daten (‘of the
data’). The following SSI-rule for complementation is a category independent general-
ization of the rule for verbal DP arguments given in Egg (2005):
(19) [X¯ X DP]
(SSI)⇒ [[X¯]]: [[DP]]; [[X¯S]]: [[XS]]([[DPS]])
The DP semantics in Egg’s framework rests upon standard assumptions about the lexical
meaning of the respective D head as generalized quantifier. However, their semantic
contribution is split into a secondary fragment that is identified with the bound variable
and a fragment above that codes the quantificational information. The lexical entries
(ignoring plural) are repeated in (20), (21) cites the SSI-rule needed (cf. Egg 2009), and
(22) provides the corresponding computation:
(20) a. [[die]] = λQλP∃!x.[Q(x)]∧P(x)
b. [[Daten]] = λx.data′(x)
(21)
(22)
Putting pieces together according to (19), i.e. applying the semantics of Verar-
beitung in (18-b) to the DP meaning in (22), yields the following constraint for Verar-
beitung der Daten (‘processing of the data’):
(23)
The secondary fragment [[N¯S]] fixes x as the theme argument via λ-conversion; the
main fragment [[N¯]] is identified with [[DP]]. Additionally, the DP semantics introduce a
new λ-abstracted e; this is necessary for providing event variables at the very top of the
final representation.12 The affix information on the left remains unaffected.
12This is parallel to the sentential level where adverbials and DPs introduce event variables, needed e.g.
for the integration of tempus. For an appropriate typing of event variables see below.
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The next step consists of the modifier’s integration. Egg (2006) proposes the
SSI-rule (24):13
(24)
The idea behind reads as follows: the main fragment of the modifie is inherited
by the main fragment of the new complex constituent without any change. The new
secondary fragment though integrates the modifier: a hole is applied to the same variable
x as the modifier fragment is. Furthermore, this hole dominates the original secondary
fragment of the modifie. Crucially, whereas both main and secondary fragment of the
resultant constituent hence dominate the modifie’s original secondary fragment, their
scopal interaction with each other is not determined.
Applying (24) to N¯ schnelle Verarbeitung der Daten (‘fast processing of the data’)
yields (25); finally, Egg’s SSI-rule for phrasal completion given in (26) generates the
complete diamond in (27) for the full NP:14
(25)
(26)
(27)
How many solutions, i.e. readings, does this diamond have? In principle, there are 3!
(= 6) solutions. However, there seem to be only two readings empirically attested (i.e.
the internal vs. the external one). Since this flexibility concerns the fragments coding the
meaning of the affix and the modifier, it seems reasonable to block on principled grounds
the scopal interaction with the information for the complement DP. In Egg (2006), cer-
tain unwanted ambiguities are surpressed by taking advantage of the fact that holes are
typed, i.e. not compatible with random fragments but only with those matching type-
theoretically. This aspect of semantic construction paves way for blocking in case of
(27). The idea is to type the different event variables: I assume that verb semantics (on
a par with adverbials) introduce event variables maximally flexible, i.e. a general event
type eg comprising all other types. However, whereas the inner structure of event nom-
inalizations introduce a variable E for event concepts, the DP semantics is assumed to
13The version cited rests upon intersective modification as discussed e.g. in Higginbotham (1985).
Adjectives are thus of type 〈e, t〉. Egg prefers a version based on functional application with adjectives
typed 〈〈e, t〉,〈e, t〉〉. The choice between these options is irrelevant here.
14The top hole supports possible ambiguities between the fragments below, cf. Egg (2006).
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introduce variables e for concept-correlates.15 With e and E being incompatible with
each other, such typing rules out any solution where the fragment on the left – coding
the DP semantics – must be identified with the hole in the central fragment. For this
hole takes an E type variable. Accordingly, three of six possible solutions are ruled out,
specifically those where the affix fragment takes scope over the DP fragment.
There are three well-formed solutions left: let us first look at those two cases
where the DP fragment on the left gets widest scope, i.e. is identified with the top hole.
The subsequent computation can take two directions: either one first plugs in the affix
fragment and then the modifier’s fragment or one starts out the other way round, cf. the
results (28-a) versus (28-b) after λ-conversion:
(28) a. λe∃!x.[data′(x)]∧ e≈ λE.theme′(E,x)∧process′(E)∧ fast′(E)
b. λe∃!x.[data′(x)]∧ e≈ λE.theme′(E,x)∧process′(E)∧ fast′(e)
These are exactly those readings aimed at: in (28-a), the modifier pertains to the event
concept, thus leading to an internal modification. In (28-b) though, it has wide scope
over the concept-correlate, thus displaying the holistic external reading.
What about the third solution compliant to types? It is achieved by first identi-
fying the modifier fragment with the top, then integrating the DP semantics and finally
plugging in the affix fragment, cf. (29):
(29) λy∃!x.[data′(x)]∧ y≈ λE.theme′(E,x)∧process′(E)∧ fast′(y)
This final third representation is identical to the one for the external reading in (28-b);
hence it is not at odds with the empirical evidence for merely two readings.
3 Scopally underspecified locatives
Locative PP modifiers are another instance of the contrast between internal and external
modification. As in case of AP modifiers, internally interpreted locatives pose a problem
for a 1:1 mapping between c-command and scope since they surface in distance to their
modifie, cf. repeated from above (30):
(30) die
the
Zubereitung
preparation
des
the
Huhns
chickenGEN
in
in
einer
a
Pfeffersauce
pepper-sauce
Construing a constraint according to the rules and the procedure above yields diamond
(31). It simplifies DP semantics in representing the DP argument as a ι-term and the PP
as a simple predicate. (32) lists the constraint’s solutions.
15Admittedly, such typing is a stipulation. One might argue that DP semantics and nominal concept-
correlates are compatible because both are nominal; however, note that at the sentential level, DP argu-
ments must also be compatible with the event argument introduced by the verb.
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(31)
(32) a. λy.in′(y,P)∧ y≈ λE.theme′(E, ιx.chicken′(x))∧prepare′(E)
b. λe.e≈ λE.in′(E,P)∧ theme′(E, ιx.chicken′(x))∧prepare′(E)
In the external reading, i.e. (32-a), the preparation event as a whole is localized in the
pepper sauce. This is pragmatically deviant but otherwise unproblematic. The inter-
nal reading is not that straightforward: according to (32-b), the locative applies to the
event concept E. This suits the intuition that an internal locative somehow modifies the
conceptually specified inner event structure. However, it remains unclear what such lo-
calization of the conceptual essence exactly amounts to. Particularly, one has to assure
that, finally, it is the chicken that is localized in the pepper sauce. In order to tackle this
problem more precisely, I will first sketch Maienborn (2003)’s proposal for correspond-
ing adverbial locatives and then transfer her solution to the nominal case at hand.
Maienborn proposes an abstract modification template MOD* which is accom-
panied by a structural condition, cf. (33):
(33) MOD*: λQλPλx[P(x)&R(x,v)&Q(v)]
Condition: if MOD* applies to categorial type X, R = part-of′, otherwise (i.e.
in an XP-environment) R is the identity function.
MOD* conforms to common analyses of intersective modification by mapping two prop-
erties instantiated by the meaning of modifier and modifie to a conjunction of corre-
sponding predicates. However, it additionally introduces a free relation variable medi-
ating between the resultant predicates. Crucially, its interpretation is conditioned struc-
turally and thus compositional in nature. Applying MOD* to the adverbials in (34-a) vs.
(34-b) leads to the respective representations in (35).
(34) a. [VP
[VP
[PPin
[PPin
einer
a
Ku¨che]
kitchen]
[VP
[VP
das
the
Huhn
chicken
zubereiten]]
prepare]]
b. [VP
[VP
das
the
Huhn
chicken
[V
[V
[PPin
[PPin
einer
a
Pfeffersauce]
pepper-sauce]
[V zubereiten]]]
[Vprepare]]]
(35) a. λe.prepare′(e)∧ theme′(e, ιx.chicken′(x))∧ in′(e,K)
b. λe.prepare′(e)∧ theme′(e, ιx.chicken′(x))∧part-of′(e,v)∧ in′(v,P)
The locative’s projection above the VP triggers the identity function for the relation vari-
able and thus yields an external modification with the event as a whole being localized
in the kitchen. On the contrary, the interpretation for internal locatives, projected in V-
adjacent position, is bound to a mediating variable v: v is localized in the pepper-sauce
and part-of′ identifies v as integral to e. Whereas this integrity constraint relies upon
semantics, the particular value for v is fixed at the conceptual level, thus not part of com-
positional semantics proper. In the case at hand, the most plausible candidate for v is
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the chicken; in effect, this leads to the desired interpretation with the chicken referent
localized in the peppersauce.16
A straightforward transfer to the case at hand is impeded by the fact that internal
versus external locatives are not distinguished by surface syntax. Assuming the very
same structure for both readings, a truly compositional condition is trivially impossible.
However, based upon the derivation along the lines of Egg’s interface rules, the different
targets of locatives can be paired with respective event types. I thus reformulate MOD*
for the adnominal cases as follows:
(36) MOD*: λQλPλx[P(x)&R(x,v)&Q(v)]
Condition: if the free variable relates to the verbal concept E, R = part-of′; if it
relates to the nominal concept-correlate e, R is the identity function.
Such reformulation constrains the way locatives are integrated in terms of semantics
alone. I do not consider it stipulative but rather intuitively conclusive: if the locative is
related via v to the nominal event concept-correlate e, i.e. a variable for concrete whole
events, it ‘sees’ a potential target right from the start. Thus v and e are identified. On
the contrary, the abstract verbal concept E is not a conceivable candidate to be localized.
Thus it turns out to be necessary to infer an integral part to such a concept that could be
a plausible target for localization.
Building (36) into the modificational analysis from above yields the following
representations for external vs. internal locatives:
(37) a. λe.in′(v,P)∧R(e,v)∧ e≈ λE.theme′(E, ιx.chicken′(x))
∧prepare′(E)
b. = λe.in′(e,P)∧ e≈ λE.theme′(E, ιx.chicken′(x))∧prepare′(E)
(38) a. λe.e≈ λE.prepare′(E)∧R(E,v)∧ in′(v,P)
∧ theme′(E, ιx.chicken′(x))
b. = λe.e≈ λE.prepare′(E)∧part-of′(E,v)∧ in′(v,P)
∧ theme′(E, ιx.chicken′(x))
c. λe.e≈ λE.prepare′(E)∧ in′(ιx.chicken′(x),P)
∧ theme′(E, ιx.chicken′(x))
The results (37-b) and (38-b) suit the intuitively given readings for Zubereitung des
Huhns in einer Pfeffersauce (‘preparation of the chicken in the pepper sauce’).17 Prag-
matically, the internal reading can be strengthened by identifying v and the referent for
the chicken, cf. (38-c).18
16Maienborn builds upon ‘Two-Level Semantics’ as advanced in Bierwisch (1982) and subsequent re-
lated work. Thus she distinguishes the grammatically determined semantic form of a linguistic expression
from its conceptual structure being fixed by world-knowledge and context.
17To be sure, as before the pragmatic nonsense of external modification in this case is neglected.
18One might ask if a free choice between identity′ and part-of′ for R would do the same job as the
condition in (36). In terms of the given proposal, it would cause two additional readings:
(i) a. ‘an entity v being integral to the concept-correlate e is located in the pepper-sauce’
b. ‘the event concept E is localized in the pepper-sauce’
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Asmentioned, the given computation for locatives simplifies DP semantics. There
is no harm in simple cases. However, examples with interacting quantifiers as (39) hav-
ing the readings in (40) enforce a more involved analysis:
(39) die
the
Zubereitung
preparation
aller
all
Hu¨hner
chickenGEN
in
in
einer
a
Pfeffersauce
pepper-sauce
(40) a. internal with ∃ > ∀ ‘there is a pepper-sauce in which all chicken are pre-
pared’
b. internal with ∀ > ∃ ‘for all chicken there is some pepper-sauce in which
they are prepared’
c. external with ∃> ∀ ‘there is a pepper-sauce in which the preparation of all
chicken takes place’
d. external with ∀ > ∃ ‘for all chicken there is some pepper-sauce such that
the preparation of these takes place in it’
One might ask if the sketched mechanism can predict exactly these readings.19
Adding the quantificational force of DPs to the constraint leads to the diamond
(41). I omit the free variable for the locative’s integration in order to facilitate readability:
(41)
Taking into account that the embedded event concept of type E is incompatible with the
e introduced by the DP semantics, (41) has four solutions, cf. (42):20
Reading (i-b) is the same as (32-b); it thus does not display any explanatory progress. I do not know what
(i-a) amounts to since it seems unclear if there is any plausible distinction between an integral part of E
vs. an integral part of e. Maybe, (i-a) just collapses with the internal reading; maybe, it does not make
any sense. If one considers (i-a) a possible formulation for the case of internal modification, one might
question the whole enterprise taken up here. Instead of modelling internal vs. external reading as landing
site underspecification, adnominal locatives could be just dubbed underspecified due to the free variable.
Still, formulating a condition for the variable’s assignment as done in (36) makes more transparent which
assignment to choose during computation by linking it to the difference between concept-correlates and
event concepts.
19Interestingly, at the sentential level a quantifying internal modifier can scope out notwithstanding the
assumed base position next to V, cf. (i) with both ‘∀> ∃’- and ‘∃> ∀’-reading:
(i) Er
He
hat
has
alle
all
Hu¨hner
chicken
in
in
einer
a
Pfeffersauce
pepper-sauce
zubereitet.
prepared
20Most importantly, the λ-term for the affix in the middle is not allowed to have wide scope over any DP
e, i.e. the identification with the top has to first process both quantifier fragments. There are four instead
of merely two readings because the PP’s semantic contribution – being coded within the two separate
λ-terms on the right hand side – can go up as a whole or as separate constraints. If they are identified with
the top together, the two external readings are generated; if they are kept apart, the internal readings are
built up.
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(42) a. λe∃p.pepper-sauce′(p)∧∀h.chicken′(h)→ e≈ λE.theme′(E,h)∧
prepare(E)∧ in′(E, p)
b. λe∀h.chicken′(h)→∃p.pepper-sauce′(p)∧ e≈ λE.theme′(E,h)∧
prepare′(E)∧ in′(E, p)
c. λe∃p.pepper-sauce′(p)∧∀h.chicken′(h)→ [e≈ λE.theme′(E,h)∧
prepare(E)]∧ in′(e, p)
d. λe∀h.chicken′(h)→∃p.pepper-sauce′(p)∧ e≈ λE.theme′(E,h)∧
prepare′(E)∧ in′(e, p)
These are (if supplemented by the free variable account for locatives) exactly those four
readings empirically attested.
4 Conclusion and Outlook
The present paper addressed the challenge that AP and PP modifiers to eventive ung-
nominalizations trigger – besides straightforward event external readings – event internal
interpretations not expected by isomorphically mapping surface-oriented c-command on
semantic scope. By applying Egg’s flexible syntax-semantic interface built upon under-
specification to the cases under discussion, both internal and external readings could be
derived in a principled compositional manner without resorting to some form of syntactic
preprocessing.
Crucially, the analysis relies on a bipartite eventive structure for ung-nominalizations:
the affix introduces a secondary eventive concept-correlate e being related via≈ to a lex-
ically determined event concept argument E that is fed by the verbal base. This split pro-
vides two targets for the modification: whereas external modifiers apply to e and thereby
trigger the holistic event modification, internal modifiers apply to E and thus specify
event concepts from inside. Supplementary to such landing site ambiguity, the addi-
tional flexibility observed for internal locative PP modifiers is captured by introducing a
free variable to be instantiated on conceptual grounds.
The most obvious follow-up question in view of the proposed analysis is if it cov-
ers other event nominals. Particularly, nominalized infinitives show the same flexibility
as ung-derivations do although they lack an overt nominal affix, cf. (43):
(43) das
the
schnelle
fast
Verarbeiten
processnominal
der
the
Daten
dataGEN
One thus might ask more generally whether there is any other evidence for the assump-
tion that event nominals have a bipartite eventive structure. In other words: it must be
shown independently that event nominals do not simply render the verbal event argument
visible but trigger some sort of secondary reifying process.
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Abstract 
Although it has generally been claimed otherwise (cf. Katz and Postal 1964, 
Sadock and Zwicky 1985, Palmer 1986, Rivero and Terzi 1995, Platzack and 
Rosengren 1998, Han 1998 among others), it holds that embedded imperatives 
exist in English. We describe their main characteristics and provide an account of 
these by relying on Schwager’s (2006) propositional analysis of imperatives, 
where imperatives are treated as modalized sentences. The imperative modal is 
thereby relativized to eventualities (cf. Hacquard 2006). 
 
1 Introduction 
It has been claimed that imperatives cannot be embedded in English (cf. Katz and 
Postal 1964, Sadock and Zwicky 1985, Palmer 1986, Rivero and Terzi 1995, Platzack 
and Rosengren 1998, Han 1998, among others). This claim has been motivated in at 
least two distinct ways: by treating imperatives as inherent speech act objects which 
resist embedding on conceptual grounds (cf. Han 1998), and by taking paradigms like 
(1) as conclusive empirical evidence against their embeddability (cf. Sadock and 
Zwicky 1985, Palmer 1986 and others). (1a) and (1b) show that declarative and 
interrogative clauses can occur as complements of attitude verbs, while (1c) 
purportedly shows this not to be the case for imperative clauses.  
 
(1) a.   John claimed that [Mary sang] 
 b.   John knows [what Mary sang] 
 c. *John said that [call Mary] 
 
Both arguments against there being embeded imperatives in English are based on 
questionable premises. On the one hand, the paradigm in (1) is misleading. We should 
rather take the sentence in (2), where the complement of the intensional verb lacks an 
overt complementizer, as the indicative example. On the other hand, the assumptions 
that imperatives are essentially speech act objects and that such objects cannot be 
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arguments of attitude verbs – namely, that attitude verbs do not select for illocutionary 
acts – have independently been argued to be unwarranted (cf. Schwager 2006). 
 
(2)  John said [call Mary] 
 
The theoretical import of the existence of embedded imperatives is evident. 
Namely, theories of imperatives that predict their unembeddability need to be modified 
to accommodate (2) and similar data, while theories that predict such embeddings 
receive empirical support. Furthermore, if embedded imperatives exist, we can study 
their semantic contribution to the interpretation of the structures containing them in 
order to (i) get at a proper analysis of imperatives in general, embedded and matrix, as 
well as (ii) gain new insights about the nature of the embedding verbs. In this respect, 
the understanding garnered by the existence and the nature of embedded imperatives 
should be utilized in a way that insights about embedded interrogatives were 
(Karttunen 1977).   
 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents evidence that embedded 
imperatives are neither quotations nor elliptical to-infinitives and that the embedding 
verb is not used parenthetically. Section 3 compares felicity conditions on embedded 
and matrix imperatives. Section 4 describes analogous behavior of epistemic modals 
and provides an analysis for it. Section 5 introduces a theory of imperatives according 
to which they are modalized sentences. Section 6 provides an account for the 
parallelism observed between embedded and matrix imperatives by combining the 
insights of sections 4 and 5. Section 7 points out some issues for further research, 
while Section 8 concludes. 
 
2 Imperatives as complements of attitude verbs 
The sentence in (2) raises several questions related to the nature of the obligatory 
absence of an overt complementizer, the markedness of parallel sentences with other 
intensional verbs (3), and the reference of the imperative subject. However, before 
these questions may be addressed, it must first be shown that (2) is indeed an example 
of an embedded imperative and not a quoted imperative. This is achieved by showing 
that, unlike quotes, the string resembling an embedded imperative in (2) and similar 
examples is not grammatically opaque. Subsequently, we provide evidence that the 
embedded imperative is also not a bare infinitive, and that Mary said is not a 
parenthetical.  
 
(3) a. *John claimed (that) [call Mary] 
 b. *John knows (that) [call Mary] 
 
The standard tests for determining whether certain seemingly embedded 
clauses are quotations (cf. Anand 2006 and others) involve checking for felicitous 
occurrences of demonstratives, clause-external variable binding, association with 
external focus-sensitive operators, wh-extraction, external licensing of negative 
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polarity items, and (non-)interaction of clause-external and clause–internal nominals 
with respect to binding. If what we have characterized as embedded imperatives pass 
these tests, this can be taken as an indication that we are dealing with indirect speech. 
The facts strongly suggest that embedded imperatives are grammatically 
transparent. The first relevant datum is the contrast in (4). We see that in (4a), John 
and his can be corefential, whereas in (4b), where it is clear that the pronoun his is 
contained in a quote, the coreference reading is marked due to the unlikelihood that 
John would refer to himself with a third person pronoun. 
 
(4) a.   John1 said call his1 mom 
 b. #John1 said: ”Hey, call his1 mom” 
 
The data in (5) is related. In a situation where the examples in (5) are uttered and the 
respective indexical that is accompanied by a pointing gesture, (5a) but not (5b) is 
felicitous. Namely, if an indexical is inside a quotation, it should not be evaluated with 
respect to the utterance situation of (5b) but with respect to the situation of John’s 
original utterance. The pointing gesture would thus be misplaced. Accordingly, the 
contrast in acceptability in (5) is an indication that the sentence in (5a) is an instance of 
indirect speech and does not contain a quotation.  
 
(5) Speaker points at a book 
 a.   John1 said buy that book 
 b. #John1 said: ”Hey, buy that book” 
 
Furthermore, focus-sensitive adverbs like only are able to associate with focused 
elements inside the complement of say: (6a) conveys that the only thing that John said 
that you should give to his mom is roses. (6b) cannot convey this, nor does it have a 
metalinguistic reading in which there is quantification over parts of the quotation. 
 
(6) a.   John only said give rosesF to his mom 
 b. #John only said: ”Hey, give rosesF to his mom” 
 
The same reasoning applies to examples in (7) as well: In (7a) we see that a variable 
contained in the complement of say may be bound by a quantifier external to it; in (7b) 
we see that wh-extraction out of the complement of say is not ill-formed; and in (7c) it 
is shown that the licenser of an NPI inside the complement of the attitude verb does 
not have to be its immediate clausemate. All of these facts corroborate that the 
construction studied here allows for syntactic interaction with the rest of the clause and 
can appropriately be characterized as an embedded imperative. 
 
(7) a.  Every professor1 said buy his1 book 
 b. 
?
Who did John say call at three? 
 c. 
?
No one said buy anything 
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 Furthermore, sentences containing embedded imperatives may be arguments of 
further attitude verbs (8). Along with the data introduced above, this is an indication 
that the cases of embedded imperatives do not involve paranthesis (cf. McCloskey 
2006).  
 
(8)  John thought Mary said call her mom 
 
 Finally, it cannot be claimed that the imperative clauses under discussion are 
actually to-infinitives in which the auxiliary has been elided: In (9) we see that 
although past participles may occur in to-infinitives, they are illicit in the constructions 
studied here. In (10) we see that negated to-infinitives cannot be the source of negative 
embedded imperatives. 
 
(9) a.   John said to have called his mom by tomorrow 
 b. *John said have called his mom by tomorrow 
 
(10) a.   John said not to call his mom 
 b. *John said not call his mom 
 c.   John said don’t call his mom 
 
 In this section it was conclusively shown that imperatives can be embedded in 
English. In particular, we have shown that the respective constructions do not share the 
characterizing properties of quotations, parentheticals and elliptical to-infinitives. 
However, embedded imperatives also differ in certain respects from embedded 
declaratives and interrogatives: the former are subject to certain felicity conditions that 
the latter two are not. These constraints will be exemplified in the next section. 
 
3 Matrix and embedded imperatives 
The use of matrix imperatives is subject to a different set of constraints than the use of 
declaratives and interrogatives. Embedded imperatives are restricted in a similar 
manner. The constraints involve primarily the authority status of the speaker, her 
epistemic state, and her approval of what is commanded by the imperative
1
. Between 
them, they condition the performative nature of the imperative (Schwager 2006). Now, 
it clearly holds that the performativity of imperatives does not disappear with 
embedding under an attitude verb: a felicitous use of an embedded imperative is 
conditional on the reported utterance having been performative. This is illustrated by 
the contrast between (11a), in which the reported utterance solely described a state of 
affairs, and (11b), in which the reported utterance was performative. The 
performativity of the embedded imperative is thereby not anchored to the actual speech 
context but to the speech context of the reported utterance. 
                                                 
1
 In this paper, the focus will be on the command reading of imperatives. All the observations as well as 
the proposed analysis holds for other readings (wish, advice etc.) of imperatives as well. 
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(11) a. John to Sue: ”Peter has an obligation to call Mary” 
Sue to Peter: #John said call Mary 
 b. John to Sue: ”I hereby order that Peter call Mary” 
Sue to Peter: John said call Mary 
 
Building on the fact that the performative nature of imperatives is conserved 
under embedding, an entire class of similarities between matrix and embedded 
imperatives can be derived. In (12a), it is illustrated that a matrix imperative cannot be 
followed by a statement that negates the truthfulness of the person who utters the 
imperative. In (12b), the infelicity stems from negating the truthfulness of the person 
whose performative utterance is being reported. A shift in the locus of the explanation 
of the markedness of discourses in (12) can be observed: the locus in (12a) was in 
contradicting the actual speaker, while in (12b) it was in contradicting the subject of 
the attitude verb. 
 
(12) a. A: Call Mary right away! B: #That's not true 
 b. A: John said call Mary right away! B: #John lied 
 
  A similar reasoning applies to (13) and (14). In (13a), we see that it is 
infelicitous for the speaker to be certain that her addressee will call Mary 
independently of the utterance of the imperative and still command it; in (13b) it is the 
epistemic state of the subject of the attitude verb that is responsible for the markedness 
of the respective discourse. In (14a), it can be seen that it is infelicitous for the speaker 
to command something that she does not consider to be a good outcome; in (14b), the 
infelicity is due to subject of the attitude verb having had such considerations. 
 
(13) a. #I know you're going to call Mary. Call her! 
 b. #John knew you were going to call Mary. He said call her 
 
(14) a. #Call Mary right away. But I don't think you should 
 b. #John said call Mary right away. But he didn't think you should 
 
To summarize: certain parallels hold between the infelicitous use of embedded 
and matrix imperatives. The intuitive reason for the markedness of the (a) sentences in 
(12)-(14) is that there is a conflict between the imperative uttered by the agent of the 
actual speech event and the accompanying context (cf. Schwager 2006). The 
markedness of (b) sentences, on the other hand, is due to a conflict between the 
imperative uttered by the agent of the reported speech event and the context of that 
speech event. Thus, while the explanations of the markedness of discourses in (a) and 
(b) have the same underlying architecture, the ingredients are distinct – in (a) 
examples, the ingredients are the circumstances of the actual speech event, while in (b) 
examples, the ingredients are the circumstances of the reported speech event. A similar 
pattern has been noted in the evaluation of epistemic modals, to which we turn in the 
next section. 
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4 Matrix and embedded epistemic modals 
Epistemic modality is context-sensitive (Hacquard 2006, Stephenson 2007, Yalcin 
2007 and many others), i.e. it depends on the context whose epistemic state is relevant 
for determining the sentence’s truth conditions. In particular, the epistemic agents that 
feature in the assessment of matrix epistemics (15a) come from the actual speech 
context, while the epistemic agents featured in the assessment of embedded epistemic 
modals are determined by the context of the reported attitude situation (15b). For the 
purposes of this paper, we assume that the knowledge that is relevant for matrix 
epistemic modals is that of the speaker (cf. DeRose 1991, Stephenson 2007, 
MacFarlane 2008 for a more sophisticated treatment and caveats), while the 
knowledge that is relevant for embedded epistemic modals is that of the subject of the 
respective attitude verb. This is illustrated by the paraphrases in (15a’) and (15b’).  
 
(15) a. It might be raining 
 a’. It’s not the case that I know that it isn’t raining 
 b. John believes that it might be raining 
 b’. It’s not the case that John knows that it isn’t raining 
 
As an illustration, these assumptions provide a natural explanation of the infelicity 
found in epistemic contradictions (cf. Yalcin 2007 for discussion): since the epistemic 
modal is evaluated in relation to her knowledge, by uttering (16a) the speaker is being 
cognitively dissonant. The markedness of (16b) is due to cognitive dissonance being 
attributed to the subject of the attitude verb. 
 
(16) a. #It’s raining and it might not be raining  
 b. #John believes it’s raining. He also believes that it might not be raining 
 
 It is clear that an unmodified Kratzer (1978) approach does not capture this 
context-sensitivity: John believes that it might be raining is true according to that 
theory iff, roughly, in all the worlds w doxastically accessible to John, at least one 
world w’ is epistemically accessible from w in which it is raining – there is no mention 
of whose epistemic state is relevant in determining the latter accessible worlds. Several 
different types of accounts of epistemic modals have been proposed that try to remedy 
this shortcoming. Among them is also the event-relative approach in Hacquard (2006) 
that is based on Kratzer’s classical treatment of modality2. Hacquard assumes that the 
first argument of a modal is an accessibility relation that assigns a set of accessible 
worlds to the modal’s second argument, an event; the modal’s third argument is a 
proposition. The denotation of might is given in (17). 
 
(17) [[might R e]] = p. w  R(e): p(w) = 1 
                                                 
2
 A slightly simplified version of Hacquard’s (2006) approach is presented here. The simplifications, 
which are primarily related to the treatment of root modality and tense, are harmless since we are 
dealing with ’high’ modals, i.e. deontic addressee-oriented modals, and the role of tense is ignored. 
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The accessibility relation in (17) is epistemic and Hacquard proposes that it assigns to 
an event a set of worlds compatible with the content of that event (18a). The content of 
an event is thereby the set of propositions that are associated with the event in a certain 
manner, e.g. they are known in the event(uality) (18b). The epistemic accessibility 
relation thereby presupposes that its event argument is contentful. 
 
(18) a. Repist = e: CONTENT(e) . w. w is compatible with CONTENT(e) 
 b. CONTENT = e. p. p is known in e 
 
Furthermore, Hacquard proposes that modals may merge either with a VP – i.e. 
below tense and aspect – or T’ – i.e. above tense and aspect. They are then relativized 
to the closest c-commanding event variable, which provides the temporal and 
individual anchoring of the modal – namely anchoring to the time and the individual 
participants of the event. In the case of unembedded modals that merge with T’, that 
event is the speech event. In the case of embedded modals that merge with T’, that 
event is the attitude event. In the cases of modals that merge with a VP, the event they 
are relativized to is the event introduced by the aspect operator. This event-
relativization is formally captured by the event argument of the modal being bound by 
the closest event-binder: 
 
(19) Syntactic assumptions 
 a. Event and world variables are bound by the closest binders 
 b. ’ w’ and ’ e’ can be inserted freely to ensure interpretability 
 
This system can account for the dependence of matrix epistemics on the 
cognitive state of the speaker as well as the switch of dependence which occurs with 
embedding of epistemic modals. It also provides a natural explanation for why 
epistemic modals merge above aspect (and tense). Namely, their accessibility relation 
selects for contentful events – speech and various attitude events are contentful, while 
events in the denotation of most other VPs are not. Accordingly, merging the epistemic 
modal with a VP, where the modal’s event argument is relativized to the event 
introduced by aspect, would lead to a clash between the requirements of the 
accessibility relation and the nature of the event argument (cf. Hacquard 2006 for more 
details).  
A simplified structure for matrix epistemics is given in (20). In (20b), instead 
of binding the modal’s event argument, we represent the speech event with e* – a more 
elaborate speech act projection likely dominates the structure in (20b) but will not 
feature in our representations. We collapse the tense and aspect heads into Infl 
complex, whose denotation is given in (20c); the semantic contribution of tense is 
ignored. 
 
(20) a. John might come 
 b. [[might R e*] [ w [Infl w] [ e [John come(e)]]]] 
 c. [[Infl w]] = P. e w[P(e) = 1] 
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The truth-conditions of (20b) are computed in (21): the minimal speech event of 
uttering (20a) has only the speaker as a participant. Accordingly, it is the speaker’s 
cognitive state that determines the epistemic content of the event, i.e. the domain of the 
first existential quantifier contains only those worlds that are compatible with the 
speaker’s knowlege. It is asserted that in at least one of those worlds, John comes. 
  
(21) [[(20a)]] = 1 iff w  Repist(e*): e w[agent(e)(John) & come(e)] 
 
 If an epistemic modal is embedded under an attitude verb, its event argument is 
co-indexed with the event(uality) argument of the attitude verb – they are both bound 
by the same event binder (22b). Accordingly, since the modal is relativized to the 
attitude event, it is the beliefs of the attitude holder that will be relevant in determining 
the accessible worlds. The holder of the attitude event is denoted by the subject of the 
attitude verb. Accordingly, the content of the event, which determines the domain of 
existential quantification over worlds, consists of the beliefs of the subject. This 
accounts for the observed shift in the epistemic agent relevant for evaluating epistemic 
modals from the speaker in (21) to the subject of the attitude verb in (22d). 
 
(22) a. Mary believes that John might come 
 b. [Infl w*] e’ [Mary believe(e’) [ w’ [might R e’] [ w [Infl w] [ e [John 
come(e)]]]]] 
 c. [[believe]] = e. p. x. holder(e)(x) & believe(e) & w  
CONTENT(e)[p(w) = 1] 
 d. [[(22b)]] = 1 iff e w*[holder(e)(Mary) & believe(e) & w  
CONTENT(e)[ w’  Repist(e)[ e’ w’[agent(e’)(John) & come(e’)]]]], 
i.e. iff e w*[holder(e)(Mary) & believe(e) & w  Repist(e)[ e’ w 
[agent(e’)(John) & come(e’)]]] 
 
 This section has illustrated some basic facts related to the context-sensitivity of 
epistemic modality. In particular, we have focused on the shift of the individual 
relevant for determining the possible worlds over which the modal quantifies; such a 
shift was shown to occur when epistemics are embedded under an attitude verb. An 
approach in which modals are relativized to events was adopted to account for these 
facts. The next section will introduce a modal semantics for imperatives. Combined 
with the event-relative treatment of modality, this will allow us to analyze the facts 
described in Section 3. 
 
5 Imperatives as modalized sentences 
There are several distinct approaches to semantics of imperatives (Han 1998, 
Schwager 2006, Portner 2007 among many others). These approaches differ in 
whether they predict embeddability of imperatives. In particular, if a standard analysis 
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of embedding attitude verbs – i.e. attitude verbs select for propositions – is adopted, 
approaches that assume that imperatives are not propositional cannot be maintained in 
light of the preceding discussion. However, if imperatives are treated as denoting 
modal propositions, their embedding is expected. Schwager’s (2006) semantics of 
imperatives exemplifies the second type of approach: she analyzes imperatives as 
performatively used deontic modal sentences. More precisely, imperatives and 
performative modals are treated as having the same assertive content as non-
performative modals, but they additionally trigger three presuppositions
3
. 
An illustration of the first restriction on the use of imperatives and 
performatively used deontics is in (23). In (23a), it is shown that it is infelicitous to 
contest the verity of a peformatively used deontic modal. The same observation was 
shown to hold for imperatives in (12a), repeated in (23b). The restriction can be 
characterized as the speaker possessing a rational authority which makes disputing her 
truthfulness infelicitous. This is the authority condition. 
 
(23) a. A: You must call Mary right away! B: #That's not true 
 b. A: Call Mary right away! B: #That's not true 
 
The second presupposition triggered by imperatives and performative deontics 
is the following: prior to the utterance of the imperative, the speaker must not believe 
that the addressee will fulfill the obligation imposed by the imperative independently 
of the utterance of the imeperative. She must not be convinced that her command will 
be ignored either. This is the epistemic uncertainty condition, and it is illustrated in 
(24) (cf. (13a) above). 
 
(24) a. #I know you're (not) going to call Mary, (but) you must call her  
 b. #I know you're (not) going to call Mary, (but) call her 
 
The third presupposition is that the speaker must endorse what she commands. 
This is the accessibility relation affirmation condition (ordering source affirmation in 
Schwager 2006). Again, a parallelism between imperatives and performatively used 
modals obtains (25) (cf. (14a) above). 
 
(25) a. #You must call Mary right away! But I don't think you should 
 b. #Call Mary right away! But I don't think you should 
 
 The standard meaning of a universal modal is given in (26a); the LF of You 
must call Mary is in (26b). (26a) also represents the content of the assertive component 
of the imperative modal and the performative deontic modal must. In addition, both the 
imperative and the performative must select for a deontic accessibility relation that 
takes a contentful event of appropriate kind as its argument. They are also subject to 
the three conditions discussed above: the speaker has to be an authority in the speech 
                                                 
3
 A sparse version of Schwager’s analysis is instrumentalized in this paper. Furthermore, some liberties 
are taken in formulating some points. For more details, cf. Schwager 2006. 
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event, she has to affirm the accessibility relation, and she must be epistemically 
uncertain in an event immediately preceding the speech event about whether the 
proposition denoted by the complement of the imperative modal would obtain. The 
denotation of the imperative modal is in (27a); the LF of Call Mary is in (27b). The 
truth-conditions of (27b) are computed in (27c). 
 
(26) a. [[must]] = R. e. p. w  R(e): p(w) = 1 
 b. [must R e*] [ w [[Infl w] [ e [you call(e) Mary]]]] 
 
(27) a. [[imp]] = R. e: authority(agent(e),e) & affirm(agent(e),R,e). p: 
uncertain(agent(e),p,epre). w  R(e): p(w) = 1 
 b.      
 
 
imp R e* 
w  
 Infl w 
  e 
you call(e) Mary   
 c. [[(27b)]] is defined only if the speaker is an authority, affirms the 
accessibility relation, and is epistemically uncertain about the addressee 
calling Mary. If defined, [[(27b)]] = 1 iff w  R(e*) [ e w 
[agent(e)(the.addressee) & call(e)(Mary)]] 
 
The above representation leaves the domain of universal quantification underspecified. 
We will assume that this domain consists of worlds that are compatible with what was 
said in the respective speech event. That is, we propose that the imperative modal 
selects for the accessibility relation given in (28a). The natural content of a speech 
event is thereby the set of propositions that the speaker conveyed to an addressee by 
her utterance (28b). 
 
(28) a. Rimp = e: CONTENT’(e) . w. w is compatible with CONTENT(e) 
 b. CONTENT’ = e. p. p was conveyed in e  
 
This section introduced Schwager’s propositional analysis of imperatives and 
performative modals, which was transposed to an event-based framework introduced 
in Section 4. In particular, imperatives are clauses headed by a modal that has the same 
semantics as non-performative modals but is subject to three additional conditions that 
are encoded as presuppositions: authority, epistemic uncertainty and accessibility 
relation affirmation. The following section will combine the proposals introduced in 
the last two sections to derive the facts described in Section 3. 
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6 Shift with embedded imperatives 
The imperative modal shares a crucial property with epistemic modals: it merges 
above aspect (27b). The reason for this is the same as the reason for high merger of 
epistemic modals: the imperative modal selects for contentful events which are due to 
local event co-indexation (19) not available if the modal merges with the VP. 
Consequently, if an imperative is embedded under an attitude verb, the event argument 
of the imperative modal is bound by the same event binder as the event argument of 
the attitude verb. This can be seen in (29b), which is the LF of the sentence in (29a). 
The meaning of say is given in (29c). 
 
(29) a. John said call Mary 
 b.  
 
 
Infl  w*    
            e’ 
                   John 
                           say(e’)  
                         w’ 
                     imp R e’ 
            w  
             Infl w 
           e 
   you call(e) Mary 
 c. [[say]] = e. p. x. agent(e)(x) & say(e) & w CONTENT(e)[p(w) = 1] 
 
The imperative modal is thus anchored to the attitude event. Accordingly, this is the 
event that is subject to definedness conditions on imperatives discussed in Section 5, 
i.e. the authority, epistemic uncertainty and accessibility relation affirmation 
conditions. Since the agent of the attitude event is denoted by the subject of the attitude 
verb, it is the authority status, epistemic state and affirmative stances of this individual 
that the felicity of the embedded imperative depends on. This is exemplified in (30) 
where the truth-conditions of (29b) are computed.  
 
(30) If defined, [[(29b)]] = 1 iff e w*[agent(e)(John) & say(e) & w  
CONTENT(e)[ w’  Rimp(e)[ e’ w’[agent(e’)(the.addr.) & 
call(e’)(Mary)]]]] iff e w*[agent(e)(John) & say(e) & w  Rimp(e) [ e’ w 
[agent(e’)(the.addr.) & call(e’)(Mary)]]]]. 
[[(29b)]] is defined only if in the reported speech event, John is an authority, 
he is uncertain about the addressee calling Mary and affirms the addressee 
calling Mary. 
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These truth-conditions are accountable for the patterns observed in Section 3, repeated 
in (31). Namely, the operative condition responsible for the markedness of (31a) is 
John having to be an authority in the reported saying event. The second sentence of 
(31a) contradicts this condition. In (31b), the first sentence expresses that prior to 
uttering the imperative, John was epistemically certain about the addressee calling 
Mary. The use of an embedded imperative in the second sentence, however, comes 
with the precondition that the subject of the attitude verb was uncertain prior to the 
utterance of the imperative whether the addressee will call Mary. This precondition 
cannot be satisfied in light of the first sentence. Finally, as it is illustrated in (30), the 
first sentence in (31c) presupposes that John has an affirmative attitude towards the 
addressee calling Mary, while the second sentences negates this.  
 
(31) a. A: John said call Mary right away! B: #John lied 
 b. #John knew you were going to call Mary. He said call her. 
 c. #John said call Mary right away. But he didn't think you should. 
 
In summary, the infelicity of discourses in (31) can be shown to follow from 
the incompatibility of the event-relative semantics of the imperative modal and the 
accompanying context: by relativizing modals to events, the definedness conditions of 
imperatives become characterizable as restrictions on events in which the imperative is 
uttered. If these events cannot fulfill the felicity requirements imposed by the 
imperative modal, as is the case in (31), the sentence is marked. This accounts for the 
parallel behavior of matrix and embedded imperatives described in Section 3. The next 
section describes another prediction of the analysis developed here and touches upon 
some further issues. 
 
7 Some puzzles 
There are two puzzles concerning embedded imperatives that were mentioned only 
very briefly in the preceding exposition: the limitations on the embedding verb and the 
nature of the imperative subject. The first puzzle was illustrated in (3), which is 
repeated below. It concerns the fact that the only attitude verb that allows for 
embedding of imperatives in English is say. 
 
(3) a. *John claimed (that) [call Mary] 
 b. *John knows (that) [call Mary] 
 
The approach to imperatives and modality espoused above allows for a natural 
explanation of some restrictions on what the embedding verb may be: it has to be a 
verb of saying that describes events in which, roughly, a command has been expressed. 
Namely, as it is defined in (28), the accessibility relation of imperatives and other 
performative deontic modals selects only for events in which certain properties hold of 
the agent, e.g. the speaker in the speech event. The sentences in (3) have the structures 
given in (32) where the event arguments of the imperative modal are co-indexed with 
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the event arguments of the attitude verbs claim and know, respectively. On the one 
hand, although a minimal knowing event(uality) e does contain a cognizing individual 
– a holder of certain beliefs and knowledge – that individual is not an agent of the 
event and, accordingly, Rimp(e) is undefined (presuppositions of the imperative modal 
require there to be an agent in the respective speech event). On the other hand, the 
agent of a claiming event does not satisfy the authority presupposition triggered by the 
perfomative modal. This explains why embedded imperatives can occur only under 
attitude verbs that can be used to describe events in which a command was uttered.  
 
(32) a. [Infl w*] e’ [John claim(e’) [ w’ [imp R e’] [ w [Infl w] [ e [you 
call(e) Mary]]]]] 
 b. [Infl w*] e’ [John know(e’) [ w’ [imp R e’] [ w [Infl w] [ e [you 
call(e) Mary]]]]] 
 
However, it is not all verbs of commanding that allow embedded imperatives; for 
example, demand and order are unacceptable with an imperative complement (33). 
Descriptively, all the verbs of commanding that are such that if they take a CP 
argument, that CP has to have an overt complementizer (34), do not embed 
imperatives. 
 
(33) a. *John demanded (that) call his mom 
 b. *John ordered (that) call his mom 
 
(34) a. John demanded *(that) Mary call his mom 
 b. John ordered *(that) Mary call his mom 
 
Accordingly, the fact that the only verb of saying that can embed imperatives is say 
could be explained along the following lines: It is a common assumption that 
imperatives are CPs where either an imperative feature (Schwager 2006) or some 
directive feature (Han 1998) is situated in C. This is a position that is also targeted by 
the complementizer that, which cannot have an imperative feature. Therefore, if an 
attitude verb selects for CPs with an overt complementizer that (e.g. claim, order), an 
embedding of imperatives is illicit. 
 The second puzzle concerns the reference of the imperative subject. In matrix 
imperatives, the subject refers to the addressee in the actual context. This is frequently 
captured by assuming that the imperative subject pro has a second person feature that 
requires the denotation of pro to be the addressee of the utterance. In embedded 
imperatives, however, the referent of the imperative subject is not necessarily the 
actual addresse.  
 
(35) a. John said call his mom, so you should 
 b. John said call his mom, and I did 
 c. John said call his mom, and Bill did   
 d. John said call his mom, so we will 
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The sequences in (35) are felicitous. If the denotation of the imperative were just the 
actual addressee, only (35a) would be expected to be licit: the obligation of the actual 
addressee to call John’s mom cannot be satisfied by anyone other than the actual 
addressee. The behavior of the subject of the embedded imperative thus resembles the 
behavior of arbitrary PRO. The fact that such behavior is not observable with matrix 
imperatives might be due to pragmatic reasons. A further investigation of this issue is 
mandated. 
 In this section, the restricted distribution of embedded imperatives in English 
was to some extent derived from the semantics of the imperative modal and event-
relativity of modality. Furthermore, it was suggested that cases of non-embedding of 
imperatives under verbs of commanding were due to syntactic restrictions. Finally, it 
was shown that the denotation of the subject of the embedded imperative does not 
always straightforwardly correspond to the actual addressee. 
 
8 Conclusion 
Although it has often been claimed otherwise, there are embedded imperatives in 
English. Their semantic properties thereby closely resemble the properties of 
embedded epistemic modals: their evaluation is to some extent context-sensitive. We 
have captured this resemblance by adopting Schwager’s (2006) account of imperatives 
(imperatives denote modal propositions) and Hacquard’s (2006) approach to modality 
(modals are event-relative). 
 There are several issues that require further investigation: the restriction of 
English attitude verbs that allow embedded imperatives to say; the cross-linguistic 
variation in the embedding of imperatives; the semantics of the embedded imperative 
subject and its implications for the analysis of imperative subjects in general. First 
steps in resolving some of these issues were made above, but a lot of theoretical and 
typological work still lays ahead.   
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Abstract 
This paper presents two reading experiments investigating reference processes in 
intensional contexts. Both studies employ sentence pairs containing a definite NP 
whose potential antecedent is embedded in an intensional context, where definite 
anaphora is not supported. Previous work on this topic has shown that the 
interpretation of such sentences elicit a cost in terms of reading times, because 
readers undertake inferential or revision processes to derive a coherent text 
representation. The results of the experiments, however, do not support these 
accounts. Instead, they are consistent with a new theoretical development based 
on the notion of non-actuality implicature (Frazier 2008). 
 
1 Introduction 
It is well known in natural language semantics that intensional verbs like want, need 
and look for give rise to contexts in which indefinite noun phrases (NPs) can receive 
two readings. For example, on one reading of (1a), Mary wants a horse for her 
birthday, but no particular one, on the other reading, there is a certain horse such that 
Mary wants it for her birthday: 
 
(1) a. Mary wants a horse for her birthday. 
 b. John is looking for a unicorn. 
 
The two readings are usually referred to as unspecific and specific, 
respectively. On unspecific readings, indefinite NPs do not presuppose the existence of 
their referent, giving rise to what is often called a lack of existential import. For 
example, a sentence like (1b) may well be true although unicorns do not exist
1
. As a 
                                                 
1
 Another major property of intensional verbs is that substitution of coreferential terms in the 
complement may not preserve the truth value of the original sentence (for an overview of properties of 
intensional (transitive) verbs, see Forbes, 2004). In the remainder of the paper, I will refer to verb phrase 
constructions headed by an intensional verb as intensional contexts.  
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consequence, complements of intensional verbs generally do not support definite 
anaphora (Karttunen, 1976; Moltmann, 1997), as seen in (2a) as opposed to (2b) (here 
„#‟ means „infelicitous on the unspecific reading of the indefinite‟): 
 
(2) a. Mary wanted a horse for her birthday. # The horse / it was  
white and had a golden mane. 
 b. Mary got a horse for her birthday. The horse / it was  
white and had a golden mane. 
 
Although the theoretical investigation on intensionality has a rich tradition, 
going back at least to Frege (1892) and Quine (1956), the topic has not figured 
prominently in psycholinguistics. Intensionality has entered this field of research as a 
„tool‟ to set up contexts that do not support definite anaphora, as in (2a), in order to 
investigate whether modal information elicits empirical effects with regard to 
discourse processing (Dwivedi, Phillips, Lague-Beauvais, & Baum, 2005) and the 
nature of the inferential processes that readers undertake to achieve coherent text 
representations (Haviland & Clark, 1974). The empirical evidence collected in these 
studies suggests that intensionality affects discourse processing. However, the nature 
of the mechanisms that underlie the online processing of sentence pairs such as (2a) is 
still an open question.  
In the present paper I present two experimental studies focusing on the 
interpretation of definite NPs in intensional contexts. I argue that the results of these 
experiments do not support previous accounts of intensionality effects in discourse 
processing. Instead, they are predicted by a new theoretical development (Frazier, 
2008) based on the notions of accommodation and non-actuality implicature.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section I provide a brief overview 
and a critical assessment of the relevant psycholinguistic literature. Section 3 presents 
the two experimental studies that have been carried out. In Section 4, the experimental 
results are discussed with respect to previous models of discourse comprehension and 
Frazier‟s (2008) notion of non-actuality implicature. Section 5 provides a brief 
summary and a conclusion. 
 
2 Background 
As mentioned above, intensionality is not a core topic in psycholinguistics. However, 
intensional verbs have been exploited to test theories of reference processes during 
discourse comprehension. Specifically, sentence pairs such as (2a) as opposed as (2b) 
have been used to investigate anaphoric bridging processes (Haviland & Clark, 1974, 
Experiment 2) and theories of modal subordination (Dwivedi et al., 2005). These 
studies were motivated by the basic assumption in discourse processes research that, 
while processing a text, the reader‟s goal is to build a coherent representation in which 
incoming information is related to earlier portions of text via anaphoric or inferential 
processes (e.g. van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; Gerrig & 
McKoon, 1998; Sanford & Garrod, 1981; Wolf, Magliano, & Larsen, 2005). A 
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consequence of this assumption is that if readers are not initially successful in 
identifying an antecedent for an anaphoric expression, they resort to alternate strategies 
for establishing coherence.  
In the two-sentence discourses illustrated in (2), both the definite NP the horse- 
which normally presupposes the existence of a referent (Russell, 1905; Strawson, 
1950) and signals that it is already given or familiar to the interlocutor (Heim, 1982)- 
and the pronoun it require an antecedent to be interpreted. While in (2b) the antecedent 
is already given in the context sentence, in (2a) it must be accommodated as a new 
discourse entity, provided that the indefinite in the context sentence is interpreted as 
unspecific. As a consequence, readers must undertake additional processing in order to 
build a coherent text representation. In support of this prediction, the experimental 
studies reported in Haviland & Clark (1974) and Dwivedi et al. (2005) consistently 
showed a processing cost associated with sentences containing definites whose 
potential antecedents are embedded in an intensional rather than an extensional 
context. The two studies, however, offer two different accounts of their findings and, 
more important, both are problematic from the methodological point of view.   
To begin, Haviland & Clark (1974; Experiment 2) used intensional contexts to 
control word repetition effects in the investigation of inferential bridging processes. 
Specifically, in their first experiment, they showed that a sentence like The beer was 
warm is more difficult to process when it follows a context sentence like We checked 
the picnic supplies than We got some beer out of the trunk because readers need time to 
make a bridging inference which relates beer to picnic supplies, in order to generate a 
coherent text representation. Although the reading time difference could be indicative 
of bridging processes, there was an obvious alternative explanation of their finding: the 
repetition of the word beer in the easier condition might have facilitated the processing 
of the target sentence, causing faster reading times than in the harder, bridging 
condition. To control word repetition effects, Haviland & Clark (Experiment 2) tested 
sentence pairs like those in (3), where a repetition of the critical word was obtained in 
both conditions but, crucially, definite anaphora was supported only in (3a, b): 
 
(3) a. Ed was given an alligator for his birthday. 
 a'. Ed wanted an alligator for his birthday. 
 b. The alligator was his favourite present. 
 
Haviland & Clark hypothesized that in order to establish a coherent 
representation of the sentence pair (3a‟, b), the comprehender needs to infer that Ed 
actually got an alligator for his birthday, and that alligator was his favourite present 
(Haviland & Clark, 1974, p. 516). The bridging process, here, consists in 
accommodating a new discourse referent for the definite NP and interpreting it as 
standing for the alligator that Ed got for his birthday. The results of the experiment 
supported this hypothesis showing longer reading time for (3b) following (3a‟) than 
(3a). This finding, however, does not necessarily prove that intensional contexts affect 
discourse processing. The experimental paradigm used in the study does not enable us 
to assess whether the costly process is the accommodation of a new discourse referent 
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due to the anaphorically inaccessible context, as claimed by Haviland & Clark, or an 
otherwise motivated bridging inference. Consider the sentence pair given in (4): 
 
(4) The day of his birthday, Ed saw an alligator at the pet shop. 
 The alligator was his favourite present.  
 
Here, nothing prevents the definite NP to be interpreted as coreferentially linked 
to the indefinite in the context sentence. However, a bridging inference is required to 
coherently connect the event of seeing an alligator and the information that that 
alligator was Ed‟s favourite present (at least, it is necessary to infer that someone gave 
Ed the alligator as a birthday present!).  
More important, Haviland & Clark instructed participants in the experiment to  
“[…] be sure to read and pay attention to the first sentence in each pair since it would 
be related to the second. But, [they were] told, it was the second sentence that [they] 
were interested in […]” (p. 515). These instructions might have induced participants to 
actively find a detailed bridge between the two sentences in each pair, producing 
reading time differences as a function of task demands rather than the experimental 
manipulation. 
Finally, Haviland & Clark did not take into consideration that, upon 
encountering the definite NP in the target sentence, participants might have been 
biased to adopt a specific interpretation of the indefinite in the context sentence. When 
computed, a specific reading of the indefinite supports definite anaphora and makes 
the discourse coherent. The latter hypothesis has been investigated in an Event Related 
Potential (ERP) study by Dwivedi et al. (2005).  
The experiment tested materials like (5): 
 
In (5a), the indefinite a novel can act as antecedent for the pronoun in the target 
sentence. In (5b), by contrast, the intensional verb consider produces an intensional 
context where anaphora resolution is blocked. The results of the experiment showed a 
P600-like effect, with a frontal distribution, elicited by the verb in the second sentence 
(ends) of (5b) compared to (5a), suggesting a revision in discourse structure. The 
revision process was explained within the theory of modal subordination outlined in 
Roberts (1987, 1989, 1996). Robert‟s theory builds on Kamp‟s (1981) Discourse 
Representation Theory in which information that is conveyed in discourse is 
structurally represented in a Discourse Representation Structure (see also Kamp & 
Ryle, 1993). In Robert‟s theory, elements that are under the scope of modal or 
intensional operators are represented in subordinate structures and are not accessible 
for anaphoric reference from entities appearing in the main structure, where factual 
information is represented. The P600-like effect was thus interpreted as a structural 
revision of the context sentence in which the processor computes a specific 
interpretation of the indefinite NP in order to authorize anaphora resolution. Such 
specific interpretation comes about by accommodating the discourse referent 
(5) a. John is writing a novel. It ends quite abruptly 
 b. John is considering writing a novel. #It ends quite abruptly. 
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associated to the indefinite into the main discourse structure, where it becomes 
accessible to the pronoun. The interpretation of (5b)- as achieved through this 
structural revision process- would be paraphrasable as John is considering writing a 
certain novel that he has in mind and it ends quite abruptly.  
Although Dwivedi et al.‟s study used pronouns instead of full definite NPs, their 
results suggest that in Haviland & Clark‟s Experiment 2 participants might have spent 
additional time in revising the context sentence in order to provide the definite NP with 
a structurally accessible antecedent. However, a word of caution is in order. The 
results reported in Dwivedi et al. may be questionable at the methodological level. The 
analysis at the verb position, in fact, used as baseline correction a time window where 
the authors had shown a negative ERP effect starting at about 500 ms after the onset of 
the pronoun in the intensional condition. This may have produced a seeming long 
lasting positivity after the verb at similar scalp locations.
2
  
To summarize, the experimental investigation on reference processes in 
intensional contexts has produced controversial results. Several questions are still open 
and need further investigation. For example, even supposing that reference processes 
in intensional contexts elicit a cost in terms of reading times, it would be useful to 
investigate the locus and time-course of such cost. A clear prediction in this respect 
can be made if we consider that anaphora support is possible when the anaphor occurs 
in the context of modal subordination (Roberts, 1996; Moltmann, 1997), as in (6): 
 
(6) Mary wants a horse for her birthday. It must be white and have a golden mane. 
 
The consequence for a theory of processing is that, upon encountering the pronoun, the 
processor has still the possibility to build a coherent representation of a sentence like 
(6). It is at the verb position of the second sentence that the felicity of the discourse can 
be judged and, if need be, a repair strategy undertaken. Thus, we might expect a cost to 
be localized around the verb region of the second sentence of (3a‟, b). This prediction 
has been tested in the following studies. 
 
3 Two experimental studies on intensionality in discourse 
processing 
The two experimental studies reported in this section build on previous research to 
investigate how intensional contexts affect discourse processing. Before presenting the 
experimental investigation, a few remarks are in order with respect to the experimental 
methodologies that have been used. The first experiment employed the self-paced 
reading method, which is one of the most commonly adopted method to investigate 
sentence and discourse comprehension. In this method, items can be presented 
                                                 
2
 In ERP experiments, it is crucial to ensure that an effect is not already present in the signal before the  
target stimulus was actually presented. If this was the case, it would indicate that the signal is 
contaminated by a confound that is not stimulus-related.   
 
130 Francesca Delogu 
 
sentence-by-sentence, phrase-by-phrase, or word-by-word. Experiment 1 used a non 
cumulative phrase-by-phrase presentation, which is also called moving window 
technique. In this technique, segments appear first in the form of a set of dashes, with 
each dash corresponding to a character and with spaces between dashes corresponding 
to spaces between words. With each press of a key, a segment is revealed on the screen 
and, with each subsequent press, the subsequent segment appears and the previous one 
disappears. Thus, participants are able to control the rate of presentations of the 
materials, and reading times are recorded between each press of the key. The moving 
window technique is informative about possible processing difficulties associated with 
a fragment: the greater the processing difficulty and the longer the reading times. 
Experiment 1 used this technique to assess whether the cost previously found by 
Haviland & Clark (1974)- a cost detected by the time taken to read the whole target 
sentence- could be replicated and, if so, at which phrase of the sentence it would be 
revealed.  
Experiment 2 used the eye-tracking methodology, which allows participants to 
read in a more naturalistic way and to look back at earlier portions of the text. By 
monitoring eye-movements during reading, this technique measures fixation times on 
critical words or regions of a text as well as regressive movements towards previous 
regions. A lot of factors, both lexical (e.g., length and frequency of a word) and 
contextual (e.g., predictability and ease of integration of a word into a sentence or 
discourse) have been found to influence fixation times during reading (Just & 
Carpenter, 1980; McConkie, Hogaboam, Wolverton, Zola, & Lucas, 1979; Rayner, 
Sereno, Morris, Schmauder, & Clifton, 1989; see Rayner, 1998 for an overview). 
Interestingly, there is abundant evidence that fixation time in the region of an 
anaphoric expression varies as a function of how it is easy to make the link between 
the anaphor and its antecedent (e.g., Ehrlich & Rayner, 1983; Albrecht & Clifton, 
1998; Garrod, Freudenthal, & Boyle, 1994; Kennison & Gordon, 1998; Paterson, 
Sanford, Moxey, & Dawydiak, 1998). 
To determine the existence, locus, and time-course of processing difficulties, it 
is first necessary to define the region of interest and then analysing the temporal 
processing associated with that region. There are several measures that can be used as 
an index of processing time. In Experiment 2, the following measures have been 
considered: first-pass time, which is defined as the sum of all fixations beginning with 
the reader‟s first fixation in a region until the reader‟s gaze leaves the region; total 
time, which is the sum of all the fixations made in a region, including the time spent in 
the region after regressing back to it; second-pass time, which is the time spent in a 
region after leaving it either to the left or to the right. Notice that reference processes 
are assumed to be captured by early processing measures, like first-pass times, while 
higher-level integration processes, like bridging inferences, are more likely to be 
detected by measures of later processes, like second-pass or total reading time (Sturt, 
2003). 
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3.1 Experiment 1 
3.1.1 Method and materials 
Experiment 1 was designed to replicate the effect obtained by Haviland & Clark 
(1974; Experiment 2) using different materials in a different language (Italian)
3
.  The 
experiment tested sentence pairs such as those illustrated in (7)
4
: 
 
  Context 
(7) a.  Il  cuoco comprò/ una pentola nuova/ per il  suo ristorante. 
  The chef bought/ a pot new/ for the his restaurant. 
  ‟The chef bought a new pot for his restaurant.‟ 
 
 a‟. Il cuoco voleva/ una pentola nuova/ per  il suo ristorante. 
  The chef wanted/ a pot new/ for the his restaurant. 
  ‟The chef wanted a new pot for his restaurant.‟ 
 
  Target 
 b. La pentola/ costò/ parecchio. 
  The pot/ cost/ (PAST) a lot. 
 
The first sentence of each item began with a definite NP or a proper name 
followed either by an extensional construction [bought a saucepan in (7a)] or an 
intensional one [wanted a saucepan in (7a‟)]. The target sentence (7b) always began 
with a definite NP lexically identical to the indefinite in the context sentence, followed 
by a verb in the indicative past tense. Given the similarities between the present 
manipulation and the one employed by Haviland & Clark, it was expected to find 
longer reading times for the target sentence following (7a‟) than (7a). However, the 
main interest was in the locus of the expected effect. Based on Roberts (1996) and 
Moltmann (1997), the prediction was to observe an effect localized at the verb 
position, where it becomes clear that the referent for the definite NP must be 
accommodated as a new discourse entity.  
A set of 40 target sentences was created in the form illustrated in (7b) above. 
Two context-sentences for each target sentence were created, one containing an 
extensional construction and the other an intensional one. The intensional 
constructions were built using a total of 13 intensional (transitive) verbs, including, 
among others, cercare (look for), desiderare (wish), temere (fear for).The 80 sentence 
pairs were divided up into two lists of 40 pairs. Each list contained 20 extensional 
sentence pairs and 20 intensional ones, with the constraint that if an extensional pair 
occurred on one list, its matched intensional pair occurred on the other. Half the 
                                                 
3
 Cross-linguistic differences between English and Italian are assumed to be not relevant for the 
purposes of the experiment. 
4
 The character „/‟ indicates the section break between the chunks of the sentences that were displayed at 
one time in the moving-window display.  
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subjects received one list, and half the other. Stimuli presentation and recording of 
latencies were controlled by E-Prime Software. Sentences were divided up into three 
chunks and presented using the moving-window technique. On the first screen, all 
characters of the first sentence were replaced by dashes. Participants had to press the 
space bar to see the first chunk of the sentence. When they pressed the space bar again, 
the first chunk was replaced by dashes, and the second chunk was displayed. Another 
press of the space bar caused the context sentence to disappear and the dashes 
replacing the characters of the target sentence to appear. At this point the procedure 
was the same as before.  
Experimental items were displayed along with 139 filler sentences of various 
type and length. Comprehension questions, to which participants had to answer 
pressing one of two buttons, followed 50% of the trials. 16 native speakers of Italian 
took part in the experiment.  
 
3.1.2 Results and discussion 
The mean reading times for each segment of the target sentences are shown in Table 1. 
Data from each segment were subjected to analysis of variance (ANOVA), treating 
participants (F1) and items (F2) as random variables. Reading times that were 3 
standard deviations above or below the mean in each phrase position were excluded by 
the analysis. This resulted in less than 3% of the trials discarded. 
 
 
 
The analysis revealed no significant differences at any phrase of the target 
sentence [all Fs<1]. Therefore, the bridging effect reported in Haviland & Clark (1974) 
was not replicated in the present experiment. Quite surprisingly, readers seemed to find 
target sentences following an intensional context as easy to process as following an 
extensional one. It is, however, possible, that the bridging effect was somehow masked 
by the way in which materials were presented. In the present experiment, whenever a 
new chunk appeared, the previous one disappeared. Consequently, readers were not 
able to reread portions of the target sentence whenever they needed to. Haviland & 
Clark‟s experiment, by contrast, used a whole sentence presentation, so that 
participants were able to re-access previous portions of the target sentence without 
restraints. The bridging effect might have emerged during such re-reading stages. In 
Table 1. Mean reading times [ms] for conditions by segment: 1, 2, and 3 refer to the three segments of 
the target sentence. 
 target segments 
 1 
La pentola 
(The pot) 
 
2 
costò 
(cost) 
3 
parecchio 
(a lot) 
Extensional context 600 572 620 
Intensional contexts 594 565 609 
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view of this possibility, the following experiment employed the eye-tracking 
methodology which gives an extremely fine-grained and continuous picture of the 
time-course of processing, while allowing participants to read in a more naturalistic 
way and to look back at earlier portions of the text.  
 
3.2 Experiment 2 
3.2.1 Method and materials 
The aim of Experiment 2 was twofold: first, to assess whether the failure to replicate 
Haviland & Clark‟s effect in Experiment 1 was due to the way in which materials were 
presented; secondly, to test Dwivedi et al. (2005) hypothesis that the interpretation of 
anaphoric expressions whose potential antecedents are indefinite NPs in intensional 
contexts requires a revision in discourse structure to compute a specific reading of the 
indefinite. The basic strategy to test these hypotheses was to present participants with 
sentence pairs in four conditions, like those illustrated in (8):  
 
(8) a. John devoured a pastry for dessert at the dinner with his friends.  
The pastry was his favourite course. 
   
 b. John wished a pastry for dessert at the dinner with his friends.  
The pastry was his favourite course. 
   
 c. John devoured a pastry that his mother had prepared for him.  
The pastry was his favourite course. 
   
 d. John wished a pastry that his mother had prepared for him.  
The pastry was his favourite course. 
 
As in Experiment 1, the first sentence of each item began with a proper name or 
a definite NP followed by either an extensional construction (devoured a pastry) or an 
intensional transitive one (wished a pastry). The final clause of the sentence, however, 
was manipulated in order to obtain a condition in which the indefinite NP in the 
intensional construction could be interpreted as specific. The specific reading was 
obtained using, for example, a „that‟-clause. In (8d), if John wished a pastry that his 
mother had prepared for him, it means that he wished a specific pastry. Thus, in this 
condition, the discourse referent associated with the indefinite can act as antecedent for 
the definite in the target sentence and revision strategies such as those hypothesized by 
Dwivedi et al. (2005) are unnecessary. 
To summarize, the experimental manipulation combined two factors: the type 
of verb (extensional versus intensional) and the type of object (unspecific versus 
specific), which resulted in a 2X2 design. The verb-type manipulation allowed us to 
investigate whether the bridging effect found in Haviland & Clark (1974) could be 
replicated using the eye-tracking methodology. On this hypothesis, it was expected a 
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main effect of verb type with longer (re)reading times on the target sentence following 
an intensional context than an extensional one. The object-type manipulation allowed 
us to investigate the hypothesis advanced in Dwivedi et al. (2005) according to which 
the interpretation of the target sentence in (8b) requires a computation of a specific 
reading of the indefinite, which is unnecessary in (8d). On this hypothesis, it was 
expected an interaction between the two experimental factors, with longer reading 
times for the target sentence in condition (8b) compared to all the others.  
The study included 32 sentence pairs in each of the four conditions. The sentence 
pairs were counterbalanced across conditions in four lists. Participants saw each 
sentence pair in one condition. A Generation 5.5 Fourward Techonologies Dual 
Purkinje Image eye-tracker monitored participants‟ eye movements. At the beginning 
of the experiment, participants were seated at the eye-tracker, and a bite-bar and a 
forehead rests were used to minimize head movements. The tracker was then aligned 
and calibrated using a series of nine fixation boxes that participants were asked to 
fixate as they appeared on the computer screen. Before each trial, a pattern of boxes 
appeared on the computer screen. Participants were instructed to fixate the upper left 
box, at which point the target text appeared, with the first characters of the text 
replacing the fixating box. Experimental items were presented as two written lines, 
with two blank lines between each line of text. The experiment included 158 filler 
items of various type and length. Comprehension questions, to which participants had 
to answer pressing one of two buttons, followed 50% of the trials. 32 native speakers 
of English took part in the experiment. 
 
3.2.2 Results and discussion 
For the purpose of the analysis the target sentences were devided up into two regions, 
the first one containing the definite NP (The pastry), and the second one containing the 
other words of the sentence. First-pass, second-pass and total reading time data for the 
two regions of analysis were subjected to a 2X2 ANOVA that treated both factors as 
within-participants (F1) and within-items (F2).  
The analysis of total time data did not show any main effects or interactions. The 
analysis of first-pass data at the region containing the definite NP revealed an 
interaction between the two experimental factors that was significant only in the 
analysis by participants (F1(1, 31) = 4.486, p<.05; F2 <1). Simple effects analysis 
revealed that for sentences contining unspecific objects, first-pass reading times were 
longer when the verb was extensional rather than intensional, while for sentences 
contining specific objects there were no differences. The lack of significance in the 
analysis by materials, however, prevents us from generalizing this result over items 
(Clark, 1973). The analysis of second-pass times in the final region of the target 
sentence produced a main effect of object-type, which was significant by participants, 
and marginally significant by items (F1(1, 31) = 5.532, p < .05; F2(1, 31) = 2.918, p < 
.1), with longer re-reading times when the first sentence contained a specific object 
than an unspecific one. No other main effects or interactions were revealed in the 
second-pass measure. 
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To summarize, the experimental manipulation did not produce any main effect or 
interactions that could be interpreted as supporting bridging or antecedent reanalysis 
hypothesis. First-pass data at the definite NP, although not significant in the analysis 
by items, could be interpreted as an example of the „repeated name penalty‟, according 
to which the use of a repeated NP to refer to an highly accessible referent results in 
more demanding integration processes (Almor 1999). The main effect of object type in 
second-pass reading times at the post anaphoric region appears to be unrelated to 
bridging or reanalysis processes as well. Thus, the question arises as to whether 
reference processes are affected by intensional contexts and, if so, how. The following 
section discusses the results with respect to a new theoretical development outlined in 
Frazier (2008). It will be argued that Frazier‟s account provides new insight into how 
intensional contexts affect reference processes in discourse comprehension and, more 
important, predicts the kind of results here reported. 
 
4 The role of intensionality during discourse processing 
The results from both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 do not support previous 
accounts of reference processes in intensional contexts. The processing cost associated 
with sentences containing definites whose potential antecedents are indefinite NPs 
embedded in intensional contexts- a cost reported by both Haviland & Clark (1974) 
and Dwivedi et al. (2005)- has not been replicated in the present experiments. This null 
result, however, does not imply that intensional contexts do not affect reference 
processes during discourse comprehension. The previous experimental investigation 
on this topic, in my view, suffers from a key problem: too little attention has been paid 
to the processing of intensional contexts.  
It has been argued, both in theoretical and empirical research, that sentences 
containing modal and intensional operators carry a negative presupposition (Roberts, 
1996) or, in Frazier‟s (2008) terminology, a „non-actuality implicature‟. A sentence 
like A trip should be planned for August, for example, implies that a trip has not 
already been planned. Similarly, a sentence like John is looking for a horse implies 
that John has not already found one. Following Frazier‟s account, in this latter 
example, the non-actuality implicature can be represented as in (9), where Wo stands 
for the actual world: 
 
(9) Wo: NOT (John finds a horse) 
 
In this example, the implied contrast between the actual world and the asserted 
content may implicitly focus the content of a certain goal state that, if it was achieved, 
would be represented as the proposition that [John finds a horse]. Thus, non-actuality 
implicatures make salient a certain goal state that, crucially, may influence processing 
of subsequent elided constituents. In other words, “non actuality implicatures serve as 
a focusing device, guiding the processor to, seemingly effortlessly, build just the 
structure/interpretation required for elided constituents with flawed antecedents” 
(Frazier, 2008; p. 26, the italic is mine).  
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To illustrate the relevance of this prediction for our topic of research, suppose 
that the interpretation of a sentence pair such as (10a) requires the accommodation of 
an implicit restrictor for the definite NP, as illustrated in (10b): 
 
 
(10) a. Mary wanted a horse for her birthday. The horse was  
her favourite present. 
 b. Mary wanted a horse for her birthday. The horse that she got  
was her favourite present. 
 
The content of the implicit restrictor can be easily reconstructed from the non-
actuality implicature carried by the context sentence (i.e., Mary does not have an horse 
in the actual world). Such implicature makes salient the goal state achieved when 
Mary gets a horse for her birthday. The content of this goal state can act as antecedent 
for the implicit restrictor that should be reconstruct to interpret the definite NP in the 
continuation sentence. The consequence for a theory of processing is that the non-
actuality implicature hypothesis predicts that sentences such as those investigated in 
the experiments reported here are likely to be processed at no cost. In other words, the 
non-actuality implicature hypthesis predicts the kind of results we have found. 
It remains to be explained the discrepancy between our results and those 
reported in the literature, particularly in Haviland & Clark (1974). One possible 
explanation lies in the materials used the experiments. Haviland & Clark reported only 
two examples of their experimental materials which, crucially, differ in the presence of 
a non-actuality implicature. In the first one, (a) Ed wanted an alligator for his 
birthday. The alligator was his favourite present, the context sentence implies that Ed 
did not have an alligator, thereby providing a salient antecedent for the definite NP. In 
the second one, (b) Andrew was especially fond of beer. The beer was warm, the 
context sentence does not carry a non-actuality implicature and, consequently, there is 
no salient goal state that can guide the reader to build an interpretation for the second 
sentence. As a result, the second sentence of (b) should elicit a cost, either because the 
reader needs to build from scratch a bridge between the two sentences, or because the 
bridge is even impossible to build. Since Haviland & Clark‟s list of materials is no 
longer available, we are not able to ascertain how many items were like (a) and how 
many like (b).  
To conclude, although Frazier‟s account requires further investigation, what it 
seems to suggest is that, contrary to what has been argued in the literature, intensional 
contexts affect reference processes by facilitating, under certain circumstances, the 
recover of a coherent text representation. As a consequence, the experimental 
investigation of reference processes in intensional contexts cannot disregard how 
intensional contexts are actually processed and understood. Further investigation 
should take into careful consideration the semantic and pragmatic properties of 
intensional contexts and their influence on online sentence and discourse processing. 
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5 Conclusion 
I have argued that the results from the studies reported here do not support previous 
accounts of reference processes in intensional contexts according to which  
comprehenders undertake costly inferential or revision processes to recover coherent 
text representations. The results, however, are consistent with a recent view developed 
by Frazier (2008), according to which non-actuality implicatures triggered by 
intensional contexts can guide comprehenders to effortlessly reconstruct coherent text 
representations. The crucial implication for future research on this topic is that the 
investigation of how intensionality affects discourse processing cannot disregard a 
detailed study of the online processing of intensional constructions.  
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Abstract 
In this paper, we present a parallel between Greek and Korean in metalinguistic 
comparatives (MCs), and propose an analysis for both languages that combines an 
attitudinal semantics (building on Giannakidou and Stavrou 2008) with 
expressive meaning. The comparative morpheme supplies the former, and the 
than-particle supplies the latter. We discuss also data from Korean showing a two 
way distinction between ―regular‖ MCs, and antiveridical MCs.We argue that the 
use of MC than particles, in all variants, brings about an individual‘s emotive 
state, and propose that the morphemes contain expressive indices in the sense of 
Potts 2007. Our analysis has two implications: first, it allows the hypothesis that 
all metalinguistic functions in language are indeed part of the grammar in the 
particular way formulated here; second, our use of expressive indices supports 
Potts‘s view of the expressive component as separate, but interacting, with the 
descriptive content: the than particle is not vacuous, but the place where 
descriptive and expressive meaning interact. 
 
1 Introduction: metalinguistic comparative in English and Greek 
Metalinguistic comparatives (MCs) are a topic that remained largely unexplored in the 
literature on comparatives. With the exception of very brief discussions (McCawley 
1968, Bresnan 1973, Embick 2007), until recently very few works addressed the 
question of how MCs differ, if at all, from ‗regular‘ comparisons of degrees. MCs 
were easy to think of as just non-canonical uses of regular comparatives, just like with 
metalinguistic negation (Horn 1989). 
In a recent paper, Giannakidou and Stavrou (GS) argue that MCs in Greek are 
indeed grammatical creatures, with a syntax and semantics distinct from that of regular 
comparatives. In Greek, MCs are realized with the preposition para ‗than‘, which is 
lexically distinct, as we see, from the regular clausal comparative apoti:  
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(1) Ta  provlimata su  in       perissotero  ikonomika  para nomika. 
 the problems   yours are   more  ﬁnancial than legal 
 ‗Your problems are ﬁnancial more than legal.‘ 
 ‗Your problems are ﬁnancial rather than legal.‘ 
 
(2) O Pavlos  ine      perissotero   ﬁlologhos   {para/apoti}  glossologhos.  
 the Paul  is-3s   more    philologist  than  linguist 
 ‗Paul is more of a philologist than he is a linguist.‘ 
 ―Paul is a philologist rather than a linguist.‖ 
 
Para comparatives have the meaning of metalinguistic comparison, reinforced in 
English with the order reversal between ﬁnancial and more, which is only allowed in 
MC, and the use of rather. The sentence in (1) is intended to convey that the speaker 
believes it is more appropriate to say that the addressee‘s problems are ﬁnancial, than 
that they are legal; likewise, (2) conveys that the speaker believes that the proposition 
―Paul is philologist‖ is more appropriate than the proposition ―John is a linguist‖.  
Using para is optional mostly, but when para is used, the sentence is not 
simply a variant of the apoti comparative. Sentences with para are more emphatic, 
expressing disapproval or dispreference towards the than part. The use of rather in 
English, likewise, conveys some kind of emphatic dispreference too, and implies that 
the speaker believes John to be not a good linguist. 
In this paper, we maintain that the lexicalization of MC observed in Greek is 
not an accident—Korean too, we show, exhibits a MC than like para: kipota. 
Strikingly, Korean lexicalizes additionally a ―negative‖ comparative morpheme, 
charari, the analysis of which, we will argue, carries over to rather. The discussion 
proceeds as follows. First, in section 2 we present the properties of para and kipota 
comparatives which render them distinct from regular comparisons. In section 3, we 
give an attitudinal semantics for MCs, and in section 4, we further identify charari as 
an antiveridical (i.e. negative) version of MC. In section 5, we augment the attitudinal 
semantics with expressive indices (Potts 2007) that range over a negative interval. This 
is the contribution of the than-particles. We conclude with brief comments on NPI 
licensing—which we discuss more thoroughly in Giannakidou and Yoon 2008). 
 
2 Metalinguistic Comparatives in Greek and Korean 
In this section we summarize the properties of MCs following GS. In particular, the 
than-clause in the MC is clausal, and that it has undergone ellipsis (in the sense of 
Merchant 2006). In the literature on Greek comparatives (Stavrou 1982, Merchant 
2006), two types are distinguished: a clausal one, introduced by apoti ―than.wh‖ (with 
a variant aposo for amounts), and a phrasal one, introduced with apo. The para clause 
is a variant of the apoti syntactically. 
 Regarding the comparison forms used, in Greek, two types are distinguished: 
(a) a synthetic form, based on the bound morpheme -(o)ter- attached to the adjectival 
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stem and followed by the inﬂectional afﬁx, and (b) two analytic forms consisting of 
the free morphemes pjo or perissotero ‗more‘ followed by the adjective: 
 
(3) I Kiki  ine   psiloteri    apoti            i Ariadhni.  
 the Kiki is                taller        than  the.nom Ariadne 
 
(4) I Kiki   ine  {pjo/perissotero} psili         apoti  i  Ariadhni. 
 the Kiki  is  more tall   than the.nom Ariadne 
 ‗Kiki is more tall than Ariadne.‘ 
  
(5) I Kiki   pezi  kithara  kalitera  apoti i  Ariadhni. 
 the Kiki  plays  guitar  better  the.nom Ariadne 
 ‗Kiki plays the guitar better than Ariadne.‘ 
 
With para, the degree adverbial is usually the synthetic of the adverb poli ‗much‘— 
perissotero—, but it can also be pjo ‗more‘, the base adverb poli, and quite often 
kalitera ‗better‘. Kalitera comparatives sound a bit more emphatic and ―negative‖, as 
we see later. The para remnant can belong to various syntactic categories: 
 
(6) Perissotero  xazevi  para  dhjavazi.    (TP) 
 more   is gooﬁng off than  studying 
 ‗He is gooﬁng off rather than studying.‘ 
   [‗It is more accurate to say that ―he is gooﬁng off‖ than to say that ―he is studying‖.‘] 
 
(7) Kalitera  na  se  dino  para  na  se  taizo! 
 better   to  you  dress than  to  you  feed 
      ‗I would rather clothe you than feed you.‘ 
 [= It costs me more to feed you than to clothe you—i.e., you eat a lot!] 
 
Korean employs pota for both clausal and phrasal comparative (for diagnostoc 
of the prepositional use of pota see Giannakidou and Yoon 2008).  In the clausal 
comparative pota is a complementizer, preceded by a free-relative clause marker kes.  
 
 (8) Kim-un    [Lee-ka     khun-kes]-pota      (te)     khu-ta.        (clausal) 
he-Top     [Lee-Nom tall-FRel]-than       more  tall-Decl 
           ‗Kim is taller than Lee is tall.‘ 
 
The comparative predicates (taller) are formed in free variation with or without 
the comparative modifier te (more) in Korean regular comparative, just like the Greek 
analytic form (the synthetic form is unavailable in Korean). Hence, we assume that the 
pota clause contains an operator yielding an ordering relation between two degrees of 
properties, following the standard semantic analysis (von Stechow 1984; Kennedy 
1997; Heim 2000 among others).  
In parallel to Greek, MCs are also lexically marked in Korean: by kipota: 
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(9) Kim-un        enehakca-la-kipota         chelhakca-i-ta.                           (N) 
       Kim-Top     linguist-Decl-saying.than         philosopher-be-Decl 
           ‗Kim is more of a philosopher than he is a linguist.‘ 
 
(10) Ku-nun       kongpwuhan-ta-kipota                nolkoiss-ta.                              (TP) 
        he-Top        studying-Decl-saying.than          goofing off-Decl 
     ‗It is more accurate to say that ―he is goofing off‖ than to say that ―he is studying‖.‘  
 
Importantly, clause types in Korean are distinguished by the use of sentence-
ending illocutionary force markers such as interrogative ni, exclamative ela, and 
declarative marker la or ta. Since the role of these markers is to indicate the 
communicative purpose of a sentence, they only attach to a ―propositional‖ content 
rather than a predicate. For instance, even when the declarative ta is attached to an 
apparent noun form as in Sue-ta (Sue-Decl), it is interpreted as ‗It is Sue‘ rather than 
‗Sue‘. (This is unsurprising considering that Korean is a pro-drop language and the 
expletive subject ‗it‘ is only optional.) Our kipota comparatives, as we see, are 
accompanied by la or ta, which mark them formally as clausal.  
 With this basic background, we can now proceed to show how para and kipota 
comparatives differ from regular comparatives in Greek and Korean.  
 
2.1 Para and Kipota do not express “regular” comparison 
Consider the simplest case of predicative comparative: 
 
(11) * I Kiki  ine  pjo   psili  para  i Ariadhni. 
  the Kiki  is  more  tall  than  the Ariadne 
 [Intended: ‗Kiki is taller than Ariadne.‘] 
 
(12) Kim-un          Lee-{*kipota/pota}                 khu-ta. 
      Kim-Top        Lee-saying.than/than              tall-Decl 
         (Intended: Kim is taller than Lee.) 
 
These sentences cannot be used to convey that the degree to which Kiki/Kim is tall is 
greater than the degree to which Ariadne/Lee is tall. The impossibility of para and 
kipota as predicative comparatives suggests that there is no degree abstraction of the 
regular kind  in the para-clause.  
 
2.2 Incompatibility with the synthetic comparative 
Para is not compatible with the synthetic form of the comparative adjective or adverb: 
 
(13) *O Pavlos ine eksipnoteros para erghatikos.   
 ‗#Paul is smarter than he is industrious.‘ 
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The same effect has been observed for MCs in English (McCawley 1988, Embick 
2007 and references). Again, this suggests a deviation of the para-clause from the 
regular comparative in terms of routine degree abstraction. In Korean, as we noted 
earlier, synthetic comparatives are unavailable, but the difference arises in terms of the 
availability of te (―more‖). While te is totally optional in regular pota comparatives, 
kipota is incompatible with it: 
 
(14)   * Lee-nun     pwucirenha-ta-kipota                     te         ttokttokha-ta.            
             Lee -Top   industrious-Decl-saying.than     more    smart-Decl 
            ‗Lee is clever more/rather than industrious.‘  
 
2.3 No para or kipota in comparison of deviation 
Para is not possible in a comparative of deviation: 
 
(15) I Mesoghios          ine  pjo  vathia       {apoti/*para}  i Adhriatiki       ine  rixi. 
the Mediterranean Sea  is    more deep  than   the Adriatic       is shallow. 
‗The Mediterranean Sea is deeper than the Adriatic is shallow.‘ 
 
The impossibility of para here is another manifestation of the general inability of this 
type of comparative to express regular degree comparison. These structures also tell us 
that the para remnant must contain one term only, not more, as is the case here where 
two pairs are compared: the Adriatic and Mediterranean, and the predicates deep and 
shallow. Korean kipota follows the Greek pattern: 
 
(16)   * Cicwunghay-nun            aduriahay-ka       nac-kipota                        kip-ta.  
             Mediterranean-Top        Adriatic-Nom      shallow-saying.than         deep-Decl  
            ‗The Mediterranean Sea is deep more than the Adriatic is shallow.‘ 
 
2.4 Comparative ﬂoat 
The comparative morpheme perissotero can ―ﬂoat‖: it can precede or follow the 
contrasted constituent, and can also appear sentence-initially. In regular comparatives 
it can only immediately precede the adjective, as we see: 
 
(17) a. Ine               (perissotero)  eksipnos  (perissotero)  para  erghatikos. 
 is                (more)       clever           (more)  than  industrious 
b. Perissotero ine eksipnos  para  erghatikos. 
More  is   clever  than  industrious 
He is clever more than he is industrious. 
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(18)     a. ??Perissotero  ine o Janis  eksipsnos  apoti i Maria. 
         more   is the John  clever   than Maria 
 b. ??O Janis ine  eksipsnos  perissotero apoti i Maria. 
            John       is   clever   more  than Maria. 
 c. O Janis ine  perissotero eksipsnos  apoti i Maria. 
            John  is  more           clever  than Maria. 
 
Apoti is thus less flexible vis-à-vis adverb position, as we see.  By contrast, the MORE 
adverbial can be positioned in various places when we have para. This flexibility of 
MORE with para encourages us to think of it as as a (sentential) adverb. We cannot 
apply this test to Korean because because te is incompatible with kipota. 
 
2.5 Single remnant constraint 
GS note that para comparatives contain only a single constituent. (This test cannot be 
applied to Korean.) Contrast the sentences below with apoti and para: 
 
(19) a. Ghnorizo     perissotero    tin Elena   apoti  ghnorizo  tin adherﬁ tis.  
 know-1sg    more            the Elena   than   know-1sg  the sister hers 
 ‗I know Elena more than her sister.‘ 
b. *Ghnorizo   perissotero    tin Elena    para    ghnorizo tin adherﬁ tis.  
 
The verb in the para version must be omitted, but it need not in the apoti version; 
hence the ellipsis with para appears to be stricter than with apoti. A useful way of 
looking at this is to assume that it has to do with the expressive nature of para. It is 
helpful to note an observation by Potts and Roeper 2006 that some expressives—n 
expressive small clauses— are predicate bare, and disallow systematically the use of 
verbal functional elements: 
 
(20) a. You fool! 
 b. *You a fool. 
 c. *You are fool. 
 d. You are a fool.   
 
(The example in d is just a regular proposition.) According to Potts and Roeper, 
impoverished structure is part-and-parcel of the fact that expressives are generally very 
bad at combining directly with the material around them.  As a result, they are either 
very minimal (like a, and the MC para clauses), or they are indifferent to what is 
around them (as in 'abso-fucking-lutely'). If our analysis (to be fleshed out soon) that 
para contains expressive content is correct, then the predicate dropping can be 
understood as a typical behavior of the natural class para belongs to. 
 To conclude, we saw in this section Greek and Korean employ MC than 
markers that are lexically distinct from the thans used in regular clausal degree 
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comparisons. This is an impressive fact, first, because Greek and Korean are 
genetically not related, and second, because if metalinguistic functions are just 
pragmatic, we don‘t expect systematic lexicalizations. We now turn to the semantics. 
 
3 An attitude semantics for metalinguistic MORE 
By choosing to use a comparative with para, the speaker expresses a disbelief or 
disapproval towards the para-proposition, and she believes the proposition expressed 
by the main clause to be more appropriate, desirable, or preferable. GS suggest that the 
MC must thus have an attitudinal component in it, and locate the attitude in 
metalinguistic MORE. We will rely here on this analysis, and define a metalinguistic 
MOREML, distinct from the ―regular‖ MORE of the comparative, which contains a 
propositional attitude. This attitude is anchored to an individual (the individual anchor 
employed in the definition below); the anchor is typically the speaker: 
 
(21) [[MOREML]] = p q d[R( )(p)(d)  d > max( d [R( )(q)(d )])] (GS: (40)) 
 where R is a gradable propositional attitude supplied by the context: either an 
epistemic attitude such as belief; or an attitude expressing preference 
(desiderative or volitional);  is the individual anchor (see Farkas 1992; 
Giannakidou 1998) of the attitude. 
 
Syntactically, MOREML is like a sentential adverb (recall its flexibility in positioning), 
and in the semantics, MOREML relates two propositions in terms of how much they are 
R-ed by the speaker : the proposition expressed by the main clause p, and q, the 
proposition of the para clause. MOREML compares the two propositions in terms of the 
degree to which  believes them to be appropriate, prefers them, or is willing to assert 
them.
1
 This individual is typically the speaker, as we said, and GS emphasize that the 
individual anchor is implicit (i.e., it is not syntactically present as an argument). This 
claim renders the individual anchor of the MC similar Lasersohn‘s 2005 judge, i.e. the 
                                                 
1
 A brief final comment is in order here regarding the extension of the attitude semantics we propose to 
metalinguistic uses that do not prima facie appear to involve propositions, e.g.: 
 
(i) Pio sixna leme ―dear‖ para ―darling‖. 
(ii) More often we say ―dear‖ than ―darling‖. 
 
Such cases are often discussed in connection to metalinguistic negation (Horn 1989)—and 
metalinguistic negation is known to negate various aspects of the sentence including pronunciation, 
words (as in the examples here), and at any rate non-propositional aspects of the sentence. We will take 
it that even in these cases a propositional attitude is expressed (see also GS‘s a analysis (section 6) of 
metalinguistic negation as a binary connective along this line). Recall that the propositional nature of the 
MC than-constituent is further evidenced in Korean by the use of the declarative marker la (or ta), 
which would be used even in cases like the ones here:  
 
      (iii)        Pothong  wuri-nun   ―darling‖-la-kipota             ―dear‖-la-ko            han-ta. 
                     normally  we-Top    ―darling‖-Decl-saying.than ―dear‖-Decl-Comp  say-Decl 
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individual who is a parameter for the evaluation of predicates of personal taste and is 
only implicit; but the individual anchor expresses a parameter for evaluation that, 
unlike the judge, can be explicit – as is the case, e.g., of the embedded subject in mood 
choice and veridicality (Giannakidou 1998). 
GS note that individuals other than the speaker may be plausible individual 
anchors; for instance, we can have a quantiﬁer subject: 
 
(22)  Kathe ﬁtitis pistevi oti o Pavlos ine perissotero glossologhos para ﬁlologhos.  
Every student believes that Pavlos is a linguist rather than a philologist.  
 
Here, the individual anchor of comparison ranges over every student— a fact that is 
expected since we have overt embedding under a propositional attitude verb, which 
makes the embedded (in this case, quantificational) subject a possible anchor. These 
cases suggest that the notion of anchor is the one we need for MC, and not a judge 
(which tends to be implicit only).   
A singular main clause subject can also serve as an anchor: 
 
(23)  I Maria pistevi oti o Janis ine perisotero eksipnos para ergatikos. 
Mary believes that John is bright more than intelligent.  
 
Here the MC can be anchored to the main clause subject, Maria, and need not be tied 
to the speaker only. This observation correlates with Lasersohn‘s (2008) that, although 
the judge is typically the speaker, occasionally judges can be third parties; and 
likewise, it is reminiscent of Potts‘s (2007) observation that expressive meaning, 
though typically anchored to the speaker, in embedding, may get associated with the 
embedded individual. In both accounts, these extraordinary associations of the anchor 
do not threaten the general validity of the claim that the anchor is typically the speaker. 
In our account, overt embedding under a propositional attitude makes additional 
anchors available, and there is no reason why these should not serve as appropriate 
evaluation parameters for the para clause.  
 This semantics captures the perspective dependence of MC, by putting all the 
action in the comparative morpheme (no attitude is argued to be syntactically present):  
 
(24) O Pavlos ine perissotero eksipnos para erghatikos. 
 Paul is bright more than he is industrious. 
 
(25)
 
TP = d.I believe to the degree d that Paul is smart  d > 
max( d .it is I believe to the degree d  that Paul is 
industrious) 
  
       TP         ParaP = Paul is industrious 
  
 MOREML
   
         TP 
    
   o Pavlos ine eksipnos 
   ‗Paul is bright‘ 
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The structure of the para clause in particular is given in (38):  
 
(26)
  
              ParaP = para o Pavlos ine erghatikos ‗than Paul is industrious‘ 
   
 P
             
FP 
 |       
           para  APF              
          erghatikos       F[E]       <TP> 
          ‗industrious‘    [uFoc*]  <O Pavlos ine t>  
 
 
We see that we have ellipsis of the TP in the para clause, consistent with the fact that 
clausal comparatives involve TP ellipsis in Greek. 
 If MOREML gives attitude semantics, what is the contribution of para and 
kipota? So far, no special role is assigned to para (and likewise kipota), apart from 
being selected by MOREML. In section 5 we address the role of the particles 
themselves; but before we do so, we want to identify next a more ―negative‖ version of 
MOREML that is lexicalized in Korean. 
  
4 Antiveridical metalinguistic comparatives in Korean 
We claimed so far that the kipota-clause is like a para-clause: it introduces the second 
argument of MOREML. In Korean, there is no overt comparative morpheme, so we will 
hypothesize that MORE ML is there abstractly. At this point we would like to bring into 
the discussion the case of nuni. Kipota, just like Greek para, is emphatic and expresses 
dispreference towards the proposition it embeds—but this dispreference does not 
imply negation in the clause. If one wants to express a completely negative stance, 
nuni will be used with charari, which is equivalent to rather below: 
  
(27) Ku-wa       kyelhonha-nuni               (charari)       nay-ka       cwukkeyss-ta.  
       him-Dat    marry-rather than              rather          I-Nom       die-Decl 
     „I would rather die than marry him.‟ 
(28) It is not preferable for me that I marry him and it is more preferable that I die.  
 
As paraphrased here, the combination of charari and nuni brings about a completely 
negative attitude: the speaker‟s strong unwillingness to accept the first proposition 
(that I marry him) by juxtaposing itself with another dispreferred proposition (that I 
die). This latter proposition is obviously also dispreferred under normal circumstances, 
but in the context, it appears as more preferable than the nuni-clause.  
 In Greek, the effect of nuni and charari is achieved with para and kalitera. 
But notice that in this case, the use of apoti is excluded:  
 
(29) Kalitera na pethano  {para/*apoti}   na ton pandrefto! 
I would rather die         than     marry him! 
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The fact that in Greek apoti is excluded suggests that we are dealing here with a 
qualitatively different comparison from regular MC, where apoti and para are 
generally interchangeable.  
We will assume here that  charari entails some kind of negation, though it is 
not itself morphologically negative. We define charari below as the negative variant of 
MOREML which imposes a total dispreference of the q argument, i.e. the proposition 
supplied by the nuni-clause. The negative component is added as a third conjunct in 
the underlined part in the formula in below: 
  
(30) Antiveridical MOREML (Neg-MOREML) 
         [[ charari]] = p q d[R( )(p)(d)  d > max( d [R( )(q)(d )])    
         max( d [R( )(q)(d )]) = 0)] 
 where R is a gradable attitude provided by the context, expressing preference 
(desiderative or volitional);  is the individual anchor of the attitude. 
 
This definition renders charari a MOREML that asserts zero preference of q by the 
speaker. Zero preference will render charari antiveridical (though not strictly speaking 
negative, since there is no negation). Antiveridicality alone is sufficient to license NPIs, 
as is shown in Giannakidou and Yoon (2008). Greek para is obviously compatible 
with the Neg-MOREML meaning, and indeed in cases like (42) only this meaning is 
triggered. However, we cannot posit a covert Neg-MOREML in this case because the 
para-clause generally does not license NPIs that need antiveridical licenser—unlike 
the charari (Giannakidou and Yoon 2008).  
 We have evidence, then, from Korean, Greek, and English that, when 
lexicalized, MC affects two positions: the comparative morpheme itself (MOREML, or 
Neg-MOREML), and the than- position. We find distinct lexicalizations in either or 
both positions, as we saw. We gave an attitude semantics for two variants of MOREML, 
and we are now finally ready to consider the contribution of the particle.  
 
5 The expressive dimension of MC 
When a speaker chooses to use para, kipota and nuni, the utterance becomes emphatic. 
The lexical choice is thus not redundant, or a mere reflex of syntactic selection, but 
rather a reflection of the speaker‘s emotive stance. MC particles, we suggest,  add the 
speaker‟s heightened emotional perspective— a property typical of the class of 
expressive expressions such as damn and bastard, studied in Potts (2005, 2007).  
The hallmark property of expressives is that when uttered, they have “an 
immediate and powerful impact on the context” (Potts 2007: 1). Almost invariably, “a 
speaker‟s expressives indicate that she is in a heightened emotional state. They can tell 
us if she is angry or elated, frustrated or at ease, powerful or subordinated” (Potts 
2007: 8). Potts call this property perspective dependence, and MCs exhibit this 
property clearly. Before offering our specifics of the idea that MC particles contain 
expressive content, we would like to elaborate just a little bit more on the properties of 
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the particles that we believe render them expressives. We are using here the typical 
properties of expressives we find in Potts (2007).  
Independence. Expressive content contributes a dimension of meaning that is 
separated from the regular descriptive content:   
 
(31)  That bastard Kresge is famous.  
 
This sentence asserts that Kresge is famous (descriptive meaning), and it also 
conveys that “Kresge is a bastard in the speaker‟s opinion” (expressive meaning). One 
can accept the assertion as truthful without also accepting the characterization of 
Kresge as “bastard”. Potts argues that “the expressive and descriptive meanings that a 
sentence can convey should not be combined in single unit” (Potts 2007: 3), but also 
that “some expressive meanings act as bridges between the two realms, by mapping 
descriptive content to expressive content”. This is exactly how we envision the 
function of the MC particles.  
Nondisplacebility, ineffability. Expressives always tell us something about the 
utterance situation itself, and cannot be used to report on past events, attitudes or 
emotions (Potts 2007: 5).  This is what we find typically with MC particles: 
 
(32) Kalitera na pethano  para na ton pandrefto! 
I would rather die  than  marry him! 
 
(33)  Ku-wa       kyelhonha-nuni          (charari) nay-ka    cwukkeyss-ta.  
       him-Dat    marry-rather than         rather         I-Nom    die-Decl 
     I would rather die than marry him‟. 
 
These sentences can only be understood with the possibility of undesired marriage as 
very imminent.  
Structural isolates. Potts, and Potts and Roeper 2006 argue that expressives 
tend to not connect with the linguistic material around them, they are in this sense 
isolates: e.g. 'abso-fucking-lutely'. This property is certainly consistent with the 
predicate dropping and restriction to one remnant that we observed earlier with para 
clauses, as well as the fact that all metalinguistic particles are incompatible with the 
synthetic forms of the adjective. They exhibit in this case a discontinuity that can be 
seen as a manifestation of their expressive nature. 
Expressive indices. Expressive indices are the main objects manipulated by 
expressive denotations. We are not going to elaborate on the whole system here, but 
we go directly to the definition that Potts offers (Potts 2007: (37)): 
 
(34) An expressive index is a triple <a I b>, where a,b  De and I  [-1, 1]. 
 
Expressive indices are the foundation for expressive domains, and are contained in 
expressives such as damn. These indices encode the degree of expressivity as well as 
the orientation of the expressive, and they are defined via numerical intervals I  [-1, 
1]. We can read <a I b> as conveying that individual a is at expressive level I for an 
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individual b. Mapping emotional stance onto expressive intervals has the advantage of 
allowing flexibility from very neutral (if I = [-1, 1])—in Potts‘s words, ―a has no 
feelings for b‖—to very negative. Emotive relations emerge as we narrow down I to 
proper subintervals of [-1, 1]; the more positive the numbers, the more positive the 
expressive relationship, and conversely. For example: 
 
(35) a. <[[ tom]]  [-.5, 0] [[jerry]] >:   Tom feels negatively toward Jerry 
 b. <[[ ali]]  [-.8, 1] [[ jerry]] >:   Ali feels essentially indifferent to Jerry 
 c. <[[kevin]]  [0, 1] [[ jerry]] >:   Kevin is wild about Jerry 
  
Expressive indices are just entities—this explains why they are not amenable to 
paraphrases (ineffability), but they have propositional implications: we see that from 
objects like <[[tom]] [-.5, 0] [[jerry]]> we tend to infer propositions, in this case that 
Tom feels negatively toward Jerry. Importantly, the indices are built by relating two 
individuals by means of I; in our case, however, we will need to express the fact that 
an individual stands in an emotive relation to a proposition.  
We noted that the emotional state is not constant across MCs, but ranges from 
mildly negative (para, kipota), to negative (nuni); we thus argue that para, kipota, and 
nuni contain expressive indices. We thus claim that the particles contain expressive 
relations between an individual and a proposition, and this is our innovation on Potts: 
 
(36) Expressive indices of metalinguistic comparative complementizers  
Nuni, kipota and para contain expressive indexes <a I q>, where a is the 
individual anchor, q the proposition they embed, and I  [-1, 0]. 
 
Para/ kipota‟s index ranges through the negative interval, at most approaching zero: 
 
(37) a. para/kipota: <t, > : para/kipota  combine descriptive content t (the type of 
propositions) and expressive content  . 
b. [[para/kipota]] c : p.p  (identity function); c is the context 
c. Expressive content of para/kipota in c: 
 Para/kipota contain an expressive index <a I q>, where a is the individual 
anchor, q the proposition they embed; and I ranges between [-1, 0]. 
 
With nuni we have an even narrower interval: the length of I cannot range more than  
-.5. This is the very negative part of the interval: 
 
(38) a. nuni: <t, > 
 b. [[nuni]]
c
 = p.p  (identity function); c is the context 
c. Expressive content of nuni in c: 
Nuni contains an expressive index <a I q>, where a is the individual anchor, q 
the proposition it embeds; and I ranges between [-1, -.5]. 
 
What is important is to note here is that the semantic (in the sense of truth conditional) 
content and the expressive remain independent: truth-conditionally para/kipota and 
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nuni are mappings from propositions to propositions. The negative interval that they 
contribute in their index is not going to affect their truth conditional meaning—i.e. will 
not render them negative in the sense of antiveridical (Giannakidou 1998). In other 
words, a negative emotive stance to a proposition does not imply negating that 
proposition. This means that expressive force alone does not suffice to license NPIs:   
 
(39) * That bastard Kresge said anything! 
 
(40) *Kalitera na mino siopili, para na po KOUVENDA! 
 I‟d rather be silent than say a word. 
 
(41) * Na-nun   [kuren-saramtul   amwuto    manna-nuni]         cipey   issko   sip-ta. 
          I-Top       such-people         anyone      meet-rather.than    home   be     want-Decl 
         ‗I would rather stay home than meet anyone among such a crowd.‘ 
 
We see here that the negative expressive force of bastard does not suffice to license 
any; and in Korean and Greek, minimizers (which are strong NPIs and need an 
antiveridical licenser) are simply ungrammatical in para and nuni clauses. The 
negativity that comes the expressive intervals is not part of the descriptive content, 
where truth conditions are calculated. Improvement happens only if we add charari  
because it is antiveridical, as we argued earlier: 
 
(42) Na-nun  [kuren-saramtul  amwuto   manna-nuni]    charari    cipey    issko sip-ta. 
        I-Top     such-people       n-person   meet-rather.than rather    home be want-Decl 
       ‗I would rather stay home than meet anyone among such a crowd.‘ 
 
More on NPIs in Giannakidou and Yoon 2008. Here, it is important to emphasize that 
when we posit negative expressive force in the particles, we do not render them 
equivalent to negation.  
 
5 Conclusion 
In sum, our analysis claims that MC has two components: an attitudinal semantics, 
which is hosted in the comparative morpheme, and an expressive component that is 
manifested in the choice of than-particle. By embedding MC morphemes into the 
realm of expressives, our analysis achieves a natural coverage of at least this kind of 
metalinguistic interaction, and allows the hypothesis that perhaps all metalinguistic 
functions in language are combinations of attitudinal semantics and expressivity.  
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Abstract
The paper looks at the Hungarian particle ugye, which has traditionally been clas-
sified as an interrogative particle but can also legitimately appear in declarative
sentences in present-day Hungarian, and explores the possibility of assigning it a
core interpretation that covers all of its uses and attributing apparent remaining dif-
ferences between its meanings in the various sentence-types to intonation.
1 Introduction
The aim of the paper is to characterise the interpretation of the Hungarian particle ugye,
which can equally appear in utterances having the force of a question or that of an as-
sertion. (1-b), pronounced with the intonation shown in Figure 1, can be uttered in order
to provide a felicitous answer to a question like (1-a), whereas the string-identical (2-a),
pronounced with the intonation pattern shown in Figure 2, can be used to ask a question.1
(1) a. Why is Thomas so upset?
b. Mari
Mary
Ja´nost
John.ACC
le´ptette
promoted
ugye
PRT
elo˝.
VM
‘As you know, Mary has promoted John.’2
(2) a. Mari
Mary
Ja´nost
John.ACC
le´ptette
promoted
ugye
PRT
elo˝?
VM
‘Mary has promoted John, hasn’t she?’
b. Yes, she has.
Given the lack of substantial evidence for assuming that the syntactic structures
of the string-identical (1-b) and (2-a) should be different (cf. E´. Kiss (2002)), it seems to
1Note, importantly, that the contribution of ugye to the sentences intended as assertions and as ques-
tions must be translated differently into English. The particular choices made will be motivated later
on.
2The abbreviation ‘VM’ stands for verbal modifier.
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Pi
tch
 (H
z)
Mari Jánost léptette ugye elõ
Time (s)
0 1.94086
0
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500
Figure 1: Intonation of (1-b)
Pi
tch
 (H
z)
Mari Jánost léptette ugye elõ?
Time (s)
0 1.87744
0
100
200
300
400
500
Figure 2: Intonation of (2-a)
be a reasonable assumption that their different functions in the dialogues above should
be attributed to their different intonational contours.
The above strategy runs into two difficulties, however. First, the differences be-
tween the intonations of (1-b) and (2-a) do not mirror those between ‘ordinary’ declar-
ative sentences and their string-identical polar interrogative counterparts in Hungarian.
According to the standard view (cf. Fo´nagy and Magdics (1967), Kornai and Ka´lma´n
(1988), Rosenthall (1992), among others), Hungarian declaratives are pronounced with
a falling contour, whereas polar interrogatives bear a charactertistic rise-fall on their
penultimate syllable. Figures 3–43 illustrate the standard intonation of declarative and
polar interrogative sentences without ugye, examples of which are shown in (3) and (4):
(3) Mari
Mary
Ja´nost
John.ACC
le´ptette
promoted
elo˝.
VM
‘Mary has promoted John.’
(4) Mari
Mary
Ja´nost
John.ACC
le´ptette
promoted
elo˝?
VM
‘Has Mary promoted John?’
(5) and (7) below, pronounced the way indicated in Figures 5 and 7, would both
be substitutable for (1-b) in (1), as would (6) and (8), having the prosody indicated in
Figures 6 and 8, be substitutable for (2-a) in (2).
(5) Mari ugye Ja´nost le´ptette elo˝.
(6) Mari ugye Ja´nost le´ptette elo˝?
(7) Mari Ja´nost le´ptette elo˝, ugye.
3The ToBI labeling of these examples closely follows the suggestions made by Rosenthall (1992) for
analogous cases. Due to the lack of consensus concerning the appropriate representation of the system of
Hungarian intonation in the ToBI framework (cf. Pierrehumbert (1980)), I have refrained from providing
any labels for the rest of the examples, though.
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Figure 3: Intonation of (3)
Pi
tch
 (H
z)
Mari Jánost léptette elõ?
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Figure 4: Intonation of (4)
Pi
tch
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z)
Mari ugye Jánost léptette elõ
Time (s)
0 1.97893
0
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500
Figure 5: Intonation of (5)
Pi
tch
 (H
z)
Mari ugye Jánost léptette elõ?
Time (s)
0 2.01274
0
100
200
300
400
500
Figure 6: Intonation of (6)
(8) Mari Ja´nost le´ptette elo˝, ugye?
Figures 1-2 and 7-8 show that sentences with postverbal ugye that are intended to
express questions differ from those intended to express assertions in that the former has
a rise-fall pitch, analogous to the final rise-fall of ordinary interrogatives, falling exactly
on the bisyllabic particle (cf. Figure 4 above), whereas the prosody of the latter does
not differ from that of ordinary declaratives, cf. Figure 3. There is no rise-fall contour
on the particle in sentences where it precedes an immediately preverbal pitch-accented
focus constituent, but the prosodic difference between sentences of this type intended as
questions, as shown in Figure 6 and assertions, in Figure 5, is still apparent.
In the rest of the paper, when we talk about declarative sentences containing ugye
(ending in a period), we will mean those with a prosodic pattern analogous to that shown
in Figures 1, 5 or 7. A question mark at the end of an ugye-sentence will indicate that its
prosodic pattern is assumed to be analogous to those shown in Figures 2, 6 or 8.
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Mari Jánost léptette elõ ugye
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Figure 7: Intonation of (7)
Pi
tch
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z)
Mari Jánost léptette elõ ugye?
Time (s)
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0
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500
Figure 8: Intonation of (8)
The second difficulty in the way of providing a unified semantic interpretation
for the particle is that sentence-internal ugye is traditionally viewed in the Hungarian
literature as an interrogative particle, that is, as a sufficient means of creating the (form)
type of interrogative sentences. (References include H. Molna´r (1968), Kugler (1998)4,
Keszler (2000).)
The latter view is most certainly due to the (still transparent) etymology of the
particle, according to which it is the result of composing the adverb u´gy ‘so’ with the
interrogative particle -e, which resulted in the interpretation ‘is that so?’. The occurrence
of ugye in sentences that satisfy the criteria of the declarative form type (discussed be-
low) is a relatively new phenomenon (first attested in 1923 according to Benko˝ (1995)),
although quite a pervasive one (in spite of being under great attack by normative lin-
guists).
In the rest of the paper, I wish to explore the possibilities for proposing an in-
terpretation for sentences like (1-b) and (2-a) compositionally, by assuming a unique in-
terpretation for the particle in both sentence-types, and attributing the difference in their
illocutionary force potentials to their different intonation patterns. Section 2 looks at the
use of the particle in what formally appear to be declarative sentences, and compares it to
those of two German particles, whereas Section 3 is concerned with its use in sentences
that have traditionally been classified as polar interrogatives. Section 4 describes two
proposals for capturing the interpretation of the particle in a way that accounts for both
of its usage patterns. The paper closes with the conclusions in Section 5.
2 Ugye in declaratives
The only work so far where the use of ugye in declaratives has been looked at is Pe´teri
(2002), which argues that ugye has an interpretation there that is relatively similar to that
of German (unaccented) ja. He characterises the difference between the two by saying
4Kugler (1998) mentions, however, that ugye also has a so-called shading particle use.
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that with German ja the speaker only reminds the hearer of their common knowledge
base, whereas with Hungarian ugye she also expresses the expectation that the hearer
will agree with the propositional content of the sentence. Given the latter proposal, it
seems reasonable that the search for the interpretation of ugye in declaratives should start
with comparing its distribution to that of German ja, which seems to be well-described
in the literature.
According to Zimmermann (to appear), adding ja to a sentence with a propo-
sitional content p indicates that the speaker considers p to be uncontroversial, that is,
either being part of the common ground, or its truth being based on evidence that the
speaker considers the addressee to be in possession of. The intended meaning of (9-a),
containing ja, is adequately expressed in its Hungarian counterpart with the help of ugye,
as shown in (9-b):
(9) First brother to second brother:
a. Morgen
tomorrow
wird
turns
Mama
mum
ja
PRT
siebzig
seventy
‘Mum turns 70 tomorrow, y’know.’ (from Zimmermann (to appear))
b. Anyu
mother
ugye
PRT
holnap
tomorrow
hetven
seventy
e´ves
years old
lesz.
be.3SG.FUT
‘As you know, Mum turns 70 tomorrow.’
The following examples, however, point to some differences between the two:
(10) S is climbing the stairs in front of W.
a. W: Du
you
hast
have
ja
PRT
’n
a
Loch
hole
im
in
A¨rmel.
sleeve
‘You’ve got a hole in your sleeve, you know.’ (from Lindner (1991))
b. W: Van
be.3SG
(#ugye)
PRT
egy
one
lyuk
hole
az
the
ingeden.
shirt.your.on
‘You’ve got a hole in your shirt.’
(11) A: Maria is also coming along.
a. B: Sie
she
ist
is
#ja
PRT
verreist.
left
‘She has left.’ (from Karagjosova (2004))
b. B: Nem,
no
o˝
he/she
ugye
PRT
elutazott.
VM.left
‘No, as you know, she left.’
On the one hand, the contrast between (10-a), which is compatible with a continuation
of the formWhere? on the part of the addressee, and the infelicitous (10-b) indicates that
it is not enough for the licensing of ugye in an utterance that the speaker assumes that
the addressee has enough evidence for judging the propositional content of the sentence
to be true. On the other hand, the fact that (11-a) is infelicious in the context indicated,
whereas (11-b) could be felicitous if intended as a reminder shows that ugye is licensed
if there is a way, according to the speaker, for the addressee to arrive at the truth of the
proposition, given the information in the common ground. The asymmetries illustrated
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above indicate that the conditions for the felicitous use of ugye are not equivalent to
those of German ja.
The fact that in the context of (11), the version of (11-a) with the particle doch, il-
lustrated in (12-b), is as felicitous as (11-b), might suggest that ugye has an interpretation
that is more similar to that of German unaccented doch.
(12) a. A: Maria is also coming along.
b. B: Sie
she
ist
is
doch
PRT
verreist.
left
‘She has left.’ (from Karagjosova (2004))
The parallel etymologies of ugye and doch support the same conclusion. According to
Hentschel (1986) (cited in Zeevat and Karagjosova (2007)), German doch is of Indoger-
manic origin, and is composed of the demonstrative to, the question marker –u and an
emphatic marker h, and could therefore paraphrased as That? or Is that so?
According to Zimmermann (to appear) (based on work by Lindner (1991)), the
use of doch in a declarative with propositional content p indicates the speaker’s assump-
tion that the addressee is not aware of p, either because he has forgotten about it, or
because he believes it to be false.
The above characterization for doch does not apply to ugye, however. On the one
hand, as opposed to the case of (12-b), without the negative particle nem ‘not’, (11-b)
cannot convey the interpretation that B’s utterance contradicts that of A. On the other
hand, the two utterances of B in (13-a) and (13-b) give rise to different effects:
(13) Employee: Shall I come to work tomorrow?
a. Boss: Du
you
bist
are
doch
PRT
ernsthaft
seriously
krank!
ill
‘But you are seriously ill!’
b. Boss: Te
you
ugye
PRT
su´lyos
serious
beteg
ill
vagy!
be.2SG
‘But you are seriously ill, as we know!’
According to the assumptions about the interpretation of doch summarized above, Boss’s
utterance in (13-a) can only convey that he believes Employee to be temporarily unaware
of his own serious illness. With the utterance of (13-b), however, Boss can express his
doubt about whether the illness that Employee has previously reported to him is a reality.
This is due to the fact that ugye does not serve the aim of explicitly indicating a contrast
between the current utterance and the previous one, but summarizes instead what is in
the common ground or what follows from it under normal circumstances according to
the speaker, which leads indirectly to the contrast effect.
Thus, we have established that the distribution of ugye in declaratives neither
corresponds to that of German ja nor to that of doch, which indicates that the seman-
tic interpretation of the Hungarian particle cannot be equivalent to those of the German
ones. Given that neither of the German particles is allowed to appear in polar interroga-
tives, cf. Thurmair (1989), this is actually a welcome result.
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Based on the examples discussed above, the contribution of ugye to the interpre-
tation of Hungarian declarative sentences seems to be best described as marking that,
according to the speaker, the propositional content of the sentence follows due to default
reasoning from the common ground. Given that p is a proposition, Zeevat (2003) defines
the truth of normally(p) in an information state along the following lines: the truth of
normally(p) requires that the “CG |= ψ1, . . . ,ψn, and that ψ1, . . . ,ψn together constitute
a reason for thinking that p, while at the same time the CG must not contain a reason for
thinking that ¬p” (p. 183). Given the above definition, I propose that the contribution of
ugye to the interpretation of Hungarian declaratives can be captured as follows:
(14) In a Hungarian declarative sentence with a propositional content p, given a CG,
ugye marks that normally(p).
Note, importantly, that the above characterisation of the interpretation of a declarative
with ugye having a propositional content p does not require that p should be in the com-
mon ground. Otherwise, the contribution of speaker A in (11), for example, could only
be interpreted as committing her to the truth of a proposition that stands in contradiction
with the common ground, which is not the case.
Having made a proposal for capturing the interpretation of ugye in declaratives,
we turn now to the analysis of ugye-sentences that have traditionally been classified as
interrogatives in the literature.
3 Ugye in ‘interrogatives’
As mentioned in Section 1 above, ugye is viewed in many studies as a constituent that
is responsible for the formation of interrogative sentences. In this section we take this
view under close scrutiny. As also reviewed above, one characteristic type of polar
interrogative main clauses in Hungarian has the same surface order as the corresponding
declarative, cf. (3) vs. (4), differing from the latter in its intonation, as shown in Figures
3 and 4 above. The other characteristic type, illustrated in (15), is formed with the help of
the interrogative particle -e, and has the same, falling intonation contour as declaratives:
(15) Mari
Mary
volt-e
was-PRT
Pa´rizsban?
Paris.IN
‘Has Mary been to Paris?’
The following example shows that ugye is not compatible with the interrogative particle
-e:
(16) (*Ugye) Mari (*ugye) volt-e (*ugye) Pa´rizsban (*ugye)?
The unacceptability of (16) can, naturally, be accounted for within the frameworks re-
ferred to above by saying that ugye and -e serve the same function, therefore their si-
multaneous appearance is either excluded by economy principles, or even blocked on
syntactic grounds, for example, due to a principle regulating the filling of a functional
head like Forceo (cf. Rizzi (1997)).
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The following examples illustrate, however, that the functions of the latter two
particles are still not identical:
(17) Jo´zsi
Joe
tudja,
knows
hogy
that
Mari
Mary
volt-e
was-PRT
Pa´rizsban.
Paris.IN
‘Joe knows whether Mary has been to Paris.’
(18) Jo´zsi
Joe
tudja,
knows
hogy
that
Mari
Mary
ugye
PRT
volt
was
Pa´rizsban.
Paris.IN
‘Joe knows that, as you know, Mary has been to Paris.’
A comparison between (17) and (18) shows that only the particle -e is capable of indi-
cating the interrogative status of an embedded clause. The subordinate clause of (18)
can only be interpreted as a declarative. A further evidence for the dissimilar behaviour
of polar interrogative main clauses with or without -e and ugye-‘interrogatives’ is that
whereas the former do support negative polarity items, ugye is incompatible with these
(cf. Gunlogson (2003)):
(19) Mari
Mary
volt(-e)
was-PRT
valaha is
ever
Pa´rizsban?
Paris.IN
‘Has Mary ever been to Paris?’
(20) #Mari
Mary
ugye
PRT
volt
was
valaha is
ever
Pa´rizsban?
Paris.IN
‘Has Mary ever been to Paris?’
The above data thus point to the conclusion that, as opposed to the standard view, ugye-
sentences intended as question acts do not exemplify the interrogative form type. In this
case, however, the question arises what the basis of viewing ugye as being responsible
for the illocutionary force of the question in examples like (2-a) above is. The etymol-
ogy of the particle, discussed above, as well as the fact that historically it first appeared
in peripheral positions (sentence finally and then sentence-initially) makes it very simi-
lar to tags in various languages. The informal descriptions about ugye-‘interrogatives’,
according to which they denote biased questions (cf. Ka´roly (1957-62), Fo´nagy and
Magdics (1967), Varga (2002), among others) give further support to viewing them as
tag questions, most types of which are also attributed a biased question interpretation in
the literature.
According to one dominant view, represented by Sadock (1974), Ladd (1981),
Quirk et al. (1985), Reese and Asher (2006), and Reese (2007), among others, the biased
question interpretation of most varieties of tag questions5 is due to the fact that they
express two illocutionary acts at the same time: an assertion (due to the declarative
sentence) and a question (due to the tag).
The latter claim has been supported by the application of Sadock (1974)’s di-
agnostics for illocutionary force. According to Sadock (1974), compatibility with the
discourse marker after all signals that the sentence under consideration expresses an as-
sertive act (at least), whereas compatibility with by any chance and tell me marks that
5One notable exception are negative-anchor postnuclear tag questions, which can have an interpretation
of neutral questions (cf. Ladd (1981), Reese and Asher (2006) and further references in the latter).
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it expresses a questioning act (at least). The latter two diagnostics can also be used to
discriminate between neutral and biased questions: whereas the former is restricted to
neutral questions, the latter can appear with both. As the contrast between the follow-
ing examples shows, Hungarian mondd csak ‘tell PRT’, behaves analogously to English
tell me. (‘\’ at the end of (21) is to distinguish the declarative sentence from its string-
identical polar interrogative counterpart.) The translations of the Hungarian examples
illustrate the relevant tests for English:
(21) *Mondd
tell
csak,
PRT
Ja´nos
John
itt
here
van.\
is
*‘Tell me, John is here.’
(22) Mondd
tell
csak,
PRT
Ja´nos
John
itt
here
van-e?
is-PRT
‘Tell me, is John here?’
The fact that (23) patterns with (22) as far as compatibility withmondd csak is concerned,
indicates that it expresses a question (possibly among other illocutionary acts):
(23) Mondd
tell
csak,
PRT
Ja´nos
John
ugye
PRT
itt
here
van?
is
‘Tell me, John is here, isn’t he?’
Insertion of ve´letlenu¨l ‘by any chance’ into the sentences above confirms that questions
expressed with the particle -e are neutral, whereas those expressed by ugye are biased:
(24) Ja´nos
John
itt
here
van-e
is-PRT
ve´letlenu¨l?
by any chance
‘Is John here by any chance?’
(25) *Ja´nos
John
ugye
PRT
itt
here
van
is
ve´letlenu¨l?
by any chance
‘*By any chance, John is here, isn’t he?’
Negative questions with ugye, which are compatible with ve´letlenu¨l, seem to constitute
an exception to the generalization above, and, therefore, seem to pattern with negative
anchor postnuclear tag questions in English:6
(26) Ja´nos
John
ugye
PRT
nincs
be.NEG
itt
here
ve´letlenu¨l?
by any chance
‘By any chance, John isn’t here, is he?’
Having shown that Hungarian sentences with ugye having ‘question-prosody’ do sat-
isfy the tests proposed by Sadock (1974) for questioning acts, it remains to be seen
whether they can also be proven to express assertive acts as well. There are some trans-
6Reese and Asher (2006) account for the neutral question interpretation of the latter tag questions
(available in addition to the biased question interpretation) by claiming that the negation of the anchor is
to be interpreted as metalinguistic, that is, taking wide scope over an assertion operator. Limitations of
space prohibit me from discussing the applicability of this kind of analysis to the Hungarian example in
(26).
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lation equivalents of the English discourse marker after all, such as elve´gre ormindennek
ellene´re, that seem to be compatible only with sentences that express assertive acts:
(27) Elve´gre
after all
Ja´nos
John
itt
here
van.\
is
‘After all, John is here.’
(28) *Elve´gre
after all
Ja´nos
John
itt
here
van-e?
is-PRT
‘*After all, is John here?’
(29) Elve´gre
after all
Ja´nos
John
ugye
here
itt
is
van?
‘After all, John is here, isn’t he?’
The data discussed above thus suggest that ugye-sentences that can express question acts
have an interpretation analogous to English tag questions, that is, they actually express
a question and an assertion at the same time. This conclusion is strongly supported by
prosodic data, discussed in Section 1, according to which ugye-sentences intended to ex-
press question acts differ from the corresponding declarative sentences with or without
ugye in the melodic pattern of the particle itself, which resembles that of a one-word
polar interrogative (disregarding the interaction of pitch-accented focus and ugye im-
mediately preceeding it). This means that in structures where ugye appears sentence-
medially, we are talking about an internalized tag. This raises, however, the question of
how these sentences are also capable of expressing a simple assertion, as illustrated in
(1-b). The next section will address this issue, by trying to disentangle the interpretation
of the particle from that of the intonation.
4 Towards a unified interpretation for ugye
Having considered the relevant data concerning the interpretation of the particle ugye
in declaratives and in tag questions, in this section we will explore the possibilities of
integrating the two into one unified interpretation. There seem to be two ways this could
be achieved. On the one hand, we could follow the path of the historical development
and consider the interpretation of ugye in tag questions, described in Section 3, as basic
and its contribution to sentences that have been classified as declaratives in Section 2
as a derived case. On the other hand, we could consider the interpretation of ugye in
declaratives as basic, and describe its contribution to tag questions as the result of an
interaction between the former meaning and the meaning of the question intonation on
the particle.
Let us first assume that the particle ugye, that originated as an independent clause,
but later became available for being integrated into the sentence structure, is to be anal-
ysed as a tag in all its occurrences. Semantically, this means that it always contributes
a question to the interpretation of the sentence it occurs in that asks about the truth of
the proposition p asserted by the rest of the sentence (the anchor). In the default case,
the contribution of the particle to interpretation is mirrored by its intonation, which is
analogous to that of a polar interrogative in Hungarian. How can this account be ex-
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tended to cases where the intonation of an ugye-sentence is not to be distinguished from
those of its declarative counterparts with or without ugye, and therefore the sentence can
only be used felicitously to answer a question, as shown in (1-b), but not to ask one?
Let us assume that low pitch on the particle has its standard iconic function, indicating
confidence, assurence and certainty (cf. Ohala (1994)), in other words, the rhetorical
question status of the question contributed by the tag. On these assumptions, an ugye-
‘declarative’ could be taken to assert that p and assert that the answer to the question
whether p holds is obvious. This characterisation more or less corresponds to the way
the interpretation of ugye-declaratives was captured in (14) above. This approach, ac-
cording to which ugye-sentences of all kinds are to be considered to belong to the same
form-type, namely, tag questions, entails, naturally, that there cannot be any sentence
containing ugye that is well-formed when pronounced with the question-intonation on
the particle, but not when it is pronounced with low pitch, or vice versa. However, there
are at least two types of examples, illustrated below, that are only well-formed when
pronounced with low pitch on the particle:
(30) (Ha´t)
PRT
e´n
I
mit
what.ACC
tehetek
do.POSS.1SG
ugye?
PRT
‘What can I do?’
(31) Ka´r,
pity
hogy
that
nem
not
volt
was
ugye
PRT
ido˝.
time
‘It’s a pity that there was no time, as we know.’
(30) is a constituent interrogative with a rhetorical question reading where ugye (pro-
nounced with low pitch) marks the truth of the proposition indirectly conveyed by the
rhetorical question to be obvious, whereas (31) shows that it can appear in an embedded
clause, which is not normally the case with tag questions.7
The above data indicating that the particle ugye is not equally compatible with
all sentence types on both of its pronunciations brings us to the second proposal, which
takes the interpretation of ugye in declaratives as basic and derives the interpretation of
tag questions with ugye from the contribution of the anchor, from that of the particle,
and from that of the question intonation on the particle. Let us assume that this basic
interpretation of ugye is equivalent to that described in (14) above. According to this,
the particle marks that the propositional content of the sentence it appears in is assumed
by the speaker to be entailed from information in the common ground by default rea-
soning. If we want to make this the basic interpretation of the particle, and assume that
localisation of the question intonation contour on a particular constituent means that it
is only the contribution of the constituent to the meaning of the sentence is questioned
(instead of the propositional content of the whole sentence), the interpretations of the
three relevant parts of a tag question with ugye could be represented as follows:
7There might also be a possibility of analysing (31) as an embedded root phenomenon, cf. Hooper and
Thompson (1973). However, this analysis would also have to account for the obligatory low pitch on the
particle.
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(32) A proposal for capturing the interpretation of tag questions with ugye
Anchor Ugye Question intonation on ugye
INTERPRETATION p normally(p) ?normally(p)
According to (32), on the assumption that ugye has a basic meaning characterised
in (14), tag questions with ugye would have to assert the propositional content p of the
anchor, to assert that p follows from the common ground under default reasoning, and
to question the truth of the proposition according which p follows from the common
ground under default reasoning. Unfortunately, this proposal does not capture the intu-
itive meaning of tag questions with ugye correctly: the answer given to such a question
by the hearer does not depend on whether he considers the propositional content p of
the anchor to follow by default reasoning from the common ground, but on whether he
considers p to be true or not.
5 Conclusion
The present paper investigated the interpretation of the Hungarian particle ugye, that
can equally appear in sentences intended to express assertive acts as well as in those
intended to express questioning acts. We have argued that in the former case, it has
an interpretation of a context marker, whereas in the latter case it is to be interpreted
analogously to English tags. Two attempts at unifying the interpretation of ugye across
its two uses were explored, but both of them were found to run into some difficulties.
This suggests that the particle has two distinct interpretations in the two sentence-types
it can appear in, which are not to be derived from each other.
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Abstract
Objects of intensional transitive verbs (ITVs) can be in interpreted transparently or
opaquely. How to represent this ambiguity has been of considerable interest to the
field over the years. This paper presents evidence from real time sentence process-
ing to weigh in on that debate. Our evidence supports approaches that rely in an
essential way on a syntactic scoping mechanism to explain the ambiguity. Specif-
ically, our evidence suggests that the object of an ITV is interpreted transparently
only if it takes syntactic scope over the ITV. If it is inside the syntactic scope of
the ITV, it is necessarily interpreted opaquely. Purely semantic approaches to the
ambiguity cannot explain this strict dependency between syntactic scope and inter-
pretation.
1 Introduction
A well known property of intensional transitive verbs (ITVs) such as look for is that,
unlike their extensional counterparts, e.g. have in (1), they give rise to an ambiguity with
regard to their DP objects, (2), (Quine, 1960; Montague, 1973, etc.). In the transparent
reading (2a), the DP a secretary has a specific or extensional reading, while in the opaque
reading (2b), it does not.
Arndt Riester & Torgrim Solstad (eds.)
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(1) Mary has a secretary. Extensional
(2) Mary was looking for a secretary.
a. a specific (e.g. the department) secretary Transparent
b. any secretary (e.g. to hire) Opaque
A number of questions arise when considering how to formally characterize these read-
ings. First, though both (1) and (2a) can be faithfully paraphrased within extensional
first-order predicate logic as in (3) and (4a) respectively, the opaque reading has no ade-
quate characterization in extensional terms, (4b):
(3) JMary has a secretaryK = 1 iff
∃x[x is a secretary and Mary has x] Extensional
(4) JMary was looking for a secretaryK = 1 iff
a. ∃x[x is a secretary and Mary was looking for x] Transparent
b. ??? Opaque
This suggests that look for denotes a modal operator, which creates an intensional en-
vironment, and that a secretary can be interpreted in that environment. What the repre-
sentational resources are that natural language uses to create intensional environments
of this sort and how the interpretation of DPs can be made sensitive to them are open
questions (Larsen et al., 1997; von Fintel & Heim, 2005, etc.).
For our purpose here, the central question is to what extent syntax feeds and
bleeds the interpretation system responsible for opacity. We take it to be uncontroversial
that an opaque interpretation requires the object DP to be in the scope of look for. It is an
open question, however, whether or not the transparent interpretation can be generated
from the same syntactic structure. To see how a transparent interpretation might arise
from a structure in which the object DP is in the scope of the ITV, we present an account,
which we call the “world pronouns view,”based on Percus (2000). We contrast that
approach with a more traditional account, the “strict-scope view,” according to which
the transparent interpretation requires that the object DP be structurally higher than the
ITV (Montague, 1973, etc.). Our experimental evidence clearly favors the second.
2 Opacity with ITVs
2.1 Opacity and Quantification
A fact about ITVs important for our argument is that typically only weak quantifiers like
a allow opaque readings. Strong quantifiers (every, most, the etc.) do not (Zimmermann,
1993). As Moltmann (1997) argued, this can be seen clearly when comparing the felicity
of strong and weak quantifiers in contexts that favor transparent, (5), or opaque, (6),
readings.
(5) Who is Mary looking for?
a. Mary is looking for a secretary. Transparent
b. Mary is looking for the/every/most secretaries. Transparent
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(6) What is Mary looking for?
a. Mary is looking for a secretary. Opaque
b. #Mary was looking for every/the/most secretaries. *Opaque
In “transparent contexts” such as those introduced by a who-question, (5), we see that
strong and weak quantifiers are equally felicitous. In “opaque contexts” such as those
introduced by a what-question, however, only weak quantifiers are felicitous, (6a). The
infelicity of (6b) suggests that strong quantifiers do not tolerate opaque interpretations.1
Why that is so is not important for our purpose. However, that this is the case, is exploited
in our experimental design.
2.2 A Possible Worlds Semantics for ITVs
A characterizing property of opaque readings with ITVs is that the object can have an
empty extension in the actual world, without making the sentence necessarily false, (7).
No such reading is available for extensional transitive verbs, (8).
(7) Mary was looking for a dragon.
(8) #Mary found a dragon.
To capture this property, ITVs are analyzed as modal operators, which allow for the
evaluation of predicates across possible worlds, thereby removing the commitment to
existence in the actual world (w0). NPs, in turn, denote properties (type 〈e,st〉), i.e.
predicates whose denotation can vary across possible worlds. In extensional environ-
ments, NPs are evaluated with respect to w0, (9), while in intensional environments,
with respect to the set of worlds that are made accessible by the modal operator. As-
suming a Quinean paraphrase for look for as try to find, this set might be characterizable
as the set of worlds in which Mary’s search (as defined in the actual world) is success-
ful. For (7) to be true, then, existence of a dragon is required in those worlds but not
necessarily in w0, (10).
(9) JMary caught a dragonKw0 = 1 iff
∃x[x is a dragon in w0 and Mary caught x in w0]
(10) JMary was looking for a dragonKw0 = 1 iff
∀w[Mary’s search in w0 is successful in w→
∃x[x is a dragon in w and Mary finds x in w]]
With these ingredients in place, we can now sketch two approaches to the opaque/ trans-
parent ambiguity. The first relies on a syntactic scoping mechanism while the second
relies on the possibility of leaving evaluation parameters such as world variables un-
bound even when they are in the scope of a suitable modal operator.
1See Moltmann (1997) for special cases where strong quantifiers are interpreted opaquely.
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2.3 Opacity via Scope
The first solution to the transparent/opaque ambiguity insists on a strict correspondence
between the environment that the object DP occurs in and its interpretation (Montague,
1973). DPs that occur in an intensional environment, such as the scope of an ITV, are
necessarily interpreted opaquely, (11), while DPs that occur in an extensional environ-
ment are necessarily interpreted transparently, (12).
(11) JMary was looking for a secretaryKw0 = 1 iff
∀w[m search in w0 is successful in w→
∃x[x is a secretary in w and m finds x in w]]
(12) J[a secretary]7 [Mary was looking for t7]Kw0 = 1 iff
∃x[secretary(x) in w0 and
∀w[m search in w0 is successful in w→ m finds x in w]]
The mechanism that is standardly assumed to be responsible for mediating between these
two structures is quantifier raising (QR), a covert movement operation that raises the
object DP from its base position to a clausal node above the ITV.2
(13) Opaque C: What is Mary looking for?           Transparent C: Who is Mary looking for? 
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If a secretary occurs in its base position, it is in the scope of the ITV, (13) on the left.3
This results not only in a secretary being interpreted non-specifically (in the scope of the
universal modal) but also in the evaluation index of a secretary being bound by look for.
If the object DP is covertly moved outside the scope of the ITV, on the other hand, the ex-
istential takes scope over the modal operator and the evaluation index remains unbound,
(13) on the right. Assuming a default rule that assigns w0 to unbound world variables,
(von Fintel & Heim, 2005), this results in a specific and transparent interpretation of a
secretary.
2Montague’s term is “Quantifying in.” Following Fox (2002), we assume QR to be rightwards.
3Note that the sister node of look for is simply labeled as XP in (13), indicating that its categorical
status (CP, IP, QP, or NP) is not relevant for our purpose. All that we need is the possibility for object
QPs to be interpreted in the scope of the ITV. This can be achieved by assuming that the complement
position of ITVs is covertly clausal (Larsen et al., 1997), that ITVs take quantifiers as internal arguments
(Montague, 1973), or that they take properties (type-shifted DPs) as arguments (Zimmermann, 1993, e.g.).
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To capture the previously described distributional facts about quantifiers in this
“strict-scope” view, it needs to be assumed that, for some reason, strong quantifiers lack
a narrow scope LF and always undergoing QR, as in (14).
(14) J[every secretary]7 [Mary was looking for t7]Kw0 = 1 iff
∀x[secretary(x) in w0 → ∀w[m search in w0 is successful in w→
m finds x in w]]
2.4 Opacity via World Pronouns
Assuming, with Percus (2000), that world variables are not just evaluation parameters of
the interpretation function but are, in fact, realized in the object language as pronouns,
provides the representational flexibility for an alternative account of opacity. Rather than
treating the ambiguity strictly as a matter of syntactic scope, this alternative exploits
the possibility of leaving world pronouns unbound even when they are in the scope of
a modal operator. For our cases, this means that an in-situ DP can, in principle, be
interpreted intensionally, (15), as well as extensionally, (16), depending on whether the
world pronoun introduced by the DP is bound by the ITV or defaulted to w0.4
(15) JMary was looking for a secretaryKw0 = 1 iff
∀w[m search in w0 is successful in w→
∃x[x is a secretary in w and m finds x in w]]
(16) JMary was looking for a secretaryKw0 = 1 iff
∀w[m search in w0 is successful in w→
∃x[x is a secretary in w0 and m finds x in w]]
Note that in this system, even strong quantifiers, which presumably do not tolerate
opaque readings for independent reasons, can stay in-situ. All that needs to be assumed
to ensure a transparent interpretation for strong quantifiers, is that the world parameter
associated with them cannot be bound by the ITV.
(17) JMary was looking for every secretaryKw0 = 1 iff
∀w[m search in w0 is successful in w→
∀x[secretary(x) in w0 → m finds x in w]]
2.5 The Question
Though both approaches can account for extensional and intensional interpretations of
objects of ITVs, they do so with very different mechanisms, and therefore assume fairly
different underlying structures. While both theories agree that for an object DP to be
interpreted opaquely, it needs to be interpreted in the scope of the ITV, they differ when
it comes to the structures that give rise to transparent readings: in a strict-scope view,
transparent object DPs must be QRed above the verb; in a world-pronoun view, transpar-
ent object DPs stay in-situ. Thus, distinguishing between these theories can be re-framed
4See below for discussion whether (14) can represent the transparent reading of a secretary.
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in terms of a question of structure: how we can distinguish QRed structures from in-situ
structures?
Since the purported movement of transparent object DPs is covert, there is no
direct evidence from word order that would distinguish between these two proposals.
Furthermore, for definite descriptions and universally quantified objects the in-situ and
the QRed structures predict the same truth-conditions. Definite DPs are scopally inert
and since they are evaluated relative to the actual world when interpreted transparently,
leaving them in-situ will result in the same truth-conditions as moving them above the
ITV. Similarly, universally quantified DPs are scopally commutative with other universal
quantifiers. Since ITVs express universal modal operators, scoping a universal object
over it will yield the same truth-conditions as those that result when the object is left
in-situ - again, as long as the object DP is evaluated relative to the actual world.
The only case, then, that might provide evidence for or against a scope-based
account of transparent readings are indefinite objects. Scoping a secretary over the ITV
will generate truth-conditions that are different from those that result when the indefinite
DP is left in situ. The former structure, in (18a), yields a “specific” reading, while the
latter, (18b), where a secretary is left in-situ yet evaluated in w0, will result in a “non-
specific de re” reading.
(18) a. JMary was looking for a secretaryKw0 = 1 iff
∃x[secretary(x) in w0 and
∀w[m search in w0 is successful in w→ m finds x in w]]
b. JMary was looking for a secretaryKw0 = 1 iff
∀w[m search in w0 is successful in w→
∃x[x is a secretary in w0 and m finds x in w]]
The existence of non-specific de re readings for indefinite objects, cf. Fodor (1970),
prima facie seems to suggest that we need the flexibility provided by a Percus style
system. The existence of a specific reading, on the other hand, seems to suggest that
we also need a scoping mechanism. However, things are more complicated than that.
A defender of an in-situ view might, for instance, point out that the specific reading
entails the non-specific de re reading and because of that, the specific reading might
arise actually from the in-situ structure as a special case.5 A proponent of a strict-scope
view, on the other hand, might propose a movement analysis of the non-specific de re
reading by moving only the NP secretary while leaving the scopally active indefinite
determiner a inside the scope of the ITV.
The upshot is that whether indefinites provide evidence for or against a strict
scope view depends on the analysis of the specific and the non-specific de re reading.
Since this is not a settled matter, a final evaluation of the evidence from indefinites
cannot be given at this point. Similarly, transparent readings of definite and universally
quantified objects are compatible both with in situ and as QR structures, and so provide
no means of distinguishing between LFs. This means that off line data cannot distinguish
between the two competing approaches.
In the next section, we show that evidence from real time sentence processing can
5This is a general problem of wide scope indefinites.
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distinguish the two approaches. More specifically, building on Koster-Moeller et al. (to
appear), we argue that QR-ed and in situ structures have distinct processing implications
for sentences with antecedent contained deletion (ACD). Building on those results, we
then present processing evidence that strongly supports a strict scope view of transparent
readings and that calls into question whether we need a Percus-style system of world
pronoun binding.
2.6 Processing Antecedent Contained Deletion
The term antecedent contained deletion (ACD) refers to elided material, in (19), that
is properly contained within the expression that serves as its antecedent.
(19) John read every book Mary did .
In (19), the elided constituent is the VP inside the relative clause. Its antecedent is the
matrix VP, which seems to contain as a proper part the DP that hosts the elided VP itself.
From a general perspective on ellipsis licensing ACD is paradoxical because eliding a
constituent is possible only if there is an identical/parallel constituent that serves as its
antecedent. Obviously, an elided VP cannot be identical to another VP if the elided VP
is a proper part of that VP. This, however, seems to be exactly what is going on in (19),
making the acceptability of sentences like (19) on-face paradoxical.
The paradox can be resolved if the sentence is reconfigured using QR. Specifi-
cally, if the DP hosting the relative clause, which contains the elided VP, is moved above
the matrix VP the ellipsis site is no longer contained within its antecedent, (cf. Sag, 1976;
Kennedy, 1997, etc.), (20).
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For our purposes here, it is important to note that in ACD structures, QR occurs
regardless of the semantic properties of the DP. Normally, QR of an object DP occurs
only if the object DP is quantificational. Quantificational DPs are not directly inter-
pretable in their base position due to a type-mismatch (Montague, 1973). QRing the
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object resolves that type-mismatch (May, 1985; Fox, 2003, etc.).6 In ACD structures,
however, the motivation for QRing the object DP is to undo antecedent containment.
Hence, QR of an object DP hosting an ACD site happens independently of whether or
not the DP itself is quantificational.
These two types of triggers for QR can be distinguished in a left-to-right real
time sentence processing paradigm, since the parser encounters the determiner, whose
semantic properties determine whether or not the object DP is quantificational, before it
encounters the ACD site. Importantly, if the determiner of the host DP is quantificational,
QR is triggered at the point where the parser encounters the determiner. This incurs a
processing cost due to movement (Varvoutis & Hackl, 2006). The ACD site down-
stream would be only a second trigger for the same operation and since QR has already
occurred, incurs no additional processing cost. However, if the determiner of the host DP
is definite, QR will not be triggered until the parser encounters the ACD site, incurring
the additional processing cost of movement at the ACD site. Thus, we can use a relative
increase in processing cost of an ACD site as means to detect whether the host DP
has been previously QRed or not: specifically, object DPs that undergo QR facilitate
downstream ACD processing, while those that remain in situ do not.
In a self-paced reading study, Koster-Moeller et al. (to appear) demonstrate these
processing implications using the paradigm exemplified in (21).
(21) The secretary was trained to manage...
a. the/every program that the intelligent young professional designed
b. the/every program that the intelligent young professional did
...during her four years at college.
The logic behind this design exploits the linear dependency between QR and ACD as
discussed above. Specifically, comparing processing costs for ACD sites, (21b), relative
to an identical baseline, (21a), across two determiner conditions reveals a relative ad-
vantage for the quantificational determiner because it triggers QR, thereby preparing the
parser for an ACD site downstream. The definite determiner, on the other hand, does not
trigger QR. Hence, the ACD site itself is the first time the parser encounters a trigger for
QR, resulting in a larger increase in processing cost for the ACD relative to the baseline.
As can be seen in figure (22), this is exactly what Koster-Moeller et al. (to appear) found.
The graph in (22) displays reading times two words after the verb/ellipsis site in two
determiner conditions. We see that there is a significant increase in RTs for the ACD
condition for the definite determiner. For every there is no significant difference in RT
between the ACD and the verb conditions. An interaction of this sort suggests that no
additional processing cost was incurred when the parser reached the ACD site in the
latter case. This, in turn, suggests that encountering a quantificational object triggers
QR, facilitating processing in the ACD site.
We can turn this logic around, using ACD reading times to test for whether the
host DP has independently undergone QR. Specifically, a relative increase in reading
time two words after the ACD site suggests that the host DP has been interpreted in situ.
6However, see Montague (1973), Jacobson (to appear), Barker (2002), etc. for alternatives to resolve
the type-mismatch.
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No relative increase of this sort, on the other hand, suggests that the host DP has been
QRed for independent reasons. The next section shows how we can apply this logic to
the question of the ambiguity in ITVs.
3 A Processing Study of Opacity
3.1 Experimental Design: Intensionality and ACD
We can distinguish the strict-scope approach to ITVs from the world-pronoun approach
in terms of their predictions for down-stream ACD resolution. For a sentence like (23),
which contains both an ITV and an ACD site, the two approaches make different pro-
cessing predictions for the facilitation of processing the ACD site. Specifically, a strict-
scope account predicts an interaction between the opacity of the object DP and ACD,
such that transparent readings (which in this view require QR) will facilitate ACD res-
olution down-stream. A world-pronoun approach, on the other hand, assumes that QR
never needs to occur until the ACD site. This predicts a main effect of ellipsis, because
ellipsis resolution is never facilitated and so will always be harder than processing a verb.
(23) Mary was looking for a secretary that John was.
We tested these predictions using the following 2-Factor (Determiner by Ellipsis) design.
We used three determiners, the weak indefinite a, and the strong quantifiers the and
every. We paired each of these with two verb conditions, one with an ACD site, (a), and
one with a basic verb, (b), giving rise to six total conditions.
(24) The producer was looking for ...
a. an/the/every actress that the director was
b. an/the/every actress that the director wanted
...before finalizing the casting list.
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3.2 Predictions
Using this paradigm, we can make explicit predictions for each theory. In a strict-scope
view, the/every always undergo QR because they are not compatible with an opaque
reading. Thus, unlike in the extensional cases of Koster-Moeller et al. (to appear), where
we saw only the quantifier to facilitate ACD processing, both the/every do that with
ITVs. The indefinite a, however, facilitates ACD only when the ITV-object is construed
transparently, triggering QR, and not when construed opaquely, staying in situ. In other
words, for transparent environment, a strict scope account predicts that ACD resolution
will be no harder than basic verb resolution for all three quantifiers (as they all undergo
QR), while in an opaque environment, it predicts that ACD resolution for indefinites will
be noticeably harder (as they do not undergo QR).
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This contrasts noticeably with the predictions made by a world-pronoun view. In
that view, none of the, every, or a trigger QR, and thus will not facilitate ACD processing,
in either a transparent or opaque environment. This predicts that for all three, ACD
resolution is noticeably harder than verb resolution.
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3.3 Methods and Materials
To investigate whether real time processing of intensional transitive verbs interacts with
ACD as discussed above, we use the self-paced, word-by-word moving window reading
methodology (Just et al, 1982).
Our target items were constructed following the sample paradigm in (24). The
matrix verb was always in the past progressive to allow for ellipsis resolution triggered
by was in the relative clause.
Adverbs and adjectives were inserted between the object DP and the main point
of interest (the verb or auxiliary in the relative clause) to prevent spillover effects from
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the different determiners interfering with processing difficulties that might arise at the
point of interest.
We constructed 60 target sentences, which were combined with 120 fillers of
various types. These included sentences that were similar to the target items in structure
(employing relative clauses, elided material or covert movement triggers), in length, or
because they contained quantifiers. The items were counterbalanced across six lists using
a Latin-square design. Items were pseudo-randomized separately for each participant,
with at least one filler sentence preceding each target.
65 undergraduates from the Claremont Colleges were tested on Dell PCs running
the Linger software developed by Doug Rohde. All were native speakers of English and
received course credit or $10.00 cash for their participation.
3.4 Analysis and Discussion
Following standard procedure, residual reading times (rRTs) were calculated to adjust
for word length and differences in participants’ natural reading rates. RRTs beyond
two standard deviations were excluded from analysis and only rRTs from items whose
follow-up question was answered correctly were included in the final analysis. Partici-
pants with less than 75% accuracy were excluded, (n = 5) and rRTs over 200 ms were
trimmed.
Additionally, in order to test the predictions made by each theory for both the
opaque and transparent environments, we separated participants into two groups, the
“Transparent” group, whose rRTs were longer when the indefinite was accompanied by
a verb than when accompanied by an ellipsis site (a-verb > a-was), and the “Opaque”
group, whose rRTs were not (a-verb ≤ a-was):
a-verb > a-was→ Transparent (n = 28)
a-verb ≤ a-was→ Opaque (n = 32)
This criterion provides an effective way of dividing participants into those that only got
transparent readings for ITVs and those that also got opaque readings - without biasing
the results. Specifically, as only the strict scope view predicts any difference between
the opaque and transparent conditions, the Opaque group includes all participants who
employ a world-pronouns solution, as well as any participants who, using a strict-scope
semantics, construed the indefinite opaquely. Thus, the only participants who were sep-
arated out from the Opaque group, which we used for the primary analysis, were those
who adhere to strict scope.
3.5 Results
Looking at the Opaque group, we see a prominent separation of reading times across
conditions at the region of interest, two words after the ellipsis site (marked by ORDER
in Figure 1). A repeated measures ANOVA (Determiner by Ellipsis) reveals a significant
interaction, F(2,29) = 3.830; p < .033. We see that the interaction is driven by the high
reading time of the indefinite in the ellipsis condition (a-was), specifically by a det*ell
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interaction for a/every and a/the, F(1,30) = 6.991; p = .013, and F(1,30) = 5.635; p =
.024, respectively, Figure 1.
p < .033
Figure 1: Residual Reading Times: Opaque Group
However, in the Transparent group, we see no significant differences between any con-
ditions at the area of interest (all p > .5), Figure 2.
p > .5
Figure 2: Residual Reading Times: Transparent Group
We can see the results of the experiment more clearly looking at a pullout of
the area of interest, which presents the residual readings times for each determiner in
the verb condition (Ved) and the ellipsis condition (Ell), Figure 3. Specifically, for the
Transparent group, we see that the ellipsis condition is as easy as the verb condition for
all determiners. Based on Koster-Moeller et al. (to appear), this indicates facilitation of
ACD in all three determiner conditions, i.e. that all three determiners have undergone
QR. For the Opaque group, we see no significant difference between every and the, but
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a significant difference for a. This indicates that QR occurred upstream for both every
and the, but not for a, Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Area of Interest: two words after the gap
Recalling the original predictions, we see that results from both the Transparent
and Opaque group strongly support a strict scope analysis of intensional transitive verbs.
In the Transparent group, only a strict scope view predicts QR (ease of ACD resolution)
for all three determiners. A world-pronoun view would predict no facilitated ACD res-
olution for any determiner. In the Opaque group, both views predict that the indefinite
a remains in-situ, but only a strict-scope view predicts that both every and the undergo
QR and facilitate ACD processing downstream.
The fact that both every and the facilitate ACD resolution contrasts noticeably
with the results of Koster-Moeller et al. (to appear), who found facilitation of ACD res-
olution only for every but not for the. The difference between these two experiments is
the choice of matrix verb: Koster-Moeller et al. used extensional transitive verbs while
the present study used intensional transitive verbs. For extensional verbs only true quan-
tifiers require QR to resolve a type-mismatch. Since definite DPs do not give rise to a
type-mismatch in object position, they do not trigger QR and, hence, do not facilitate
ACD resolution. For intensional verbs, however, our study shows that any DP that does
not tolerate an opaque construal undergoes QR, whether or not the DP is quantifica-
tional. Importantly, these results are predicted only by a strict-scope view of opacity,
which relies essentially on syntactic movement to account for the transparent/opaque
ambiguity.
4 Conclusion
This paper presented real time sentence processing evidence weighing in on the correct
analysis of intensional transitive verbs. We discussed two accounts, differing in their
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treatment of the transparent/opaque ambiguity. One employs syntactic movement, while
the other has no direct implication for the syntax but relies on the representational flex-
ibility introduced by treating world variables as object language expressions. We argue
that only the former approach can account for our experimental results, namely an in-
teraction between the interpretation of an object DP and its ability to facilitate ACD
resolution. From this, we conclude that any analysis of the ambiguity must essentially
rely on a syntactic mechanism to account for the available interpretations of the objects
of ITVs.
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Abstract 
This paper argues that clausal comparatives are completely unattested in Turkish 
and thus verifies the need for a genuinely phrasal analysis of comparison 
constructions in this language. It develops such a syntactic and semantic analysis 
that differs considerably from „standard‟ analyses commonly suggested for 
languages like English and also shows that this phrasal analysis derives the 
correct predictions for the scopal behaviour of quantified DPs and the 
comparative operator. It furthermore argues that phrasal comparatives are the 
„basic‟ and potentially universal type of comparatives, in contrast to what has 
been hypothesised previously, and speculates on how this phrasal analysis might 
even be applied to solve problems for analysis with English comparatives.  
 
1 Introduction 
At least for languages like English and German, there has been a strong tendency in 
recent linguistic literature to analyse apparently phrasal comparatives featuring nothing 
but a single noun phrase (or determiner phrase) in the standard term against which the 
comparison is made such as 
 
(1) a. Mary ran faster than Peter. 
 
by deriving them from an underlyingly clausal source (cf. e.g. Lechner (2004) and 
references therein). Under such an analysis, the element expressing the gradable 
property is either copied and subsequently deleted in the than-clause, or moved 
directly to the matrix clause: 
 
(1) b. Mary ran fast-er/fasti-er than Peter ran d-fast/ti. 
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Such approaches do away with the need for a special phrasal analysis for examples like 
(1a) and allow us to treat phrasal and clausal comparatives alike. A question that 
naturally comes to mind, then, is whether this uniform way of analysing all 
comparatives is only valid for a particular group of languages, or whether it even holds 
cross-linguistically.
1
   
Based on findings from a large-scale empirical study on comparison 
constructions in Turkish, in which I investigated the variety of possibilities to express a 
comparison in this language by interviewing a substantial number of native speakers 
on more than 150 sentences each to obtain a thorough amount of positive and negative 
evidence alike, I should like to argue that the latter is clearly not the case: After 
introducing some basic Turkish data in section 2, I shall show in the following section 
that this language is characterised by a total lack of clausal comparatives altogether, so 
that the „standard‟ syntactic and semantic analysis commonly suggested for 
comparatives in English-like languages cannot be applied to Turkish comparatives, 
which, in turn, require a genuinely phrasal approach that I shall develop in section 4. 
As a next step, I shall produce additional evidence for this analysis by testing the 
predictions it makes with respect to the scopal behaviour of the comparative operator 
and quantified determiner phrases (section 5). In section 6, I shall then make a few 
comments on what the Turkish data make us expect for the cross-linguistic distribution 
of phrasal and clausal comparatives that contrast sharply with the assumptions 
presented in Bhatt & Takahashi (2007). Section 7 finally concludes this paper and 
speculates on how the phrasal analysis developed for Turkish comparatives, here, 
might also be transferred to languages like English and solve a couple of long-standing 
problems such as the proper analysis of comparatives featuring quantified determiner 
phrases in the standard term, there.   
 
2 Comparative Constructions in Turkish – Some Basic Data 
Before going into details and taking a look at particular pieces of data in the following 
sections, I should like to give my readers a first impression of what an „ordinary‟ 
Turkish comparative looks like, here. As can be seen from the predicative comparative 
in (2), in Turkish, comparatives typically consist of (at least) a comparee term (Maria), 
a standard term that has to appear in the ablative case (Peter’den) and a gradable 
predicate (the adjective uzun).
2, 3
  
                                                 
1
 As a matter of fact, even the first and weaker part of this assumption is far from being uncontroversial, 
as will be shown for English in section 6 below. 
2
 With present tense, the copula is usually left out in Turkish, and in fact, insertion of the corresponding 
form dur would rather decrease than increase the well-formedness of (2) according to my informants. 
3
 Readers familiar with Turkish might miss the element daha here, which often appears in comparatives 
in this language and seems to trigger a wide range of semantic effects (with „ordinary‟ comparatives, it 
usually increases the difference between the standard and the comparee term, in comparatives lacking an 
overt standard, it seems to express the fact that we are dealing with a comparative as such, and in 
comparatives with an overt differential, it does not seem to make any contribution to meaning 
whatsoever). Given that this element is rather irrelevant for my present purposes and that its omission 
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(2) Maria Peter‟den uzun. 
 Maria Peter.Abl. tall 
         „Maria is taller than Peter.‟ 
 
(3a) constitutes an example of an adverbial comparative, featuring the adverb hızlı4 
and an overt verb form (koştu) occupying a position at the very end of the sentence 
(note that Turkish is a head-final language): 
 
(3) a. Maria Peter‟den hızlı koştu. 
  Maria Peter.Abl. fast run.Past.3Sg. 
               „Maria ran faster than Peter.‟ 
 
Finally, I should also like to introduce an example of an equative (4), which displays 
the same basic structure as its comparative counterpart (2), the only difference being 
the equative operator kadar, which has been added in the appropriate position as well 
as the fact that Peter no longer takes an ablative case morphology:
5
 
 
(4) Maria Peter kadar uzun. 
 Maria Peter as...as tall 
        „Maria is as tall as Peter.‟ 
 
For lack of space, I need to limit myself to these very few examples here and refer the 
interested reader to Beck et al. (to appear) for further Turkish data including 
superlatives, the positive, differential comparatives, degree questions, etc. and a lot 
more.   
 
3 The Overall Absence of Clausal Comparatives in Turkish 
When trying to decide whether the overall clausal analysis of comparatives often 
suggested for English-like languages and sketched in the introductory section above 
can be transferred to Turkish or not, the first thing to be checked is whether a phrasal 
comparative such as (3a) can be assigned a corresponding clausal source underlying it. 
As it turns out, though, this is not the case, as the ungrammaticality of (3b) clearly 
indicates:  
 
                                                                                                                                             
does not render Turkish comparatives less grammatical or acceptable, I shall simply not consider it here 
and leave its discussion for another occasion.  
4
 What I mean by „adverb‟, here, is nothing more than that this element performs the function of a 
canonical adverb in (3a). From a morphological point of view, it is usually impossible to distinguish 
between adverbs and adjectives in Turkish, both sharing the same basic form. 
5
 This is probably due to the fact that the overt operator kadar sufficiently marks the entire construction 
as an equative, whereas there is no corresponding explicit comparative operator in examples like (2) or 
(3a) above, so that the ablative case marking on the standard term is obligatory here to mark the 
comparative quality of the whole construction in the first place.  
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(3) b. 
*
 Maria Peter‟den (hızlı) koştu hızlı koştu. 
   Maria Peter.Abl. (fast) run.Past.3Sg. fast run.Past.3Sg. 
                    intended as: „Maria ran faster than Peter ran.‟ 
 
People might object at this point that sentence (3b) might simply be out due to a 
stylistic awkwardness arising from the immediate repetition of (hızlı) koştu. However, 
avoiding this repetition by choosing two distinct verbs in the matrix clause and the 
subordinate clause, respectively, does not improve the well-formedness of 
comparatives featuring a clausal standard in the least: 
 
(5) 
*
 Maria Hans (sesli) ıslık çalmadı sesli şarkı söyledi. 
  Maria Hans (loud) whistle.Past.3Sg. loud sing.Past.3Sg. 
              intended as: „Maria sang louder than Hans whistled.‟ 
 
Conversely, English standard terms that are clausal in nature typically translate as 
nominalisations into Turkish, as shown in (6), where the possessive pronoun benim 
directly preceding düşündüğümden as well as the ability of the latter element to adopt a 
case ending indicate that the deverbal düşündüğümden has indeed taken on nominal 
characteristics and functions as a noun in (6): 
 
(6) Maria benim düşündüğümden zengin. 
 Maria my think.Ptcple.1Sg.Abl. rich 
         „Maria is richer than I thought.‟ 
 
Interestingly enough, the unavailability of clause-like standard terms in Turkish 
comparatives is not just an isolated phenomenon as such, but matches the fact that 
finite subordination is generally unattested in the Turkish language, and that canonical 
subordination constructions in English-like languages such as relative clauses (7) or 
complements of verbs of perception and thinking (8) typically correspond to Turkish 
constructions featuring essentially the same nominalisation pattern as the one attested 
in the comparative in (6) above: 
 
(7) Maria‟nın aldığı kitap enteresan. 
 Maria.Gen. buy.Ptcple.3Sg. book interesting 
        „The book bought by Maria is interesting.‟ 
 
(8) Yağmur yağdığına eminim. 
 rain(N) rain(V).Ptcple.3Sg.Postp. think.Pres.1Sg. 
         „I think (that) it is raining.‟ 
 
Within the domain of comparison constructions, this complete lack of finite 
subordination in Turkish leads to an interesting prediction: Given that subdeletion 
structures are always inherently clausal in nature, this type of construction is predicted 
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to be entirely absent from a language like Turkish, and this prediction is indeed fully 
borne out, as the ungrammaticality of (9) below confirms:
6, 7
 
 
(9) 
*
 Bıçak çekmeceden derin uzun. 
  knife drawer.Abl. deep long 
             intended as: „The knife is longer than the drawer is deep.‟  
 
 
4 The Syntax and Semantics of English vs. Turkish 
Comparison Constructions 
In this section, I shall develop a syntactic and semantic analysis appropriate for dealing 
with comparison in a language like Turkish. To do so, I shall first of all briefly sketch 
the analysis standardly assumed for comparatives in English-like languages
8
 to show 
that this type of analysis cannot be successfully transferred to Turkish, thereby 
verifying the need for a genuinely phrasal analysis to cope with Turkish comparison 
constructions, and finally, I shall try and establish such a phrasal approach.  
As already mentioned in the introduction, the standard analysis for comparative 
constructions in languages like English parts from the basic assumption that all 
comparatives (including those that feature nothing but a single nominal expression in 
the standard term) instantiate an underlyingly clausal standard of comparison. It is 
furthermore assumed that the matrix clause as well as the (standard) subordinate clause 
each provide a set of degrees and that the comparative operator then forms their 
maxima and compares these, as can be seen from the lexical entry for this operator: 
 
(10) [[Comp.Op.Engl]] = λD1  D<d,t>. λD2  D<d,t>. max(D2)  max(D1) 
  
Moreover, gradable adjectives and adverbs are generally taken to denote relations 
between individuals and degrees, as shown in the model lexical entry for fast in (11):
9
  
                                                 
6
 Since sentences like (9) are perfectly ungrammatical, it is sometimes difficult to establish such 
negative evidence with native speakers. What (9) represents is the most plausible word order for 
subdeletion structures, if this phenomenon really existed in Turkish. In the elicitation process, however, 
I also checked several other structures to make sure that sentences like (9) are not just out for reasons of 
a simple word order violation. 
7
 This is not to say that subcomparative concepts as such cannot be expressed in Turkish at all, but just 
that different strategies like nominalisations (cf. (i) below) would have to be used and that gradable 
elements as such cannot form a subcomparative: 
  
(i) Bıçak çekmecenin derinliğinden uzun. 
  knife drawer.Gen. depth.Abl. long 
        „The length of the knife exceeds the depth of the drawer.‟ 
   
8
 Doing so, I shall by and large follow Beck (to appear, subsection 2.1). 
9 In what follows, I shall be careless enough to simply write “x is d-fast” and the like in order to save 
space, although I do assume monotonicity, which will play a crucial role in section 5 below. 
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(11) [[fast]] = λd  Dd. λx  De. speed(x)  d/x is d-fast 
 
In (12), I present the logical form for sentence (1a) from above, including semantic 
types as well as partial calculations:
10
 
 
 
(1) a. Mary ran faster than Peter. 
 
 
(12) 
                                                  S<t> 
 
 
 
 
                          <<d,t>,t> 
 
         -er than              <d,t>                                                    <d,t> 
      <<d,t>,<<d,t>,t>>                            
                            λd                                                      λd 
                                               S<t>                                                   S<t> 
                                                                                                  
                                           DP                                                    DP 
                                      Peter<e>      VP<e,t>                             Mary<e>    VP<e,t> 
 
                                                      V                                                    V 
                                                    ran<e,t>        DegP<e,t>                   ran<e,t>        DegP<e,t> 
                                                                 
                                                               Deg                                                 Deg  
                                                               t1<d>         AdvP                               t2<d>    AdvP 
                                                                                fast                                             fast 
                                                                             <d,<e,t>>                                         <d,<e,t>> 
 
                                           λd. Peter ran d-fast 
 
 
                                                                                                  λd. Mary ran d-fast 
As readers may easily check for themselves, (1a) is thus predicted to be true iff 
„max(λd. Mary ran d-fast)  max(λd. Peter ran d-fast)‟, which corresponds exactly to 
what this sentence intuitively means. 
                                                 
10
 I try to keep this representation as simple and straightforward as possible and therefore, I do not take 
more recent developments in syntax into account that do not directly affect the point I am trying to 
make, here. 
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From what has been argued for in section 3 above, it should immediately 
become obvious that this analysis cannot be transferred successfully to Turkish, 
because it crucially hinges on the presence of a clausal standard term, which is never 
the case with comparatives in Turkish. What I suggest instead is the following 
genuinely phrasal analysis inspired by the one proposed in Heim (1985, cf. in 
particular pp. 5-7 and the appendix), which I adapted to the special needs of Turkish 
syntax and also modified in order to take later developments in the analysis of 
comparatives into account: I stick to the assumption according to which gradable 
adjectives and adverbs denote relations between individuals and degrees (cf. the model 
entry for fast in (11) above), but in Turkish, I assume that, instead of furnishing a set of 
degrees, the standard term provides us with an individual which relates to another 
individual in the matrix clause and that the comparative operator then forms and 
compares the maximal degrees to which these two individuals possess a quality, 
perform an action, etc., as specified in the matrix clause, which can be seen from its 
lexical entry, given in (13):
11
 
 
(13) [[Comp.Op.Turk]] = λx  De. λA  D<d,<e,t>>. λy  De. max(λd. A(d)(y))      
max(λd. A(d)(x)) 
 
In (14) below, readers will find the logical form for sentence (3a), where I once again 
include types and part of the actual semantic calculation, so that it can easily be seen 
that (3a) will come out true iff „max(λd. Maria ran d-fast)  max(λd. Peter ran d-fast)‟, 
and (14) thus derives the correct truth conditions for this sentence:
12
 
  
(3) a. Maria Peter‟den hızlı koştu. 
  Maria Peter.Abl. fast run.Past.3Sg. 
               „Maria ran faster than Peter.‟ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Kennedy (to appear, subsection 3.1) posits essentially the same lexical entry for a phrasal comparative 
operator as (13) above, and Bhatt & Takahashi (2007, p. 21; to appear, subsection 1.2) also suggest a 
similar lexical entry. Whereas the entry I propose in (13) is along the lines of von Stechow (1984) (in 
the version adopted in Heim (2001, pp. 214-217) and Beck (to appear, subsection 2.1)), Bhatt and 
Takahashi posit a lexical entry for the comparative operator in the tradition of Seuren (1973), which, in 
my opinion, however, has serious shortcomings when it comes to analysing comparatives featuring an 
explicit differential.   
12
 The logical form in (14) might at first glance look a bit odd, given that the second instantiation of 
movement targets a position between the first moved element and its binder index, so that we are 
dealing with a sort of „parasitic‟ movement (cf. Kennedy (1997, pp. 170-174; to appear, section 3.3) and 
Bhatt & Takahashi (2007, pp. 21f.; to appear, subsection 1.2), here. As Beck & Sauerland (2000, in 
particular pp. 263f.) have argued, however, this special movement strategy is also indispensably at work 
with cumulative interpretations of relational plurals in combination with definite numerals, indefinite 
numerals as well as coordinations of proper names, so that there is independent motivation for it anyway 
and does thus not constitute a mere stipulation for analysing comparatives.  
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(14) 
 
        S<t>  
 
    DP          <e,t>  
Maria<e>   
    <<d,<e,t>>,<e,t>>       <d,<e,t>> 
 
      DP                 λd           <e,t> 
Peter‟den<e> Comp. 
                       Op.            λe           S<t> 
             <e,<<d,<e,t>>,<e,t>>> 
                                                   DP            VP<e,t> 
                                                  t1<e> 
                                                               DegP<e,t>  
 
                                                          AdvP 
                                                           hızlı       Deg              V 
                                                         <d,<e,t>>        t2<d>               koştu<e,t> 
 
                                                  λd. λx. x ran d-fast 
 
With only slight modifications, this phrasal analysis for „ordinary‟ comparatives then 
translates in a simple and straightforward manner to other comparison constructions. If 
I posit the lexical entry given in (15) for the equative operator kadar, 
 
(15) [[kadar]] = λx  De. λA  D<d,<e,t>>. λy  De. max(λd. A(d)(y))  max(λd. 
A(d)(x)) 
 
sentence (4) from above  
 
(4) Maria Peter kadar uzun. 
 Maria Peter as...as tall 
         „Maria is as tall as Peter.‟ 
 
will e.g. properly be predicted true iff „max(λd. Maria is d-tall  max(λd. Peter is d-
tall)‟, i.e. iff Maria is at least as tall as Peter.13   
 
 
                                                 
13
 Once again, spatial limitations force me to confine myself to the case of the equative as one 
exemplary illustration, here. 
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5 Predictions of the Phrasal Analysis for the Scopal 
Behaviour of the Comparative Operator and Quantified DPs 
As a next step, I shall now take a closer look at what my phrasal approach to Turkish 
comparison constructions predicts for the scopal interaction of the comparative 
operator and quantified determiner phrases (DPs). To this end, I shall first consider 
(16), featuring a universally quantified DP in the standard term: 
 
(16) Maria her oğlandan uzun. 
 Maria every boy.Abl. tall 
           „Maria is taller than every boy.‟ 
 
Due to the fact that the Turkish comparison operator looks for two individuals (cf. (13) 
above), but finds only one individual and a quantified expression of semantic type 
<<e,t>,t>, instead, a type mismatch arises, which I suggest to remove by Quantifier-
Raising (QR-ing) the string of words her oğlandan as indicated in the following 
logical form: 
 
(17) 
 
           S<t> 
 
       DP             <e,t>  
       her             
  oğlandan  λe              S<t>  
    <<e,t>,t> 
                              DP              <e,t>  
                           Maria<e>   
                                     <<d,<e,t>>,<e,t>>    <d,<e,t>> 
 
                                      DP             λd             <e,t> 
                                      t3<e>        Comp. 
                                                    Op.        λe               S<t> 
                                           <e,<<d,<e,t>>,<e,t>>> 
                                                                               DP            VP<e,t> 
                 Quantifier                                             t1<e> 
                   Raising                                                           DegP<e,t>  
                     
                                                                                     AdvP 
                                                                                      hızlı         Deg              V 
                                                                                     <d,<e,t>>          t2<d>              koştu<e,t> 
 
                                                                              λd. λx. x ran d-fast 
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Observe now, that repairing the type mismatch in this fashion automatically predicts 
the quantified DP her oğlandan to outscope the comparative operator and thus that 
(16) only comes out true iff Maria is even taller than the tallest among the boys (cf. the 
truth conditions given in (18a)), and that it won‟t be considered true iff Maria is only 
taller than the shortest among the boys, which would correspond to the much weaker 
truth conditions (specified in (18b)), that would result from a logical form in which the 
comparative operator would have to take wide scope with respect to her oğlandan. 
 
(18) a. [[(16)]] = 1 iff x [boy(x) → max(λd. Maria is d-tall)  max(λd. x is d-tall)] 
 b. [[(16)]] ≠ 1 iff max(λd. Maria is d-tall)  max(λd. x [boy(x) → x is d-tall]) 
 
According to all my informants, the Turkish sentence (16) has – just as its 
corrseponding English counterpart Mary is taller than every boy. – only the first of the 
two alternative readings outlined above, so that my phrasal analysis in combination 
with the requirement to resolve a type mismatch, which cannot even generate the 
unattested reading, immediately predicts the correct scopal order of the comparative 
operator and a universally quantified DP.
14
 
In a sentence containing an existentially quantified DP such as (19), 
 
(19) Maria herhangi birinden uzun. 
 Maria somebody.Abl. tall 
           „Maria is taller than some other person.‟ 
 
the emerging type mismatch would similarly be fixed by QR-ing herhangi birinden, 
which makes this quantified DP once again outscope the comparative operator and 
thus leads to the expectation that (19) should be considered true iff Maria is taller than 
some other person (cf. the truth conditions in (20a)), which is what sentence (19) 
actually means according to all my Turkish informants. And once again, the other 
reading with the reverse scopal order of the quantified DP herhangi birinden and the 
comparative operator, according to which (19) would come out true iff Maria is taller 
than everyone else is (cf. (20b)), is indeed unattested.  
 
(20) a. [[(19)]] = 1 iff x [person(x) & max(λd. Maria is d-tall)  max(λd. x is d-
tall)] 
 b. [[(19)]] ≠ 1 iff max(λd. Maria is d-tall)  max(λd. x [person(x) & x is d-
tall]) 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that even the counterpart of the totally ungrammatical 
English (21) is perfectly acceptable in Turkish (22), and that it once more has the 
reading in which the quantified DP hiç kimseden outscopes the comparative operator, 
so that (22) is true iff Maria is (the) shortest (as specified in (23a)) and lacks the 
                                                 
14
 For a detailed discussion of the scopal behaviour of quantified expressions in the standard term in 
English comparatives, cf. Schwarzschild & Wilkinson (2002), Heim (2006) or Beck (2009), among 
others.  
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alternative reading according to which (22) would have to be considered true iff Maria 
is simply not (the) tallest (cf. the truth conditions in (23b)), altogether. 
 
(21) * Mary is taller than nobody. 
  
(22) Maria hiç kimseden uzun değil. 
 Maria somebody.Abl. tall not 
           „Mary is not taller than anybody.‟; intended as: „Maria is taller than nobody.‟ 
 
(23) a. [[(22)]] = 1 iff ~ x [person(x) & max(λd. Maria is d-tall)  max(λd. x is d-
tall)] 
 b. [[(22)]] ≠ 1 iff ~max(λd. Maria is d-tall)  max(λd. x [person(x) & x is d-
tall]) 
 
Additionally, one might consider cases with quantified DPs in the comparee, rather 
than the standard term, but given that the two potential readings are almost always 
indistinguishable in this case (cf. Heim (2001, pp. 217f.)), it does not really matter 
whether the quantified DP takes scope over the comparative operator, or whether the 
reverse situation obtains,
15
 so that although these data are perfectly compatible with 
the phrasal approach outlined above, they do not really constitute further evidence in 
favour of it.   
 
6 A Word on the Cross-linguistic Distribution of Phrasal 
and Clausal Comparatives 
Having established the need for a genuinely phrasal approach to comparatives in a 
language like Turkish, I shall now address the question of what the Turkish data makes 
us expect with respect to the distribution of phrasal and clausal comparatives cross-
linguistically. On the basis of data largely taken from Hindi-Urdu, Bhatt & Takahashi 
(2007) argue that clausal comparatives constitute the „basic‟ type that is taken to be 
universal and that phrasal comparatives exist only in certain languages. They reach this 
                                                 
15
 To see this, take an English sentence like 
 
(i) Every boy is taller than Mary. 
 
that would be associated with the two truth conditions in (ii) depending on the scopal order of the 
quantified DP and the comparative operator: 
 
(ii) a. [[(i)]] = 1 iff x [boy(x) → max(λd. x is d-tall)  max(λd. Mary is d-tall)] 
 b. [[(i)]] = 1 iff max(λd. x [boy(x) → x is d-tall])  max(λd. Mary is d-tall) 
 
In spite of their quite distinct surface appearance, (iia) and (iib) actually state exactly the same thing, for 
if the maximal degree to which every boy is tall is larger than that to which Mary is tall, it follows that 
even the shortest among the boys and thus every boy automatically happens to be taller than Mary. 
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conclusion (i) by following up on Lechner (2004), who has it that in languages like 
English and German, all comparatives are underlyingly clausal, and (ii) by observing 
that Hindi-Urdu displays phrasal comparatives parallelling the ones I found in Turkish 
alongside with correlative constructions that are undoubtedly clausal in nature. In 
contrast to this, I should like to defend the exactly opposite hypothesis: Since Turkish 
is much more radical than Hindi-Urdu in not even allowing correlatives, all Turkish 
comparatives clearly have a purely phrasal status and I thus seem to have come across 
a “language that has only individual comparison”, the existence of which was already 
stipulated in Kennedy (to appear, section 3.3). At the same time, I am absolutely 
convinced that even languages like English and German feature phrasal along with 
clausal comparatives, for which linguistic literature provides abundant evidence from 
syntax such as the (un-)availability of extraction operations (24) or that of reflexive 
pronouns bound by the matrix subject (25),  
 
(24) a.  You finally met somebody you‟re taller than. 
 b. 
* 
You finally met somebody you‟re taller than is. 
                                                                                                   [Kennedy (1997, p. 163)]  
  
(25) a.  No star is brighter than itself. 
 b. 
*
 No star is brighter than itself is. 
                                                                        [Kennedy (1997, p. 165)] 
 
and empirical observations such as differences in meaning and/or acceptability 
between a phrasal comparative and its putative clausal source clearly point in this 
direction, too, as e.g. cases show where phrasal comparatives lack an obvious clausal 
counterpart (26), where the reverse situation obtains (27), or where the two sharply 
contrast in meaning (cf. the generic meaning of (28a) that disappears in (28b)):
16
 
 
(26) a.  John is older than me. 
 b. 
*
 John is older than me am/is. 
[Lechner (2004, p. 179)] 
 
(27) a.  There couldn‟t have been any more people than there were. 
 b. 
* 
There couldn‟t have been any more people than there. 
 [Lechner (2004, p. 180)] 
 
(28) a. He loved him more than a brother. 
 b. He loved him more than he loved a brother. 
[Heim (1985, p. 18)] 
                                                 
16
 For additional evidence and detailed lines of argumentation defending the view that languages like 
English do indeed display both, clausal comparatives as well as truly phrasal ones that cannot be derived 
from underlying clausal sources, I refer the interested reader to Hankamer (1973), Hoeksema (1983), 
Napoli (1983), von Stechow (1984, section IX), Heim (1985, section 3.2) and Kennedy (1997, pp. 162-
166; to appear, section 3.1). 
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Therefore, I rather assume phrasal comparatives to represent the „basic‟ and potentially 
universal type of comparatives and that clausal ones are restricted to particular, 
English-like languages, instead.
17
   
 
7 Conclusion and Outlook 
In this paper, I have shown that Turkish comparatives never allow for a clausal 
standard term and thus cannot be analysed using the inherently clausal „standard‟ 
English-like approach to comparatives, and that languages like Turkish require a truly 
phrasal account of comparison constructions, instead. I have developed such an 
analysis that successfully captures various sorts of Turkish comparison constructions 
and also makes the correct predictions with respect to the scopal behaviour of the 
comparative operator and quantified DPs, be these in the standard or in the comparee 
term. The radically phrasal status of Turkish comparatives furthermore led me to reject 
Bhatt & Takahashi (2007)‟s assumption on the cross-linguistic distribution of phrasal 
and clausal comparatives and to hypothesise instead that it is the phrasal rather than the 
clausal type that constitutes the „basic‟ comparison construction. And if my 
assumption that English features both, clausal as well as phrasal comparatives, is on 
the right track, the phrasal analysis could even be transferred to some English 
comparatives, where it might eventually solve a couple of long-standing problems such 
as differences in meaning between phrasal comparatives and their clausal counterparts 
or the fact that an English sentence like 
 
(29) a. Mary is taller than every boy. 
  
has only the reading where the quantified DP outscopes the comparative operator (cf. 
the truth conditions specified in (18a) above) and not the alternative one (cf. (18b)) 
with the reverse scopal order (Schwarzschild & Wilkinson (2002); Heim (2006, p.1)), 
which has hitherto remained unexplained, but follows neatly if I apply my phrasal 
analysis to this sentence, that cannot even generate the unattested alternative reading. 
The scope facts, however, seem to parallel those found in the corresponding clausal 
counterpart (29b). 
 
(29) b. Mary is taller than every boy is. 
                                                 
17
 In Bhatt & Takahashi (to appear), the two authors altered their assumptions somewhat in that they 
now stipulate that both – phrasal and clausal comparatives – are available cross-linguistically and that it 
is rather the subcategorisational properties of the individual, language-specific comparative operators 
that account for their compatibility with phrasal and/or clausal complements. While it is largely unclear 
to me why phrasal and clausal comparatives should be taken to be universal if it is inherent properties of 
the specific operators that ultimately decide on their availability in a given language, I should still 
maintain that in my opinion, English than would have to subcategorise for phrasal as well as clausal 
complements under this approach, and not just for clausal ones only, and that Turkish would still differ 
from Hindi-Urdu in that, unlike its counterpart in the latter language, the Turkish comparative operator 
would have to subcategorise for phrasal comparatives, only. 
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A complete understanding of the English scope facts would therefore require an 
appropriate analysis of (29b) as well as a systematic way to decide on which English 
comparatives that display a phrasal surface structure are truly phrasal in nature, and 
which ones are just elliptical variants of a clausal source, which, however, remains yet 
to be investigated. 
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Abstract
This paper argues in favor of a partial semantics for indicative conditionals, along
the lines of a proposal made by Belnap in the seventies: conditionals only have
a truth value if their antecedent is true, and in this case, their truth value equals
the truth value of their consequent. I argue that this semantics offers a way out
of the impasse following Gibbard’s (1981) famous proof that if ϕ→ (ψ→ χ) and
(ϕ∧ψ)→ χ are equivalent,→ cannot be stronger than material implication.
1 Introduction
The present paper concerns the meaning of if in indicative conditionals. An example of
such a conditional is (1):
(1) If it is snowing, it is cold.
I am going to explore a proposal made by Belnap (1970, 1973) which says that if corre-
sponds to a two-place connective→, with a partial semantics, informally as follows:
(2) ϕ→ ψ only has a truth value if ϕ is true and if ϕ→ ψ has a truth value, this is
the truth value of ψ.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces one of the problems that
Belnap’s partial semantics helps to solve: the problem of iterated if -clauses.1 After that,
section 3 discusses existing solutions and their problems. Then, in section 4 Belnap’s
semantics is introduced and I will explain how it deals with iterated if -clauses.
Of course, once we adopt a partial semantics, we are bound to alter the predic-
tions that classical approaches make about the logic of conditionals. But I will argue in
section 5 that we shouldn’t be too worried about this. Finally, in 6 I will conclude the
1I actually believe that there are further reasons to adopt the partial semantics that I am championing
here: (i) it offers a neat account of the interpretation of conditionals in the scope of quantifiers, and (ii) the
interpersonal traffic of conditionals in dialogue seems to require a two-place connective just like the one I
am advocating here. See Huitink (2008, chapter 5) for discussion.
Arndt Riester & Torgrim Solstad (eds.)
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paper by some remarks on how the partiality that I propose to write into the semantics of
if relates to the partiality that is often employed in theories of presupposition projection.
2 The problem: iterated if -clauses
2.1 Material implication and its paradoxes
In order to see what is problematic about iterated if -clauses, we must consider a tra-
ditional proposal about the meaning of if. Material implication goes back to Philo of
Megara, but was championed by logicians like Frege and Russell. The idea is that an
indicative conditional excludes the possibility that its antecedent is true while its conse-
quent is false:
(3)
ϕ ψ ϕ⊃ ψ
1 1 1
1 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
If you believe that if is truth functional, material implication is really the only reasonable
option (in a classical system, that is). To see this, consider (4):
(4) If Mary and John are both in Paris, then Mary is in Paris.
This conditional is true, come what may. It is thus true when its components are (true,
true), (false, true), or (false, false). Now, if conditionals are indeed truth-functional, it
follows that they are always true in these cases, cf. Edgington (1995, 242).2
Nevertheless, material implication seems plain wrong as an analysis of indicative
conditionals. In fact, associating the semantics of ‘ordinary’ indicative conditionals with
→ leads to counterintuitive predictions, known as paradoxes of material implication (see
Bennett (2003) for an overview). These paradoxes have two sources:
1. Whenever the antecedent is false, the conditional is true.
2. Whenever the consequent is true, the conditional is true.
The first paradox is that the material implication analysis predicts that the falsity of the
antecedent is sufficient to affirm the truth of a conditional. However, this doesn’t seem
to be borne out. We would not reason as follows: I am convinced that the Chinese will
stay out of the conflict, therefore I am convinced that (5) is true (example from Stalnaker
(1968)):
(5) If the Chinese enter into the Vietnam conflict, the United States will use nuclear
weapons.
2Obviously, the components of (4) are such that it cannot happen that the antecedent is true while the
consequent is false. Hence, (4) does not establish that conditionals should be false in this case. However,
no one doubts that conditionals are false in this situation.
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The second paradox is that, given an analysis of indicative conditionals as material im-
plications, the truth of the consequent is predicted to be sufficient to affirm the truth of
a conditional. This, too, seems unwarranted. If you believe that the US will use nuclear
weapons, simply because of their arrogance, the low intelligence of their president or
whatever, but have no opinions about the future actions of the Chinese, you wouldn’t
utter (5), which seems to state that there is some connection between the US warfare and
Chinese politics. In sum, the problem with analyzing indicative conditionals as material
implication is that this makes it far too easy for such conditionals to be true.
Several solutions have been proposed. Some have opted for a pragmatic defense,
saying that conditionals with false antecedents (true consequents) are true, but infelici-
tous, e.g. David Lewis (1976), but it has convincingly been argued by Bennett (2003,
38-42) that such stories don’t hold water. In short, the problem is that disbelief in its an-
tecedent does not automatically mean that one shouldn’t utter a conditional. Others have
proposed stronger, modal truth conditions, i.e. strict implication by C.I. Lewis (1912,
1918). Conditionals do not just exclude that the antecedent is true while the consequent
is false, but they claim that this is impossible. Such an analysis still gives rise to some
paradoxes. For instance, if the antecedent is contradictory, the conditional is automat-
ically true. Lewis thought that these paradoxes were less severe than those of material
implication, but not everyone agreed (relevant logicians did not (Mares, 2008)).
2.2 Iterated if -clauses
We are now ready to state the problem about iterated if -clauses. The problem is that the
following two sentences are equivalent. In fact, both are trivial (Edgington, 1995):
(6) a. If it rains or snows tomorrow, then if it doesn’t rain tomorrow, it will snow.
b. If it rains or snows tomorrow and it doesn’t rain (tomorrow), it will snow.
Why is this problematic? This: Gibbard (1981) famously proved that it follows from
this equivalence that indicative conditionals cannot have stronger truth conditions than
material implication.
Let→ stand for the indicative conditional, without prejudging its semantics, and
suppose we adopt the following principles:
(i) ϕ→ (ψ→ χ)≡ (ϕ∧ψ)→ χ
(ii) ϕ→ ψ |= ϕ⊃ ψ
(iii) If ϕ |= ψ, then |= ϕ→ ψ
These principles appear unremarkable. The first of these is just the equivalence we want
to account for. Principle (ii) says that whatever truth conditions we assign to →, they
should be such that our conditional entails material implication. It seems agreed upon in
the literature that we want this. Note that the modal analysis just alluded to (i.e. strict
implication) makes it true. Finally, principle (iii) says that if one sentence entails another,
it implies this sentence. For example, ‘Mary and John are both in Paris’ entails ‘Mary
is in Paris’, and ‘If Mary and John are both in Paris, then Mary is in Paris’ is indeed
tautological.
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Yet given these principles, we can proof that indicative conditionals cannot be
stronger than material implication. The proof proceeds by showing that (7) is a tautology
and that it entails (8):
(7) (ϕ⊃ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
(8) (ϕ⊃ ψ)⊃ (ϕ→ ψ).
To see that (7) is a tautology, note that it is by (i) equivalent to ((ϕ⊃ ψ)∧ϕ)→ ψ. This,
in turn, is equivalent to (ϕ∧ψ)→ ψ (by proposition logic). By (iii), this formula is
true in any world. Now, given that→ entails ⊃ (principle (ii)) (7) entails (8). Now, as
(8) is entailed by a tautology, (8) must itself be a tautology, and this must be because its
antecedent entails its consequent. It follows that→ cannot have stronger truth conditions
than ⊃.
3 Previous solutions
3.1 Kratzer’s solution
Let’s now discuss some solutions in the literature. First, Kratzer (1991) argues that
Gibbard’s proof shows that we were mistaken to assume that such things as conditional
connectives exist. She wrote that:
The history of the conditional is the story of a syntactic mistake. There is no
two-place if . . . then connective in the logical forms of natural languages. If -
clauses are devices for restricting the domains of various operators. When-
ever there is no explicit operator, we have to posit one. (Kratzer, 1991, 656)
Take (9), in which a conditional occurs in the scope of a modal:
(9) If it is snowing, it must be cold.
Intuitively, the if -clause provides the restrictor of the modal, i.e. quantification ranges
over worlds in which it is snowing. This follows if the modal and the if -clause are
interpreted as a single quantifier-restrictor complex.
(10) (must if it is snowing) (it is cold)
“in all accessible worlds where it is snowing, it is cold”
Of course, not all conditionals occur embedded under an overt quantificational operator,
but Kratzer assumes that in these cases, we must postulate a covert operator, which is
usually an epistemic necessity modal like must. So (11) is analyzed as equivalent to (9),
which seems right:
(11) If it is snowing, it is cold.
≈ If it is snowing, it must be cold
“in all accessible worlds where it is snowing, it is cold”
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We can now see how Krater would analyze iterated if -clauses. She proposes to treat
such if -clauses as stacked relative clauses, which results in successive restriction of the
domain:
(12) If it rains or snows tomorrow, then if it doesn’t rain tomorrow, it will snow.
“in all worlds in which it rains or snows tomorrow and in which it doesn’t rain
tomorrow, it will snow”
Though this gets the predictions right, it requires to drastically rearrange various parts of
the sentence (at surface, the if -clause occurs sentence-initially, far away from the covert
operator that it is supposed to restrict).
Particularly problematic is the position of then. Intuitively, this word is some
anaphoric element which picks up the if -clause (in von Fintel’s (1994, chapter 3) version
of the analysis, then is a phonetic realization of the modal’s restrictor variable). However,
then it occurs in the wrong place. Compare:
(13) a. If it rains or snows tomorrow, then if it doesn’t rain tomorrow, it will snow.
b. If it rains or snows tomorrow, if it doesn’t rain tomorrow, then it will snow.
We want to account for the meaning of (13a), but on Kratzer’s analysis one would expect
that this meaning could only be expressed by (13b).
3.2 Schlenker’s solution
To solve the syntax-semantics mismatch associated with Kratzer’s analysis,
Schlenker (2004) proposes that if -clauses are plural definite descriptions of possible
worlds. He would analyze our sentence as follows:
(14) If it rains or snows tomorrow, then if it doesn’t rain tomorrow, it will snow.
[ιW: it rains or snows tomorrow (W)][ιW′: W′ ⊆ W and it doesn’t rain tomorrow
(W′)][all w: w ∈W′] (it will snow (w))
Thus, Schlenker takes over Kratzer’s assumption that the sentence contains a covert
quantifier over possible worlds, but the relevant domain is now determined in a different
way. The first if -clause denotes all and only those worlds in which it rains or snows.
The second if -clause narrows this further down to just those worlds in which it rains
or snows but doesn’t rain. It is asserted that in all of the remaining worlds it snows.3
Crucially, the (covert) modal in (14) is interpreted in situ. Hence, this representation
is more natural than Kratzer’s analysis from a syntactic point of view. However, the
analysis makes different predictions than Kratzer does. For instance, it is now expected
3This analysis goes back to Schein (2003), who proposed it to solve a puzzle raised by Barker (1997):
if pronouns go proxy for definite descriptions (as the E-type approach has it), how to account for sentences
like (i)?
(i) If a theory is classical, then if it is inconsistent, it is usually trivial.
Here, the second occurrence of it is to be analyzed as ‘the classical inconsistent theory’, but this interpre-
tation cannot be derived if usually is restricted by the coordination of the if -clauses.
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that modals can also collectively quantify over the worlds supplied by the if -clause. But,
as far as I know, such cases have not been attested.
4 Belnap’s partial semantics
4.1 Conditional assertion
Belnap (1970, 1973) presents his conditional semantics as a formalization of the idea
that conditionals make conditional assertions. He traces this idea back to Quine:
Now under what circumstances is a conditional true? Even to raise this
question is to depart from everyday attitudes. An affirmation of the form
‘if p then q’ is commonly felt less as an affirmation of a conditional than
as a conditional affirmation of the consequent. [At this point, Quine credits
Dr. Philip Rhinelander in a footnote - JH] If, after we have made such
an affirmation, the antecedent turns out true, then we consider ourselves
committed to the consequent, and are ready to acknowledge error if it proves
false. If on the other hand the antecedent turns out to have been false, our
conditional affirmation is as if it had never been made. (Quine, 1950, 12)
To see the point, consider (15), which is taken from McDermott (1996) and concerns the
result of the next roll of an ordinary, six-sided dice:
(15) If it is even, it will be a six.
Suppose that you had bet on (15). It seems clear that the bet is won when the result of
the next roll is six, and lost when the result is four. But what if it is five? McDermott
reports that most people assume that the bet is called off in this case.
Belnap wanted to give a semantic version of conditional assertion. He originally
proposed the following in Belnap (1970) (still somewhat vague; to be made precise
below):
(16) If ϕ is true in w, then what ϕ→ ψ asserts in w is what ψ asserts in w. If ϕ is
false or nonassertive in w, then ϕ→ ψ is nonassertive in w.
But this doesn’t allow for iterating if -clauses. Therefore in Belnap (1973) he added the
restriction that the scope should be assertive:
(17) If ϕ is true in w and ψ is assertive in w, then what ϕ→ ψ asserts in w is what ψ
asserts in w. If ϕ is false or nonassertive in w or if ψ is nonassertive in w, then
ϕ→ ψ is nonassertive in w.
Now, the phrase ‘what ϕ→ ψ asserts in w is what ψ asserts in w’ can be understood in
two ways. It could be that ϕ→ψ has the truth value of its consequent, or it could be that
it expresses the same proposition. Then w is a part of the context rather than an index
of evaluation. Belnap chose this second option. He reckoned the first option was rather
boring, writing that what ϕ→ ψ asserts in w is identical to what ψ asserts in w “does
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not boringly mean an identity of truth-values but an identity of propositional content”
(Belnap, 1970, 4).
However, I think that the interesting semantics is not at all what we want for
conditionals. To see the problem, consider the following example by Edgington (1995,
289):
(18) If you press that switch, there will be an explosion.
Clearly, my saying (18) might well save your life, especially when the antecedent is
false. But how is this possible if (18) fails to assert a proposition? How can (18) ever be
used to persuade you to not press that switch, if my utterance of it fails to communicate
something for you to grasp?4
So I define conditional assertion as follows:
(19) ϕ→ ψ is defined in a world w if ϕ is true in w and ψ is defined in w
If defined, the truth value of ϕ→ ψ in w is the same as the truth value of ψ in w
Notice incidentally that (18) also suggests that we should change the norm for assertion.
Classically, one should only assert something if one knows/beliefs (depending on your
favorite theory of assertion) that it is true. But then (18) couldn’t felicitously be asserted,
as it probably has no truth value. In our partial system, however, the norm for asserting a
proposition should be the knowledge/belief that it is true, given that it has a truth value,
cf. McDermott (1996).
Belnap championed this semantics because he wanted to give a uniform analysis
of every crow and some crow as ‘for every x, if x is a crow’ and ‘for some x, if x is
a crow’, respectively. (Recall that classically, the domain of a universal quantifier is
restricted by a conditional, but for existential quantifiers a conjunction is used.)
(20) a. Every crow is black.
for every x, if x is a crow, x is black
b. Some crow is black.
for some x, if x is a crow, x is black
If quantifiers care only about cases for which their scope is defined, this works: “for
some x for which ‘if x is a crow, x is black’ is defined, i.e. for some x which is a crow,
it is true that x is black”. However, for ordinary restricted quantification, as supplied
by common nouns, this is unattractive. First, no one believes that quantifiers are unary
operators. Second, this involves postulating an inaudible if. Although I don’t think
Belnap’s semantics should be employed in a uniform analysis of (20a) and (20b), I do
believe that it provides a solution to the problem of iterated if -clauses, which I will argue
for next.
4Note that the last statement of Quine’s quote is thus plain false.
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4.2 Solving Gibbard’s problem
We can now analyze our sentence as follows:
(21) If it rains or snows tomorrow, then if it doesn’t rain tomorrow, it will snow.
(it rains or snows tomorrow)→ (it doesn’t rain tomorrow→ it will snow)
If (21) has a truth value, i.e. if it rains or snows, and if the embedded conditional has
a truth value, i.e. if it doesn’t rain, it snows. That is, it snows if it rains or snows but
doesn’t rain. So (21) comes out equivalent to (22):
(22) If it rains or snows tomorrow and it doesn’t rain tomorrow, then it will snow.
Note that on this theory, there is no mismatch between syntax and semantics, as this
representation mirrors the surface form of (21). Of course, on this semantics, neither of
these sentences comes out as trivial, because they may be undefined (the antecedent may
not be true). However, they do come out trivial on the assumption that the sentences
have a truth value. Clearly, if they have a truth value, this value is most definitely true.
Below in section 5, I will argue that our every-day judgments of validity and triviality are
guided by the assumption that the statements involved are defined. That is, I will propose
to combine Belnap’s semantics with what is known as Strawson-entailment (von Fintel,
1999).
Summing up, there is another way to avoid the conclusion that if we want to have
the equivalence between (6a) and (6b), material implication is the only candidate for
indicative conditionals. We can assign partial truth conditions to indicative conditionals.
This suggests that Gibbard’s proof only holds in a classical, two-valued system. Indeed,
in a partial system, it is plain that Gibbard’s principles do not straightforwardly hold.
The problem is his third principle, repeated here:
(iii) If ϕ |= ψ, then |= ϕ→ ψ
Given Belnap’s semantics, this is simply not true. If all worlds that make ϕ true are
worlds that make ψ true, it doesn’t follow that all worlds make ϕ→ ψ true, for some
worlds are ¬ϕ-worlds and in these worlds, ϕ→ ψ has no truth value.
5 Logical implications
By adopting a partial semantics for if, we loose the validity of certain laws which “warm
the cockles of a logician’s heart”, as (Belnap, 1973, 51) nicely puts it. Indeed, Lycan
(2006) sees this this as the main objection against conditional assertion theories. In
Belnap’s semantics, the following do no longer hold:5
5It is very likely that even more laws do no longer hold. We restrict attention to Contraposition and
Or-to-if-inference, because the invalidity of these particular two is often used as an argument against
conditional assertion theories, see for instance Lycan (2006).
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(23) a. Contraposition:
ϕ→ ψ≡ ¬ψ→¬ϕ
b. Or-to-if-inference:
ϕ∨ψ |= ¬ϕ→ ψ
Any world in which ϕ→ ψ is true, is a world in which ψ is true, and therefore a world
in which ¬ψ→¬ϕ lacks a truth value. It is easy to see that the reverse direction doesn’t
hold either. Contraposition is thus ruled out. As for Or-to-if-inference, some worlds in
which ϕ∨ψ is true will make ϕ is true. These worlds will clearly not make ¬ϕ→ ψ
true.67
This is a problem, for Contraposition and Or-to-if-inference do seem to hold for
natural language indicative conditionals, as (24) and (25) respectively show:
(24) If it is raining, we won’t play.
Therefore, if we play, it isn’t raining.
(25) Either Oswald killed Kennedy, or someone else did.
Therefore, if Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.
But if Contraposition and Or-to-if-inference are not valid, then why are (24) and (25)
such compelling arguments? I submit that our judgments about the validity of (24) and
(25) come about by the tacit assumption that the premise and conclusion have a truth
value.
Strawson (1952) considers ways to make the inference from the Aristotelean A-
form to the Aristotelean I-form valid:
(26) Every crow is black.
Therefore, some crows are black.
Traditionally, the inference in (26) is not justified, for its premise is true in models in
which there are no crows, yet its conclusion is clearly false in such a model. However,
most English speakers find (26) valid.
Strawson sought to solve this puzzle by (i) abandoning the assumption that all
sentences necessarily have a truth value, and (ii) redefining the notion of entailment. He
assumes that A-forms are neither true nor false in case their subject term is empty. In
addition, Strawson assumes that cases in which the subject term is empty are irrelevant
as far as entailment is concerned:
The rule that A entails I states that, if corresponding statements of these
forms have truth values, then if the statement of the A form is true, the
statement of the I form must be true; and so on. (Strawson, 1952, 177)
6The reverse direction ‘If-to-or-inference’ of course does come out: any world in which ¬ϕ→ ψ is
true, is a world in which ϕ∨ψ is true in all worlds.
7All I am presuming here about the meaning of ¬ and ∨ is that ¬ψ is not true if ψ is, and that ϕ∨ψ is
true if ϕ is. I consider this uncontroversial. Yet the reader may wonder about the semantics of connectives
other than →, now that we are working in a partial system. The semantics that Belnap assumes comes
down to strong Kleene, except of course his definitions for→.
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Let |=S be the kind of entailment that Strawson had in mind. This can be defined as
follows:
ϕ |=S ψ iff
ϕ,χ |= ψ (i.e. ϕ,χ classically entails ψ )
where χ is a premise stating that the definedness conditions of all statements
involved are satisfied
It is easy to see that (26) is Strawson-valid. The premise presupposes that there are
crows. Strawson thought of this as a precondition for the premise to have a truth value:
only if there are crows, can ‘Every crow is black’ be true or false. It follows that provided
that the premise of (26) has a truth value, we are justified to conclude that some crows
are black.
Belnap (1973) himself refers to this notion of entailment as a useful one for
conditional assertion. Indeed, both Or-to-if-inference and Contraposition turn out to be
Strawson-valid:
(27) a. Contraposition:
ϕ→ ψ≡S ¬ψ→¬ϕ
b. Or-to-if-inference:
ϕ∨ψ |=S ¬ϕ→ ψ
Contraposition follows, i.e. ϕ→ ψ,¬ψ |= ¬ψ→ ¬ϕ because there is no world which
makes ϕ→ ψ and ¬ψ true. The same holds for the other direction. Clearly, Or-to-if-
inference is also Strawson-valid: any worlds in which ϕ∨ψ is true and in which ¬ϕ→ψ
has a truth value, is a world in which ¬ϕ→ψ is true. Thus, assuming that the statements
are either true or false, we get the inferences we want.
What does this mean for our inferences in (24) and (25)? In as far as these are
valid, they are enthymematic inferences, i.e. inferences that rely on an additional tacit
premise: that the statements involved have a (classical) truth value. It could well be that
Strawson-entailment describes the way that human reasoning naturally works. More-
over, it seems that other linguistic phenomena are also sensitive to Strawson-entailment:
von Fintel (1999) argues that NPI licensing is sensitive to Strawson-downward entail-
ment.
Note that it also follows that (28a) and (28b) are Strawson-valid (they are Strawson-
entailed by any tautology):
(28) a. If it rains or snows tomorrow, then if it doesn’t rain tomorrow, it will snow.
b. If it rains or snows tomorrow and it doesn’t rain tomorrow, then it will
snow.
If our intuitions are indeed guided by Strawson-entailment, it is thus explained why
these sentences, even though they are strictly speaking not tautologies, nevertheless seem
trivial.
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6 Relation to presupposition
Truth value gaps have often been used to model presuppositions, but the partiality we
have written into the semantics of if must obviously be distinguished from presupposi-
tion. This was already observed by Belnap:8
Suppose we say that A S-“presupposes” B if whenever A is assertivew, B
is truew. This is, I take it, a semantic rendering in the present context of
Strawsonian presupposition, for then to say that A S-“presupposes” B is to
say that the truth of B is a necessary condition for the assertiveness of A. But
then it turns out for categorial A that (A/B) S-“presupposes” A, for the truth
of the antecedent, A, is a necessary condition for the assertiveness of the
conditional, (A/B), and indeed is the paradigm case of such. But it would
be mad to suggest that “If Sam is a crow, then Sam is black” presupposes
“Sam is a crow”, a madness which accounts for the shudder quotes in ‘S-
“presupposes”’. For A to presuppose B in the pragmatic sense, it should be
the case that one who utters A somehow commits himself to the truth of B.
It should be that he has done something pragmatically unacceptable if he
utters A when B is false. Something like this surely obtains when one utters
“The present king of France is bald”. But of course the whole point of con-
ditional assertion is to be able to avoid any commitment whatsoever when
the antecedent turns out false. Thus, although definable, S-“presupposition”
should not be taken as a semantic analogue of pragmatic presupposition.
(Belnap, 1973, 70)
Someone who utters ‘All John’s children are bald’ in case John has no children, counts
as having misled her audience. But this does not hold for a speaker who uttered a condi-
tional with a false antecedent. In fact, if conditionals presupposed their antecedent, one
would expect that natural language didn’t contain any conditionals. On Gricean assump-
tions, if it were given that John has children, one shouldn’t say ‘If John has children,
they are bald’, but just ‘His children are bald’.9
Perhaps we should assume that the presupposition of conditionals is of the kind
that is never already given, but that always has to be accommodated? This won’t work.
Following Gazdar (1979), it is usually assumed that conditionals ‘If ϕ,ψ’ give rise to
the clausal implicatures ♦ϕ and ♦¬ϕ, and that if a presupposition clashes with a clausal
implicature, the implicature ‘wins’, i.e. the presupposition is canceled. It follows that if
conditionals presupposed their antecedent, this presupposition would automatically be
canceled.10 To sum up, Belnap-partiality must be concluded to have nothing to do with
presupposition.11
8Note that Belnap uses the slash / as his conditional connective, whereas I use the arrow→.
9Ordinarily, that is. In some situations, for instance in an argument via modus ponens it is allowed to
assert a conditional whose antecedent is already given.
10See also Stalnaker (1975) and van der Sandt (1988), though these authors do not work in Gazdar’s
framework. For instance, in van der Sandt’s system, the presupposition is canceled because it clashes with
the fact that the conditional was uttered. Of course, the underlying intuition is similar to Gazdar’s.
11Soames (1989) distinguishes so-called ‘expressive presuppositions’:
214 Janneke Huitink
Given some presupposition theories, this is problematic. For instance, Heim’s
(1983) context change potentials are essentially based on a partial semantics. If we
were to combine this theory with our Belnap-semantics, we would thus be assuming two
distinct kinds of partiality. But this seems impossible in as far as undefinedness comes
down to a lack of semantic value; how can we distinguish between two non-existing
values? On the other hand, other presupposition theories, most notably the anaphoric
binding theory of van der Sandt (1992); Geurts (1999), are fully independent of truth
value gaps. Adopting Belnap’s semantics thus does not automatically commit us to there
being different kinds of undefinedness. At any rate, it is clear that Belnap-gaps just are
not presupposition-gaps.12
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have argued in favor of a new way to avoid Gibbard’s conclusion that
the meaning of iterated if -clauses implies that the semantics of if cannot be stronger
than material implication. The solution is to assign a partial semantics to indicative
conditionals: a conditional only has a truth value in case its antecedent is true. And if
the antecedent is true, the truth value of the entire conditional is the truth value of the
consequent. I have argued that this semantics can be made to yield a plausible logic for
conditionals, and I have explained why Belnap-partiality should be distinguished from
the partiality that is often associated with presupposition failure.
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Abstract
Bridging anaphora can refer not only to previously introduced discourse entities,
but also to abstract entities such as eventualities. The proposal made in this paper is
to extend the current account of bridging in SDRT in a way that implicit reference to
eventualities can be accounted for. We exploit the idea developed in Frame Seman-
tics that world knowledge is organized in frames. With each eventuality introduced
in a discourse, a corresponding frame is evoked in the discourse model. SDRT will
be extended to include possibly underspecified representations of frame elements,
which can give clues for finding suitable antecedents in bridging anaphora.
1 Introduction
Natural language discourses consisting of several utterances are more than merely string-
ing the utterances together. Discourses are structured and there are relationships between
utterances at various levels. Basically, one can distinguish coherence and cohesion in a
discourse. On the one hand, text segments are connected by discourse relations, yielding
coherence of a discourse. On the other hand, there are many anaphoric relations within a
single utterance as well as spanning bigger distances. They are responsible for cohesion
in a text. Various types of anaphora can be distinguished - they can be either direct, e.g.
if a pronoun is used, or more indirect, if there is some connection but no direct corefer-
ence between discourse entities. Clark (1977) called these cases of anaphora bridging
anaphora. In a bridging anaphor, an entity introduced in a discourse stands in a par-
ticular relation to some previously mentioned discourse entity. This bridging relation
is not explicitly stated. Yet it is an essential part of the discourse content because the
knowledge of these relations is necessary for successfully interpreting a discourse.
Clark differentiated various kinds of bridging inferences. The most prominent
type is indirect reference by association, where the antecedent is closely associated with
a discourse entity mentioned before. There is some literature concerning these cases (cf.
Asher and Lascarides, 1998a; Piwek and Krahmer, 2000). Another type of bridging is in-
direct reference by characterization, where the bridging relation characterizes a role that
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something implicitly plays in an eventuality1 mentioned before. Roles can be optional or
necessary agents, objects, or instruments. Less work is done on this topic. Koenig and
Mauner (1999) deal with reference to thematic arguments, and Bos et al. (1995) propose
a lexical account for bridging. In this paper, we want to investigate how extralinguistic
information sources constrain bridging references to eventualities. We will take Clark’s
example (1) as a prototypical case.
(1) a. John was murdered yesterday.
b. The knife lay nearby.
Utterance (1-a) describes a killing event which took place on the day preceding the
utterance. The individual referred to by the proper name “John” is the victim of the event.
Utterance (1-b) describes a state of the entity denoted by the definite noun phrase “the
knife”2. This entity is new in the discourse, but stands in an implicit relation to the event
described in utterance (1-a): the knife served probably as the instrument of the killing
event. This relationship is not expressed by linguistic means. Instead, the hearer has to
infer it using contextual knowledge. Apart from understanding the previous utterance,
successful interpretation of (1-b) requires some world knowledge: in a murdering event,
there must be a victim and a killer, and normally there is also an instrument used for
performing the act.
Only by means of this additional knowledge, the hearer can successfully inter-
pret the utterance and connect it to the preceding discourse. In this way, interpreta-
tion involves incrementally constructing a structured mental representation of the dis-
course. It is structured in the sense that rhetorical relations hold between discourse
segments. In example (1), utterance (b) is subordinated to (a), providing background
information. Neither these relations between utterances nor relations between discourse
entities (including eventualities) have necessarily to be expressed directly by linguistic
means. They often exist only implicitly, forcing the hearer to infer them using defeasible
pragmatic inferences. In a successful interpretation, all information, not only directly ex-
pressed but also indirectly inferred, will be part of the discourse model constructed by the
hearer in course of interpretation. The discourse model, as Cornish (1999) puts it, is “a
constantly evolving representation of the entities, propositions, eventualities, properties,
and states, as well as their interrelations, which are introduced into the discourse, or are
assumed already to exist therein, at particular points”. We adopt Segmented Discourse
Representation Theory (SDRT, Asher and Lascarides, 2003) as theory of modelling dis-
course structure and processes, a theory that has already been formalized in considerable
detail.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we will summa-
rize the current account of bridging in the framework of SDRT and introduce the basic
1We use the term eventuality for uniformly referring to events, states, actions or circumstances.
2There are also cases of referring indefinite noun phrases which convey a bridging relation. In (i), “a
knife” clearly refers to the probable instrument of murdering, almost identically as in example (1).
(i) John was murdered yesterday. A knife lay nearby.
As the literature on bridging mainly focuses on definite descriptions, we will concentrate on utterances
involving definites. Different behaviour of indefinites is indicated whenever necessary.
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ideas of Frame Semantics before we propose to integrate these two lines of research.
Section 3 shows how bridging references can be solved using the proposed account. In
section 4, we discuss related approaches, and we conclude in section 5.
2 Using Frame Semantics for Bridging in SDRT
2.1 Bridging in SDRT
We assume that the hearer is familiar with the basics of dynamic semantics (DRT, Kamp
and Reyle, 1993). SDRT (Asher and Lascarides, 2003) is an extension of DRT with basi-
cally two new expressions: (i) speech act discourse referents, which label content of text
segments and keep track of token utterances, and (ii) rhetorical relations, which relate
speech act discourse referents. The resulting structures are segmented DRSs (SDRSs).
In SDRT, bridging inferences are seen as “a byproduct of computing how the
current sentence connects to the previous ones in the discourse” (Asher and Lascarides,
1998a). Four meta-rules for bridging are stated:
1. If possible use identity.
2. Bridges must be plausible.
3. Discourse structure determines bridging.
4. Maximize discourse coherence.
The first rule reflects the empirical preference of resolving anaphora to an iden-
tical antecedent. This rule is the preferred rule; if resolution to identity is not possible,
then the other rules apply in the indicated order. The second rule means that world
knowledge “specifies certain plausible ways of filling the underspecified parameters in
the presupposed material”. Thus, plausibility relies on world knowledge, but is not pre-
cisely defined. We will try to refine this notion in a more constrained way. The third rule
states that if a rhetorical relation between the involved discourse segments gives partic-
ular clues for resolving the anaphora, then this information is to be used. The fourth
rule is one of the most basic principles assumed in SDRT. In discourse interpretation,
there is a preference for resolving bridging anaphora in a way that maximizes discourse
coherence.
To see more formally how bridging inferences a drawn in SDRT, we will con-
centrate on the meaning representation of definite descriptions triggering bridging in-
ferences. In Russellian tradition, the denotation of a definite noun phrase can only be
given if it fulfills the conditions on existence and uniqueness. This can be written in a
short form using the iota operator ι which maps a set containing only one element to this
element. An expression ιx.P(x), representing the core meaning of ”the P”, denotes x if
∃x.P(x)∧∀x′[P(x′)→ x′ = x] is true; if not, it is not defined. Chierchia (1995, p. 221)
extends this notion and includes a contextual parameter B for a bridging relation. He
claims that ”the P” denotes a P that is related by B to an antecedent a to be specified
by context. B restricts the domain and must be included in the uniqueness condition.
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Building on that, Asher and Lascarides (1998a, p. 87) characterize the meaning of a
definite noun phrase as λQ.Q(ιx(B(x,a)∧P(x))). This expression applies a predicate Q
(the verb meaning) to the entity x, for which P (the meaning of the NP) is true and that
is related by a bridging relation B to some contextually given antecedent a.
This meaning characterization corresponds to the SDRT representation shown in
(2). Note that the condition of uniqueness is now represented by the DRS condition
consisting of the two small DRSs connected by ⇒. The representation of an indefinite
noun phrase would be very similar, in the sense that we just leave out the uniqueness
condition and keep the rest of the conditions.
(2) λQ
u,v,R
u :
e,x,a,B
Q(x,e),P(x),
B(a,x),B=?,a=?
x′
P(x′)
B(a,x′)
⇒
x′ = x
R(u,v),R=?,v=?
There are two underspecifications to be specified by pragmatic inference: Firstly, a
coherence relation R(u,v) has to be established. According to Asher and Lascarides
(1998b), a definite description triggers a coherence relation between the current utterance
u and some previous utterance v. Secondly, in the bridging relation B(a,x), the param-
eters B and a have to be specified (Asher and Lascarides, 1998a). For direct anaphora,
B is identity. For indirect reference by association, B can be part-of or member-of. For
indirect reference by characterization, B is a thematic role, e.g. agent, theme, or instru-
ment. The question we want to go further into is what kind of information can we exploit
to help us drawing these inferences.
2.2 Frame Semantics and FrameNet
To get clues for the resolution of this kind of bridging inferences, we propose to ex-
ploit an idea already mentioned in Gardent et al. (2003), but not further pursued. The
idea is to use Frame Semantics, developed by Fillmore (1976), and subsequent work on
FrameNet (Baker et al., 1998; Fillmore et al., 2003). This framework is based on the
central assumption that world knowledge is organized in frames. Basic units are frames
and lexical units. Frames are mental representations of stereotypical situations, whose
elements can only be defined by relating one to another. A lexical unit is a pairing of a
word with a meaning; polysemous words are represented by several lexical units. Ev-
ery lexical unit evokes a particular frame and can only be understood in relation to that
frame.
FrameNet (Baker et al., 1998) is a lexical resource providing a body of annotated
sentences based on frame semantics. The database contains around 10,000 lexical units,
800 semantic frames and over 120,000 example sentences. Frames are hierarchically
organized: e.g. the frame Killing inherits the properties from the more general frame
Transitive action, which in turn inherits from the abstract frame Event. A frame con-
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sists of various Frame Elements, kinds of entities that can participate in a frame. They
are defined in relation to a frame, and correspond roughly to thematic roles in an event.
Sometimes, conceptually necessary Frame Elements do not show up in a sentence. This
is the case of omitted agents in passive sentences (Constructional Null Instantiation,
CNI), missing obligatory elements that can be inferred from the context (Definite Null
Instantiation, DNI), or implicit arguments of certain transitive verbs that are used in-
transitively, e.g. verbs as eat, bake (Indefinite Null Instantiation, INI). For illustration,
the Killing frame is described below in Fig. 1, and one of the lexical units evoking that
frame, the verb murder, is characterized in Fig. 2.3
Definition: A Killer or Cause causes the death of the Victim.
Core Frame Elements :
FE description inherited
FE
semantic
type
Killer The person or sentient entity that
causes the death of the Victim
Agent sentient
Victim The living entity that dies as a result of
the killing
Patient sentient
Instrument The device used by the Killer to bring
about the death of the Victim
Instr. physical en-
tity
Cause An inanimate entity or process that
causes the death of the Victim
Cause
Means The method or action that the Killer or
Cause performs resulting in the death
of the Victim
Means state of af-
fairs
Non-Core Frame Elements: Beneficiary, Manner, Place, Purpose, Time, ...
Lexical Units: annihilate.v, annihilation.n, ..., murder.n, murder.v, murderer.n, ..., terminate.v
Figure 1: The Killing frame
As can be seen in Fig. 2, there are three cases among the 23 annotated sentences
in the FrameNet database containing the lexical unit murder.v in which the Killer was
not expressed at all (CNI), and the Victim showed up as external argument of the verb.
This configuration is typical for passive sentences like (1).
An important question is whether a linguistic expression denoting an eventuality,
e.g. a verb, evokes at most one frame, exactly one frame, or more than one frame4. As
said above, in FrameNet, a lexical unit is defined as a pairing of a word with a sense.
For a polysemous word, “the separate senses of the word correspond to the different
(sets of) frames that the word can participate in. When a word’s sense is based on a
3Definitions are taken from the FrameNet Database, obtainable from the International Computer Sci-
ence Institute, Berkeley, California (http://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/).
4I owe the examples to an anonymous reviewer who drew my attention to this point.
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Lexical Entry: murder.v
• Frame elements and their syntactic realizations
Killer CNI.– (3), NP.Ext (15), PP[by].Dep (5)
Victim NP.Ext (8), INI.– (1), NP.Obj(14)
• Frame elements and valence patterns
frame element realized as
Killer NP.Ext NP.Ext PP[by].Dep CNI.–
Victim NP.Obj INI.– NP.Ext NP.Ext
(23) (14) (1) (5) (3)
Figure 2: Lexical entry murder.v
particular frame, the word evokes the frame” (Fillmore et al., 2003). For example, the
verb “break” can evoke, among others, the frame Experience bodily harm (e.g. in “I
broke my leg”) or the frame Render nonfunctional (in “I guess I broke the doorknob”).
Thus, interpretation of a text requires assumptions about which frame is relevant in the
given context. Take the verb “eat”: it could be associated with a set of frames, e.g.
a restaurant frame, a family home frame, a wild-animals-in-the-open frame, etc. The
question is how the right frame ends up being selected. We would suggest to choose the
most general frame fitting in the given context. For “eating” this would be the frame
Ingestion. Due to the hierarchical structure of FrameNet, any frame involving eating
would inherit the properties and frame elements of this frame. Of course, in case that
there are various very divergent senses of a word, the selected frame perhaps is too
general to be helpful for our purposes. But still, FrameNet provides in many cases very
useful information for discourse interpretation.
2.3 Proposal: Integrate FrameNet and SDRT
Each eventuality introduced in a discourse evokes a corresponding frame in the discourse
model. Its frame elements correspond to all relevant (necessary or optional) thematic
roles of the event. We propose to include for all core frame elements a representation
in the discourse model, i.e. in the SDRS of the current utterance5. In case that some
participant of a frame is not expressed linguistically, its representation remains under-
specified. These elements can be further specified by subsequent information, provided
that the discourse referent for the eventuality remains accessible for anaphoric reference.
We will spell out in more detail how this works in section 3. Before that, we will dis-
cuss how frame elements can be represented in SDRT, and how they help to determine
5For expository purposes, we will ignore non-core frame elements, as well as the core frame elements
Cause andMeans, but surely a more sophisticated discourse model must contain additional representations
of spatial and temporal coordinates. However, they do not add to the main points we want to make in this
paper.
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discourse relations.
In order to integrate FrameNet data in SDRT, we adopt a neo-Davidsonian style
of event semantics (Parsons, 1990), assuming that lexical units expressing eventualities
include an implicit event argument in their semantic representation. Thematic roles in
an event are represented as conditions in form of predicates, whose first argument is this
event argument. For instance, the sentence “John eats an apple” gets a semantic repre-
sentation ∃e∃ j∃a[eat(e)∧agent(e, j)∧ theme(e,a)∧ john( j)∧apple(a)]. Equipped in
this way, we can express the underspecified semantic content of (1) as shown in (3).
According to FrameNet data (Baker et al., 1998), in course of interpreting the
utterance, the Killing frame is evoked by the verb “murder”. Its core frame elements
show up in the SDRS as killer(e1,x), victim(e1, j) and instrument(e1,y). Similarly, the
verb “lie” (in its sense “lie nearby”) evokes the frame Being located, with only one core
frame element theme(e2,k).
(3)
u1,u2 | R,v
u1 :
e1, j | x,y
john( j),murder(e1)
killer(e1,x),victim(e1, j), instrument(e1,y),x=?,y=?
u2 :
e2,k | B,a
kni f e(k), lie.nearby(e2), theme(e2,k)
B(a,k),B=?,a=?
k′
kni f e(k′)
B(a,k′)
⇒
k′ = k
R(v,u2),R=?,v=?
Thanks to the hierarchical structure of the FrameNet database, the Killing frame inherits
the properties of the more general abstract frame Transitive action, which in turn inherits
from Event. The frame Being located inherits the frame elements of the abstract frame
State. As assumed in Asher and Lascarides (2003), the occurrence of an event followed
by a state is a strong indicator for the presence of a BACKGROUND relation between the
discourse segments containing the eventualities. This can be expressed by a default rule
(4) 6 (cf. Asher and Lascarides, 2003, p. 207, Vieu and Pre´vot, 2004, p. 486). Thus, in
example (1), a BACKGROUND relation R between u1 and u2 can be assumed.
(4) u1 : event(e1)∧u2 : state(e2) > BACKGROUND(u1,u2)
3 Resolving Bridging References
Resolving bridging anaphora requires two problems to be solved: (i) the correct an-
tecedent to which the anaphor is to be connected has to be found, and (ii) the nature
of the bridging relation itself must be identified. For solving (i), possible antecedents
must be identified, and impossible ones must be ruled out. For solving (ii), it is helpful
6’>’ is a nonmonotonic conditional operator. A> B means: if A then normally B.
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to restrict possible relations to conditions on discourse referents already present in the
discourse model or at least evoked.
3.1 Constraints on Anaphoric Reference
Accessibility for anaphoric reference is constrained by general discourse principles such
as the Right Frontier Constraint (RFC, Polanyi, 1988; Webber, 1988). Basically, this
constraint draws a distinction between coordinating and subordinating discourse rela-
tions: a coordinating relation pushes the right frontier to the right, closing off its attach-
ment point, and a subordinating relation extends the right frontier downwards, leaving
open its attachment point. In SDRT, an antecedent for an anaphoric expression must be
DRS-accessible on the right frontier (Asher and Lascarides, 2003). Asher & Lascarides’
meta-rule “discourse structure determines bridging” (see section 2.1) is captured by this
constraint. Recent work on SDRT (Vieu and Pre´vot, 2004) has revealed that BACK-
GROUND should be considered as subordinating by default. Accordingly, in (1), u1 lies
on the right frontier of the discourse, and e1 is accessible for anaphoric reference in u2.
So the discourse structure tells us that, in principle, a bridging relation can be estab-
lished. Now, the question remains of how to build the bridge between the knife and
the killing event. As seen in the last section, FrameNet data can give important clues
to establish discourse relations. But this knowledge is not always sufficient to resolve
bridging references. In (1), the presence of a BACKGROUND relation alone is not enough
to motivate the bridge. Which further information can we obtain from FrameNet?
The frame element instrument in the killing frame must have a semantic type (in
the FrameNet sense) “physical entity”. It can be a weapon, but in principle any other
physical entity could be used for killing, e.g. hands (5) or a lamp (6).
(5) John killed Mary. He strangled her.
(6) John killed Mary. He stunned her with a lamp.
On the other hand, the lexical unit “knife” evokes the frame Weapon bearing a semantic
type “artifact”, indicating the possibility that it could serve as an instrument in a killing
event. But as noted in the informal FrameNet description, knives are not necessarily
designed as weapons. So this knowledge does not really help us to resolve the bridging
relation, at least in the present state of FrameNet. The only knowledge we can use is
that there is no clash of semantic types: both knives and killing instruments are physical
entities. As far as that we can capture the intuition behind Asher & Lascarides’ meta-rule
that “bridges must be plausible”. It is little more than saying that interpretations must be
consistent. In fact, as Zeevat (2006) suggests, selecting the most plausible interpretation
given the context and the utterance entails a preference for consistent over inconsistent
interpretations. Thus, using FrameNet data, we at least partly get an approximation to the
plausibility constraint, which, nevertheless, is a probabilistic notion while consistency is
either fulfilled or not. A full, gradual notion of plausibility is surely better captured by
some kind of probabilistic system than by an all-or-nothing notion of consistency.
Looking again at the four meta-rules, we find as first rule “if possible use iden-
tity”. This rule seems to be subsumed by a very general constraint in discourse in-
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terpretation, sometimes called DOAP “Don’t overlook anaphoric possibilities”. This
principle is essentially stating that if there is an anaphoric trigger, we must try to find
an antecedent. This preference can be captured by a general low ranked default saying
that, unless otherwise indicated, (semantically compatible) discourse referents can be
assumed to be equal. Formal details on how Equality by Default constrains anaphoric
reference are described in Cohen (2007).
As noted above, with the presence of a discourse relation between u1 and u2, the
discourse referents in u1 are accessible for anaphoric reference in u2. So, with Equality
by Default, we can assume that a is equal to e1. Thus, the bridging relation B(a,k) can be
specified as instr(e1,k). As a byproduct, the underspecified variable y in the condition
instr(e1,y) in u1 can be resolved to k, yielding that instrument and knife refer to the same
entity. Although k is not accessible in u1, it is accessible in the superordinated SDRS
compromising both utterances, and therefore, after processing the second utterance, the
underspecification can be resolved. Note that these inferences are defeasible and can
be overridden by subsequent information. Nevertheless, if the bridging relation can be
resolved, the discourse turns out to be more coherent. This captures the intuition behind
Asher & Lascarides’ fourth meta-rule “maximize discourse coherence” (MDC). Now
consider discourse (7).
(7) a. John was murdered yesterday. b. # The book lay nearby.
This discourse is - in a neutral context - less coherent than (1), and we would like to
explain why. In example (1), the knowledge that a knife is a kind of weapon that can
serve as an instrument in a killing event licenses the bridging inference. In example (7),
such a connection cannot be found. Again, a BACKGROUND relation can be inferred,
but the role that “the book” could play in the killing event is less clear than that of
a knife. Although there is no clear semantic connection between “the book” and any
evoked core frame element, there is no clash of semantic types, and a bridging relation
to the instrument could be plausible. Nevertheless, as no sense of “book” evokes a frame
similar to Weapon, it remains unclear what nature has the bridging relation, and the
discourse seems less coherent. Note again, if the context provides additional evidence
that the book is a probable killing instrument, e.g. by being contaminated with poison,
the bridging inference indeed can be drawn. To summarize the principles we need for
bridging resolution, we remain with the following constraints on anaphoric reference:
• DOAP
• PLAUSIBLE or CONSISTENT
• RFC
• MDC
Note that they are not meant to be special meta-rules designed for bridging res-
olution, they rather seem to be more general constraints to be obeyed in discourse inter-
pretation. They could be seen as constraints in optimality theoretic pragmatics, but we
will not adopt a particular framework here, as we leave open the question whether the
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ranking of these constraints should be left as stated above. For a related discussion, see
Zeevat (2006).
3.2 Weak Discourse Referents
For illustration, a pragmatically enriched SDRS for discourse (1) is shown in (8). Note
that as the murderer is not mentioned at all, his referent could not be resolved and its
representation remains underspecified.
(8)
u1,u2
u1 :
e1, j | x,y
john( j),murder(e1)
killer(e1,x),victim(e1, j), instrument(e1,y)
x=?
u2 :
e2,k | B,a
kni f e(k), lie.nearby(e2), theme(e2,k)
B(a,k),B= instrument,a= e1,k = y
k′
kni f e(k′)
B(a,k′)
⇒
k′ = k
BACKGROUND(u1,u2)
As suggested by the SDRT representations, we now have to deal with two different
kinds of discourse entities: regular discourse referents introduced by linguistic expres-
sions, and weak discourse referents which are not (yet) expressed linguistically. Weak
Discourse Referents are abstract entities which are evoked or activated in course of the
interpretation process. A linguistic expression does not introduce them directly, rather
indirectly by virtue of the frame evoked by a lexical unit. They often remain underspec-
ified, but can be specified by subsequent anaphoric reference. This is what happens with
the killing instrument. Its identification with the knife helps to render the discourse more
coherent. If the knife in the second sentence had nothing to do with the first sentence,
the discourse would be rather incoherent, at least after uttering the second sentence.
The distinction between two types of discourse referents is not entirely new, e.g.
Kamp and Rossdeutscher (1994) assume “schematic discourse referents”. Furthermore,
this assumption could be generalized in the sense that all discourse referents are assigned
finer-grained weights on a scale according to their salience, instead of distinguishing just
two kinds of referents. We leave this point to further investigation.
Our proposal is to restrict the search space for suitable antecedents for bridging
anaphora to take into account only accessible regular and weak discourse referents. In
this way, the resolution of bridging inferences can be considerably constrained. In our
model, new entities are (weakly) introduced with every eventuality that is talked about,
with the potential to be strengthened, to remain in the background, or even to be dropped.
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4 Related Approaches
4.1 Implicit Arguments as A-definites
(Koenig and Mauner, 1999)
Important work on the discourse status of non-expressed event participants was pre-
sented by Koenig and Mauner (1999), who build upon results of psycholinguistic ex-
periments concerning implicit verbal arguments. Reading times of sentences like (10)
following one of the sentences in (9-a) were compared in an experiment carried out by
Mauner et al. (1995)
(9) a. A ship was sunk
b. A ship sank
c. A ship was sunk by someone
(10) ... to collect settlement money from the insurance company.
Subjects take longer to process rationale clauses like (10) when they follow intransi-
tive sentences like (9-b) than when they follow short passives (9-a) or agentive passives
(9-c). Thus it seems that verbs like “sink” in (9-a) include an implicit actor argument
as part of the representation of the lexical item, and the implicit anaphoric (PRO) sub-
ject of “collect” in (10) can be anchored more easily in the discourse model. Koenig
and Mauner (1999) claim that implicit arguments, as well as words like the French sub-
ject clitic “on”, the German “man”, and indefinite uses of English “they” (a-definites in
their terminology), cannot serve as antecedents of anaphora and do not introduce any
discourse referent at all. Their DRT representation for sentence (9-a) is (11):
(11)
y
ship(y),sink(x,y)
In this representation, it remains unclear how the apparently free variable x, representing
the actor, is model-theoretically interpreted. Moreover, as noted in their paper, bridging
references to implicit arguments are indeed possible, e.g. consider example (12).
(12) a. They killed the president.
b. The terrorists were merciless.
Koenig and Mauner (1999) do not give any details on how such an inference can be
drawn according to their theory. The interpretational apparatus of DRT (Kamp and
Reyle, 1993) would have to be changed in order to allow uninstantiated variables in
final DRSs. Such an attempt is made by Farkas and Swart (2003). Here, we want to
refrain from a major modification of truth conditions in DRT.
4.2 Bridging as Coercive Accommodation (Bos et al., 1995)
Bos et al. (1995) presented an approach that is indeed very close to our proposal. Basi-
cally, they combine an extension of van der Sandt (1992)’s theory of presupposition with
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the Generative Lexicon (Pustejovsky, 1995), comparing bridging with Pustejovsky’s co-
ercion. This approach is based on a convincing formal definition of an extension of DRT.
However, the treatment of bridging as a lexical phenomenon is not unproblematic. It is
limited to lexically induced bridging inferences. Bos et al. (1995) show example (13) as
a limitation case of their approach.
(13) Probably, if Jane takes a bath, Bill will be annoyed that there is no more hot
water.
Interpreting this short discourse involves the inference that taking a bath involves us-
ing a hot water reservoir. This inference is difficult to explain in Bos et al. (1995)’s
framework. Regarding FrameNet, in the present state of English FrameNet it is un-
clear whether phrasal verbs are lexical units and how they evoke frames, e.g. whether
“take a bath” counts as a lexical unit, or just “take”. However, in other versions of
FrameNet, such knowledge is encoded; an equivalent sentence in Spanish using the verb
“ban˜arse” (to take a bath) is analyzable in FrameNet terms7. There, it evokes the frame
Cause to be wet with a core frame element Liquid, which can be instantiated by “hot
water”. Still better is a suggestion made by the developers of Polish FrameNet8, accord-
ing to which both “wziac´ kapiel” (like in English) and “wykapac´ sie” (like in Spanish)
evoke the frame Grooming, where an Agent engages in personal body care. An Instru-
ment can be used in this process as well as aMedium. Thus, if “take a bath” is treated as
a lexical unit, we can draw the inference that the water in the second clause is used for
the bath in the first clause.
(14) Yesterday, Chomsky analyzed a sentence on the blackboard, but I couldn’t see
the tree.
Moreover, as Piwek and Krahmer (2000) note, not all implied antecedents are lexi-
cal entailments; sometimes, non-lexical background knowledge is needed, as in (14).
To correctly understand this utterance, the hearer has to rely on specific background
knowledge, in particular on the knowledge that a generative syntactic analysis typically
involves a tree-like representation of the sentence. It is questionable whether highly
context-sensitive information of this kind is part of the lexicon. In any case, FrameNet
provides us with additional secondary information which surely is beyond the lexicon
but still has an influence on resolving bridging anaphora.
5 Conclusion
We have sketched how SDRT’s account of bridging can be extended in order to cover
reference to eventualities. SDRT and FrameNet are combined by assuming a neo-
Davidsonian event representation and distinguishing two types of discourse referents.
We could indicate that the meta-principles assumed for bridging can be put down to
more general constraints to be obeyed in discourse interpretation. We have spelled out
7see http://gemini.uab.es/
8Magdalena Zawisławska, p.c.; see http://www.ramki.uw.edu.pl/
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how world knowledge, represented in frames, contributes to the interpretation process,
both for establishing discourse relations and for resolving indirect anaphora.
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Abstract
The paper analyses the Russian conjunctions i, a and no, the English conjunctions
and and but and the German conjunctions und, aber and sondern in terms of spe-
cialised additivity: special cases of the relation between sentences expressed by too
and also. The first section gives an overview of the analysis, the second section
tries to give an explicit characterisation of additivity and its specialisations. The
third section uses an OT-like framework to explain the complementary distribution
of the conjunctions and the blocking effects that result.
1 Conjunctions
A much debated issue in Russian linguistics is the precise demarcation of the conjunc-
tions i, a and no. I corresponds to the English and, a has to be translated sometimes
as and and sometimes as but, where all the uses of no seem to correspond to English
but. We refer to Jasinskaja and Zeevat (ms) for an attempt to do justice to the descriptive
problems and the debate. In this paper, we try to look at the theoretical side of the pro-
posal. That comes down to the semantical analysis of additivity and an account of the
blocking of one conjunction by another that is needed to make the explanation work.
The theory can be recapitulated as follows.
The English and is a general marker of additivity. Additivity is a property of
a clause to give a distinct answer to a question that was already addressed before. If
the question contains a single wh-element, the additive clause and its antecedent must
give distinct values to the wh-element. If the question has more than one wh-element,
Arndt Riester & Torgrim Solstad (eds.)
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the additive clause and its antecedents give distinct values to each of the wh-elements—
otherwise, it can still be additive, but with respect to the corresponding question with
fewer wh-elements. The theory assumes that polar questions have wh-elements and are
wh-questions that can take values from the set of truth-values. Accordingly they will be
called whether-questions.
The conjunction and is indifferent to the number of wh-elements and the type of
these wh-elements. But and competes with but that is a special case of additivity asking
for questions with at least two wh-elements of which one must be whether. (1) gives an
example of a who-whether-question, which can be split into two whether-subquestions:
whether John likes football, answered by the first conjunct, and whether Bill does, an-
swered by the second.
(1) Who “whether” likes football?
John does, but Bill doesn’t.
The Russian system is more complex. The conjunction i requires a single wh-
element in the question. The conjunction a can be taken as the generic additive marker
(like and) that is blocked from single wh-questions by the presence of i and from the
case covered by no by the presence of that marker1. No marks additivity with respect
to a why-whether question. That means that the first conjunct gives a reason for some
statement C and the second one a reason why C should not be adopted. This makes
the argumentative function of no the basic one and constructs the denial of expectation-
reading as the case thatC is identical to the second conjunct.
(2) Why “whether” should we buy this ring?
It is beautiful, but (russ.: no) expensive.
Why “whether” didn’t John make it?
He wanted to come, but (russ.: no) did not make it.
Whether-questions are special. Distinctness implies that there cannot be con-
joined distinct answers to a single whether-question. They would have to answer yes
and no to the same question and would be contradictory. But there can be conjoined
answers to double wh-questions with one of the elements being whether.
A special case are correction markers like sondern in German (Spanish has a
similar marker sino).
(3) Peter ist nicht in Berlin, sondern/*aber in Paris.
Peter is not in Berlin, but in Paris.
Peter ne v Berline, a v Parizˇe.
These are a special case of distinct answers to double wh-questions with one of
the elements being whether, in (3) a where-whether-question: where whether is Peter?
It provides the negative answer to whether Peter is in Berlin and a positive answer to
1In Jasinskaja and Zeevat (ms), i is taken to be the unmarked case, and a as the special case. It is
however i that has the simpler semantics and it is hard to see how the property of marking for additivity
with respect to multiple wh-questions can grammaticalise, while many additive particles allow only a
single associate and provide a good source for conjunctions like i.
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1wh add wh-whether why-whether correction
i a no
and but
und aber sondern
Table 1: Correlations between the Russian, English, and German conjunction systems.
(1wh stands for “single wh-element”.)
whether Peter is Paris. Sondern marks wh-whether-questions with a correction presup-
position: the first conjunct is presupposed (and denied by the second). Typically, in
languages like Russian, where a has to do the job, the presupposition is not marked and
the correction can be made in both orders.2
(4) Peter v Parizˇe, a ne v Berline.
Double wh-questions in Russian select a and not no because no requires both why
and whether. This is not even satisfied in (5): John hits Peter in both conjuncts.
(5) John did not hit Peter because he was angry, but because he was drunk.
The conjunction answers: whether John hit Peter because of what? (a whether-
what-question) by two doubly distinct answers. It would be sondern in German and a in
Russian.
In providing different answers to the same questions, conjunctions belong to the
class of additive markers, like too and also. Zeevat and Jasinskaja (2007) argue that some
and-like conjunctions can be historically related to additive particles and need additivity
for the proper understanding of their behaviour.
Blocking is the final ingredient of the explanation. If no or i can be used, a
cannot. If i cannot, a must be used, if but can be used, and cannot.
Given these ingredients, it is possible to give a parsimonious description of the
Russian system, the English system and the German system and correlate them as shown
in table 1. It follows that no always translates to but. A translates as but and aber if one of
its wh-elements is whether, unless one of the conjuncts is presupposed to be false (in the
common ground or in the interlocutor’s information state) in which case it is rendered
by sondern and the presupposed conjunct is preposed. Otherwise, a translates as and
and und. I always corresponds to and and und. Sondern always translates as a and but.
2The presupposition of the first conjunct is also missing in the English but, nevertheless but shows a
slight preference for the negative-positive order of conjuncts under the correction reading, cf.: Peter did
not go to Paris, but to Berlin vs. Peter went to Berlin, but not to Paris. Umbach (2004) claims that in the
latter case the positive-negative order is only compatible with the non-corrective reading: Peter did not
go to Paris in addition to (rather than instead of) going to Berlin, which in our theory results just from
answering a wh-whether-question without any additional presupposition. The correction reading with the
positive-negative order is conveyed better by using and: Peter went to Berlin, and not to Paris. This
difference between the English but and the Russian a could be related to the asymmetry of the conjuncts
of but that also shows up in its argumentative and denial of expectation uses like (2). An account of this
asymmetry is presented in section 3.
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Aber is always translated into English as but. Into Russian it translates as a unless it
answers a why-whether-question in which case it becomes no. And translates as i if it
marks 1wh and as a otherwise and in German to und. These translation relations are
illustrated below.
wh1:
(6) Vera prinimala vannu, i razgovarivala po telefonu.
Vera was taking a bath and talking on the phone.
Vera nam ein Bad und telefonierte.
(7) Idet sneg, i duet veter.
It is snowing and the wind is blowing.
Es schneit und der Wind weht.
wh>1:
(8) Vera prinimala vannu, a Lena razgovarivala po telefonu.
Vera was taking a bath and Lena was talking on the phone.
Vera nam ein Bad und Lena telefonierte.
(9) V Moskve idet sneg, a v Amsterdame duet veter.
It’s snowing in Moscow and it’s windy in Amsterdam.
In Moskau schneit es und in Amsterdam weht der Wind.
(10) Oleg ljubit futbol, a Roma basketbol.
Oleg likes football and Roma likes basketball.
Oleg spielt gern Fussbal und Roma Basketball.
wh-whether:
(11) Oleg ljubit futbol, a Roma ne ljubit.
Oleg likes football, but Roma doesn’t.
Oleg spielt gern Fussball, aber Roma nicht.
why-whether:
(12) E`to kol’co krasivoe, no dorogoe.
This ring is beautiful, but expensive.
Dieser Ring is scho¨n aber teuer.
wh-whether correction:
(13) Peter ne v Berline, a v Parizˇe.
Peter is not in Berlin, but in Paris.
Peter ist nicht in Berlin, sondern in Paris.
Explaining Conjunction Systems: Russian, English, German 235
2 Additivity
The first formal semantics of additivity has been provided by theorists of presupposition
like Gazdar (1978) and Karttunen and Peters (1979) who assigned to additive particles
associating with a name the property that an object non-identical with the referent of the
name also has the property that is expressed by the rest of the clause. This is too re-
strictive since additive particles also associate with other NPs and other constituents and
even with sequences of NPs. Also the property of being non-identical seems too weak
in two respects: for sequences there must be additivity at each coordinate and following
Hendriks (2004), there should be more than just non-identity: the two elements should
not overlap: John’s hand cannot be in addition to John, a part of the content of a bottle of
milk cannot be in addition to the content itself, an event cannot be additive with respect
to a subevent. (14) is an illustration.
(14) John is coming. His whole family is coming (*too).
A third failure of these accounts is that they allow accommodation and satisfac-
tion by common ground knowledge, something criticised by Kripke (ms) by the example
(15).
(15) Tonight John is having dinner in New York too.
Kripke’s point is that (15) is not acceptable out of the blue, even though every-
body knows that there are millions who have dinner every evening in New York. Too
seems to require an overt antecedent in the context and the property that allows and ne-
cessitates the occurrence of too would be that the clause readdresses a question that has
already been addressed in the discourse. This gives the following definition.
(16) Definition 1:
ϕ(a) and ϕ(b) are additive to each other with respect to ?xϕ in w iff
(1) both are true in w and answers to ?xϕ.
(2) and there is no c such that c≤ a and c≤ b
This is one-place additivity. A more general definition is needed to capture addi-
tivity on pairs (and more generally, tuples) as in the examples below:
(17) A: I love you.
B: I love you too.
(18) Tim loves Louise and Sandra.
Sandra loves him too.
The tuples need to be distinct in each of the corresponding elements, that is why
(19c) is infelicitous with too. It cannot be construed like (19a) as one-place additive
(John is another person loving Sandra). While (19b) can be construed in terms of two-
place additivity (〈John,Monique〉 is another pair standing in a love relation whose every
element is distinct from the corresponding element in 〈Tim,Louise and Sandra〉),3 (19c)
cannot because Sandra and Monique has a common part with Louise and Sandra.
3For some speakers too can only associate with a single constituent (Krifka, 1999, n. 7), however others
accept (19b) with the reading where too associates with the pair of constituents John andMonique, giving
rise to two-place additivity.
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(19) Tim loves Louise and Sandra.
a. JOHN loves Sandra, too.
b. JOHN loves MONIQUE, too.
c. JOHN loves Sandra and MONIQUE, (*too).
A general definition of additivity uses questions of the form ?x1 . . .xnϕwith n≥ 1.
(20) Definition 2:
ϕ(a1 . . .an) and ϕ(b1 . . .bn) are additive to each other with respect to ?x1 . . .xnϕ
in w iff
(1) both are true in w and answers to ?x1 . . .xnϕ.
(2) for all 1≤ j ≤ n there is no c such that c≤ a j and c≤ b j
This would be general additivity and correspond with markers like and and und,
apart from blocking effects. If a is the default case, it is also just a general marker
of additivity like and and und, but subject to more blocking. All the other markers
discussed, including too are more restricted by putting more constraints on the number
of wh-variables or on the type of these variables.
Some remarks on the definition: First of all, the definition appeals to a notion of
x ≤ y which needs further motivation. Intuitively, distinctness between objects is about
not sharing parts. There are a number of part-relations that are relevant. The following
list seems to cover the most important cases.
1. objects and their constituent parts
2. set of objects and their subsets and elements
3. quantities of matter (some bread) and the subquantities that make them up
4. events and the subevents that constitute them
5. states and their component states
6. regions and their subregions
7. temporal intervals and their subintervals
8. truth values have no parts
This suffices for the wh-phrases considered here. Why takes events and states
as values, who persons, what non-human objects, when and where spatial and temporal
regions. The problems are mainly with abstract objects like habits, tendencies, disposi-
tions, propositions and properties4.
4A good deal of progress can be made by a reduction to their instances. If an instance of a property
invariably or typically has another property that property could count as a part or a prototypical part of the
property. If a proposition is true in virtue of events or states with invariable or prototypical subevents that
make another proposition true, the other proposition is a part or prototypical part of the proposition. And
the same would hold for habits, tendencies, and dispositions.
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Second, the definition is about objects and not about generalised quantifiers, the
general case of an NP meaning. The idea is that a linguistic answer with a generalised
quantifier as a value for the wh-variable can always be witnessed in a world by an object
answer.
This works as follows: If ϕ(a) is true in w and w |= N(a) (N is the meaning of
a noun) then ϕ(a) will witness a whole range of sentences of the form (¬)QNϕ(x) (Q
is a determiner meaning). Which determiners are witnessed (possibly under a negation)
depends on the size of a and the size of the extension of N minus a and (sometimes) on
contextual standards of comparison.
Let ϕ(a) be true in w and a be in the extension of N in w.
Then
1. ϕ(a) witnesses some N ϕ(x) in w
2. ϕ(a) witnesses all N ϕ(x) in w iff a is the extension of N in w
3. ϕ(a) witnesses 3 N ϕ(x) in w iff a has size 3
4. ϕ(a) witnesses many N ϕ(x) in w iff a has a large size
5. ϕ(a) witnesses most N ϕ(x) in w iff a outsizes the set of members of the extension
of N in w which do not satisfy ϕ(x)
6. ϕ(a) witnesses f ew N ¬ϕ(x) in w iff a is nearly all of the extension of N in w.
Given an information state X ⊆W , the sentences with NP semantics are additive
with respect to the question, if they can be witnessed by additive object answers to the
question, in each world w ∈ X .
The definition also does not directly allow for pragmatic additivity, where the
additivity holds not with respect to the common ground or the speaker’s information
state but with respect to the hearer’s information state, as in (21).
(21) A: Did you invite the mayor and the doctor?
B: Well, the mayor is the doctor. So by inviting the mayor I invited the doctor
too.
Thus in the most general terms, the conditions licensing additive marking can be
characterised as follows5:
(22) The context must contain an answer A to a question ?x1 . . .xnϕ and the contri-
bution B of the speaker must be witnessed by an additive answer with respect
to the information state of the hearer as it is known to the speaker.
5Lexical —unlike the grammaticalised markers considered in this paper— expressions of additivity
like “in addition” or “additionally” enforce additivity with respect to the common ground after the update:
i.e. additivity is part of the truth-conditional content of the utterance. Another difference is that they do
not need to have an additive antecedent, but can introduce it or accommodate it.
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Additive conjunctions vs. additive particles: The additive conjunctions considered
in this paper are special in that the antecedent is always the first conjunct and that the
question is directly related to the goal of the speaker in producing the conjunction. This
does not need to be the case for normal additive marking with too and also.
The speaker can answer a question with his contribution that is different from the
question which makes his contribution additive as in (23).
(23) What did Susan do?
SUSAN had spaghetti TOO.
The speaker answers the question but in producing the answer also readdresses
the question who ate spaghetti and marks the fact that he is readdressing it with the
additive marker.
Specialisations of additivity: The first kind of specialisation is simplex vs. duplex
(multiplex) questions. I marks single wh-questions, no the particular case of double
questions with why and whether as the two wh-elements. The Russian a does not impose
any restriction on the number of wh-elements per se, but because of blocking by i it
is only possible with multiplex questions. All the other conjunctions do not have a
restriction on the number of wh-elements with or without blocking.
The second kind is typing. The wh-variable in a question can allow only values
of a certain type, like object, event, truth-value, region, quantity etc., corresponding to
wh-words like who, why, whether, and which, whether, where, how much and others.
Polar questions are treated as normal wh-questions. This is not problematic, whether p
gets the logical representation: ?xt ext(p) = xt .
Whether-questions are a special case: the only way to be a distinct truth-value is
to be the other truth value. This makes it impossible to have simplex additivity of type
truth-value: one would affirm and deny the same statement. But duplex and multiplex
questions can include a type truth-value: it is possible that P holds of x but does not hold
of y.
There is a similar problem with why-whether-questions. If A but B addresses
Why whether p? and A addresses the positive side, i.e. A gives a reason for p, and B a
reason for ¬p, then the answer does not decide the whether-question. Markers like but
are however implicating that B is the decisive part. So if B gives a reason for ¬p, the
speaker implies that ¬p is true or should be the decision that has to be taken.
3 Blocking
As described in section 1 the various specialised additive markers block each other when
their condition of application is more specific: but is preferred to and when the condi-
tions for wh-whether hold, even though wh-whether is also compatible with the weaker
conditions imposed by the generalised additive marker and. Similarly, i and no block a
in Russian. In German, sondern blocks aber, which is otherwise very similar to English
but or Dutch maar.
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and/und/a
but/aber WHETHER, 2ND
sondern CORRECTION
i SINGLE
no WHY, WHETHER, 2ND
Table 2: Conjunctions and the features they realise
How does this happen? It is not a general property of natural language that what
is more specific in semantics is preferred. It is not necessary to refrain from calling Bill
a man, if he is an actor and a bachelor. Blocking is known from morphology (the more
specific rule that makes the plural of goose geese wins from the more general rule that
would make gooses out of goose). But the system of conjunctive markers is not normally
seen as a paradigm.
It could however be compared to a paradigm. The present of the verb to be is the
paradigm am, is and are. For the negation, the form amn’t is missing and gives way to
aren’t in Aren’t I clever?. This makes are and aren’t into the unmarked form and lets the
special forms am and is come out of a constraint that tries to realise the input features of
number and person on the output form, when this is possible. Bresnan (2000) employs a
constraint AGR for this purpose.
We could do the same, by assuming that AGR tries to realise a special category of
features on conjunctions. Candidates for such features would be WHETHER, 2ND (sec-
ond), SINGLE, WHY and CORRECTION with our conjunctions realising these features
as in the following table 2. WHETHER requires that one of the wh-elements be typed
as truth value, 2ND makes the second conjunct resolve the whether-issue, WHY types
one of the wh-elements as a proposition giving an argument for φ, SINGLE restricts the
number of wh-elements to one, and CORRECTION introduces the presupposition of the
first conjunct characteristic of corrections.
Unfortunately, conjunctions are not obligatory as such. Quite systematically,
conjunctions of any type can be replaced by two adjacent unmarked sentences.
(24) John came and Mary left.
John came. Mary left.
John is tall but Bill is small.
John is tall. Bill is small.
Johann ist nicht in Paris, sondern er ist in Berlin.
Johann ist nicht in Paris. Er ist in Berlin.
This makes the problem different from agreement marking. There is nothing
optional about agreement, at least in English, while additive conjunctions can be left out
if distinctness is obvious from the context or signalled by other means, e.g. by additive
particles like too and also, or adjectival markers like another, a different.
The paradigmatic approach also does not explain why the system emerged. For
the verbal agreement system, it is generally accepted that the agreement morphemes
come from fusion of the verb with pronouns and would be remains of clitic doubling. It
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needs to be explained of course why such remains are stable, but there is a general expla-
nation that applies here: the agreement morphemes mark finiteness and their presence
increases semantic redundancy and therefore supports understanding. It seems wrong
to consider the conjunction systems to be atavistic remains of any other paradigm, even
though they do make understanding more robust.
Another approach is to assume a maximisation constraint MAX(OTHER) that
checks that the items that are distinct in the input are also distinct in interpretations of the
output (see Zeevat, 2003). The check can be understood as part of the self-monitoring
of the speaker and is here directed to checking that objects are not identified in inter-
pretation when this is not intended. The constraint is closely related to the fact that
perception is strongly oriented towards identification: identify when there is no reason
not to. Pragmatic formulations of that principle are *NEW (Zeevat, 2008), DO NOT
ACCOMMODATE (Blutner, 2000) and DOAP (Williams, 1997; Hendriks and de Hoop,
2001). The approach by MAX(OTHER) however also runs into a number of problems.
Distinct objects can be associated with different descriptions, but if they share
descriptions, it is necessary to use a marker of distinctness like other or different. If the
same predicate applies to a different object, it is necessary to employ an additive marker.
It is important to realise that in these cases there can be plenty of other cues to infer that
the objects are different. In (25), the two men need to be different because one cannot
non-metaphorically meet oneself, because a full NP cannot be coreferential with another
NP in the same clause and because indefinites introduce new referents.
(25) A man met another man.
The interpretation of the phenomenon as a max-constraint does not work in these
cases precisely because of the fact that distinctness can be completely clear and the
marker is still needed. The rule seems to be that other (or an equivalent marker) needs
to be used if there is another object with the same description.
The same point can be made about additive marking by particles. In (26), the
different names are sufficient to guarantee that John and Bill are distinct people.
(26) John went to the party. Bill went too.
So it is best to see other-marking and additive-marking as production constraints
along the following lines.
(27) OTHER: mark the re-use of the same description for a different object
(28) ADD: mark the application of the same predicate to a different object
That does not mean that MAX(OTHER) is not involved. The existence of lexi-
cal markers together with MAX(OTHER) would be responsible for the formation of the
grammaticalised markers and the production constraints as partial grammaticalisations
of MAX(OTHER). The pattern would presumably be that the markers appeared suffi-
ciently often in response to MAX(OTHER) that their absence started being a signal that
there is no OTHER. This forces the emergence of these production constraints, since the
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English:
and ¬ (WHETHER, 2ND)
but WHETHER, 2ND
German:
und ¬ (WHETHER, 2ND)
aber WHETHER, 2ND ¬ CORRECTION
sondern CORRECTION
Russian:
i SINGLE
a ¬ SINGLE, ¬ (WHY, WHETHER, 2ND)
no WHY, WHETHER, 2ND
Table 3: Blocking in the conjunction systems of English, German, and Russian
probability of misunderstanding increases with the signalling function of the absence of
the marker.
The same would be applicable in the case of conjunctions: conjunctions gram-
maticalise in response to MAX(OTHER) as additive markers. Specialised additive mark-
ers can grammaticalise because they mark distinctness even better (type, number) and
MAX(OTHER) is then responsible for a pragmatic preference for the specialised marker
in favour of the less specialised marker when they are in competition.
For the choice to leave out any conjunction, one has to assume that there is no
other principles than MAX(OTHER) involved in conjunction (unlike the additive par-
ticles and adjectives discussed above). Not marking is then possible, if the distinct-
ness is sufficiently clear from other cues (which may include additive and contrastive
particles, intonation, choice of lexical items, overtness of the question addressed etc.).
MAX(OTHER) by itself would allow the use of the less specialised conjunction when
more specialised conjunctions can be used, if there are enough cues to infer the distinc-
tions.
The way out is to assume that the non-specialised markers have become signals
that the more specialised markers do not apply. This will happen if in fact MAX(OTHER)
would make the specialised marker dominant over the general marker in the cases where
the specialised marker can apply. There is a legitimate probabilistic inference from not
using the more specialised marker to the assumption that the conditions for its use do
not hold.
This would turn our earlier table 2 into the schemata shown in table 3.
There is some evidence for setting it up in this way in the interpretations that
arise when and is used in situations that seem to require but, or a in situations that seem
to require no, or aber in the situations that seem to require sondern.
An empirical observation about why-whether-conjunctions (expressed by but, no
or aber) is that the second conjunct decides the issue, in the sense that the speaker in-
dicates that the second argument is better than the first (Anscombre and Ducrot, 1977).
This is illustrated in (29). This observation is not a consequence of the theory presented
in this paper and may perhaps be explained by the fact that if one of the two conjuncts is
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old, it should be the first. In that case, the speaker adds a new argument for consideration
in the second conjunct, presumably because she deems it important enough to be con-
sidered. The preference of the speaker for the course of action advocated in the second
conjunct can therefore be inferred and the standard ways of expressing why-whether-
conjunction can become signals of this conclusion. In the schema, this corresponds with
the feature 2ND.
(29) The ring is beautiful, but expensive. (Let’s not buy it)
The ring is expensive, but beautiful. (Let’s buy it)
If one assumes that the conventional markers of why-whether-conjunction indeed
signal the decisiveness of the second argument for the speaker, replacing the marker by
a less specific one would cancel the effect, as in (30) under the assumption that the
question of buying the ring or not is at issue.
(30) The ring is beautiful and expensive. (I don’t know what to do)
This may give the explanation of the mirative uses of and and a.
(31) Max can’t read and he’s a linguist.
Her husband is in hospital and she is seeing other men.
Leto, a idet sneg.
It’s summer and it’s snowing.
In all these cases, but (no) is possible with a why-whether-reading: Why whether
Max can read?: he should because he is a linguist, he does not because (it is known
that) he cannot. The point is to establish the second conjunct and protect it from the
expectation arising from the first conjunct.
It can be argued that this is the proper content of the feature 2ND: it makes the
conjunction marked by no, but or aber a contribution to the issue whether C? given
by the why-whether-question Why whether C? and lets the second conjunct resolve that
issue. In the cases at hand, C is identical to the second conjunct B. The negation of
2ND will then in general stop the conjunction from being a contribution to the issue
whether C and thereby remove the special role of the second conjunct. In the examples
of (31), this means that the issue addressed by the whole conjunction is not whether B?
but something else. (32) provides some possible alternative issues. The examples all
seem to be of the kind that denies a rule: linguists can read, wives behave when their
husband is in hospital, it doesn’t snow in summer. These rules are precisely the ones
evoked in the first conjunct by interpreting the conjunctions, just like their variants with
no, but and aber as giving distinct answers to why whether B? and relate directly to the
wider issues assumed in (32).
(32) Are linguists any good?
Is she a good person?
Is the weather as it used to be?
While we think that this is an attractive option and the alternative of postulating
that a lexically codes for a mirative reading is unappealing, there is reason for doubt. A
variant of an example by Blakemore and Carston (2005, p. 571) is (33).
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(33) A: Loose rugs are pretty harmless.
B: Well, John slipped on a Persian rug and he broke his leg.
Mirative uses of and/a like those in (31) usually can be paraphrased with but/no
with the loss of mirativity, but (33) cannot be paraphrased by (34), which means that
it cannot be addressing a why-whether question. It is not clear though that (33) is an
instance of a mirative use of and.6
(34) (???) John slipped on a Persian rug, but he broke his leg.
How about the other cases? Does and mean ¬(WHETHER, 2ND)? Does aber
mean ¬CORRECTION? Does a mean multiple? The prediction that they do have these
additional effects is confirmed. Assigning a the meaning of DOUBLE is the most fre-
quent line taken by the tradition on a, often next to other readings (Jasinskaja and Zeevat,
ms). Apart from the mirative uses which were analysed above as avoiding the feature
2ND, and is not used for arguing in different directions. For aber, consider example
(35).
(35) Johann is nicht in Paris, sondern/aber bei seiner Frau.
John is not in Paris, but (he is) with his wife.
With sondern, John is with his wife instead of being in Paris. In particular, the
sentence implies that John’s wife is not in Paris. With aber, there is an expectation
that John would be both in Paris and with his wife (because his wife lives in Paris),
but contrary to this expectation, John is with his wife outside Paris. The fact that such
non-correcting interpretations arise is predicted by the assumption that aber signals the
absence of correction.
It is consistent to assume that these three effects of blocking arise by reasoning
about alternatives, as e.g. in scalar implicatures, but if that is so one would expect similar
effects: extra processing costs and the possibility of cancellation. It seems unlikely that
there are such effects, but we are not aware of any empirical studies in this area.
4 Conclusion
This paper tried to show that additivity can be seen as a common “semantics” for the
conjunctions under consideration. For this purpose it is necessary to define additivity as
the property of giving an answer that is distinct on each dimension corresponding to a
wh-element x j of a question ?x1 . . .xnϕ.
While there seems to be no other way to deal with the problem given by the exam-
ple “I love you too” and the conjunctions discussed in this paper, it is a bit of a mystery
why this is the crucial notion and not the simpler one: distinct answer to the same wh-
question. It can be argued that blocking is again at work: for a good representation of
the relations involved, it may be mandatory to construct answers constituted by distinct
6I is quite possible in Russian for this example. This suggests that this is probably not a mirative use,
which would require a in Russian.
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tuples that coincide on one of their elements (e.g. 〈John,Mary〉 and 〈John,Susan〉) to
be additive with respect to the question with one wh-element removed. This makes the
distinctness marking that is the most probable functional advantage of additive marking
unoperative for markers that do not have a fixed arity, such as and, und and a, while at
the same time providing a functional motivation for the markers with a fixed arity (i, no,
aber, but and sondern).
The account of blocking by means of extra meaning being generated by the same
process that generates complementary distribution patterns needs further explanation.
The departure point is the situation that the default marker of additivity competes with
the specialised marker and that pragmatics decides whether the specialised marker is
used: the speaker judges that he will be misunderstood without the special marker. This
in turn turns the generic marker into a stochastic signal that the specialised meaning
is not intended. The stochastic signal pushes up the probability of misunderstandings
arising with the use of the generic marker for the special case. This will increase the
frequency with which the speakers will judge that they will be misunderstood in that
particular case. The end result is a complementary distribution and the generic sign
being a categorial signal that the specialised meaning does not obtain. The argument is
identical to the model of grammaticalisation proposed in Zeevat (2006).
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Abstract
We consider pseudo-imperatives like Come near (and) I’ll show you, which have
a conditional interpretation (‘if you come near, I’ll show you’). We show that they
have basically the same semantics as Sufficiency Modal Constructions studied by
von Fintel and Iatridou (2007). We provide a detailed analysis of ‘sufficiency’ in
Lewis’s counterfactual framework, extending the analysis to pseudo-declaratives.
We discuss the possible origins of the construction and offer a characterisation of
the syntax-semantics interface.
1 Introduction
Pseudo-imperatives (P-imperatives) are structures of the form A-IMP B or A-IMP and
B, where a conditional interpretation is possible, as in (1).
(1) a. Come near (and) I’ll show you
b. If you come near, I’ll show you
It has been proposed that the morphologically imperative constituent does not convey a
separate speech act of command, permission, etc., but combines with the second con-
stituent to form a conditional unit, see Franke (2008) and Russel (2007) for recent ref-
erences. This is specially useful to deal with contrasts noted by van der Auwera (1986)
between A and B and A or B structures.
Unfortunately, it turns out that there are other, unexpected restrictions on the
semantic relation between A and B in P-imperatives. Roughly speaking, A (and) B
sounds strange whenever the causal relation between A and B is perceived as ‘weak’, in
a sense to be clarified in section 4.2. Yet, the relevant examples allow for conditional
paraphrases, a fact which is potentially problematic for the mentioned approaches. One
Arndt Riester & Torgrim Solstad (eds.)
Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 13, University of Stuttgart, 2009
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could assume that P-imperatives are just conditional structures in disguise. One must
then explain why the semantic relation between A and B does not coincide with that
observed between the antecedent and consequent of conditional sentences. Alternatively,
one could describe P-imperatives as ‘special’ conditionals, which, when compared to
the standard ones, obey additional constraints. In that case, the question arises whether
there is a connection of some kind between the imperative morphology and these specific
constraints.
In this paper, we follow the second route and show that P-imperatives are special
conditional structures that most probably inherit their semantic features from an inter-
action between modal subordination and the basic semantics of imperative. In section
2, we present the data we consider in the paper. In section 3, we focus on certain prob-
lematic observations, which are not accounted for by current analyses. In section 4, we
characterise the semantic constraint we propose in Lewis’s counterfactual framework,
motivating the pseudo-imperative construction in section 4.3. Finally, in section 5, we
discuss briefly some aspects of the syntax-semantics interface.
2 Basic observations
In this section, we provide a short description of the relevant structures in English and
in French. In addition to P-imperatives, one finds P-declaratives (2a-b), where A is a
declarative clause, P-optatives in French (2-c) and P-interrogatives (2d-e), where the
↗ marks rising intonation. We will be mostly concerned here with P-imperatives and
P-declaratives.
(2) a. You come near (and) I show you
b. Tu t’approches (et) je te montre
c. Qu’
that
il
he
vienne
come-SUBJ
et
and
je
I
lui
him
montrerai
show-FUT
d. You have any
↗
problem (and) they come
e. Tu as un pro
↗
blème (et) ils viennent
AB structures, where A is imperative and declarative, exist independently, without any
conditional interpretation. They realize two speech acts, a command (advice, invitation)
in A, followed by the expression in B of a consequence of the eventuality that A’s speech
act targets, through modal subordination (Roberts, 1989). For instance, (3) might be
interpreted as “I want you to come near. Then, I’ll show you”. It seems that the future is
preferred, but the present tense is not impossible.
(3) (You) come near. I’ll show you
Several factors interact in facilitating or preventing a conditional interpretation for P-
X (where X may be imperative, declarative, etc.). First, prosodic cues play a role in
discourse attachment. Dargnat and Jayez (2008) show that, if a discourse segment A,
occurring at the end of a sequence of segments Σ, is immediately followed by a segment
B, the absence (or shortness) of pause between A and B and the presence of a contin-
uative contour on A, favours a direct attachment of B to A, rather than to a previous
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segment of Σ.1 The nature of the discourse relation is largely unspecified. For instance,
(4a) features a justification and (4b) a temporal relation. If, other things being equal, a
conditional interpretation is possible, the combination of a short/null pause and a contin-
uative rise favours the integration of A and B into a unique conditional discourse relation
holding between A and B.
(4) a. Hurry up we are late
b. Il est arrivé il était huit heures
‘He came it was eight’
Two remarks are necessary at this point. First, it is important to keep in mind that
prosody does not create the possible discourse relation(s). It only makes the attachment
of B to A most plausible and natural. The preferred attachment itself needs a discourse
relation to gain substance. Therefore, the mentioned prosody-driven approach does not
in itself account for P-X interpretations (where ‘X’ covers at least imperatives and declar-
ative cases and possibly others). It would have this power only if one could show that, for
instance, imperatives and declaratives can convey some hypothetical meaning by them-
selves. This is unlikely for imperatives2 and calls for further discussion in the case of
declaratives. Second, from the fact that A and B can be connected by a discourse rela-
tion, it does not follow that the result forms a unique speech act. This might be the case
for P-imperatives, as proposed by Franke (2008), but it is more debatable for examples
such as (4) or (5) (Dargnat, 2008, ex. 10), where the question about the title remains
separate and the global speech act, if any, does not consist in questioning the conditional
relation.
(5) Tu écris tes mémoires, tu leur donnes quel titre?
‘You write your memoirs, what title do you choose?’
≈ If you write your memoirs, what title do you choose?
However, in all cases, prosodic cues favour an ‘integrated’ interpretation. Either there
is a unique speech act or one of the acts is ‘focal’ or ‘foregrounded’, that is, it consti-
tutes a potential answer to a question under discussion or introduces such a question.
For example, in French, (4b) can be an answer to the question A quelle heure est-il ar-
rivé? (‘When did he come?’) and (5) introduces a question about the title. We group
these two possibilities (speech act merging and foregrounding) under the generic label
of (discourse) integration.
A second type of factor is the semantic relation between A and B. In the most
clear-cut cases, B expresses a consequence of A. Consequences can be divided into cases
of triggering and generation. Intuitively, an eventuality e1 is a trigger of an eventuality
e2 whenever e1 makes the occurrence of e2 more probable (or certain) according to gen-
eral social, physical or logical laws. e1 generates e2 whenever the occurrence of e1
physically coincides with the occurrence of e2. For instance, one can open a door (e2)
by turning the key into the keyhole (e1). Pollack (1986, 1990) distinguishes between
generation and enablement: an action A1 enables A2 if A1 contributes to executing A2
1See (Mithun, 1988, p. 335) for a similar remark on the absence of an intonation break between con-
joined clauses.
2We disagree with Corminbœuf (2008) on this point.
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but, in addition to executing A1, it is necessary to do something else in order to achieve
the result of A2. Note that (1) is a triggering case, not an enablement one. In addition
to the consequence vs. enablement distinction, one must consider the type of the terms
of the discourse relation, or in Sweetser’s (1990) terms the domains that are related. For
instance, in (5), one may discern a relation between the fact of writing one’s memoirs
(content domain) and the speaker’s question (speech act domain), which is prompted or
at least made relevant by the writing. A content-based relation between writing one’s
memoirs and choosing a title for them is also possible. As shown by Sweetser (1990)
and Dancygier (1998), there is a rich array of possibilities in if -conditionals. P-X are
more restricted. For instance Austinian conditionals, a.k.a biscuit-conditionals, are in-
felicitous with P-imperatives and P-optatives (6). The corresponding imperatives and
optatives are not impossible in P-X in general (7). These contrasts can be explained
by assuming that certain P-X require that there be a triggering or generation relation
(causation type) between the content of A and that of B (domain type). Franke (2008)
imposes an analogous constraint on P-imperatives. As shown by (7), P-imperatives and
P-optatives do not require that the A part describe an action.
(6) a. ?? Be hungry (and) there are biscuits in the cupboard
b. ?? Qu’
That
il
he
ait
have-SUBJ
faim
hunger
(et)
(and)
il y a
there are
des biscuits
biscuits
dans
in
le
the
buffet
cupboard
(7) a. Be hungry (and) you’ll realize how hard it is to control your bodily reactions
b. Qu’
That
il
he
ait
has-SUBJ
faim
hunger
(et)
(and)
il verra comme c’est dur de contrôler ses réactions corporelles
‘he’ll see how hard it is to control one’s bodily reactions’
A third family of parameters is the choice of tense and mood. We won’t go
into detail here, but we note that, in line with a similar observation by Culicover and
Jackendoff (1997), and is not compatible with a conditional interpretation when A is in
the conditional. So, and is not sufficient to determine a conditional interpretation.
(8) a. You’d come near, I’d show you (‘If you come near . . . ’)
b. You’d come near and I’d show you (6= ‘If you come near . . . ’)
3 The problem
In this section, we make clear what the relevant data are and why they are problem-
atic. In the literature on P-imperatives, one finds the view that they are not genuine
imperatives but rather elements of a conditional construction (van der Auwera, 1986;
Han, 1998; Takahashi, 2004; Russel, 2007; Franke, 2008). Whatever the details and the
differences between them, these proposals have two benefits. First, they provide a sim-
ple solution to van der Auwera’s asymmetry. van der Auwera (1986) observed that, in
families of example like (9), whereas the first three forms are appropriate in opposite
contexts, like cold/hot weather, the last one is more difficult to interpret in both contexts.
If one assumes that the and sentences are conditional structures in disguise whereas the
disjunctive structures associate two speech acts through modal subordination (‘Do that,
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otherwise . . . ’), the first three sentences are predicted to be pragmatically appropriate.
More importantly, the last one is predictably odd in both contexts since the two speech
act interpretation is implausible and the conditional one is not available. A similar dis-
tribution exists for P-declaratives.
(9) a. Open the window and I’ll kill you [Context: it’s cold]
b. Open the window or I’ll kill you [Context: it’s hot]
c. Open the window and I’ll kiss you [Context: it’s hot]
d. #Open the window or I’ll kiss you
Second, if A is hypothetical, we have an explanation of why it externally behaves as an
NPI-licenser environment (Culicover, 1972).
(10) a. Make any serious attempt to understand string theory and it’ll ruin your scientific
life
b. Fais la moindre tentative sérieuse pour comprendre la théorie des cordes et ça
ruinera ta vie scientifique
In view of it ability to account for two major observations, the conditional approach
seems to be on the right track. However, there are some unexpected contrasts, which
exhibit three features.
1. A conditional resultative interpretation is available. So, there is no question of a
‘hidden’ Austinian interpretation.
2. Only paratactic (= non-coordinated) P-declaratives are natural.
3. The contrast is unstable and seems to depend on the consequent.
Suppose for instance that the addressee has just bought a new computer and is very
nervous about possible breakdowns. The speaker tries to make him relax by pointing
out that he has signed in for a hot-line service. Although the four variants in (11) aim
at conveying the very same conditional meaning (‘If you breakdown, you call the hot-
line’), only the first is really natural.
(11) a. You break down, you call the hot-line
b. #You break down and you call the hot-line
c. #Break down, you call the hot-line
d. #Break down and you call the hot-line
One might hypothesise that the ‘you call the hot-line’ actually carries a directive
speech act, a fact which, for some reason, would hinder the interpretation of the last three
examples. But the contrast persists with P-optatives, which pattern like P-imperatives.
(12) #Qu’
That
il
he
tombe en panne
break down-SUBJ
(et)
(and)
il
he
appelle
calls
la
the
hot-line
hot-line
The contrast is also to be found with non-directive consequents. The directive interpre-
tation may be absent from (13) if the speaker is taken to simply describe what is going
to happen.
(13) a. You have a headache, I give you some aspirin
b. #Have a headache (and) I give you some aspirin
c. #You have a headache and I give you some aspirin
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In the conditional paraphrases of (11) and (13), a result interpretation is available, since
calling the hot-line (getting aspirin) results from breaking down (having a headache): ‘If
you break down, then you call the hot-line’ (description), ‘If you break down, then you
may/must call the hot-line’ (directive), ‘If you have a headache, then I give you some
aspirin’.
The instability of the contrast is evidenced by (14). Suppose a context of car-
pursuit, where a bunch of gangsters is running after the speaker and the driver, who is
the addressee. (14c) extends the paradigm in the direction of (13).
(14) a. You break down (and) we are dead
b. Break down (and) we are dead
c. Have another fit (and) you are going to get an operation
At this point, the problem we face is the following. To what extent can we account for
the observed contrasts without endangering the assimilation of P-imperatives and similar
structures to integrated semantic objects, in which only one speech act is executed?
4 The automaticity condition
4.1 The basic automaticity constraint
The term ‘automaticity’ is reminiscent of Bolinger’s (1977) remark that in A and B P-
imperatives, given A, B is ‘automatically’ true. A consonant suggestion has been made
by von Fintel and Iatridou (2007) for Sufficiency Modal Constructions (SMC) of the
general form ‘If you want to get A you only have to do B’. In essence, von Fintel and
Iatridou propose that a SMC (i) presupposes that in every world where A obtains, the
addressee does something and (ii) asserts that in at least one world where B obtains, the
addresses does not do anything else than A. If we assume that P-imperatives correspond
to SMC, we can account for (11c-d): there is no world reasonably similar to the actual
world in which it is sufficient to break down to call the hot-line, since the call itself is
a mandatory action, which is not triggered/generated by the breakdown independently
of the agent (the addressee). The proposal has to be slightly relaxed, to allow for the
possibility of (14)-type example. In the formulation given in (15), we leave open the
possibility that a does or undergoes e.
(15) Given an agent a and a couple of eventualities e, e′, in which a participates, we say
that e′ is an automatic consequence of e with respect to a, if e causes e′ and e′ is
not an action by a.
In view of examples like (16), we do not need to describe a presupposed component. B
reacts to A’s P-imperative by denying that breaking down would lead automatically to
death. It is usually assumed that direct rejections (‘you are wrong’, ‘It’s false’, ‘You are
lying’, etc.) cannot target the presupposed or implicated part of an assertion.3
3Actually, this is not that simple. In some cases, one can construct natural examples where a discourse
participant attacks a presupposition or a conventional implicature. However, in (16) and analogous exam-
ples, it seems difficult to find a presupposition or conventional implicature trigger and to articulate a main
content fundamentally different from ‘B automatically follows from A’.
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(16) A – Break down (and) we are dead
B – You’re wrong, we have guns, remember?
This shows that the constraint for P-imperatives must put the automaticity condition at
the level of the main content. We treat P-optatives along the same lines since they pattern
with P-imperatives. Only conjunctive P-declaratives must obey the same constraint.
(17) Automaticity condition
A P-imperative or P-optative of the form A (and) B is appropriate only under an
interpretation where the eventuality described by B is an automatic consequence of
the eventuality described by A with respect to the addressee. P-declaratives of the
form A and B are subject to the same constraint.
Examples like (13) raise a problem, since having a headache might be a sufficient con-
dition for getting aspirin if the aspirin is provided by someone else than the relevant
agent (by default, the addressee in P-imperatives). Although they may sound odd out
of the blue, they improve in appropriate contexts. For instance, (13) fits well in a situa-
tion where the addressee is craving for aspirin. Generally speaking, communicating the
fact that B is an automatic consequence of A makes better sense when automaticity is
relevant to the addressee’s goals and concerns, that is, whenever comparing A to other
non-automatic triggers of B or B to other non-automatic consequences of A can help
the addressee to reach her goals or to update/revise her expectations, given her current
concerns. When it is difficult to abduce plausible contexts for using constructions that
convey automaticity, they will be felt as anomalous, even if is not difficult to abduce
contexts that satisfy their basic semantic requirement, i.e. the automaticity condition.
This is just one more illustration of the fact that the Gedanke experiment of interpreting
sentences in isolation combines understanding the meaning of the sentences and moti-
vating their use. As an additional symptom of the difference, note that the following
variant of (11) is perfect in a context where the addressee is seeking a reason for calling
the hot-line.
(18) a. You break down (and) you can call the hot-line
b. Break down (and) you can call the hot-line
4.2 A Lewis-style causal analysis
So, pseudo-imperatives and coordinated P-declaratives demand that there be a causal
relation between the eventualities described by A and by B. It is apparent from the dis-
cussion of causation type in section 2 that sufficient conditions correspond to triggering
or generation, but never to enablement. At this stage, we have to make precise at least
one notion of consequence, in order to provide a framework in which we can express the
sufficiency requirement that characterises the pseudo-X we consider.
We resort to Lewis’s (1973a; 1973b; 2004) analysis of causation. Although some
subtle aspects of causation might not be captured by Lewis’s approach (see the papers
in Collins et al. (2004) for various illustrations), we consider that it covers all the main
cases we need to take into account.
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(19) Lewis’s causal dependency
1. For a given similarity ordering ≺ between worlds, w,≺|= A2→B =df
at every w-closest world where A, B
2. B causally depends on A at w (w,≺|= AV B) =df
w,≺|= (A2→B&¬A2→¬B).
One must keep in mind that the intuition for ‘A being a sufficient condition for B’ in a
counterfactual analysis may convey a tension. On the one hand, to establish the truth of
A2→B at w, only the minimal revisions of w with A are considered. This entails that
all that is necessary to derive B from A is already present in w or is a consequence of
adopting A in w and making as few changes as possible. In this respect, A is ‘sufficient’
to ensure B. On the other hand, events posterior to A in w might play a role; so, in that
respect, A is not really ‘sufficient’ to trigger B. Consider (14): if an unfortunate break-
down occurs, the B event (the murder) cannot take place if the gangsters change their
plan for some reason and decide to abandon the pursuit. For B to take place, an action
by the gangsters is required, which means that the murder is not really ‘automatic’ in a
strictly causal and deterministic sense. However, in the situation at hand, the murderous
intentions of the gangsters are part of the initial conditions. Therefore, in order to obtain
an acceptable definition for ‘B is an automatic consequence of A at w’, we need to make
sure that (i) A causes B, that (ii) no eventuality of w posterior to or simultaneous with A
and which would not be caused only by eventualities preceding A is necessary for ob-
taining B and that (iii) actions of the relevant agent (e.g. the addressee for P-imperatives)
may be suppressed without changing the result B.
We construct our definition for automaticity in two major steps. First, we define
a notion of sufficient condition; then, we define automaticity proper. We abbreviate
(19.2) as AVw,≺ B. Worlds are seen as sets of eventualities. The set of worlds, W ,
contains every consistent subset of eventualities. In particular, if w ∈W , w′ ⊆ w and w′
is consistent, w′ ∈W .
(20) For a set of eventualities E in w,CAUSEw,≺(E) = {e ∈ w : ∃e′ ∈ E(e′Vw,≺ e)}
CAUSEw,≺(E) stands for the set of causes of eventualities in E . We can now ‘slice up’
worlds into temporal regions with respect to A. X <w Y notes that the starting point of Y
is posterior to that of X in w.
(21) 1. w≪A =df w−{e : A≤w e}.
2. wA = w≪A∪{e ∈ w :CAUSEw,≺({e})⊆ w≪A}∪
{e ∈ w : ∀e′((e′ ∈CAUSEw,≺({e})& e′ ≥w A)⇒
∃e′′(e′′ ∈CAUSEw,≺({e})& e′′ <w A))}
w≪A is the set of eventualities that precede A. wA is the set of eventualities that
(i) precede A or (ii) have at least one causal precursor that precedes A. The notion of
sufficient condition (22) corresponds to a causal dependence between a precursor A and
a consequence B where the world ordering is sensitive only to those eventualities that
precede A or have precursors that precede A.
(22) Let WA be {w ∈W : ∃w′ ∈W (w = w′A)}. A is a sufficient condition for B at
(w,≺) whenever wA,≺WA |= A2→B and w,≺|= ¬A2→¬B.
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In prose, A is a sufficient condition for B at w if, (i) when we compare only worlds
where no eventuality not preceding A or causally dependent only on eventualities not
preceding A takes place, at every closest world, if A then B, and (ii) ¬A2→¬B holds
at w in the original model (W,≺). In contrast with A2→B, we do not require that
worlds be modified for ¬A2→¬B. Consider the gangsters’ case. If the fugitives do not
break down and the police has enough time to rescue them, we don’t want to suppress
the rescuing event because it occurs after the breakdown, since doing so might falsify
¬breakdown2→¬killing.
Under the simple deterministic view we have adopted, ‘A is a sufficient condition
of B’ means that the causal link from A to B does not involve any eventuality that would
be independent of every event preceding A. In the gangsters’ case, given the initial setting
(the physical circumstances and intentions of the agents) the killing is unavoidable once
the breakdown has occurred. Thus, the breakdown is a sufficient condition of the killing
since all the eventualities that have a part in the result are triggered or generated by
eventualities that precede the breakdown. With (11), the breakdown is also a sufficient
condition of the call if calling the hot-line is the consequence of a plan existing before
the breakdown. In order to reflect von Fintel and Iatridou’s idea, we need an extra
constraint in the definition of sufficient condition. If a is the relevant agent, the general
idea is to ‘ignore’ the actions of a that do not precede A, even if they play a causal role
in bringing about B and are caused by eventualities that precede A. We define a new
shrinking method, waA, which consists in subtracting from wA the actions by a that
do not precede A. αx ranges over actions by x.
(23) waA = wA−{αa : αa ≥wA A}
Finally, A entails B automatically if (i) B causally depends on A in a model where we
keep only the worlds where eventualities irrelevant to the causal connection between A
and B and actions not preceding A have been suppressed and (ii) ¬B causally depends
on ¬A in the initial model.
(24) Automatic consequence
B is an automatic consequence of A in w w.r.t. an agent a whenever:
waA,≺W aA |= A2→B and w,≺|= ¬A2→¬B.
When applied to (11), (24) predicts that the action of calling the hot-line will be removed
from any relevant world, which conflicts with the possibility of characterising the call
as a consequence of the breakdown. The analysis offered here deliberately ignore the
issue of causal preemption, that is, roughly speaking, the fact that several conflicting
causes may produce the same effect. It does not seem to be crucial for the type of simple
examples we have commented. However it is an open problem whether preemption can
be accommodated in a counterfactual framework like Lewis’s (see Hall and Paul (2003);
Spohn (2006)).
4.3 How come?
As noted in section 2, modal subordination plays a role in the conjunction of an imper-
ative clause and a clause expressing one of its consequences (Jayez, 2002; Jayez and
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Rossari, 1999). Imperatives propose to or impose on the addressee a some course of
action α. If the result of α depends on further actions of a, they should be mentioned
as recommended or compulsory. It would be uncooperative to mention only α and to
count on some other action which does not necessarily follow from the context and is
not a default action by the addressee. So, in general, in a structure A-IMP B, where B
expresses the result of A, this result is an automatic consequence. In such modally sub-
ordinated structures, automaticity is a conversational implicature. It is not infrequent to
see pragmatically preferred interpretations of linguistic structures acquire a conventional
meaning, although there is probably no agreement about what factors are (ir)relevant
(frequency, saliency, etc.), as evidenced by the discussion in Ariel (2008, chap. 5). We
conjecture that automaticity has become the prominent conventional meaning of A-IMP
B structures whenever prosody (short/null pause + continuative rise) favoured an in-
tegrative interpretation, as explained in section 2. In addition to this combination of a
conditional reading (integration) with automaticity (‘frozen pragmatics’4), P-imperatives
exhibit a sort of bleaching on the imperative itself. The A part may use non-controlled
predicates, as in (25).
(25) a. Be a blonde and every man will start fantasising about you
b. #Be a blonde
What is the role of and? Normally, and introduces the last term in an enumeration. So A
and B suggests that B is the last term in a sequence of eventualities. Consider paratactic
(= non-coordinated) P-declaratives AB. The conditional interpretation corresponds to the
view that the eventuality eA expressed by A leads to a point where eB is normally true or
bound to be true. But other eventualities might play a role. The relation between eA and
eB may be paraphrased by ‘given A, normally B’, which means that, in certain cases,
for eB to obtain, eA should be supplemented by other eventualities, which are expected
to happen (‘normal’) in general or in the particular circumstances under consideration.
With coordinated P-declaratives, B is marked as final. Why would a speaker choose to
emphasise that a result is final, rather than just a result? A plausible reason is that eA
leads directly to the result (eB), without it being necessary to mention any intervening
eventuality. So, the speaker is convinced that, given A, the whole process will run to its
term, this belief being itself motivated by the fact eA leads automatically to eB without
any agent intervention (blind causality) or with respect to some agent, whose action
is irrelevant to the result. We conjecture that the latter inferential motivation has been
internalised as a grammatical construction, which would explain the difference between
the paratactic and and-coordinated forms for P-declaratives.
5 Interface problems
In this section, we discuss briefly the representation of P-structures in an extension of
the HPSG framework (Pollard and Sag, 1994), designed to accommodate constructions
in the sense of Goldberg. Strictly compositional structures preserve the contribution of
their constituents in isolation. In P-structures, A (and) B, A has not the meaning it has
4A term we borrow from Levinson (1987), see also Hyman (1984).
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in isolation, e.g. imperatives are not semantically imperative. Moreover, the prosodic
integration of A and B cannot be attributed to A or B separately. The rising contour
itself seems to be ambiguous between continuation and interrogation (Dargnat and Jayez,
2008). This shows that P-structures should be analysed as constructions. It is well-
known that Construction Grammars exploit feature structures of the type used in HPSG,
in particular because they provide facilities for accessing different parts of information
simultaneously (multidimensionality). The default mechanism of HPSG (Lascarides and
Copestake, 1999) can also be imported. The following feature structure summarises the
most important aspects of the representation for French. / notes a default value.
The decl-hd-su-cl type corresponds to declarative headed clauses with a subject
and demands indicative or conditional mood. Imperative clauses demand imperative
mood. The initial string X (et) Y is split into two constituents consA and consB. consA
hosts preferentially a rising contour and is preferentially saturated (/{}). The pause is
preferentially short or null. Two discourse moves A′ and B′ with a common speaker
are associated with A and B. attach type objects describe the attachment of a discourse
move to a subset (list) of discourse moves through a discourse relation (value of DR).
B′ must be attached to A′ through an automatic consequence relation.  notes the re-
placement of a value. The original illocutionary force of A′ is switched to a hypothetical
value. The whole construction inherits its illocutionary force (assertion) from B′. The
net result amounts to asserting the proposition (C) that an automatic consequence rela-
tion holds between a hypothetical discourse move (A′) and an assertive discourse move
(B′) attached to it.
(I) decl-hd-su-cl :
[
HEAD
[
MOOD ind ∨ cond
]]
(II) imp-hd-cl :
[
HEAD
[
MOOD imp
]]
(III) P-imp/decl :
STRING
〈
X . (et) . Y
〉
CONSA

decl-hd-su-cl ∨ imp-hd-cl
MORPH X
SLASH /{}
END-CONTOUR /rising
DISC-MV
dmvSPEAKER 1
ILLOC-FORCE F1
 A′

A
PAUSE /(short ∨ null)
CONSB

decl-hd-su-cl
MORPH (et) Y
SLASH /{}
DISC-MV
dmvSPEAKER 1
ILLOC-FORCE F2
 B′

B
DISC-MV

dmv
SPEAKER 1
ILLOC-FORCE F2
PROP C

CNTXT

DISC-MVS list-of (disc-mv) 2
DISC-RELS list-of (

attach
DR dr
DISCMV1 sub-list-of ( 2 )
DISCMV2 el-of ( 2 )
) ⊕

attach
DR automatic consequence C
DISCMV1 A′( F1 =hyp)
DISCMV2 B′



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This basic feature structure has to be supplemented with constraints that handle
more specific details, such as the presence of et or mood/tense agreement. E.g., P-
declaratives require the presence of et under the automatic consequence interpretation
(1), when A is in the conditional, B also must be in the conditional (2), A may not be in
the plus-que-parfait (≈ pluperfect) (3), etc., see Dargnat (2008) for other examples.
1. CONSA : decl-hd-su-cl⇒ STRING : 〈X . et .Y 〉
2. CONSA : HEAD|MOOD : cond⇒ CONSB : HEAD|MOOD : cond
3. CONSA : TENSE : ¬plus-que-parfait
6 Conclusion
In further work, we will apply the present approach to a larger spectrum of paratac-
tic structures, involving for instance optative and interrogative clauses as well as NPs
(see Culicover’s (1972) OM-sentences). Ideally, the relationship between coordina-
tion and conditional interpretation would have to be studied in a broader typological
and diachronic setting. In particular, the fact that and is semantically distinctive for
P-declaratives should be compared with the idea that, typologically, conjunctive coordi-
nation is less marked than, for instance, disjunctive coordination (Ohori, 2004). While
the contrast between and and or P-declaratives (one vs. two speech acts) goes in the
same direction, the role of and in P-declaratives is, in this respect, in need of further
clarification.
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Abstract
The interpretation of sentences with focus-sensitive elements like ‘only’ depends on
context to restrict the domain of relevant alternatives for evaluating the focused ex-
pression. But what kinds of contextually available information do listeners actually
use to restrict interpretive domains? Three visual world eye-tracking experiments
show that listeners use at least previous mention (Experiment 1), real-world knowl-
edge about specific scenarios (Experiment 2), and conceptual similarity to recently
mentioned items (Experiment 3).
1 Introduction
The semantic contribution of the focus particle ‘only’ in sentences like (1-a)-(2-a) has
two components, under standard assumptions: (i) the proposition expressed by the sen-
tence without ‘only’1—e.g., Matt’s acing the exam in (1-a); and (ii) the claim that no
alternative to the focus value associated with ‘only’ makes the sentence true. The focus
value and its alternatives are understood to be drawn from some appropriately restricted
domain, as suggested in (1-b)-(2-b).
(1) a. Only Matt got a perfect score on the exam.
b. students in some class
1This proposition is often referred to as the prejacent; there has been a lot of debate about its status,
which we do not address here.
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(2) a. I only had a crush on Jared Leto.
b. cast of mid-90s teen TV drama ‘My So-called Life’
A likely context for (1-a), for instance, is a discussion of a specific class in a specific
term. In other cases, like (2), the alternatives that the sentence is interpreted against
seem to vary easily with the particular discourse context the sentence appears in.
Our concern in this paper is how this contextual narrowing of alternatives takes
place. The work of spelling out the role of context generally falls to pragmatics, as
von Fintel (1998) suggests in connection with similar issues of domain restriction for
generalized quantifiers:
The idea is to (temporarily) restrict the domain of evaluation for the whole
sentence or even the whole discourse. The pragmatics will help in choosing
a suitable universe for the evaluation of a particular sentence, but the seman-
tics can just operate abstracting away from any such choice of a universe.
Rooth (1996) similarly characterizes the domain variable posited for interpretation of
focus as pragmatically determined. How exactly the pragmatics accomplishes the task
of suitably restricting the domain remains largely unarticulated. Our approach in the
present study is to investigate experimentally potential sources of relevant contextual
information by considering their effects on processing of sentences with ‘only’.
We examine three factors, starting with preceding mention, cited by Rooth (1996)
as one pragmatic factor affecting interpretation of ‘only’ sentences. With reference to
(3) (Rooth’s 24), he observes that “the domain of quantification is understood as consist-
ing of just three propositions, rather than the full set of propositions of the form ‘John
introduced y to Sue’ ”.
(3) John brought Tom, Bill, and Harry to the party, but he only introduced BillF to
Sue. (Rooth 1996, example 24)
That is, the domain is restricted to the set of propositions featuring the individuals just
mentioned. In Experiment 1, we manipulate the factor of previous mention, as in Rooth’s
example.
Experiment 2 varies, in addition to linguistic mention, ‘how much’ context there
is—that is, how much the nature of the scene described by the context-setting sentences
constrains likely alternatives. To illustrate this, consider a shopper described as being
at a farmers market vs. one who is at a shopping mall. Potential purchases for the
first shopper are most likely confined to produce and other food items, whereas the mall
shopper could be buying just about anything. Relative to the shopping mall, the farmers
market context is more restrictive and hence more informative, in a sense, about the
kinds of things available for purchase.
Finally, Experiment 3 introduces the factor of conceptual similarity with previ-
ously mentioned items. In principle, the pair of sentences (4-a)-(4-b) can be interpreted
with respect to the alternatives in (4-c), but we most easily construe this as meaning
‘strawberries, but not other types of fruit’ (4-d).
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(4) a. Jill likes apples and nectarines.
b. Abby only likes [strawberries].
c. {strawberries, apples, nectarines, grapes, peas, socks, fountain pens,...}
d. {strawberries, apples, nectarines, grapes,..}
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, in Section 1, we re-
view some relevant previous psycholinguistic work on domain restriction. Section 2
introduces the Visual World paradigm in general, and describes specifically how eye
movements can be used to probe comprehenders’ expectations about focus alternatives.
Sections 3-5 present three eye-tracking experiments examining effects on focus alter-
natives of previous mention, informativity of the context, and conceptual similarity, re-
spectively. Section 6 concludes with directions for future research.
2 Using eye-tracking to investigate domain restriction
Our methodology involves monitoring of participants’ eye movements in a ‘visual world’
paradigm. In a typical visual world eye-tracking study, participants move or click on ob-
jects in a visual display as they are listening to a sentence that indicates what item in
the display is the target. Eye-movements have been shown to be closely time-locked
to salient linguistic events in auditorily presented stimuli (Tanenhaus et al., 1995), and
therefore provide a means to track listeners’ expectations about upcoming linguistic in-
put given the visual context and what they have heard so far. By manipulating the avail-
ability of different information types available in the visual or linguistic context, one can
ask to what extent each of these potential information sources helps the listener restrict
the referential domain to the point that the single intended referent can be picked out.
Previous experimental work has shown that language comprehenders rapidly in-
tegrate multiple sources of information for the purpose of referential disambiguation.
Tanenhaus et al. (1995) showed that reference resolution can be guided by what we
know about the meanings of definite descriptions, in conjunction with properties of the
visual context. Participants’ eye movements were tracked as they followed instructions
to manipulate items in a display. For example, they would hear ‘Put the apple on the
napkin in the box’, while viewing a display containing one apple on a napkin, an empty
napkin, an unrelated item, and a box. They found that whether the PP ‘on the napkin’
was interpreted as a modifier or as a goal depended on properties of the visual display.
When the display contained only one referent that matched the description ‘apple’, at the
point when participants had heard ‘the apple’, they had all the information they needed
to pick out the intended unique referent in the scene. As a result, ‘on the napkin’ was
not construed as a modifier but as a goal: participants looked at the empty napkin and
sometimes even started to put the apple on the empty napkin. However in a display con-
taining two apples, after hearing ‘Put the apple’, listeners interpreted ‘on the napkin’ as
a restrictive modifier picking out one of the two apples, not a goal.
These findings demonstrate that reference resolution is an incremental process
that is sensitive to the visual context—in fact small changes to the visual context can
bias comprehenders in favor of one parse over another. Moment to moment biases are
reflected in participants’ anticipatory eye movements as they are interpreting a sentence
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Figure 1: Example display. target = candy; cohort = candles; unrelated = anchors,
sneakers.
in a particular visual context. Subsequent studies have established language comprehen-
ders’ sensitivity to a variety of information sources during online processing: selectional
properties of lexical items (Altmann & Kamide, 1999), the presence of contrast (Se-
divy et al., 1999), information about the preceding linguistic discourse (Chambers et al.,
2002), and knowledge about possible eventualities in the world (Chambers et al., 2004).
The current study take the same methodological approach to investigating what
factors determine what is included in the set of focus alternatives that a sentence like (5)
is interpreted with respect to.
(5) Jane only has some candy.
Under our standard assumptions, (5) conveys that Jane has some candy and that she has
nothing other than candy. What is included in this ‘nothing else’? Since the eventual
target word (‘candy’) must be included among the focus values, having an expectation
about what that word will be amounts to having stronger or weaker expectations about
what will be a possible alternative.
For each trial, we record continuously what item the participant is fixating in a
display like Fig. 1, as they are hearing the target sentence. After averaging this infor-
mation over many trials (for a number of subjects), we can look at the proportion of
fixations to a particular display item (for example, fixations to the target item) over time.
Once we have the proportion of fixations to the target, the cohort competitor,2 and the
distractors, we can look at a particular time interval and ask whether there is a difference
between the proportion of looks to each display item.
3 Experiment 1: Focus alternatives are constrained by
previous mention
Even out of the blue, one might expect (5) to be interpreted with respect to just the
relevant alternatives (6-a).
(6) a. {candy, cupcakes, apples, sandwiches, gum, dry erase markers, refrigera-
tors, pickup trucks ...}
2The cohort competitor shares initial phonology with the target word; see Section 3.1.
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b. {candy, cupcakes, apples, sandwiches, gum, ...}
(7) Mark has some candy and some apples.
But in the context of a sentence like (7), the mentioned subset of the focus alternatives
seem much more salient (6-b): the mentioned alternatives are somehow ‘preferred’. Is
the set of alternatives considered in interpreting a sentence like (5) constrained by the set
of things just mentioned in the discourse?
3.1 Design, Procedure
The same basic paradigm is used (with variations) in all four experiments. The pre-
recorded stimuli each consist of one or more context sentences, the last one of which
includes references to particular types of objects such as boots or candy. The target
sentence follows, as exemplified in (8).
(8) a. [Context] Mark has some candy and some apples.
b. [Target] Jane (only) has some . . .
(i) candy
(ii) candles
What Jane is described as having varies by experimental condition, e.g., the mentioned
candy above vs. unmentioned pencils. The presence vs. absence of only is systematically
varied as well. The task required of subjects is simply to click on the item(s) identified
in the target sentence.
We manipulated (i) whether the target word was mentioned in the context sen-
tence (Mention), and (ii) whether ‘only’ appears in the target sentence. Examples of
the four resulting conditions are in Table 1; target sentences are to be interpreted with
respect to the four-item display in Fig. 1.
On each trial, participants heard a pair of sentences like (7) (context sentence)
and (5) (target sentence). At the onset of the target sentence, four pictures appeared
(Fig. 1), one in each quadrant of the computer screen. Participants were instructed to
click on the items in the target sentence (i.e. the things Jane had). 28 University of
Rochester students who were native speakers of American English participated in the
experiment.
Context No Mention Mention
Mark has... ...some gloves and some pencils. ...some candy and some pencils.
Target No Only Only
Jane... ...has some candy. ...only has some candy.
Table 1: Experiment 1 design and example stimuli.
In experimental trials, two of the four pictures were members of the same phono-
logical cohort (‘candy’-‘candles’). In the absence of biasing factors, participants will
begin to shift fixation to words that match the acoustic input about 200 ms after the onset
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of the word (Allopenna et al., 1998). Therefore we expect participants to look equiprob-
ably at the target item and the cohort competitor at the point in the target sentence when
they’ve heard just the beginning of the direct object (‘can...’). As the unfolding audi-
tory input disambiguates the target referent (‘...ndy’)—the point of disambiguation—the
proportion of fixations to the target item should rise as fixations to the competitor drop
off. This means that if looks to the target item increase earlier than the point of dis-
ambiguation, there is a bias toward the target item due to some other property of the
stimulus.
If recent mention of a particular type of object makes that kind of object more
salient, as seems plausible, then we expect earlier identification of the target candy just
in the Mention conditions. Since the target item in critical trials is always either an item
mentioned in the Context sentence, or a phonological competitor of a mentioned item,
using previous mention as a cue would effectively allow participants to identify the target
early, despite the fact that the initial syllables of the target and competitor are identical.
Whether the presence of ‘only’ by itself can be expected to facilitate identifica-
tion of the target is not clear. A more interesting question is whether ‘only’ interacts
with the mention factor. If the presence of ‘only’ strengthens the mention effect, we will
see fastest identification of the target in Mention Only conditions—faster than can be
expected on the basis of Mention NoOnly and NoMention Only conditions.
3.2 Results
In order to examine the time course of fixations, we calculated the proportion of fixations
to the target at every 33 ms time slice, aggregating trials for each condition first within
a participant and then across participants. Fig. 2.a shows proportion of fixation curves
plotted as a function of time. The average time to convergence on the target referent
(where target looks reliably exceed looks to the competitor) for each condition is shown
in Fig. 2.b. For example, the ‘Mention-Only’ curve in Fig. 2.a corresponds to the average
proportion of looks to the quadrant containing the target referent, candy, in Fig. 1, as
listeners hear the sentence ‘Jane only has some candy’. In this condition, the target word
will have been mentioned in the preceding context sentence. The corresponding bar in
Fig. 2.b (rightmost) represents the average time for fixations to converge on candy—that
is, diverge from fixations to the competitor, candles.
There were main effects of Mention (F1(1,24) = 46.8, p < .0001) and Only
(F1(1,24) = 6.2, p < .05), as well as a Mention-Only interaction (F1(1,24) = 14.8,
p< .0005). On No Mention trials, listeners were able to disambiguate the target referent
from the phonological competitor only after hearing the entire word, on average 560 ms
after the onset of the target word (left-hand bars in Fig. 2.b). Thus in the absence of
Mention, listeners had no preference for candy over candles. There was no advantage
for the Only condition over the No Only condition (t = 1.4, p= .15).
The Mention-No Only trials (right-hand bars, Fig. 2.b) showed an effect of Men-
tion independent of any effect of Only: fixations converged on the target referent 404
ms after target word onset. Thus when a previously mentioned item appeared as part of
the visual context, listeners had a preference for the mentioned item. When ‘only’ was
present, fixations converged on the target referent 139 ms after target word onset, well
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b.
Figure 2: Experiment 1: a. Proportion target fixations over time, b. Mean point of
disambiguation (error bars are Standard Error).
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before the input disambiguated the target and the cohort competitor. In the 200-400 ms
post-target onset interval, fixations to the target in Mention-Only trials exceeded those
in Mention-No Only trials (t = 10.4, p < .001), while No Mention trials did not differ
as a function of Only (t = .9, p = .35). Thus, after hearing only the initial part of the
target word, listeners strongly expected the possible referents to be constrained by the set
of just mentioned items. When this expectation is violated, as in the No Mention-Only
condition, the point of disambiguation is late (in fact, later in absolute terms than in the
No Mention-No Only condition).
These results suggest that upon hearing ‘only’, listeners have a strong expectation
that the upcoming focus will be a recently mentioned item. We might think of ‘only’
as functioning as a cue that increases listeners’ sensitivity to aspects of the preceding
discourse context.
4 Experiment 2: Informativity contributes to restricting
alternatives
Presumably the manipulation of Mention in Experiment 1 has the effect of making some
set of things salient in the context. We might then expect to observe the same restrictive
effect just by enriching the information in the context (i.e. making the context more ‘re-
strictive’). Experiment 2 tests this hypothesis, asking whether having richer information
in the context contributes to restricting focus alternatives in sentences like (9). Compare
(10-a) and (10-b).
(9) Peter only wants to buy [some magazines].
(10) a. Jill and Peter are at the drugstore.
b. Jill and Peter are at the newsstand.
Intuitively, (10-b) provides more information, since our knowledge about the world tells
us that the range of items that can be purchased is relatively narrow compared to a
drugstore, where a wider set of items can be purchased. In addition to repeating the
experimental conditions from Experiment 1 (Mention x Only), Experiment 2 varied the
informativity of the discourse context.
4.1 Design, Procedure
Experiment 2 crossed three factors: Context Informativity (Informative, Underinforma-
tive), Mention, and Only; the resulting eight conditions are given in Table 2. The corre-
sponding visual display is in Fig. 3.
The procedure was as in Experiment 1, except that two context sentences (Con-
text 1 and 2 in Table 2) preceded the target sentences. As participants heard the target
sentence, they were shown a visual display like Fig. 3, with a target item (magazines), a
cohort competitor (magnets), and two unrelated distractor items (scissors, lamps). No-
tice these are all items consistent with the Underinformative Context (here, ‘drugstore’),
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Context 1 Underinformative Informative
Jill and Peter are... ...at the drugstore. ...at the newsstand.
Context 2 No Mention Mention
Jill is getting... ...some comic books and some
cigarettes.
...some magazines and some
cigarettes.
Target No Only Only
Peter is... ...getting some magazines. ...only getting some magazines.
Table 2: Experiment 2 design and example stimuli.
Figure 3: Experiment 2 example display.
while only the target item is compatible with the Informative Context (‘newsstand’). 24
native English speakers participated in the experiment.
If more informative contexts function in the same way as mention, they could
restrict the domain of interpretation specifically when ‘only’ is present. We might then
expect faster convergence on the target item only in Only conditions (on top of the Only-
Mention effect from Experiment 1). On the other hand, we might find that enriching the
context has a restrictive effect on subsequent interpretation, but in a general way that isnt
specific to the presence of ‘only’. In that case, we would expect across-the-board faster
convergence on the target item in Informative conditions, irrespective of the presence of
‘only’.
4.2 Results
Fig. 4 shows the average time to convergence on the target referent (Underinformative
conditions on the left, Informative conditions on the right).
4.2.1 Underinformative contexts
There were main effects of Informativity (F(1,20)= 34.0, p< .0001), Mention (F(1,20)=
11.5, p< .001), and Only (F(1,20) = 9.8, p< .005), and no interactions.
Underinformative contexts patterned much like Experiment 1. This is expected:
the most underinformative thing to say is nothing at all, and in this case the four Un-
derinformative conditions reduce to the conditions in Experiment 1. The target referent
was disambiguated latest in the No Mention-No Only and Mention-No Only conditions,
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Figure 4: Experiment 2. Mean point of disambiguation.
earlier in the No Mention-Only condition, and earliest in the Mention-Only condition
(Fig. 4, left-hand bars). As in Experiment 1, ‘only’ seems to increase sensitivity to in-
formation in the preceding linguistic context, creating a bias in favor of discourse-old
items.
4.2.2 Informative contexts
First, there was a general restrictive effect of context informativity: Informative context
conditions had on average a 335 ms earlier convergence on the target referent relative to
the corresponding Underinformative context conditions.
In addition, the benefit due to informativity was strengthened in the presence of
‘only’: there was a 399 ms advantage due to Informative context in Only conditions,
compared to a 271 ms advantage for No Only conditions. In Mention-Only trials, target
fixations start rising well before the onset of the target word, soon after the onset of
‘only’. The largest advantage occured in the Mention-Only condition, where listeners
were able to disambiguate the target referent after hearing ‘only’, but well before the
onset of the target word.
5 Experiment 3: Generating expectations about likely
alternatives
In Experiment 3, we asked whether conceptually similar alternatives are preferred over
conceptually unrelated ones: after hearing ‘Jane likes apples and nectarines’, a continu-
ation like ‘Mark only likes oranges’ seems more expected than one like ‘Mark only likes
pickup trucks’. If this contrast is real, we might be able to use it to ask a question about
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Figure 5: Experiment 3 example display.
the nature of the expectations comprehenders have about the members of the alternative
set.
What might listeners be doing to produce the results of Experiments 1-2? At
least two explanations seem possible. First, maybe given the items in the visual display,
listeners are ruling out certain referents as unlikely (based on the previous discourse
context, etc.). This could explain the pattern of results we observe in both experiments.
But another possibility is that listeners use the information from the discourse context
to start generating hypotheses about what items are likely to be in the alternative set. If
listeners are actively generating candidate alternatives, they might do this on the basis
of something like conceptual similarity; this would predict earlier target disambiguation
for same-category over different-category items, even without previous mention.
5.1 Design, Procedure
The structure of Experiment 3 is virtually identical to Experiment 1. Participants heard
sequences consisting of a context sentence and a target sentence (Table 3; the corre-
sponding visual display is shown in Fig. 5.
Context Mention Novel-Same category Novel-Different cat.
Mark has... ...some apples and
some oranges.
...some pears and some
oranges.
...some boots and some
sandals.
Target Jane only has some apples.
Table 3: Experiment 3 design and example stimuli.
At the onset of the target sentence, a display containing a target item (apples), a
cohort competitor (anchors), and two unrelated distractors (candycanes, speakers) ap-
peared. Based on Experiments 1-2, we expect a Mention preference. The question
of interest is whether there is an advantage for Same-category over Different-category
Novel items. 16 native English speakers participated in the experiment.
5.2 Results
Average points of disambiguation are in Fig. 6. Fixations converged on the target refer-
ent earlier in the Mention condition than in the Novel conditions (t = 3.7, p < .0001),
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Figure 6: Experiment 3: Mean point of disambiguation.
consistent with the results of Experiments 1-2.
Interestingly, within Novel conditions, the target was disambiguated earlier when
the target word was in the same category as recently mentioned items (‘some pears and
some oranges ... some apples’) than when it was in a different category (‘some boots and
some sandals ... some apples’) (t = 2.4, p < .05). This advantage cannot be due to ex-
plicit mention, since Same and Different category conditions both contained novel target
words. Instead, it suggests that previous mention of ‘pears’ and ‘oranges’ activates not
only the meanings of those particular words and their corresponding conceptual repre-
sentations, but also the conceptual category they are members of; this in turn makes other
category members (like ‘apples’) more salient as possible members of the alternative set.
6 General discussion
In the current study, we address the question of how alternative sets are established for
the purpose of interpreting sentences containing focus operators, looking specifically at
sentences with adverbial ‘only’. We use comprehenders’ eye movements in a visual
scene as a measure of their changing expectations about possible referents; in critical
cases, the presence of ‘only’ earlier in the sentence served as a cue to attend to aspects
of the linguistic context.
In three eye-tracking experiments, we show that recent mention (Experiment 1),
the informativity of the linguistic context (Experiment 2), and conceptual similarity (Ex-
periment 3) are among the factors that contribute to the restriction of focus alternatives
in the context of ‘only’. These factors speed recognition of targets for sentences without
‘only’ as well, suggesting they have a general role in comprehension. Their enhanced
effect in the presence of ‘only’ is striking, raising the possibility that ‘only’ has a general
function of directing attention to contextual cues about the relevant domain for inter-
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pretation. The results of Experiment 3 further suggest that listeners’ expectations about
likely alternatives underly the contrasts observed in Experiments 1-2: given the linguis-
tic context, comprehenders immediately begin generating hypotheses about likely focus
alternatives.
These findings for ‘only’ raise interesting questions about the behavior of other
focus operators. Future work comparing ‘only’ with other alternative-sensitive opera-
tors like ‘also’ will help pull apart the specific contributions of these lexical items from
general aspects of focus interpretation. In particular, our conclusions about ‘only’ lead
us to specific predictions about how the behavior of ‘also’ will diverge from ‘only’, al-
lowing us to substantiate the hypothesis that comprehenders actively generate candidate
alternatives. Even more generally, we have been treating focus alternatives as analogous
to quantifier domains, but whether the same factors influence domain restriction is an
empirical question. We anticipate addressing this question by comparing ‘only’ with
quantifiers like ‘every’ or quantificational adverbs like ‘always’, which share with ‘only’
the general problem of domain restriction, but also differ along other dimensions (for
instance, the presuppositions carried by an ‘only’ sentence versus an ‘every’ sentence)
that may influence the types of information comprehenders take into consideration.
A very general problem to be addressed from the point of understanding language
comprehension has to do with cue combination; that is, how do prosody, discourse par-
allelism, discourse old-new status, and other potentially relevant factors combine with
each other? Once we can adequately characterize how different kinds of information
interact in various instances of contextual domain restriction, we will be in a position
to ask how the linguistic properties of particular lexical items predict what contextual
information they will draw on, given general facts about how different information types
are integrated during interpretation.
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Abstract 
We consider the distribution of norm-related readings with dimensional adjectives 
across various degree construction in Russian and English and argue that the ob-
served pattern as well as some well-known asymmetries in the use of antonyms in 
English follow from the assumption that gradable adjectives are ambiguous 
between the scalar and the vague predicate meaning. 
 
1 Introduction 
Bierwisch (1989) introduced the term norm-relatedness to refer to the comparison with 
a contextually determined standard of the relevant gradable property. This kind of 
comparison is inherent in positive sentences like (1a) where Jimmy‟s height is said to 
lie above the given standard of tallness. It is not obligatory in comparatives like (1b) 
that normally express direct comparison between two points referred to in the sen-
tence. 
 
(1) a. Jimmy is tall. 
 b. Tony is taller than Jimmy. 
 
Kennedy (2001) observes that the norm-related comparison in contrast to the direct 
comparison is a freely available interpretative option and surfaces as the comparison of 
deviation reading. Bierwisch also concludes that comparison with the norm can be part 
of the meaning of any degree construction and under certain circumstances it must be. 
In the latter account, norm-relatedness is treated as a re-interpretation strategy applied 
in the environments in which the direct comparison reading is impossible, e.g. a cross-
polar anomaly example in (2) can only receive a norm-related interpretation. 
 
(2) ??Tony is taller than Gemma is short. 
 „Tony is further above the standard of tallness than Gemma is below the  stan-
dard of shortness.‟ 
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Recently, Rett (2008) investigated the link between norm-relatedness
1
 and the polarity 
of the gradable predicate. In the equative, negative polar adjectives (A–) obligatorily 
trigger the norm-related reading, see (3a), whereas positive polar ones (A+) do not, see 
(3b). However, from a broader cross-linguistic perspective, the two phenomena are not 
always related. In Russian, the equative as well as some other degree constructions are 
norm-related regardless of the polarity of the adjective, compare (3b) and (4). 
 
(3) a. Gemma is as short as Judy. 
 b. Tony is as tall as Pat. 
 
(4) Катя такая же высокая, как и Лариса. 
 Katja that emph. tall as also Larissa 
 „Katja and Larissa are equally tall.‟ 
 
It is this distribution of norm-relatedness in English and Russian that we will consider 
in this study. Our findings will reveal some crucial properties of degree constructions 
in these languages that may shed light on the long-standing puzzles related to the se-
mantics of antonyms and measurement. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 compares the norm-relatedness patterns in 
English and Russian and elaborates on the norm-related reading in English to highlight 
the link between the polarity and norm-relatedness; section 3 compares different ap-
proaches to norm-relatedness and sets the stage for the new proposal that is presented 
in section 4; in section 5 we discuss the consequences and conclude. 
 
2 Data 
2.1 Two Patterns of Norm-Relatedness 
According to Rett (2008), who adopts a degree-based approach to the semantics of 
gradation, the cancellability of norm-related inferences in English, except in the posi-
tive construction (1a), depends on the polarity of the adjective and the properties of the 
involved degree operator. She observes that along with the equative, that we consid-
ered above, „how‟ questions are norm-related too if they feature an A–. For example, 
the answer to (5a) must make reference to the narrowness norm for desks in the given 
context, while (5b) is normally a neutral request for the width of the desk. 
 
(5) a. How narrow is the desk? 
 b. How wide is the desk? 
 
Comparatives, including the „too‟ and „enough‟ constructions, do not usually display 
such a switch in the meaning if the polarity of the predicate is reversed. However, as 
                                                 
1
 Rett uses the term evaluativity that is also employed to refer to the properties of non-dimensional 
adjectives, such as „happy‟. We stick to Bierwish‟s norm-relatedness to avoid confusion. 
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observed by Bierwisch (1989) for German in certain subdeletion comparatives only the 
norm-related reading is available. If the embedded clause of a subdeletion comparative 
contains an A–, the direct comparison is impossible, regardless of what is in the main 
clause, see (6a–b). The A– in the subdeletion equatives, be it in the main or in the em-
bedded clause, forces a norm-related interpretation, see (6c–d). The complete pattern is 
summarised in the table in (6) where the shaded cells represent the unavailability of the 
direct comparison. According to Bierwisch, if the insertion of a differential measure 
phrase or a ratio modifier makes a sentence unacceptable, the direct comparison read-
ing is not available and the sentence gets a norm-related interpretation, as illustrated in 
(6). Note that Bierwisch‟s measure phrase test is effective for degree questions as well. 
If (5a) were not norm-related, (7) would be an acceptable answer to it. 
 
(6) a. ??The door is (*2 cm) higher than it is narrow. A+ er than A+ as A+ as A+ 
 b. ?The door is (*2 cm) lower than it is narrow. A+ er  than A– as A+ as A– 
 c. ?The door is (*twice) as high as it is narrow. A– er than A+ as A– as A+ 
 d. The door is (*twice) as low as it is narrow. A– er than A– as A– as A– 
 e. ?The door is (*twice) as low as it is wide.   
 
(7) *The desk is 70 cm narrow. 
 
In Russian, we observe a contrast between the synthetic and the analytical form of the 
comparative (also reported in Pancheva (2006) among others). The analytical compara-
tive is judged unacceptable in contexts containing the negation of the positive form of 
the relevant adjective or its antonym, compare (8a) and (8b). Thus, Russian has a dif-
ferent distribution of norm-relatedness: the comparative morpheme on a gradable ad-
jective makes the norm-related inference cancellable. The equatives, too/enough com-
paratives and superlatives support the observation that the norm related interpretation 
in Russian is triggered by the lack of degree morphology on an adjective, see (9)–(12). 
 
(8) a. Катя не выcокая, но она выше, чем Сергей.  
  Katja neg tall but she tall-er than Sergej  
 b. Катя не высокая, *но она более высокая, чем Сергей. 
  Katja neg tall but she more tall than Sergej 
 „Katja is not tall, but she is taller than Sergej.‟ 
 
(9) a. * Катя низкая, она такая/настолько же высокая, 
   Katja short she that/by that much emph. tall 
   как/насколько и Лариса.   
   as/by how much also Larissa   
  lit.: „Katja is short, she is as tall as Larissa.‟ 
 b. * Катя высокая, она такая/настолько же низкая, 
   Katja tall she that/by that much emph. short 
   как/насколько и Лариса.   
   as/by how much also Larissa   
  lit.: „Katja is tall, she is as short as Larissa.‟ 
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(10) a. ?? Катя низкая, но достаточно высокая, 
   Katja short but enough tall 
   чтоб дотянуться до полки.  
   to reach to shelf  
  lit.:„Katja is short but she is tall enough to reach the shelf.‟ 
 b. ?? Катя высокая, но достаточно низкая, 
   Katja tall but enough short 
   чтоб носить это платье.  
   to wear this dress  
  lit.: „Katja is tall but she is short enough to wear this dress.‟ 
 
(11) a. ?? Катя низкая, но слишком высокая, 
   Katja short but too tall 
   чтоб уместиться на диване.  
   to fit on sofa  
  lit.: „Katja is short but she is too tall to fit on the sofa.‟ 
 b. ?? Катя высокая, но слишком низкая, 
   Katja tall but too short 
   чтоб носить это платье.  
   to wear this dress  
  lit.: „Katja is tall but she is too short to wear this dress.‟ 
 
(12) a. ?? Все три брата низкие.  
   all three brothers short  
   Коля самый высокий из них. 
   Kolja most tall from them 
  lit.: „The three brothers are short. Kolja is the tallest among them.‟ 
 b. ?? Все три брата высокие.  
   all three brothers tall  
   Коля самый низкий из них. 
   Kola most short from them 
  lit.: „The three brothers are tall. Kolja is the shortest among them.‟ 
 
(13) a. Насколько стол широкий? 
  by how much desk wide 
 b. Насколько стол узкий? 
  by how much desk narrow 
 lit.: „How wide/narrow is the desk?‟ 
 
The degree questions in (13) require a norm-related proposition as an answer, similarly 
to (5a). Neither (13b) nor (13a) can be used as a request for the width of the desk, they 
rather inquire about the comparison class or the relation to the contextual norm. Thus, 
an appropriate answer to (13a) would be „It is fairly wide‟ or „It is wide for the desks 
in our department.‟ 
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Considering what we saw above, subdeletion examples that contain a morphologically 
unmarked form of the adjective in the embedded clause are expected to express com-
parison of deviation only. Indeed, the subdeletion equative in (14) does not compare 
the width and the length of the bed directly. It can be true if the bed is longer than it is 
wide, but, say, looks out of place due to its extreme wideness rather than its length. 
 
(14) Этa кровать не настолько длинная, 
 this bed neg by that much long 
 насколько широкая.    
 by how much wide    
 „This bed is not as long as it is wide.‟ 
 
In compliance with Bierwisch‟s test, measure phrases can occur only in the synthetic 
comparative in Russian since it does not require the norm-related interpretation in con-
trast to the analytical comparative, compare (15a) and (15b). Bierwisch‟s test also cor-
rectly rules out the cases of the measure phrase modification of non-comparative ad-
jectives in Russian, see (16). 
 
(15) a.  Кровать на 4 см/ в 2 раза шире, чем диван.  
   bed by 4 cm twice wide-ER than sofa  
 b. * Кровать на 4 см/ в 2 раза более широкая, чем диван. 
   bed by 4 cm twice more wide than sofa 
 „The bed is 4 cm wider than the sofa./The bed is twice as wide as the sofa.‟ 
 
(16) Кровать 80 см *широкая/ *узкая/ шириной. 
 bed 80 cm wide narrow width-instr 
 „The bed is 80 cm wide.‟ 
 
To conclude, two factors are responsible for whether a degree construction has a direct 
comparison interpretation or must be re-interpreted and make reference to the relevant 
contextual norm. First, in English, this is partly determined by the polarity of the 
predicate. In comparatives the overt instances of A– in the embedded clause trigger re-
interpretation. In the equatives the direct comparison is incompatible with the overt A– 
in general. A– in the „how‟ questions also lead to norm-related readings. The second 
factor is at work in Russian where the norm-related interpretation is triggered by the 
lack of degree morphology on an adjective. 
 
2.2 Norm-Relatedness and Antonymy 
The constructions that we discussed in the previous section in connection with the 
norm-relatedness in English are often argued to show that A– are marked with respect 
to their A+ counterparts. Measure phrase constructions, „how‟ questions, equatives 
with ratio modifiers and embedded clauses of subdeletion comparatives are the envi-
ronments in which A+ and A– show a different behaviour. In these cases negative po-
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lar adjectives result in deviancy, see (17a) and (17c), unless the sentences can receive a 
norm-related interpretation as in (17b) and (17d). 
 
(17) a. The desk is 70 cm wide/*narrow. 
 b. How wide/narrow is the desk? 
 c. The desk is twice as wide/*narrow as the doorway. 
 d. The doorway is higher/lower than the desk is wide/??narrow. 
 
Rullmann (1995) notes that this asymmetry is hard to explain in a degree-based theory 
if one makes the common sense assumption that the degrees of an A– are identical to 
the degrees of its antonymous A+. Since degrees are standardly defined as equivalence 
classes of individuals, see Cresswell (1976), the equivalence of antonymous degrees 
means that they refer to the same equivalence classes. This assumption is crucial for 
deriving the equivalence in (18), which Rullmann speaks of as the minimal adequacy 
requirement for any theory of antonymy. 
 
(18) Katja is taller than Larissa. ⇔ Larissa is shorter than Katja. 
 
The task of deriving (18) while accounting for the markedness of A– demonstrated in 
(17) drove Kennedy (1997) to introduce a sortal distinction between the two types of 
degrees. He suggests that antonymous degrees (extents) refer to different segments of 
the same scale. An A+ maps an entity to an initial interval on the relevant scale called 
the positive extent. The corresponding A– returns the final interval whose lower bound 
is shared by the positive extent. By adopting this distinction one can indeed come up 
with satisfactory explanations for the restricted distribution of A–, see Kennedy 
(2001), von Stechow (1984a). However, this kind of approach faces difficulties with 
the cases where one cannot appeal to the asymmetry of the poles on the one hand, see 
(19), and where this asymmetry does not lead to unacceptability on the other, see (20). 
 
(19) a. The desk is (*4 cm) lower than it is narrow. 
 b. The desk is as narrow as the doorway. 
 c. How narrow is the desk? 
 
(20) The doorway is lower than the desk is wide. 
 
By denying any link between polarity and norm-relatedness, extent-based theories fail 
to predict that (19a)–(19c) are impossible on the direct comparison interpretation and 
that the differential measure phrases are bad in subdeletion comparatives like (19a). 
Those analyses therefore have to resort to ad hoc stipulations to account for the norm-
related inference, see Kennedy (2001, pp. 44–51). No less stipulatory are the existing 
explanations of the cross-polar nomaly in (20), see Büring (2007), Heim (2008). 
We suggest a switch in the perspective in the hope of getting around some loose ends: 
we claim that the restricted distribution of A– is due to the norm-related inference. 
Before discussing this claim in more detail, let us consider the different approaches to 
analysing norm-relatedness. 
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3 Sources of Norm-Relatedness 
Depending on the ontological assumptions, we can distinguish two approaches to ana-
lysing norm-relatedness. To derive the meaning of (1a), scalar theories usually need to 
assume a silent operator that performs the comparison to the contextual standard in the 
form of a free variable over degrees, von Stechow (1984b). In the “vague predicate” 
theories norm-relatedness stems from the meaning of gradable adjectives, Klein 
(1980). In this section, we will consider the two strategies and see that both have diffi-
culties accounting for the data that we discussed above. Section 4 will be a synthesis of 
the two points of view. 
 
3.1 Vague Predicates 
According to Klein (1980) and other “vague predicate” analyses of comparative con-
structions, gradable adjectives denote partial functions from individuals to truth values. 
Applied to a context, they partition their domain into the positive extension, the nega-
tive extension and the extension gap. Thus, in a simple case, like (1a), the relation of 
Jimmy‟s height to the standard of tallness in a given context is determined by „tall‟ that 
specifies who counts as tall in the context. 
 
(21) ⟦ tall⟧  = λc λx 1 if x  postall (c), 0 if x negtall (c) and undefined otherwise, 
where  postall (c) = {u: u is tall in c} and negtall (c) = {u: u is not tall in c} 
 
Gradable adjectives can be modified by various degree adverbs that denote a family of 
degree functions specifying how exactly partitioning is to be done. Thus, measure 
modifiers make vague predicates precise in that they turn them into properties holding 
of entities of the particular size, e.g. „six foot‟ maps „tall‟ to a set of entities that are 
equal in length to 6 foot (the sixth element of the standard sequence based on foot), see 
Klein (1980, p. 28). Other modifiers, such as „very‟, „fairly‟, „extremely‟, do not elimi-
nate the extension gap as numerical modifiers but shift the boundary of the positive 
extension in a lexically specified way. For example, „very‟ turns „tall‟ into a new 
vague predicate that is like the original one except for the contextual comparison class 
with respect to which it is evaluated. The comparison class is set to the positive exten-
sion of „tall‟ in the given context, see (22). 
 
(22) a. For any context c: c[X] is that context c′ just like c except that the compari-
son class in c′ is X. 
 b. ⟦ very⟧  = λc λKc(et) λx K(c[X])(x), where X = {u: K(c)(u) = 1} 
Klein (1980, p. 42) 
 
The comparative and the equative introduce quantification over degree functions and 
like numerical modifiers remove reference to the norm in the given context. For exam-
ple, the comparative maps the vague predicate „tall‟ in (1b) to a new predicate that is 
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true of Tony iff there is at least one degree function that makes „tall‟ true of Tony and 
false of Jimmy. The equative is a universal quantifier over degree functions. 
Though successful and simple in accounting for the meaning of positive sentences and 
sentences with vague degree adverbs, this approach as it stands does not explain the 
norm-related readings of the comparative or the equative. However, the theory is tech-
nically equipped enough to offer us a means for deriving such readings. One such way 
is mentioned by van Rooij (2008, fn. 9), where he proposes to introduce a new class of 
operators that quantify over a restricted set of degree functions. For example, (1b) can 
be analysed as in (23a), according to which both Tony and Jimmy are tall in c. 
 
(23) a. f  F* [f(⟦ tall⟧ )(c)(Tony) ∧ ((NEG(f)(⟦ tall⟧ ))(c)(Jimmy)] 
 b. F* = {f: (f(⟦ tall⟧ ))(c) ⊆ ⟦ tall⟧ (c)}
 c. NEG = λf λP λc (⟦ tall⟧ (c ) − (f(⟦ tall⟧ ))(c)) 
 
However, this proposal does not address the distribution of the norm-related readings. 
In general, a vague predicate analysis as developed in Klein neither can explain why 
the polarity of an adjective may be decisive in this respect nor can it offer any explana-
tion for the contrast between Russian and English with respect to norm-relatedness. 
Another problem is the ban on numerical modifiers under the norm-related interpreta-
tion. If differential measure phrases can be integrated into this kind of analysis, see 
Klein (1991), there is nothing in the theory that would prevent their occurrence in the 
norm-related cases. The same can be said about the ratio modifiers in the equative and 
the contrast in (17a). 
 
3.2 Degrees 
Degree theories assume that gradable adjectives make use of scales formed from ab-
stract entities called degrees. Degrees are usually defined in the style of Cresswell 
(1976) as equivalence classes of individuals, see (24). The ontology is enriched to in-
clude the semantic type of degrees and the denotation domain of this type, (25a-b). 
 
(24) a. Let ≻tall be the empirically given relation “taller than” and F(>tall) its field.  
xe, ye  F(≻tall): y =tall x iff  
ze  F(≻tall): [y ≻tall z iff x ≻tall z] ∧ [z ≻tall y iff z ≻tall x] 
 b. A „tallness‟ degree: 
[u]tall ⊆ De =: {xe: ye ≠ x ∧ y  [u]tall → y =tall x} 
 c. Ordering on „tallness‟ degrees: 
Let Dtall be the set of tallness degrees. 
d, d′  Dtall : d >tall d′ iff x  d, y  d′ x ≻tall y 
 
(25) a. Let d be the semantic type of degrees. 
 b. Let Dd consist of disjoint sets of degrees of various sorts. 
 c. Call each pair ⟨ X, ≻⟩ , s.t. X ⊆ Dd and ≻ is the ordering on X, a scale. 
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One of the ways to conceive predicates like „tall‟ and „short‟ in a degree approach is as 
relations between individuals and degrees that use measure functions of the respective 
sort. A measure function maps an individual to its equivalence class based on some 
property, e.g. HEIGHT defined in (26c) maps an individual to its height. 
 
(26) a. ⟦ tall⟧  = λdd  F(>tall) λxe HEIGHT (x) = d 
 b. ⟦ short⟧  = λdd  F(>short) λxe HEIGHT (x) = d
2
 
 c.   HEIGHT = λx. ɩd: d  Dtall ∧ x  d 
 
In this setup, in the LFs of (1a-b) it is assumed that the degree morphemes bind the 
degree argument of „tall‟ and express the relevant type of comparison. The compara-
tive turns the gradable predicate A into a relation that maps a degree d to a property 
that holds of x if x's degree of A-ness exceeds d, see (27a). The positive does not take a 
degree argument but receives the standard-of-comparison value from the context, 
(27b). The analysis of (1b) is sketched in (28a-b). The embedded clause is assumed to 
express a definite degree description. 
 
(27) a. ⟦ COMP⟧ = λAd(et) λdd  F(>R) λxe   ɩd′(A(d′)(x)) >R d 
 b. ⟦ POSC⟧ = λAd(et) λxe   ɩd′(A(d′)(x)) >R g(C) 
 
(28) a. Tony [[COMP taller] [DEF λd Jimmy d tall]] 
 b. HEIGHT(Tony) >tall HEIGHT(Jimmy) 
 
If we pursue this approach to comparatives, the interpretation of subdeletion examples 
like (29a) is not so straightforward. The two degrees that are to be compared here form 
different scales and cannot be directly related to each other. This kind of comparatives 
could be analysed as involving an additional step, namely, that of mapping the result-
ing degrees to real numbers. Let NUM be a function that maps a unit of measurement 
and a degree to the real number that corresponds to the number of times the unit must 
be concatenated with itself to form the abstract object representing the degree. We can 
now define a number-relating comparative morpheme that is applied if the conven-
tional one in (27) fails to compare the two degrees, see (29c-e). 
 
(29) a. The desk is higher than the door is wide. 
 b. HEIGHT(the desk) >? WIDTH(the door) (undefined!) 
 c. ⟦ COMPnum⟧  = λA λn λx NUM(u)(ɩd′A(d′)(x)) >R n, 
where >R is „>‟ or „<‟ ordering on real numbers
3
. 
 d. the desk [[COMP
num
 higher] [NUM λd the door d wide]] 
 e. NUM(u)(HEIGHT(the desk)) > NUM(u)(WIDTH(the door)) 
                                                 
2
 We presuppose that the equivalence classes base on the relations ≻tall and ≻short are identical and 
therefore the degrees of tallness are not distinguishable from the degrees of shortness, hence the use of 
the same measure function in the defintion of „tall‟ and „short‟. 
3
 We make the assumption that ‟<‟ is employed to compare two numbers if the adjective argument of the 
number-relating comparative operator is an A–. 
284 Sveta Krasikova 
 
NUM would then also be at work in the interpretation of measure phrases. Differential 
measure phrases like „by 5 cm‟ in (30a) specify the distance between the numbers that 
NUM maps each of the compared degrees and the measure unit to, see (30b-c). The 
measure phrase „1.80 m‟ in (31a) has a different function. It points to a degree of the 
appropriate type that is directly fed into the adjective meaning to yield a statement 
about Jimmy‟s height. Let us assume that the mapping of a number and a unit to a de-
gree is performed by the operator EQ as shown in (31b-c). 
 
(30) a. Tony is taller than Jimmy by 5 cm. 
 b. ⟦ by 5 cm⟧  = λR λAd(et) λdd λxe R(A)(d)(x) ∧ DIFF(d, ɩd′(A(d′)(x)), cm) = 5 
 c. d, d′  Dd, : DIFF(d, d′, u) = |NUM(u)(d) – NUM(u)(d′)| 
 
(31) a. Jimmy is 1.80 m tall. 
 b. Jimmy [[EQ 1.80 m] tall] 
 c. ⟦ EQ 1.80 meter⟧  = ɩd(NUM(meter)(d) = 1.80) 
 
The equative sentence in (32) can be assumed to have the same structure as the meas-
ure phrase construction in (31a) except that the degree argument of „tall‟ is not created 
by the EQ operator from a number and a unit but is referentially linked to the correla-
tive phrase. In many languages, including Russian, the correlate in the main clause 
may surface as a pronoun, e.g. in (4). 
 
(32) Tony is as tall as Pat. 
 
Interestingly, this analysis when applied to the English data we discussed in section 2 
makes the obligatorily norm-related environments look distinct from the ones where 
this inference can be cancelled. Their distinct characteristic is that in they do not dis-
tinguish truth-conditionally between the sentences with A+ and A–. This observation 
was first made in Rett (2008) for „how‟ questions and equatives. Indeed, under the 
assumption that antonymous degrees refer to the same equivalence classes, see foot-
note 2, the equative in (33) and the „how‟ question in (34) end up having the same ex-
tension in the A+ and the A– case. 
(33) a. The desk is as wide/narrow as the doorway. 
 b. WIDTH(the desk) = WIDTH(the doorway) 
 
(34) a. How wide/narrow is the desk? 
 b. {p: d p = λw WIDTH(the desk) = d} 
 
Note that the measure phrase construction and the subdeletion comparatives, repeated 
in (35) and (36), reveal this property too. In the subdeletion case, we are forced to ap-
ply the number-relating comparative. This renders the pairs in (36a) and (36c) differ-
ing only in the polarity of the embedded predicate truth-conditionally equivalent. 
 
(35) a. The desk is 70 cm wide/*narrow. 
 b. WIDTH(the desk) = ɩd(NUM(cm)(d) = 70) 
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(36) a. The doorway is higher than the desk is wide/??narrow. 
 b. NUM(u)(HEIGHT(the doorway)) > NUM(u)(WIDTH(the desk)) 
 c. The doorway is lower than the desk is wide/narrow. 
 d. NUM(u)(HEIGHT(the doorway)) < NUM(u)(WIDTH(the desk)) 
 
One can follow the strategy developed in Rett (2008) and assume that the process of 
semantic competition between the marked A– and unmarked A+ forces us in these 
cases to parse the sentences with A– as involving a positive morpheme that she calls 
EVAL and defines as an optional degree modifier. For example, in (37) EVAL would 
restrict the degree set it attaches to include only degrees that exceed the contextual 
standard for narrowness. As a result, the answer to (37a) has to be norm-related. 
 
(37) a. How narrow is the desk? 
 b. how ? [EVAL [λd the dest d narrow]] 
 c. {p: d p = λw WIDTH(the desk) = d & d > g(C)} 
 
However, this approach does not attempt and, for that matter, cannot give us an answer 
to the question why measure phrases are incompatible with the norm-related interpre-
tation. What is worse it makes an absurd prediction that the measure phrase construc-
tion is optionally norm-related and therefore (31a) can be false if Jimmy‟s height, 1.80 
m, does not exceed the contextual standard of tallness, cf. (38). 
 
(38) HEIGHT(Jimmy) = ɩd(NUM(meter)(d) = 1.80) & d > g(C) 
 
In general, degree based theories are inept to handle the norm-related comparison. Ac-
cording to the standard approach, pursued in Bierwisch (1989) and taken up in 
Kennedy (1997), norm-related comparatives or comparatives of deviation relate the 
degrees of deviation from the contextual norm(s). It is clear that such deviation degrees 
can be only obtained by applying the distance function to two numbers, which is ex-
actly what we want to avoid in order to account for the ban on numerical expressions 
in the norm-related contexts. 
 
4 Proposal 
We want to make use of the obvious advantage of the degree analysis outlined in sec-
tion 3.2, namely its ability to distinguish the obligatorily norm-related environments 
from the others. At the same time, we do not want to inherit its problems in dealing 
with measure modifiers in the norm-related contexts. This brings us to the lexical am-
biguity hypothesis. Let us assume that gradable adjectives are ambiguous between the 
vague predicate and the scalar meaning. The vague predicate meaning is responsible 
for the norm-relatedness. The analysis of numerical expressions is based on degrees as 
proposed in 3.2 and so they are allowed to occur only in the scalar meaning contexts. It 
remains to spell out the factors that determine when which meaning is selected. 
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4.1 Degree Morphology: The Case of Russian 
The empirical pattern that we observe in Russian, see section 2.1, suggests that the 
choice of the scalar meaning for a gradable adjective is triggered by the comparative 
morphology. We propose the following rule for Russian: 
 
(39) The scalar meaning of a gradable predicate must be licensed by the degree mor-
phology. 
 
The consequence of (39) is that all comparative constructions in Russian, except for 
the synthetic comparative, employ the vague predicate meanings of gradable adjec-
tives. We are faced with deriving the norm-related interpretations in the vague predi-
cate approach. We propose that the correlate „такая‟/„that‟ in the main clause of a Rus-
sian equative construction, e.g. in (4), does not refer to a degree but to a degree func-
tion, see (40b). Recall that the expressions denoting degree functions now exclude the 
numerical modifiers that neutralise norm-relatedness. Since the role of degree func-
tions is to fix the comparison class parameter in a given context, (40a) can serve as a 
paraphrase for the meaning of (4) under this analysis. 
 
(40) a. Katja is tall with respect to the same comparison class with respect to which 
Larissa is tall. 
 b. ɩ f (f(⟦ tall⟧ )(c)(Katja)) = ɩ f (f(⟦ tall⟧ )(c)(Larissa)) 
 
One prediction of the analysis in (40) is that (4) can be truthfully uttered in a situation 
in which Katja‟s and Larissa‟s heights are not equal. (4) is predicted to only convey 
that Katja and Larissa are both tall with respect to the same standard of tallness. The 
inappropriateness of B‟s remark in (41) indicates that this is indeed the case. 
 
(41) A: Катя довольно высокая. Она еще выше Ларисы. 
  Katja rather tall she even tall-er Larissa 
 B: *Она не выше, а такая же высокая. 
  she neg tall-er but that emph. tall 
 „A: Katja is rather tall. She is even taller than Larissa. 
 B:  She is not taller but as tall as Larissa.‟ 
 
While the equative construction involves a reference to a degree function, the analytic 
comparative expresses comparison of degree functions. To implement this idea we 
need to define an ordering on degree functions. Assume that vague degree adverbs 
form a natural scale of the kind shown in (42). The comparative in (8b) repeated below 
as (43a) does not compare the degrees of tallness as its synthetic counterpart in (8a) 
but the degree functions that specify the comparison class with respect to which the 
subject and the object are asserted to be tall (43b-c). 
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(42) somewhat < … < very < … < extremely 
 
(43) a. Катя более высокая, чем Сергей. 
  Katja more tall than Sergej 
 b. Katja [[COMP tall] [DEF λf Sergej f tall]] 
 c. ɩ f(f(⟦ tall⟧ (c)(Katja)) > ɩ f(f(⟦ tall⟧ (c)(Katja)) 
 
For other norm-related constructions like the superlative in (12) and the intensional 
comparison constructions in (10)–(11) we need to specify the interpretation of their 
degree adverbs. Roughly, the superlative „самый‟/„most‟ that also uses the lexical 
scale in (42) requires that the degree function that makes the adjective true of the 
subject is ranked higher than the degree functions that make other individual in the 
given comparison class true of the adjective. The intensional adverbs „слишком‟/„too‟ 
and „достаточно‟/„enough‟ restricts the comparison class to include only those 
individuals that make the modalised statement of the embedded clause false and true 
respectively. In (10a), the extension of „достаточно высокая‟/„tall enough‟ in the 
given context is the set of individuals who are tall and can reach the shelf. 
To sum up, Russian does not exploit the scalar meaning of gradable adjectives unless 
they are morphologically marked for comparison. We proposed to pursue a Klein‟s 
style approach to interpret the indirect comparison constructions and showed that their 
meaning can be derived by manipulating the comparison classes. 
 
4.2 Semantic Competition: The Case of English 
In contrast to Russian, resolving the ambiguity of an English adjective does not depend 
on the degree morphology but on its polarity. We believe that the markedness of A– 
with respect to their A+ counterparts and the process of semantic competition are at 
stake here. If assume that A– are marked4 the process of semantic competition can be 
described as follows: 
 
(44) If two degree constructions X(A–) and X(A+) are truth-conditionally 
equivalent and the speaker utters the marked X(A–) then she had a  
reason to do so, namely to employ the meaning of A– that renders  
X(A–) and X(A+) non-synonymous. 
 
This line of reasoning as well as the fact that NUM is defined on degrees and cannot be 
applied to vague predicates accounts for the subdeletion paradigm we considered 
above. Recall that the comparative fails to relate two degrees if they are the values of 
different measure functions. The number-relating comparative can remove the problem 
by mapping the resulting degrees to the real numbers. This is what happens in (45a) 
and (45c). If the embedded clause features a marked A– as in (45b) and (45d) the rea-
                                                 
4
 This assumption can most probably get independent empirical support from language acquisition or 
processing. 
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soning in (44) can be applied since these two examples come out equivalent with (45a) 
and (45c) respectively as we showed in (36). As a result, the vague predicate meaning 
is selected and only the indirect comparison analysis along the lines we outlined in the 
previous section is possible. The reduced acceptability of these examples, as noted in 
Bierwisch (1989), corresponds to the fact that the assignment of the norm-related read-
ing is a kind of re-interpretation strategy. 
 
(45) a. The doorway is higher than the desk is wide. 
 b. ??The doorway is higher than the desk is narrow. 
 c. ?The doorway is lower than the desk is wide. 
 d. ?The doorway is lower than the desk is narrow. 
 
Another welcome prediction of our proposal is the unacceptability of ratio modifiers 
with A– equatives and the A– measure phrase construction in (35). Assuming „twice‟ 
has the semantics in (46), it cannot apply in (33) where the scalar meaning of A– is 
banned. For the same reason, EQ is undefined in the A– variant of (35). The subdele-
tion equatives in (47) require the accommodation to numbers step. Obviously, the in-
sertion of NUM is blocked in the process of semantic competition if one of the adjec-
tives is A–. 
 
(46) ⟦ twice⟧  = λd ɩd′ (2 *NUM(u)(d) = d′) 
 
(47) The desk is twice as wide/*narrow as the doorway is high/*low. 
 
To conclude, the assumption that A– are marked and enter the process of semantic 
competition with their positive pole counterparts correctly predicts the distribution of 
direct comparison readings and measure phrases in English. 
 
5 Conclusion 
We propose that gradable predicates are lexically ambiguous. Norm-relatedness is the 
result of preferring the vague predicate meaning of a gradable predicate to the scalar 
one. In English, the polarity of the adjective and the process of semantic competition 
govern the selection of the meaning. In Russian, only degree morphology can license 
the scalar meaning. This strategy has proved successful in explaining some puzzling 
and so far unresolved asymmetries in the distribution of antonyms and handling the 
cross-linguistic variation in the distribution of norm-relatedness. The two patterns that 
we observe in Russian and English do not have to be exhaustive. We would expect 
languages to vary in how often and under which conditions they employ the scalar 
meaning. 
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